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
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THE EASTERN QUESTION

THE EASTERN QUESTION

A Reprint of Letters written 1853-1856 dealing
with the events of the Crimean War

BY
KARL MARX

Edited by
ELEANOR MARX AVELING
AND
EDWARD AVELING, D.Sc. (LOND.)



London
SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO. LIM^d
PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1897
D

Washington, has an interesting and special bearing upon the leaders written by Marx :

" You see the TRIBUNE has again appropriated a leader ; this would be right enough, because it attracts special attention, if only K. M. were printed below it. I believe, too, that they would do this, if it were not against their rules and habits. And, after all, it doesn't harm you much either, for the careful reader can see that it wasn't written by the editorial staff. . . .

" WASHINGTON.

" 23/24 October, 1853."

From personal knowledge we can state that many of Marx' letters were used, and printed by the TRIBUNE, as leaders, although Marx had originally written them as correspondence. Upon other occasions, he, of purpose, wrote articles which were intended to be leaders, and in these he naturally wrote in a somewhat different form from that used in his signed correspondence. In several cases where his correspondence has been turned into leaders, a few words of addition and interpolation have been written in by the American editors, to keep up journalistic appearances. (See, for example, pp. 188, 190, 222, and especially the end of p. 193.)

Apparently also, on more than one occasion, ideas or actual passages from letters of Marx were used and written round by the American journalists. This has made the task of selection very difficult, and has certainly, in one case at least, led to the inclusion (see CI.) of an article, the major part of which could not have been written by Marx.

Whilst there may be one or two authentic contributions of his that have been missed, we have designedly left out several of a purely technical military character. On the other hand, we have included certain military articles bearing very directly on the war. Most, if not all, of these were either written by Engels, or grew out of letters from him to Marx.

Marx on several occasions has stated, in writing, the fact that he wrote leaders, as well as letters, for the TRIBUNE, *e.g.*,

in "Herr Vogt" (see Preface to *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, p. ix.). And in a short biographical note, written at his dictation, he says: "A regular collaborator on the TRIBUNE up to the beginning of the American Civil War, writing not only the English correspondence signed with his name, but a mass of leading articles on the European and Asiatic movement."

In one or two cases it would appear that part of his letter was used as a leader, and the rest left in the letter form. Hence, in these one or two cases, the reader will find the leader and the letter bearing the same newspaper date.

The volume ends with four papers on the fall of Kars. These, in substance, appeared in the NEW YORK TRIBUNE. They appeared in the form in which they are now given, in Ernest Jones' *People's Paper*, for which Marx enlarged and revised them. And a summary of these four Kars papers was made by their author for the *Free Press*. This summary is not printed in the present volume. These Kars articles produced at the time a very remarkable sensation, and were the immediate cause of a vote of thanks from the Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee for the "great public service rendered by the admirable exposé."

In the present reprint it has not been thought wise to speak of chapters; so that the letters or leaders are merely numbered in succession. In most cases the letters contained, besides passages dealing with the Eastern Question, passages dealing with other matters. In the present volume all the latter passages are omitted. As a consequence some of the letters appear to be very short. A heading has been given to each of the CXIII. divisions of the book. These headings correspond generally with the headings in the NEW YORK TRIBUNE, for which probably the American editor was responsible.

All quotations have been printed in smaller type, and all italics in them are those of Marx.

In the original letters there was necessarily a great deal of quotation from newspapers and despatches. In almost all cases *précis* have been made of these quotations, some of

which were of very great length. In the case of the Kars articles, however, all the very important extracts are given in full. These *précis* are printed within square brackets and in italics, so as to distinguish them from actual quotations. Italicised passages in the original are marked off in the *précis* by being printed in small capitals; and whenever, as often happened, Marx has interpolated comments of his own in the quotations, those comments are printed within secondary brackets.

Except in cases where obvious misprints have occurred (it must be remembered that Marx never saw the proofs of his American contributions), no corrections or alterations have been made.

One great difficulty has been the spelling of the names of people and places. In this we have followed the best authorities; there are one or two cases, however, of double spelling.

The volume contains two maps—one of the Balkan Peninsula at the time of the Crimean War; the other of the Balkan Peninsula at the present time.

In compiling the Index, in consequence of the very large number of times that certain names recur, it has only been found possible, in such cases, to give the page where the name first occurs.

This volume will, we think, be found of especial use at the present time. The ever-recurring Eastern Question has entered upon another phase. During the last forty years the conditions, geographical, historical, economic, of Europe have changed vastly. Servia, Bulgaria, Roumania, *e.g.*, have become independent States; Alsace-Lorraine has changed hands. The relations between the Great Powers have undergone numberless modifications. Perhaps most important of all, as a factor, has been the growth of Social Democracy. With this, the Continental nations at least have to reckon. One thing, however, has remained constant and persistent: the Russian Government's policy of aggrandizement. The methods may vary—the policy remains the same. To-day the Russian Government, which

is no longer to-day wholly synonymous with Russia, is, as it was in the "fifties," the greatest enemy of all advance, the greatest stronghold of reaction.

Great as these changes have been, nevertheless to understand the present relations of the States of Europe to one another and to the Eastern Question, it is necessary to have a knowledge of those relations in the past. This volume, therefore, is not only of interest and importance as a collection of historical writings, but as throwing a singular light upon what is occurring to-day, and what may occur to-morrow.

Readers of the following papers will probably be especially struck with the immense mass of information contained in them; the remarkable historical acumen shown, and the great power of piercing through the semblance of things to the things themselves; the accuracy with which, in almost every case, events and consequences likely to follow have been foretold. Of course, not all the prophecies have come true, or have been realized in the precise form in which they were made. But the accuracy of them in the main is astonishing. We are tempted to quote one case out of a great number. That which is foretold in No. XCIII., of what would happen if Bonaparte went personally to the war, did actually happen in 1871 when Bonaparte did go personally to the Franco-German war.

Besides the treatment of the Eastern Question and the War, the volume will be found to be of great personal interest. There are many trenchant and plain-speaking descriptions and analyses of prominent men of the time. Among these figure Bonaparte and his riff-raff, especially Marshal St. Arnaud; Lord John Russell ("the little earth-man," as Marx calls him); the "good" Aberdeen; the letter-stealer, Sir James Graham; the Napiers; Gladstone (for whom Marx had a particular loathing); the Russian diplomats; the "prolific father and obsequious husband," Prince Albert.

In all these sketches there comes out, not only Marx' acuteness of observation, but his quite original humour.

His studies and merciless exposure of Palmerston, that ought once for all to dispel the popular illusion that Palmerston was an enemy of Russia, are of the greatest importance. So many letters and articles are devoted to the account of this "charlatan," that exigencies of space have compelled the omission of a whole series called "The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston." This series, with another on the "Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century," together with some more character sketches, will, it is hoped, be published at an early date.

Our heartiest thanks are due to Mr. C. D. Collett, and to Mr. Seddon, of the Free Reference Library, Manchester, for their help and kindness. And the exceedingly difficult task of selecting, collating, analysing, the enormous mass of letters and articles would have been almost impossible but for the unvarying courtesy and ready assistance of the officials in the Reading Room, the Large Room, and the Newspaper Room of the British Museum. We are especially glad of this opportunity of thanking the British Museum officers, as it had been the intention of Marx, who read there for some thirty years, to make public acknowledgment of the ready assistance always given, and especially of the invaluable services rendered to him in his work for so many years by Dr. Richard Garnett.

ELEANOR MARX AVELING.
EDWARD AVELING.

SYDENHAM,

8th July, 1897.

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I

Turkey

LONDON, *March 22, 1853*

N. Y. T., April 7, 1853

PRINCE MENTSCHIKOFF, after reviewing the Russian forces stationed in the Danubian Principalities, and after an inspection of the army and fleet at Sebastopol, where he caused manœuvres of embarking and disembarking troops to be executed under his own eyes, entered Constantinople in the most theatrical style on February 28, attended by a suite of twelve persons, including the Admiral of the Russian squadron in the Black Sea, a General of Division, and several staff officers, with Count Nesselrode, junr., as Secretary of the Embassy. He met with such a reception from the Greek and Russian inhabitants as if he were the orthodox Czar himself entering *Czarigrad* to restore it to the true faith. An enormous sensation was created here and at Paris by the news that Prince Mentschikoff, not satisfied with the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, had demanded that the Sultan should abandon to the Emperor of Russia not only the protection of all the Christians in Turkey, but also the right of nominating the Greek Patriarch; that the Sultan had appealed to the protection of England and France; that Colonel Rose, the British Envoy, had despatched the steamer *Wasp* in haste to Malta to request the immediate presence of the English fleet in the Archipelago, and that Russian vessels had anchored at Kili, near the

Bosphorus. The Paris *Moniteur* informs us that the French squadron at Toulon has been ordered to the Grecian waters. Admiral Dundas, however, is still at Malta. From all this it is evident that the Eastern Question is once more on the European "*ordre du jour*," a fact not astonishing for those who are acquainted with history.

Whenever the revolutionary hurricane has subsided for a moment, one ever-recurring question is sure to turn up: the eternal "*Eastern Question*." Thus, when the storms of the first French Revolution had passed, and Napoleon and Alexander of Russia had divided, after the peace of Tilsit, the whole of Continental Europe between themselves, Alexander profited by the momentary calm to march an army into Turkey, and to "give a lift" to the forces that were breaking up, from within, that decaying empire. Again, no sooner had the revolutionary movements of Western Europe been quelled by the Congresses of Laibach and Verona, than Alexander's successor, Nicholas, made another dash at Turkey. When, a few years later, the revolution of July, with its concomitant insurrections in Poland, Italy, Belgium, had had its turn, and Europe, as re-modelled in 1831, seemed out of the reach of domestic squalls, the Eastern Question in 1840 appeared on the point of embroiling the "great Powers" in a general war. And now, when the shortsightedness of the ruling pigmies prides itself on having successfully freed Europe from the dangers of anarchy and revolution, up starts again the everlasting topic, the never-failing difficulty: What shall we do with Turkey?

Turkey is the living sore of European legitimacy. (The impotency of legitimate, monarchical government, ever since the first French Revolution, has resumed itself in the one axiom: Keep up the *status quo*. A *testimonium paupertatis*, an acknowledgment of the universal incompetence of the ruling powers, for any purpose of progress or civilization, is seen in this universal agreement to stick to things as by chance or accident they happen to be. Napoleon could dispose of a whole continent at a moment's notice; aye, and dispose of it, too, in a manner that showed both

genius and fixedness of purpose. The entire "collective wisdom" of European legitimacy, assembled in Congress at Vienna, took a couple of years to do the same job; got at loggerheads over it, made a very sad mess indeed of it, and found it such a dreadful bore that ever since they have had enough of it, and have never tried their hands again at parcelling out Europe. Myrmidons of mediocrity, as Béranger calls them; without historical knowledge or insight into facts, without ideas, without initiative, they adore the *status quo* they themselves have bungled together, knowing what a bungling and blundering piece of workmanship it is.

But Turkey no more than the rest of the world remains stationary; and just when the reactionary party has succeeded in restoring in civilized Europe what they consider to be the *status quo ante*, it is perceived that in the meantime the *status quo* in Turkey has been very much altered; that new questions, new relations, new interests have sprung up, and that the poor diplomatists have to begin again where they were interrupted by a general earthquake some eight or ten years before. Keep up the *status quo* in Turkey! Why, you might as well try to keep up the precise degree of putridity into which the carcass of a dead horse has passed at a given time, before dissolution is complete. Turkey goes on decaying, and will go on decaying as long as the present system of "balance of power" and maintenance of the *status quo* goes on; and in spite of congresses, protocols and ultimatums it will produce its yearly quota of diplomatic difficulties and international squabbles quite as every other putrid body will supply the neighbourhood with a due allowance of carburetted hydrogen and other well-scented gaseous matter.

Let us look at the question at once. Turkey consists of three entirely distinct portions: the vassal principalities of Africa, viz., Egypt and Tunis; Asiatic Turkey; and European Turkey. The African possessions, of which Egypt alone may be considered as really subject to the Sultan, may be left for the moment out of the question. Egypt belongs more to the English than to anybody else,

and will and must necessarily form their share in any future partition of Turkey. Asiatic Turkey is the real seat of whatever strength there is in the empire; Asia Minor and Armenia, for four hundred years the chief abode of the Turks, form the reserved ground from which the Turkish armies have been drawn, from those that threatened the ramparts of Vienna, to those that dispersed before Diebitsch's not very skilful manœuvres at Kulewtscha. Turkey in Asia, although thinly populated, yet forms too compact a mass of Mussulman fanaticism and Turkish nationality to invite at present any attempts at conquest; and, in fact, whenever the "Eastern Question" is mooted, the only portions of this territory taken into consideration are Palestine and the Christian valleys of the Lebanon.

The real point at issue always is, Turkey in Europe—the great peninsula to the south of the Save and Danube. This splendid territory has the misfortune to be inhabited by a conglomerate of different races and nationalities, of which it is hard to say which is the least fit for progress and civilization. Slavonians, Greeks, Wallachians, Arnauts, twelve millions of men, are all held in submission by one million of Turks, and up to a recent period it appeared doubtful whether, of all these different races, the Turks were not the most competent to hold the supremacy which, in such a mixed population, could not but accrue to one of these nationalities. But when we see how lamentably have failed all the attempts at civilization by Turkish authority—how the fanaticism of Islam, supported principally by the Turkish mob in a few great cities, has availed itself of the assistance of Austria and Russia invariably to regain power and to overturn any progress that might have been made; when we see the central, *i.e.* Turkish, authority weakened year after year by insurrections in the Christian provinces, none of which, thanks to the weakness of the Porte and to the intervention of neighbouring States, is ever completely fruitless; when we see Greece acquire her independence, parts of Armenia conquered by Russia,—Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, successively placed under the protectorate of

the latter power,—we shall be obliged to admit that the presence of the Turks in Europe is a real obstacle to the development of the resources of the Thraco-Illyrian Peninsula.

We can hardly describe the Turks as the *ruling class* of Turkey, because the relations of the different classes of society there are as much mixed up as those of the various races. The Turk is, according to localities and circumstances, workman, farmer, small freeholder, trader, feudal landlord in the lowest and most barbaric stage of feudalism, civil officer, or soldier; but in all these different social positions he belongs to the privileged creed and nation—he alone has the right to carry arms, and the highest Christian has to give up the footpath to the lowest Moslem he meets. In Bosnia and the Herzegovina, the nobility, of Slavonian descent, have passed over to Islam, while the mass of the people remain Rayahs, *i.e.* Christians. In this province, then, the ruling creed and the ruling class are identified, as of course the Moslem Bosnian is upon a level with his co-religionist of Turkish descent.

The principal power of the Turkish population in Europe, independently of the reserve always ready to be drawn from Asia, lies in the mob of Constantinople and a few other large towns. It is essentially Turkish, and though it finds its principal livelihood by doing jobs for Christian capitalists, it maintains with great jealousy the imaginary superiority and real impunity for excesses which the privileges of Islam confer upon it as compared with Christians. It is well known that this mob in every important *coup d'état* has to be won over by bribes and flattery. It is this mob alone, with the exception of a few colonized districts, which offers a compact and imposing mass of Turkish population in Europe. And certainly there will be, sooner or later, an absolute necessity for freeing one of the finest parts of this continent from the rule of a mob, compared with which the mob of Imperial Rome was an assemblage of sages and heroes.

Among the other nationalities, we may dispose in a very

few words of the Arnauts, a hardy aboriginal mountain people, inhabiting the country sloping toward the Adriatic, speaking a language of their own, which, however, appears to belong to the great Indo-European stock. They are partly Greek Christians, partly Moslems, and, according to all we know of them, as yet very unprepared for civilization. Their predatory habits will force any neighbouring Government to hold them in close military subjection, until industrial progress in the surrounding districts shall find them employment as hewers of wood and drawers of water; the same as has been the case with the Gallegas in Spain, and the inhabitants of mountainous districts generally.

The Wallachians or Daco-Romans, the chief inhabitants of the district between the Lower Danube and the Dniester, are a greatly mixed population, belonging to the Greek Church and speaking a language derived from the Latin, and in many respects not unlike the Italian. Those of Transylvania and the Bukowina belong to the Austrian, those of Bessarabia to the Russian Empire; those of Moldavia and Wallachia, the only two principalities where the Daco-Roman race has acquired a political existence, have princes of their own, under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte and the real dominion of Russia. Of the Transylvanian Wallachians, we heard much during the Hungarian War; hitherto oppressed by the feudalism of Hungarian landlords who were, according to the Austrian system, made at the same time the instruments of all Government exactions, this brutalized mass was, in like manner as the Ruthenian serfs of Galicia in 1846, won over by Austrian promises and bribes, and began that war of devastation which has made a desert of Transylvania. The Daco-Romans of the Turkish Principalities have at least a native nobility and political institutions; and in spite of all the efforts of Russia, the revolutionary spirit has penetrated among them, as the insurrection of 1848 well proved. There can hardly be a doubt that the exactions and hardships inflicted upon them during the Russian occupation since 1848 must have raised this spirit still higher, in spite of the

bond of common religion and Czaro-Popish superstition which has hitherto led them to look upon the Imperial chief of the Greek Church as their natural protector. And if this is the case, the Wallachian nationality may yet play an important part in the ultimate disposal of the territories in question.

The Greeks of Turkey are mostly of Slavonic descent, but have adopted the modern Hellenic language; in fact, with the exception of a few noble families of Constantinople and Trebizond, it is now generally admitted that very little pure Hellenic blood is to be found even in Greece. The Greeks, along with the Jews, are the principal traders in the seaports and many inland towns. They are also tillers of the soil in some districts. In all cases, neither their number, compactness, nor spirit of nationality, gives them any political weight as a nation, except in Thessaly and perhaps Epirus. The influence held by a few noble Greek families as dragomans (interpreters) in Constantinople is fast declining, since Turks have been educated in Europe, and European legations have been provided with attachés who speak Turkish.

We now come to the race that forms the great mass of the population and whose blood is preponderant wherever a mixture of races has occurred. In fact, it may be said to form the principal stock of the Christian population from the Morea to the Danube, and from the Black Sea to the Arnaut Mountains. This race is the Slavonic race, and more particularly that branch of it which is resumed under the name of Illyrian (Ilirski), or South Slavonian (Yugoslavvanski). After the Western Slavonian (Polish and Bohemian), and Eastern Slavonian (Russian), it forms the third branch of that numerous Slavonic family which for the last twelve hundred years has occupied the East of Europe. These southern Slavonians occupy not only the greater part of Turkey, but also Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia and the south of Hungary. They all speak the same language, which is much akin to the Russian, and by far, to Western ears, the most musical of all Slavonic tongues. The Croatians and part of

the Dalmatians are Roman Catholics; all the remainder belong to the Greek Church. The Roman Catholics use the Latin alphabet, but the followers of the Greek Church write their language in the Cyrillian character, which is also used in the Russian and old Slavonic or Church language. This circumstance, combined with the difference of religion, has contributed to retard any national development embracing the whole South Slavonic territory. A man in Belgrade may not be able to read a book printed in his own language at Agram or Petch, he may object even to take it up, on account of the "heterodox" alphabet and orthography used therein; while he will have little difficulty in reading and understanding a book printed at Moscow in the Russian language, because the two idioms, particularly in the old Slavonic etymological system of orthography, look very much alike, and because the book is printed in the "orthodox" (pravoslavni) alphabet. The mass of the Greek Slavonians will not even have their Bible, liturgies, and prayer-books printed in their own country, because they are convinced that there is a peculiar correctness and orthodoxy and odour of sanctity about anything printed in holy Moscow or in the imperial printing establishment of St. Petersburg. In spite of all the panslavistic efforts of Agram and Prague enthusiasts, the Servian, the Bulgarian, the Bosnian Rayah, the Slavonian peasant of Macedonia and Thracia, has more national sympathy, more points of contact, more means of intellectual intercourse with the Russian than with the Roman Catholic South Slavonian who speaks the same language. Whatever may happen, he looks to St. Petersburg for the advent of the Messiah who is to deliver him from all evil; and if he calls Constantinople his *Czarigrad*, or Imperial City, it is as much in anticipation of the orthodox Czar coming from the north and entering it to restore the true faith, as in recollection of the orthodox Czar who held it before the Turks overran the country.

Subjected in the greater part of Turkey to the direct rule of the Turk, but under local authorities of their own

choice, partly (in Bosnia) converted to the faith of the conqueror, the Slavonian race has, in that country, maintained or conquered political existence in two localities. The one is Serbia, the valley of the Morava, a province with well-defined natural lines of frontier, which played an important part in the history of these regions six hundred years ago. Subdued for a while by the Turks, the Russian War of 1809 gave it a chance of obtaining a separate existence, though under the Turkish supremacy. It has remained ever since under the immediate protection of Russia. But, as in Moldavia and Wallachia, political existence has brought on new wants, and forced upon Serbia an increased intercourse with Western Europe. Civilization began to take root, trade extended, new ideas sprang up, and thus we find in the very heart and stronghold of Russian influence, in Slavonic or orthodox Serbia, an anti-Russian Progressive party (of course very modest in its demands of reform), headed by the ex-Minister of Finances, Garaschanin.

There is no doubt that, should the Greco-Slavonian population ever obtain the mastery in the land which it inhabits, and where it forms three-fourths of the whole population (seven millions), the same necessities would by-and-by give birth to an anti-Russian Progressive party, the existence of which has been hitherto the inevitable consequence of any portion of it having become semi-detached from Turkey.

In Montenegro we have not a fertile valley with comparatively large cities, but a barren mountain country difficult of access. Here a set of robbers have fixed themselves, scouring the plains, and storing their plunder in their mountain fastnesses. These romantic but rather uncouth gentlemen have long been a nuisance in Europe, and it is but in keeping with the policy of Russia and Austria that they should stick up for the rights of the Black Mountain people (Tserno-Gorgi) to burn down villages, burn the inhabitants, and carry off the cattle.

II

The London Press—Policy of Napoleon on the Turkish Question

LONDON, *March 25, 1853*
N. Y. T., *April 11, 1853*

UNTIL this morning no further authentic news has been received from Turkey. The Paris correspondent of *The Morning Herald* of to-day asserts that he has been informed by a responsible authority that the Russians have entered Bucharest. In the *Courier de Marseilles* of the 20th inst. we read :

[*Note from Russia to Turkey, inviting Turkey to recognise independence of Montenegro, protesting against blockade of Albanian coast, pressing for dismissal of ministers. First point refused. Arrival of Mentschikoff. Appeal of Turkey to England and France.*]

In ancient Greece an orator who was paid to remain silent was said to have an *ox on his tongue*. The *ox*, be it remarked, was a silver coin imported from Egypt. With regard to *The Times*, we may say that, during the whole period of the revived Eastern Question, it had also an *ox on its tongue*, if not for remaining silent, at least for speaking. At first, this ingenious paper defended the Austrian intervention in Montenegro on the plea of Christianity. But afterwards, when Russia interfered, it dropped this argument, stating that the whole question was a quarrel between the Greek and Roman Churches, utterly indifferent to the

"subjects" of the Established Church of England. Then it dwelt on the importance of the Turkish commerce for Great Britain, inferring from that very importance that Great Britain could but gain by exchanging Turkish free trade for Russian prohibition and Austrian protection. It next laboured to prove that England was dependent for her food upon Russia, and must, therefore, bow in silence to the geographical ideas of the Czar. A gracious compliment this to the commercial system exalted by *The Times*, and a very pleasant argumentation, that to mitigate England's dependence on Russia the Black Sea had to become a Russian lake, and the Danube a Russian river. Then, driven from these untenable positions, it fell back on the general statement that the Turkish Empire was hopelessly falling to pieces—a conclusive proof this, in the opinion of *The Times*, that Russia presently must become the executor and heir of that Empire. Anon, *The Times* wanted to subject the inhabitants of Turkey to the "pure sway" and civilizing influence of Russia and Austria, remembering the old story that wisdom comes from the East, and forgetting its recent statement that "the state maintained by Austria in the provinces and kingdoms of her own empire was one of arbitrary authority and of executive tyranny, regulated by no laws at all." In conclusion, and this is the strongest bit of impudence, *The Times* congratulates itself on the "brilliancy" of its Eastern leaders!

The whole London Press, Morning Press and Evening Press, Daily Press and Weekly Press rose as one man against the "leading journal." *The Morning Post* mocks at the intelligence of its brethren of *The Times*, whom it accuses of spreading deliberately false and absurd news. *The Morning Herald* calls it "our Hebrao-Austro-Russian contemporary," *The Daily News* more shortly the "Brunnow organ." Its twin brother, *The Morning Chronicle*, heaves at it the following blow: "The journalists who have proposed to surrender the Turkish Empire to Russia, on the score of the commercial eminence of a dozen large Greek firms, are quite right in claiming for themselves the monopoly of

brilliancy!" *The Morning Advertiser* says: "*The Times* is right in stating that it is isolated in its advocacy of Russian interests. . . . It is printed in the English language. But that is the only thing English about it. It is, where Russia is concerned, Russian all over."

There is no doubt that the Russian bear will not draw in his paws unless he be assured of a momentary *entente cordiale* between England and France. Now mark the following wonderful coincidence. On the very day when *The Times* was trying to persuade my lords Aberdeen and Clarendon that the Turkish affair was a mere squabble between France and Russia, the *roi des drôles*, as Guizot used to call him, M. Granier de Cassagnac, happened to discover in the *Constitutionnel* that it was all nothing but a quarrel between Lord Palmerston and the Czar. Truly, when we read these papers, we understand the Greek orators with Macedonian oxen on their tongues at the times when Demosthenes fulminated his Philippics.

As for the British aristocracy, represented by the Coalition Ministry, they would, if need be, sacrifice the national English interests to their particular class interests, and permit the consolidation of a juvenile despotism in the East in the hopes of finding a support for their valetudinarian oligarchy in the West. As to Louis Napoleon, he is hesitating. All his predilections are on the side of the autocrat whose system of governing he has introduced into France; and all his antipathies are against England, whose parliamentary system he has destroyed there. Besides, if he permits the Czar's plundering in the East, the Czar will perhaps permit him to plunder in the West. On the other hand, he is quite sure of the feelings of the Holy Alliance with regard to the "parvenu Khan." Accordingly he observes an ambiguous policy, striving to dupe the great powers of Europe as he duped the parliamentary parties of the French National Assembly. While fraternizing ostentatiously with the English Ambassador for Turkey, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he simultaneously cajoles the Russian Princess de Lieven with the most flattering promises, and

sends to the court of the Sultan M. de la Cour, a warm advocate of an Austro-French alliance, in contradistinction to an Anglo-French one. He orders the Toulon fleet to sail to the Grecian waters, and then announces the day afterward, in the *Moniteur*, that this had been done without any previous communication with England. While he orders one of his organs, the *Pays*, to treat the Eastern Question as most important to France, he allows the statement of his other organ, the *Constitutionnel*, that Russian, Austrian and English interests are at stake in this question, but that France has only a very remote interest in it, and is therefore in a wholly independent position. Which will outbid the other, Russia or England? That is the question with him.

III

The Real Issue in Turkey

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, April 12, 1853

WE are astonished that in the current discussion of the Oriental question the English journals have not more boldly demonstrated the vital interests which should render Great Britain the earnest and unyielding opponent of the Russian projects of annexation and aggrandizement. England cannot afford to allow Russia to become the possessor of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Both commercially and politically such an event would be a deep if not a deadly blow at British power. This will appear from a simple statement of facts as to her trade with Turkey.

Before the discovery of the direct route to India, Constantinople was the mart of an extensive commerce; and now, though the products of India find their way into Europe by the overland route through Persia, Teheran, and Turkey, yet the Turkish ports carry on a very important and rapidly increasing traffic both with Europe and the interior of Asia. To understand this it is only necessary to look at the map. From the Black Forest to the sandy heights of Novgorod Veliki, the whole inland country is drained by rivers flowing into the Black or Caspian Seas. The Danube and the Volga, the two giant rivers of Europe, the Dniester, Dnieper, and Don, all form so many natural channels for the carriage of inland produce to the Black Sea—for the Caspian itself is only accessible through the Black Sea. Two-thirds of Europe—that is, a part of Germany and Poland, all Hungary, and the most fertile parts

of Russia, besides Turkey in Europe—are thus naturally referred to the Euxine for the export and exchange of their produce; and the more so as all these countries are essentially agricultural, and the great bulk of their products must always make water carriage the predominant means of transport. The corn of Hungary, Poland, Southern Russia, the wool and the hides of the same countries, appear in yearly increasing quantities in our Western markets, and they all are shipped at Galatz, Odessa, Taganrog, and other Euxine ports. Then there is another important branch of trade carried on in the Black Sea. Constantinople, and particularly Trebizond, in Asiatic Turkey, are the chief marts of the caravan trade to the interior of Asia, to the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, to Persia and Turkestan. This trade, too, is rapidly increasing. The Greek and Armenian merchants of the two towns just named import large quantities of English manufactured goods, the low price of which is rapidly superseding the domestic industry of the Asiatic harems. Trebizond is better situated for such a trade than any other point. It has in its rear the hills of Armenia, which are far less impassable than the Syrian desert, and it lies at a convenient proximity to Bagdad, Schiraz, and Teheran, which latter place serves as an intermediate mart for the caravans from Khiva and Bokhara. How important this trade, and the Black Sea trade generally, is becoming may be seen at the Manchester Exchange, where dark-complexioned Greek buyers are increasing in numbers and importance, and where Greek and South Slavonian dialects are heard along with German and English.

The trade of Trebizond is also becoming a matter of most serious political consideration, as it has been the means of bringing the interests of Russia and England anew into conflict in inner Asia. The Russians had, up to 1840, an almost exclusive monopoly of the trade in foreign manufactured goods to that region. Russian goods were found to have made their way, and, in some instances, even to be preferred to English goods, as far down as the Indus. Up

to the time of the Afghan War, the conquest of Sindh and the Punjab, it may be safely asserted that the trade of England with inner Asia was nearly nil. The fact is now different. The supreme necessity of a never-ceasing expansion of trade—this *fatum* which spectre-like haunts modern England, and, if not appeased at once, brings on those terrible revulsions which vibrate from New York to Canton, and from St. Petersburg to Sydney—this inflexible necessity has caused the interior of Asia to be attacked from two sides by English trade: from the Indus and from the Black Sea; and although we know very little of the exports of Russia to that part of the world, we may safely conclude from the increase of English exports to that quarter that the Russian trade in that direction must have sensibly fallen off. The commercial battle-field between England and Russia has been removed from the Indus to Trebizond, and the Russian trade, formerly venturing out as far as the limits of England's Eastern Empire, is now reduced to the defensive on the very verge of its own line of custom-houses. The importance of this fact with regard to any future solution of the Eastern Question, and to the part which both England and Russia may take in it, is evident. They are, and always must be, antagonists in the East.

But let us come to a more definite estimate of this Black Sea trade. According to *The London Economist*, the British exports to the Turkish dominions, including Egypt and the Danubian Principalities, were:

In 1840	.	.	.	.	£1,440,592
In 1842	.	.	.	.	2,068,342
In 1844	.	.	.	.	3,271,333
In 1846	.	.	.	.	2,707,571
In 1848	.	.	.	.	3,626,241
In 1850	.	.	.	.	3,762,480
In 1851	.	.	.	.	3,548,595

Of these amounts, at least, two-thirds must have gone to ports in the Black Sea, including Constantinople. And all

this rapidly increasing trade depends upon the confidence that may be placed in the Power which rules the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the keys to the Black Sea. Whoever holds these can open and shut at his pleasure the passage into this last recess of the Mediterranean. Let Russia once come into possession of Constantinople, who will expect her to keep open the door by which England has invaded her commercial domain?

So much for the commercial importance of Turkey, and especially the Dardanelles. It is evident that not only a very large trade, but the principal intercourse of Europe with Central Asia, and, consequently, the principal means of re-civilizing that vast region, depends upon the uninterrupted liberty of trading through these gates to the Black Sea.

Now for the military considerations. The commercial importance of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus at once makes them first-rate military positions; that is, positions of decisive influence in any war. Such a point is Gibraltar, and such is Helsingör on the Sound. But the Dardanelles are, from the nature of their locality, even more important. The cannon of Gibraltar or Helsingör cannot command the whole of the strait on which they are situated, and they require the assistance of a fleet in order to close it; while the narrowness of the strait at the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus is such that a few properly erected and well-armed fortifications, such as Russia, once in possession, would not tarry an hour to erect, might defy the combined fleets of the world if they attempted a passage. In that case, the Black Sea would be more properly a Russian lake than even the Lake of Ladoga, situated in its very heart. The resistance of the Caucasians would be starved out at once; Trebizond would be a Russian port; the Danube a Russian river. Besides, when Constantinople is taken, the Turkish Empire is cut in two. Asiatic and European Turkey have no means of communicating with or supporting each other; and while the strength of the Turkish army, repulsed into Asia, is utterly harmless, Macedonia,

Thessaly, Albania, outflanked and cut off from the main body, will not put the conqueror to the trouble of subduing them; they will have nothing left but to beg for mercy and for an army to maintain internal order.

But having come thus far on the way to universal empire, is it probable that this gigantic and swollen Power will pause in its career? Circumstances, if not her own will, forbid it. With the annexation of Turkey and Greece she has excellent seaports, while the Greeks furnish skilful sailors for her navy. With Constantinople, she stands on the threshold of the Mediterranean; with Durazzo and the Albanian coast from Antivari to Arta, she is in the very centre of the Adriatic; within sight of the British Ionian Islands, and within thirty-six hours' steaming of Malta. Flanking the Austrian dominions on the north, east, and south, Russia will already count the Hapsburgs among her vassals. And then, another question is possible, is even probable. The broken and undulating western frontier of the Empire, ill-defined in respect of natural boundaries, would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Dantzic, or perhaps Stettin, to Trieste. And as sure as conquest follows conquest, and annexation follows annexation, so sure would the conquest of Turkey by Russia be only the prelude for the annexation of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and for the ultimate realization of the Slavonic Empire which certain fanatical Pan Slavistic philosophers have dreamed of.

Russia is decidedly a conquering nation, and was so for a century, until the great movement of 1789 called into potent activity an antagonist of formidable nature. We mean the European Revolution, the explosive force of democratic ideas and man's native thirst for freedom. Since that epoch there have been in reality but two powers on the continent of Europe—Russia and Absolutism, the Revolution and Democracy. For the moment the Revolution seems to be suppressed, but it lives and is feared as deeply as ever. Witness the terror of the reaction at the news of the late rising at Milan. But let Russia get

possession of Turkey, and her strength is increased nearly half, and she becomes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such an event would be an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary cause. The maintenance of Turkish independence, or, in case of a possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the arrest of the Russian scheme of annexation, is a matter of the highest moment. In this instance the interests of the revolutionary Democracy and of England go hand in hand. Neither can permit the Czar to make Constantinople one of his capitals, and we shall find that when driven to the wall, the one will resist him as determinedly as the other.

IV

The Turkish Question

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, April 19, 1853

It is only of late that people in the west of Europe and in America have been enabled to form anything like a correct judgment of Turkish affairs. Up to the Greek insurrection Turkey was, to all intents and purposes, a *terra incognita*, and the common notions floating about among the public were based more upon the Arabian Nights' Entertainment than upon any historical facts. Official diplomatic functionaries, having been on the spot, boasted a more accurate knowledge; but this, too, amounted to nothing, as none of these officials ever troubled himself to learn Turkish, South Slavonian, or modern Greek, and they were one and all dependent upon the interested accounts of Greek interpreters and Frank merchants. Besides, intrigues of every sort were always on hand to occupy the time of these lounging diplomatists, among whom Joseph von Hammer, the German historian of Turkey, forms the only honourable exception. The business of these gentlemen was not with the people, the institutions, the social state of the country: it was exclusively with the Court, and especially with the Fanariote Greeks, wily mediators between two parties, either of which was equally ignorant of the real condition, power, and resources of the other. The traditional notions and opinions, founded upon such paltry information, formed for a long while, and, strange to say, form to a great extent even now, the groundwork

for all the action of Western diplomacy with regard to Turkey.

But while England, France, and, for a long time, even Austria, were groping in the dark for a defined Eastern policy, another Power outwitted them all. Russia, herself semi-Asiatic in her condition, manners, traditions, and institutions, found men enough who could comprehend the real state and character of Turkey. Her religion was the same as that of nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Turkey in Europe; her language almost identical with that of seven millions of Turkish subjects; and the well-known facility with which a Russian learns to converse in, if not fully to appropriate, a foreign tongue made it an easy matter for her agents, well paid for the task, to acquaint themselves completely with Turkish affairs. Thus at a very early period the Russian Government availed itself of its exceedingly favourable position in the south-east of Europe. Hundreds of Russian agents perambulated Turkey, pointing out to the Greek Christians the orthodox Emperor as the head, the natural protector, and the ultimate liberator of the oppressed Eastern Church, and to the South Slavonians especially, pointing out that same Emperor as the almighty Czar, who was sooner or later to unite all the branches of the great Slav race under one sceptre, and to make them the ruling race of Europe. The clergy of the Greek Church very soon formed themselves into a vast conspiracy for the spread of these ideas. The Servian insurrection of 1809, the Greek rising in 1821, were more or less directly urged on by Russian gold and Russian influence; and wherever among the Turkish pashas the standard of revolt was raised against the Central Government Russian intrigues and Russian funds were never wanting; and when thus internal Turkish questions had entirely perplexed the understanding of Western diplomatists, who knew no more about the real subject than about the man in the moon, then war was declared, Russian armies marched toward the Balkans, and portion by portion the Ottoman Empire was dismembered. ✓

It is true that during the last thirty years much has been done toward general enlightenment concerning the state of Turkey. German philologists and critics have made us acquainted with its history and literature; English residents and English trade have collected a great deal of information as to the social condition of the Empire. But the diplomatic wiseacres seem to scorn all this, and to cling as obstinately as possible to the traditions engendered by the study of Eastern fairy-tales, improved upon by the no less wonderful accounts given by the most corrupt set of Greek mercenaries that ever existed.

And what has been the natural result? That in all essential points Russia has steadily, one after another, gained her ends, thanks to the ignorance, dulness, and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of Western Governments. From the battle of Navarino to the present Eastern crisis, the action of the Western Powers has either been annihilated by squabbles among themselves—mostly arising from their common ignorance of Eastern matters, and from petty jealousies which must have been entirely incomprehensible to any Eastern understanding—or that action has been in the direct interest of Russia alone. And not only do the Greeks, both of Greece and Turkey, and the Slavonians, look to Russia as their natural protector; nay, even the Government at Constantinople, despairing, time after time, to make its actual wants and real position understood by these Western ambassadors, who pride themselves upon their own utter incompetency to judge by their own eyes of Turkish matters, this very Turkish Government has, in every instance, been obliged to throw itself upon the mercy of Russia, and to seek protection from that Power which openly avows its firm intention to drive every Turk across the Bosphorus, and plant the cross of St. Andrew upon the minarets of the Aya-Sofiyah.

In spite of diplomatic tradition, these constant and successful encroachments of Russia have at last roused in the Western cabinets of Europe a very dim and distant apprehension of the approaching danger. This apprehension has

resulted in the great diplomatic nostrum, that the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey is a necessary condition of the peace of the world. The magniloquent incapacity of certain modern statesmen could not have confessed its ignorance and helplessness more plainly than in this axiom which, from always having remained a dead letter, has, during the short period of twenty years, been hallowed by tradition, and become as hoary and indisputable as King John's Magna Carta. Maintain the *status quo*! Why, it was precisely to maintain the *status quo* that Russia stirred up Servia to revolt, made Greece independent, appropriated to herself the protectorate of Moldavia and Wallachia, and retained part of Armenia! England and France never stirred an inch when all this was done, and the only time they did move was to protect, in 1849, not Turkey, but the Hungarian refugees. In the eyes of European diplomacy, and even of the European press, the whole Eastern Question resolves itself into this dilemma: either the Russians at Constantinople, or the maintenance of the *status quo*—anything besides this alternative never enters their thoughts.

Look at the London press for illustration. We find *The Times* advocating the dismemberment of Turkey, and proclaiming the unfitness of the Turkish race to govern any longer in that beautiful corner of Europe. Skilful, as usual, *The Times* boldly attacks the old diplomatic tradition of the *status quo*, and declares its continuance impossible. The whole of the talent at the disposal of that paper is exerted to show this impossibility under different aspects, and to enlist British sympathies for a new crusade against the remnant of the Saracens. The merit of such an unscrupulous attack upon a time-hallowed and unmeaning phrase which two months ago was as yet sacred to *The Times* is undeniable. But whoever knows that paper knows also that this unwonted boldness is applied directly in the interest of Russia and Austria. The correct premisses put forth in its columns as to the utter impossibility of maintaining Turkey in its present state serve no other purpose than to prepare the British public and the world

for the moment when the principal paragraph of the will of Peter the Great—the conquest of the Bosphorus—will have become an accomplished fact.

The opposite opinion is represented by *The Daily News*, the organ of the Liberals. *The Times*, at least, seizes a new and correct feature of the question, in order afterwards to pervert it to an interested purpose. In the columns of the Liberal journal, on the other hand, reigns the plainest sense, but merely a sort of *household sense*. Indeed, it does not see farther than the very threshold of its own house. It clearly perceives that a dismemberment of Turkey *under present circumstances* must bring the Russians to Constantinople, and that this would be a great misfortune for England; that it would threaten the peace of the world, ruin the Black Sea trade, and necessitate new armaments in the British stations and fleets of the Mediterranean. And in consequence *The Daily News* exerts itself to arouse the indignation and fear of the British public. Is not the partition of Turkey a crime equal to the partition of Poland? Have not the Christians more religious liberty in Turkey than in Austria and Russia? Is not the Turkish Government a mild, paternal Government, which allows the different nations and creeds and local corporations to regulate their own affairs? Is not Turkey a paradise compared with Austria and Russia? Are not life and property safe there? And is not British trade with Turkey larger than that with Austria and Russia put together, and does it not increase every year? And then goes on in dithyrambic strain, so far as *The Daily News* can be dithyrambic, with an apotheosis of Turkey, the Turks, and everything Turkish, which must appear quite incomprehensible to most of its readers.

The key to this strange enthusiasm for the Turks is to be found in the works of David Urquhart, Esq., M.P. This gentleman, of Scotch birth, with mediæval and patriarchal recollections of home, and with a modern British civilized education, after having fought three years in Greece against the Turks, passed into their country and was the first thus

to enamour himself of them. The romantic Highlander found himself at home again in the mountain ravines of the Pindus and Balkans, and his works on Turkey, although full of valuable information, may be summed up in the following three paradoxes, which are laid down almost literally thus: If Mr. Urquhart were not a British subject, he would decidedly prefer being a Turk; if he were not a Presbyterian Calvinist, he would not belong to any other religion than Islamism; and thirdly, Britain and Turkey are the only two countries in the world which enjoy self-government and civil and religious liberty. This same Urquhart has since become the great Eastern authority for all English Liberals who object to Palmerston, and it is he who supplies *The Daily News* with the materials for these panegyrics upon Turkey.

The only argument which deserves a moment's notice upon this side of the question is this: "It is said that Turkey is decaying; but where is the decay? Is not civilization rapidly spreading in Turkey and trade extending? Where you see nothing but decay, our statistics prove nothing but progress." Now it would be a great fallacy to put down the increasing Black Sea trade to the credit of Turkey alone; and yet this is done here, exactly as if the industrial and commercial capabilities of Holland, the high road to the greater part of Germany, were to be measured by her gross exports and imports, nine-tenths of which represent a mere transit. And yet, what every statistician would immediately, in the case of Holland, treat as a clumsy concoction, the whole of the Liberal press of England, including the learned *Economist*, tries, in the case of Turkey, to impose upon public credulity. And then, who are the traders in Turkey? Certainly not the Turks. Their way of promoting trade, when they were yet in their original nomadic state, consisted in robbing caravans; and now that they are a little more civilized it consists in all sorts of arbitrary and oppressive exactions. The Greeks, the Armenians, the Slavonians, and the Franks, established in the large seaports, carry on the whole of the trade, and

certainly they have no reason to thank Turkish beys and pashas for being able to do so. Remove all the Turks out of Europe, and trade will have no reason to suffer. And as to progress in general civilization, who are they that carry out that progress in all parts of European Turkey? Not the Turks, for they are few and far between, and can hardly be said to be settled anywhere except in Constantinople and two or three small country districts. It is the Greek and Slavonic middle-class in all the towns and trading posts who are the real support of whatever civilization is effectually imported into the country. That part of the population is constantly rising in wealth and influence, and the Turks are more and more driven into the background. Were it not for their monopoly of civil and military power they would soon disappear. But that monopoly has become impossible for the future, and their power is turned into impotence except for obstructions in the way of progress. The fact is, they must be got rid of. To say that they cannot be got rid of except by putting Russians and Austrians in their place means as much as to say that the present political constitution of Europe will last for ever. Who will make such an assertion?

V

Turkey and Russia

LONDON, *May 24*, 1853

N. Y. T., *June 9*, 1853

ON Saturday last despatches were received by telegraph from Brussels and Paris with news from Constantinople to May 13. Immediately after their arrival a Cabinet Council was held at the Foreign Office, which sat three hours and a half. On the same day orders were sent by telegraph to the Admiralty at Portsmouth, directing the departure of two steam-frigates—the *London*, 90, and *Sanspareil*, 71—from Spithead for the Mediterranean. The *Highflyer* steam-frigate, 21, and *Oden* steam-frigate, 16, are also under orders for sea.

What were the contents of these despatches which threw ministers into so sudden an activity, and interrupted the quiet dulness of England?

You know that the question of the Holy Shrines had been settled to the satisfaction of Russia; and, according to the assurances of the Russian Embassy at Paris and London, Russia asked for no other satisfaction than a priority share in those Holy Places. The objects of Russian diplomacy were merely of such a chivalric character as were those of Frederic Barbarossa and Richard Cœur de Lion. This, at least, we were told by *The Times*. "But," says the *Journal des Débats*, "on the 5th of May the Russian steam-frigate *Bessarabia* arrived from Odessa, having on board a Russian colonel with despatches for Prince Mentschikoff; and on Saturday, 7th inst., the Prince

handed to the Ministers of the Porte the draught of a convention or special treaty in which the new demands and pretensions were set forth. This is the document called the ultimatum, since it was accompanied by a very brief note, fixing Tuesday, 10th May, as the last day on which the refusal or the acceptance of the Divan could be received. The note terminated in nearly the following words: 'If the Sublime Porte should think proper to respond by refusal, the Emperor would be compelled to see in that act a complete want of respect for his person, and for Russia, and would receive intelligence of it with profound regret.' "

The principal object of this treaty was to secure to the Emperor of Russia the Protectorate of all Greek Christians subject to the Porte. By the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, concluded at the close of the 18th century, a Greek chapel was allowed to be erected at Constantinople, and the privilege was granted to the Russian Embassy of interfering in cases of collision between the priests of that chapel and the Turks. This privilege was confirmed again in the Treaty of Adrianople. What Prince Mentschikoff now demands is the conversion of that exceptional privilege into the general Protectorate of the whole Greek Church in Turkey, *i.e.* of the vast majority of the population of Turkey in Europe. Besides, he asks that the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as the Metropolitan Archbishops, shall be immovable, unless proved guilty of high treason (against the Russians), and then only upon the consent of the Czar; in other words, he demands the resignation of the Sultan's sovereignty into the hands of Russia.

This was the news brought by the telegraph on Saturday; firstly, that Prince Mentschikoff had granted a further delay—until 14th inst.—for the answer to his ultimatum; that then a change in the Turkish Ministry ensued, Reschid Pasha, the antagonist of Russia, being appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fuad Effendi reinstated in his office; lastly, that the Russian ultimatum had been rejected.

It would have been impossible for Russia to make more

extensive demands upon Turkey after a series of signal victories. This is the best proof of the obstinacy with which she clings to her inveterate notion—that every interregnum of the counter-revolution in Europe constitutes a right for her to exact concessions from the Ottoman Empire. And, indeed, since the first French Revolution Continental retrogression has ever been identical with Russian progress in the East. But Russia is mistaken in confounding the present state of Europe with its condition after the congresses of Laibach and Verona, or even after the peace of Tilsit. Russia herself is more afraid of the revolution that must follow any general war on the Continent than the Sultan is afraid of the aggression of the Czar. If the other Powers hold firm, Russia is sure to retire in a very decent manner. Yet, be this as it may, her late manœuvres have, at all events, imparted a mighty impetus to the elements engaged in disorganizing Turkey from within. The only question is this: Does Russia act on her own free impulse, or is she but the unconscious and reluctant slave of the modern *fatum*—revolution? I believe the latter alternative.

VI

The Ultimatum and After

LONDON, *May 27, 1853*
N. Y. T., *June 10, 1853*

THE intelligence I transmitted to you in my last, of the rejection of the Russian ultimatum and of the formation of an anti-Russian Ministry at Constantinople has since been fully confirmed. The most recent despatches are from Constantinople, of May 17.

"On assuming office, Reschid Pasha requested from Prince Mentschikoff a delay of six days. Mentschikoff refused, declaring diplomatic relations broken off, and adding that he would remain at Constantinople three days more, to make the necessary preparations for his departure, and he exhorted the Porte to reflection and to profit by the short time he should be detained."

Under date of Constantinople, May 19, we further learn :

"On the 17th, a meeting of the Divan was held, at the issue of which it was definitively resolved that the convention, as proposed by Prince Mentschikoff, could not be accepted. Nevertheless, on this being notified to Prince Mentschikoff, he did not quit Constantinople. On the contrary, he has opened new communications with Reschid Pasha. The day of the departure of the Russian Embassy is *no longer fixed*."

Contradictorily to the latter despatch, the French Government evening organ, *La Patrie*, positively announces that the Government has received intelligence that Prince Mentschikoff has taken his departure for Odessa, and that the occurrence has occasioned but little sensation at Constantinople. The *Pays* agrees with this statement, but is

contradicted by the *Presse*. Girardin adds, however, that if the news was correct, it might easily be accounted for.

"If Prince Mentschikoff really departed from Bujukdere for Odessa, the fact is that, having failed in his mission (*manqué son effet*), no alternative was left him but to withdraw from station to station."

Some papers assert that the fleet of Admiral Delasusse has passed the Dardanelles, and is now at anchor in the Golden Horn, but this assertion is contradicted by *The Morning Post*. The *Triester Zeitung* assures its readers that, before giving an answer to Prince Mentschikoff, the Porte had asked Lord Redcliffe and M. de la Cour whether it could eventually count upon their support. To this *The Times* gives its solemn contradiction.

I now give you a literal translation from the Paris *Siècle*, containing some curious details with respect to the negotiations from May 5 to 12, at Constantinople—an exposure of the ridiculous behaviour of Prince Mentschikoff, who, in the whole of this transaction, has combined, in a most disgusting style, northern barbarity with Byzantine duplicity, and has succeeded in making Russia the laughing-stock of Europe. This "Grec du Bas-Empire" presumed to conquer the sovereignty over a whole empire by mere theatrical performances. For Russia there remains no step from the sublime to the ridiculous—a ridiculous which can only be wiped out by blood. But these days of stockjobbing moneyocracy are not the days of chivalrous tournaments. The article in the *Siècle* runs thus :

[Copies of firman about Holy Places sent to French ambassador (de la Cour) and Mentschikoff. Ultimatum from Mentschikoff demanding Russian Protectorate of Greek Church. English Ambassador (Redcliffe) and French advise rejection of ultimatum. Rejection sent to Mentschikoff.]

I conclude my report on Turkish affairs by an excerpt from the *Constitutionnel*, showing the conduct of the Greek clergy during all these transactions.

"The Greek clergy, so deeply interested in this question, had pronounced in favour of the *status quo*, i.e., in favour of the Porte. They

are protesting *en masse* against the protectorate threatened to be imposed on them by the Emperor of Russia. Generally speaking, the Greeks desire the support of Russia, but only on condition of not being subject to her direct domination. It is repulsive to their minds to think that the Oriental Church, which is the mother of the Russian Church, should ever become subordinate to the latter, a thing which of necessity would happen if the designs of the Petersburg Cabinet should be accepted."

VII

The English and French Fleets—"The Times"—Russian Aggrandizement

LONDON, *May 31, 1853*

N. Y. T., June 14, 1853

ADMIRAL CORRY'S fleet has been seen in the Bay of Biscay on the way to Malta, where it is to reinforce the squadron of Admiral Dundas. *The Morning Herald* justly observes:

"Had Admiral Dundas been permitted to join the French squadron at Salamis, several weeks ago, the present state of affairs would be quite different."

Should Russia attempt, were it only for the salvation of appearances, to back up the ridiculous demonstrations of Mentschikoff by actual manœuvres of war, her first two steps would probably consist in the re-occupation of the Danubian Principalities, and in the invasion of the Armenian province of Kars and the port of Batum, territories which she made every effort to secure by the Treaty of Adrianople. The port of Batum being the only safe refuge for ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea, its possession would deprive Turkey of her last naval station in the Pontus and make the latter an exclusively Russian Sea. This port added to the possession of Kars, the richest and best cultivated portion of Armenia, would enable Russia to cut off the commerce of England with Persia by way of Trebizond, and afford a basis of operations against the latter Power, as well

as against Asia Minor. If, however, England and France hold firm, Nicholas will no more carry out his projects in that quarter, than the Empress Catherine carried out hers against Aga Mahmed, when he commanded his slaves to drive the Russian Ambassador Voinovitch and his companions with scourges to their ships, away from Asterabad.

In no quarter did the latest news create greater consternation than in Printing-House Square. The first attempt made by *The Times* to lift up its head under the terrible blow was a desperate diatribe against the electric telegraph, that "most extraordinary" instrument. "No correct conclusions could be drawn," it exclaimed, "from that mendacious wire." Having thus laid its own incorrect conclusions to the fault of the electric wire, *The Times*, after the statement of Ministers in Parliament, endeavours now also to get rid of its ancient "correct" promises. It says :

[*Progress of Christians in Turkey, the interest of the world. They must not come under Russia. Resistance to Russia should be European.*]

How did it happen that the poor *Times* believed in the "good faith" of Russia toward Turkey, and her "antipathy" against all aggrandizement? The goodwill of Russia toward Turkey! Peter I. proposed to raise himself on the ruins of Turkey. Catherine persuaded Austria, and called upon France, to participate in the proposed dismemberment of Turkey, and the establishment of a Greek Empire at Constantinople, under her grandson who had been educated and even named with a view to this result. Nicholas, more moderate, only demands the *exclusive Protectorate* of Turkey. Mankind will not forget that Russia was the *protector* of Poland, the *protector* of the Crimea, the *protector* of Courland, the *protector* of Georgia, Mingrelia, the Circassian and Caucasian tribes. And now Russia, the protector of Turkey! As to Russia's antipathy against aggrandizement, I allege the following facts from a mass of the acquisitions of Russia since Peter the Great.

The Russian frontier has advanced :—

Towards Berlin, Dresden and Vienna about 700 miles.

Towards Constantinople 500 „

Towards Stockholm 630 „

Towards Teheran 1,000 „

Russia's acquisitions from Sweden are greater than what remains of that kingdom ; from Poland, nearly equal to the Austrian Empire ; from Turkey in Europe, greater than Prussia (exclusive of the Rhenish Provinces) ; from Turkey in Asia, as large as the whole dominion of Germany proper ; from Persia, equal to England ; from Tartary, to an extent as large as European Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain, taken together. The total acquisitions of Russia during the last sixty years are equal in extent and importance to the whole Empire she had in Europe before that time.

VIII

The Russian Humbug

LONDON, *June 7*, 1853
N. Y. T., *June 22*, 1853

ALL the Russian Generals and other Russians residing at Paris have received orders to return to Russia without delay. The language adopted by M. de Kisseleff, the Russian envoy at Paris, is rather menacing; and letters from Petersburg are ostentatiously shown by him, in which the Turkish question is treated *assez cavalièrement*. A rumour has issued from the same quarter, reporting that Russia demands from Persia the cession of the territory of Asterabad, at the south-eastern extremity of the Caspian Sea. Russian merchants, at the same time, despatch, or are *reported* to have despatched, orders to their London agents "*not* to press any sales of grain at the present juncture, as prices were expected to rise in the imminent eventuality of a war." Lastly, confidential hints are being communicated to every newspaper that the Russian troops are marching to the frontier; that the inhabitants of Jassy are preparing for their reception; that the Russian Consul at Galatz has bought up an immense number of trees for the throwing of several bridges across the Danube, and other *canards*, the breeding of which has been so successfully carried on by the *Augsburger Zeitung* and other Austro-Russian journals.

These, and a lot of similar reports, communications, etc., are nothing but so many ridiculous attempts on the part

of the Russian agents to strike a wholesome terror into the western world, and to push it to the continuance of that policy of extension, under the cover of which Russia hopes, as heretofore, to carry out her projects upon the East. How systematically this game of mystification is being played may be seen from the following :

Last week several French papers, notoriously in the pay of Russia, made the discovery that the "real question was less between Russia and Turkey than between Petersburg and Moscow—*i.e.*, between the Czar and the Old Russian party; and that, for the Autocrat, there would be less danger in war than in the vengeance of that conquest-urging party, which has so often shown how it deals with monarchs that displease it."

Prince Mentschikoff, of course, is the "head of this party." *The Times* and most of the English papers did not fail to reproduce this absurd statement—the one in consciousness of its meaning; the others, perhaps, its unconscious dupes. Now, what conclusion was the public intended to draw from this novel revelation? That Nicholas, in retreating under ridicule and abandoning his warlike attitude against Turkey, has won a victory over his own warlike Old Russians? Or that Nicholas, in actually going to war, only does so from the necessity of yielding to that (fabulous) party? At all events, "there would only be a victory of Moscow over Petersburg, or of Petersburg over Moscow," and consequently, *none of Europe over Russia.*

Respecting this famous Old Russian party, I happen to know from several well-informed Russians—aristocrats themselves—with whom I have had much intercourse in Paris, that it has long been entirely extinct, and is only occasionally called back into apparent existence when the Czar stands in need of some bugbear to frighten the west of Europe into passive endurance of his arrogant claims. Hence the resurrection of a Mentschikoff and his appropriate outfit in the fabulous Old Russian style. There is but one party among the Russian nobles actually feared by the Czar—the party whose aim is the establishment of an

aristocratico-constitutional system, after the pattern of England.

Besides these different spectres, conjured up by Russian diplomacy for the misguidance of England and France, another attempt to bring about the same result has just been made by the publication of a work, entitled *L'Empire Russe depuis le Congrès de Vienne*, by Viscount de Beaumont-Vassy. It will be sufficient to extract one sentence only for the purpose of characterizing this opusculum:

"It is well known that a deposit of coin and ingots exists in the cellar of the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. This *hidden treasure* was officially estimated, on the 1st of January, 1850, at 99,763,361 silver roubles."

Has any one ever presumed to speak of the *hidden treasure* in the Bank of England? The "hidden treasure" of Russia is simply the metal reserve balancing a three times larger circulation of *convertible* notes, not to speak of the *hidden* amount of inconvertible paper issued by the Imperial Treasury. But, perhaps, this treasure may yet be called a "hidden" one, inasmuch as nobody has ever seen it, except the few Petersburg merchants selected by the Czar's Government for the annual inspection of the bags which hide it.

The chief demonstration of Russia in this direction is, however, an article published in the *Journal des Débats*, and signed by M. de St. Marc-Girardin, that old Orleanist sage. I extract:

"Europe has two great perils, according to us—*Russia*, which menaces her independence; and the *Revolution*, which menaces her *social order*. Now, she cannot be saved from one of these perils except by exposing herself entirely to the other. . . . *In the present state of Europe, war would be the social revolution.*"

As a matter of course, M. de St. Marc-Girardin concludes in favour of peace on any condition against the social revolution; forgetting, however, that the Emperor of Russia has, at least, as much "*horreur*" of the revolution as he himself and his proprietor, M. Bertin.

Notwithstanding all these soporifics, administered by Russian diplomacy to the Press and people of England, "that old and obstinate" Aberdeen has been compelled to order Admiral Dundas to join the French fleet on the coast of Turkey; and even *The Times*, which, during the last few months, knew only how to write Russian, seems to have received a more English inspiration. It talks now very big.

The Danish (once Schleswig-Holstein) question is beginning to create considerable interest in England, since the English Press, too, has at length discovered that it involves the same principle of Russian extension as supplies the foundation of the Eastern complication. Mr. Urquhart, M.P., the well-known admirer of Turkey and Eastern Institutions, has published a pamphlet on the Danish Succession, of which an account will be given in a future letter. The chief argument put forward in this publication is, that the Sound is intended by Russia to perform the same functions for her in the north as the Dardanelles in the south; viz., the securing her maritime supremacy over the Baltic in the same manner as the occupation of the Dardanelles would do with regard to the Euxine.

IX

Brunnow and Clarendon—Armenian Proclamation

LONDON, *June 17, 1853*

N. Y. T., July 1, 1853

LAST Saturday *The Press*, a new weekly paper under the influence of Mr. Disraeli, made a curious disclosure to the public of England, as follows :

“Early in the spring Baron Brunnow communicated to Lord Clarendon the demand which the Emperor of Russia was about to make on the Porte ; that he did so with a statement that the object of the communication was to ascertain the feeling of England on the subject ; that Lord Clarendon made no objection, nor in any way discouraged the intended course ; and that the Muscovite diplomatist communicated to his Imperial master that England was not indisposed to connive at his designs on the Golden Horn.”

Now, *The Times* of yesterday had an elaborate and official article, emanating from the Foreign Office, in answer to the grave charge of Mr. Disraeli, but which, in my opinion tends rather to strengthen than to refute that charge. *The Times* asserts that, early in the spring, before the arrival of Prince Mentschikoff at Constantinople, Baron Brunnow made a complaint to Lord John Russell that the Porte had revoked the privileges conferred on the Greek clergy by treaty, and that Lord John Russell, conceiving the matter only to concern the Holy Places, gave his assent to the designs of the Czar. But *The Times* is compelled at the same time to concede that after Prince Mentschikoff's arrival at Constantinople, and when Lord John Russell had been replaced by Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office,

Baron Brunnow made a further communication to Lord Clarendon "purporting to convey the sense of his instructions, and some of the expressions used in the letter of credentials, of which Prince Mentschikoff was the bearer, from the Emperor of Russia to the Sultan." Simultaneously *The Times* admits that "Lord Clarendon gave his assent to the demands communicated by Baron Brunnow." Evidently this second communication must have contained something more than what had been communicated to Lord John Russell. The matter, therefore, cannot stop with this declaration. Either Baron Brunnow must turn out a diplomatical cheat, or my Lords Clarendon and Aberdeen are traitors. We shall see.

It may be of interest to your readers to become acquainted with a document concerning the Eastern Question, which was recently published in a London newspaper. It is a proclamation issued by the Prince of Armenia, now residing in London, and distributed among the Armenians in Turkey :

"Leo, by the grace of God, sovereign Prince of Armenia, etc., to the Armenians in Turkey :

"Beloved brothers and faithful countrymen,—Our will and our ardent wish is that you should defend to the last drop of your blood your country and the Sultan against the tyrant of the North. Remember, my brothers, that in Turkey there are no knouts; they do not tear your nostrils, and your women are not flogged secretly or in public. Under the reign of the Sultan there is humanity; while under that of the tyrant of the North there are nothing but atrocities. Therefore, place yourselves under the direction of God, and fight bravely for the liberty of your country and your present Sovereign. Pull down your houses to make barricades, and if you have no arms, break your furniture and defend yourselves with it. May Heaven guide you on your path to glory! My only happiness will be to fight in the midst of you against the oppressor of your country and your creed. May God incline the Sultan's heart to sanction my demand, because under his reign our religion remains in its pure form; while under the Northern tyrant it will be altered. Remember at least, brothers, that the blood that runs in the veins of him who now addresses you is the blood of twenty kings; it is the blood of heroes—Lusignans—and defenders of our faith; and we say to you, 'Let us defend our creed and its pure form until our last drop of blood.'"

X

Aberdeen—Clarendon—Brunnow—Connivance of the Aberdeen Ministry with Russia

LONDON, *June 21, 1853.*
N. Y. T., *July 8, 1853.*

IN the year 1828, when Russia was permitted to overrun Turkey with war, and to terminate that war by the Treaty of Adrianople, which surrendered to her the whole of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, from Anapa in the north to Poti in the south (except Circassia), and delivered into her possession the islands at the mouth of the Danube, virtually separated Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey, and placed them under Russian supremacy—at that epoch Lord Aberdeen happened to be Minister of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain. In 1853 we find the very same Aberdeen as the chief of the “Composite Ministry” in the same country. This simple fact goes far to explain the overbearing attitude assumed by Russia in her present conflict with Turkey and with Europe.

I told you in my last letter that the storm aroused by the revelations of *The Press*, respecting the secret transactions between Aberdeen, Clarendon, and Baron Brunnow, was not likely to subside under the hair-splitting, tortuous, and disingenuous pleading of Thursday’s *Times*. *The Times* was even then forced to admit, in a semi-official article, that Lord Clarendon had indeed given his assent to the demands about to be made by Russia on the Porte, but said that the demands as represented in London, and those

actually proposed at Constantinople, had turned out to be of quite a different tenor, although the papers communicated by Baron Brunnow to the British Minister purported to be "*literal extracts*" from the instructions forwarded to Prince Mentschikoff. On the following Saturday, however, *The Times* retracted its assertions—undoubtedly in consequence of remonstrances made on the part of the Russian Embassy—and gave Baron Brunnow a testimonial of perfect "candour and faith." *The Morning Herald* of yesterday puts the question "whether Russia had not perhaps given false instructions to Baron Brunnow himself, in order to deceive the British Minister?" In the meantime, fresh disclosures, studiously concealed from the public by a corrupt daily Press, have been made, which exclude any such interpretation, throwing the whole blame on the shoulders of the "Composite Ministry," and quite sufficient to warrant the impeachment of Lords Aberdeen and Clarendon before any other Parliament than the present, which is but a paralytic product of dead constitutions artificially stimulated into life by unexampled bribery and intimidation.

It is stated that a communication was made to Lord Clarendon, wherein he was informed that the affair of the Shrines was *not* the *sole object* of the Russian Prince. In that communication the general question was entered into, the question of the Greek Christians of Turkey and of the position of the Emperor of Russia with respect to them under certain treaties. All these points were canvassed, and the course about to be adopted by Russia explicitly stated—the same as detailed in the projected Convention of the 6th of May. Lord Clarendon, with the assent of Lord Aberdeen, in no wise either disapproved or discouraged that course. While matters stood thus in London, Bonaparte sent his fleet to Salamis, public opinion pressed from without, Ministers were interpellated in both Houses, Russell pledged himself to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Turkey, and Prince Mentschikoff threw off the mask at Constantinople. It now became necessary

for Lords Aberdeen and Clarendon to initiate the other Ministers into what had been done, and the Coalition was on the eve of being broken up, as Lord Palmerston, forced by his antecedents, urged a directly opposite line of policy. In order to prevent the dissolution of his Cabinet, Lord Aberdeen finally yielded to Lord Palmerston, and consented to the combined action of the English and French fleets in the Dardanelles. But at the same time, in order to fulfil his engagements toward Russia, Lord Aberdeen intimated through a private despatch to St. Petersburg that he would not look upon the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians as a *casus belli*, and *The Times* received orders to prepare public opinion for this new interpretation of international treaties. It would be unjust to withhold the testimonial that it has laboured hard enough to prove that black is white. This same journal, which had all along contended that the Russian *Protectorate* over the Greek Christians of Turkey would not be of any political consequence at all, asserted at once that Moldavia and Wallachia were placed under a divided allegiance, and formed in reality no integral portions of the Turkish Empire; that their occupation would not be an invasion of the Turkish Empire in the "strict sense of the word," inasmuch as the Treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople had given to the Czar a Protectorate over his co-religionists in the Danubian Provinces. The Convention of Balta-Liman, concluded on May 1, 1849, distinctly stipulates:

"1. That the occupation of those provinces, if it occurs, shall only be by a joint one of Russian and Turkish forces.

"2. That the sole plea for it shall be in grave events taking place in the Principalities."

Now as no events at all have taken place in those Principalities, and moreover, as Russia has no intention to enter them in common with the Turks, but precisely against Turkey, *The Times* is of opinion that Turkey ought to suffer quietly the occupation by Russia alone, and afterwards enter into negotiations with her. But if

Turkey should be of a less sedate temper and consider the occupation as a *casus belli*, *The Times* argues that England and France must not do so; and if, nevertheless, England and France should do so, *The Times* recommends that it should be done in a gentle manner, by no means as belligerents against Russia, but only as defensive allies of Turkey.

This cowardly and tortuous system of *The Times* I cannot more appropriately stigmatize than by quoting the following passage from its leading article of to-day. It is an incredible combination of all the contradictions, subterfuges, false pretences, anxieties and *lâchetés* of Lord Aberdeen's policy:

"Before proceeding to the last extremities the Porte may, if it think fit, protest against the occupation of the Principalities, and with the support of all the Powers of Europe, may still negotiate. It will remain with the Turkish Government, acting in concert with the Ambassadors of the four Powers, to determine this momentous point, and especially to decide whether the state of hostilities is such as to cause the Dardanelles to be opened to foreign ships of war, under the Convention of 1841. Should that question be decided in the affirmative, and the fleets be ordered to enter the Straits, it will then remain to be seen whether we come there as mediating Powers, or as belligerents; for supposing Turkey and Russia to be at war, and foreign vessels of war to be admitted, *casus fœderis* (!), they do not necessarily acquire a belligerent character, and they have a far greater interest in maintaining that of mediating Powers, inasmuch as they are sent not to make war, but to prevent it. Such a measure does not of necessity make us principals in the contest."

All the leaders of *The Times* have been to no purpose. No other paper would follow in its track—none would bite at its bait, and even the Ministerial papers, *The Morning Chronicle*, *Morning Post*, *Globe*, and *Observer* take an entirely different stand, finding a loud echo on the other side of the Channel, where only the legitimist *Assemblée Nationale* presumes to see no *casus belli* in the occupation of the Danubian Principalities.

The dissension in the camp of the Coalition Ministry has thus been betrayed to the public by the clamorous

dissension in their organs. Palmerston urged upon the Cabinet to hold the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia as a declaration of war, and he was backed up by the Whig and sham-Radical members of the Composite Ministry. Lord Aberdeen, having only consented to the common action of the French and English fleets upon the understanding that Russia would not act at the Dardanelles, but in the Danubian Provinces, was now quite "outwitted." The existence of the Government was again at stake. At last, at the pressing instances of Lord Aberdeen, Palmerston was prepared to give a sullen assent to the unchallenged occupation of the Principalities by Russia, when suddenly a despatch arrived from Paris announcing that Bonaparte had resolved to view the same act as a *casus belli*. The confusion has now reached its highest point.

Now, if this statement be correct—and from our knowledge of Lord Aberdeen's past there is every reason to consider it as such—the whole mystery of that Russo-Turkish tragi-comedy that has occupied Europe for months together is laid bare. We understand at once why Lord Aberdeen would not move the British fleet from Malta. We understand the rebuke given to Colonel Rose for his resolute conduct at Constantinople, the bullying behaviour of Prince Mentschikoff, and the heroic firmness of the Czar who, conceiving the warlike movements of England as a mere farce, would have been glad to be allowed, by the uncontroverted occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, not only to withdraw from the stage as the "master," but to hold his annual grand manœuvres at the cost and expense of the subjects of the Sultan. We believe that, if war should break out, it will be because Russia has gone too far to withdraw with impunity to her honour; and above all, we believe her courage to be up to this notch simply because she has all the while counted on England's connivance.

On this head the following passage is in point from the last letter in *The Englishman* on the Coalition Ministry:

"The Coalition is shaking at every breeze that blows from the Dardanelles. The fears of the good Aberdeen and the miserable incompetence of Clarendon encouraged Russia, and have produced the crisis."

The latest news from Turkey is as follows: The Turkish Ambassador at Paris has received by telegraph, *via* Semlin, a despatch from Constantinople, informing him that the Porte has rejected the last ultimatum of Russia, taking its stand on the memorandum forwarded to the Great Powers. The *Semaphore* of Marseilles states that news has been received at Smyrna of the capture of two Turkish trading vessels in the Black Sea by the Russians; but that, on the other hand, the Caucasian tribes have opened a general campaign against the Russians, in which Schamyl had achieved a most brilliant victory, taking no less than twenty-three cannons.

XI

Russian Policy against Turkey

LONDON, *July 1*, 1853
N. Y. T., *July 14*, 1853

SINCE the year 1815 the Great Powers of Europe have feared nothing so much as an infraction of the *status quo*. But any war between any two of those Powers implies subversion of that *status quo*. That is the reason why Russia's encroachments in the East have been tolerated, and why she has never been asked for anything in return but to afford some pretext, however absurd, to the Western Powers, for remaining neutral, and for being saved the necessity of interfering with Russian aggressions. Russia has all along been glorified for the forbearance and generosity of her "august master," who has not only condescended to cover the naked and shameful subserviency of Western Cabinets, but has displayed the magnanimity of devouring Turkey piece after piece, instead of swallowing her at a mouthful. Russian diplomacy has thus rested on the timidity of Western statesmen, and her diplomatic art has gradually sunk into so complete a *mannerism*, that you may trace the history of the present transactions almost literally in the annals of the past.

The hollowness of the new pretexts of Russia is apparent, after the Sultan has granted, in his new firman to the Patriarch of Constantinople, more than the Czar himself had asked for—so far as religion goes. Now was, perhaps, the "pacification of Greece" a more solid pretext? When M. de Villèle, in order to tranquillize the apprehensions of

the Sultan, and to give a proof of the pure intentions of the Great Powers, proposed "that the allies ought, above all things, to conclude a treaty by which the actual *status quo* of the Ottoman Empire should be guaranteed to it," the Russian Ambassador at Paris opposed this proposition to the utmost, affirming "that Russia, in displaying *generosity in her relations with the Porte*, and in showing *inappreciable respect* for the wishes of her allies, had been obliged, nevertheless, to reserve exclusively to herself to determine her own differences with the Divan; that a general guarantee of the Ottoman Empire, independently of its being unusual and surprising, would wound the *feelings of his master* and the *rights* acquired by Russia, and the principles upon which they were founded."

Russia claims now to occupy the Danubian Principalities, without giving to the Porte the right of considering this step as a *casus belli*.

Russia claimed, in 1827, "to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia *in the name of the three Powers*."

Russia proclaimed the following in her declaration of war of April 26, 1828:

"Her allies would always find her ready to concert her march with them, in execution of the Treaty of London, ever anxious to aid in a work which her *religion* and all the sentiments honourable to humanity recommended to her active solicitude, and always disposed to profit by her actual position ONLY for the purpose of accelerating the accomplishment of the Treaty of July 6th." . . .

Russia announced in her manifesto, 10th October, 1829:

"Russia has remained constantly a stranger to every desire of conquest—to every view of aggrandizement."

Her Ambassador at Paris was writing to Count Nesselrode:

"When the Imperial Cabinet examined the question, whether it had become expedient to take up arms against the Porte, there might have existed some doubt about the urgency of this measure in the eyes of those who had not sufficiently reflected upon the *effects of the sanguinary reforms* which the Chief of the Ottoman Empire has just executed with such tremendous violence.

"The Emperor has put the Turkish system to the proof, and His Majesty has found it to possess a commencement of physical and moral organization which it hitherto had not. If the Sultan had been enabled to offer us a more determined and regular resistance, while he had scarcely assembled together the elements of his new plan of reform and ameliorations, how formidable should we have found him had he had time to give it more solidity. Things being in this state we must congratulate ourselves upon having attacked them before they became more dangerous for us, for delay would only have made our relative situation worse, and prepared us greater obstacles than those with which we meet."

Russia proposes now to make an aggressive step and then to talk about it. In 1829 Prince Lieven wrote to Count Nesselrode :

"We shall confine ourselves to generalities, for every circumstantial communication on a subject so delicate would draw down real dangers ; and if once we discuss with our allies the articles of treaty with the Porte, we shall only content them when they will imagine that they have imposed upon us irreparable sacrifices. It is in the midst of our camp that peace must be signed, and it is when it shall have been concluded that Europe must know its conditions. Remonstrances will then be too late, and it will then patiently suffer what it can no longer prevent."

Russia has now for several months been delaying action under one pretence or another, in order to maintain a state of things which, being neither war nor peace, is tolerable to herself, but ruinous to the Turks. She acted in precisely the same manner in the period we have alluded to. As Pozzo di Borgo said :

"It is our policy to see that nothing new happens during the next four months, and I hope we shall accomplish it, because men in general prefer waiting ; but the fifth must be fruitful in events."

The Czar, after having inflicted the greatest indignities on the Turkish Government, and notwithstanding that he now threatens to extort by force the most humiliating concessions, nevertheless raises a great cry about his "friendship for the Sultan Abdul Medjed," and his solicitude "for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire." On the Sultan he throws the "responsibility" of opposing his "just demands," of continuing to "wound his friendship

and his feelings," of rejecting his "note," and of declining his "Protectorate."

In 1828, when Pozzo di Borgo was interpellated by Charles X. about the bad success of the Russian arms in the campaign of that year, he replied, that, not wishing to push the war *à outrance* without absolute necessity, the Emperor had hoped that the Sultan would have profited by his *generosity*, which *experiment* had now failed.

Shortly before commencing her present quarrel with the Porte, Russia sought to bring about a general coalition of the Continental Powers against England on the Refugee Question, and having failed in that experiment, she attempted to bring about a coalition with England against France. Similarly, from 1826 to 1829, she intimidated Austria by the "ambitious projects of Prussia," doing simultaneously all that was in her power to swell the power and pretensions of Prussia, in order to enable her to balance Austria. In her present circular note she indicts Bonaparte as the only disturber of peace by his pretensions respecting the Holy Places; but, at that time, in the language of Pozzo di Borgo, she attributed "all the agitation that pervaded Europe to the agency of Prince Metternich, and tried to make the Duke of Wellington himself perceive that the deference which he would have to the Cabinet of Vienna would be a drawback to his influence with all the others, and to give such a turn to things that it would be no longer Russia that sought to compromise France with Great Britain, but Great Britain who had repudiated France, in order to join the Cabinet of Vienna."

Russia would now submit to a great humiliation if she retreated. That was identically her situation after the first unsuccessful campaign of 1828. What was then her supreme object? We answer in the words of her diplomatist :

"A second campaign is indispensable in order to acquire the superiority requisite for the success of the negotiation. When this negotiation shall take place we must be in a state to dictate the con-

ditions of it in a prompt and rapid manner. . . . *With the power of doing more* His Majesty would consent to *demand less*. To obtain this superiority appears to me what ought to be the aim of all our efforts. *This superiority has now become a condition of our political existence*, such as we must establish and maintain in the eyes of the world."

But does Russia not fear the common action of England and France? Certainly. In the Secret Memoirs on the means possessed by Russia for breaking up the alliance between France and England, revealed during the reign of Louis Phillippe, we are told :

"In the event of a war in which England should coalesce with France, Russia indulges in no hope of success, unless that union be broken up; so that at the least England should consent to remain neutral during the Continental conflict."

The question is: Does Russia believe in a common action of England and France? We quote again from Pozzo di Borgo's despatches :

"From the moment that the idea of the ruin of the Turkish Empire ceases to prevail, it is not probable that the British Government would risk a general war for the sake of exempting the Sultan acceding to such or such condition, above all in the state in which things will be at the commencement of the approaching campaign, when everything will be as yet uncertain and undecided. These considerations would authorize the belief that we have no cause to fear an open rupture on the part of Great Britain; and that she will content herself with counselling the Porte to beg peace, and with lending the aid of the good offices in her power during the negotiation if it takes place, without going further, should the Sultan refuse or we persist."

And as to Nesselrode's opinion of the "good" Aberdeen, the Minister of 1828, and the Minister of 1853, it may be well to quote the following from a despatch by Prince Lieven :

"Lord Aberdeen reiterated in his interview with me the assurance that at no period it had entered into the intentions of England to seek a quarrel with Russia—that he feared that the position of the English Ministry was not well understood at St. Petersburg—that he found himself in a delicate situation. Public opinion was always ready to burst forth against Russia. The British Government could not

constantly BRAVE it; and it would be dangerous to excite it on questions that touched so nearly the national prejudices. On the other side we could reckon with entire confidence upon the friendly dispositions of the English Ministry which struggled against them."

The only thing astonishing in the note of Count Nesselrode, of June 11, is not "The insolent *mélange* of professions refuted by acts and threats veiled in disclaimers," but the reception Russian diplomatic notes meet with for the first time in Europe, calling forth, instead of the habitual awe and admiration, blushes of shame at the past, and disdainful laughter from the Western world at this insolent amalgamation of pretensions, finesse and real barbarism. Yet Nesselrode's circular note, and the *ultimatissimum* of June 16, are not a bit worse than the so much admired masterpieces of Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Lieven. Count Nesselrode was at their time what he is now—the diplomatic head of Russia.

There is a facetious story told of two Persian naturalists who were examining a bear; the one who had never seen such an animal before, inquired whether that animal dropped its cubs alive or laid eggs; to which the other, who was better informed, replied: "That animal is capable of anything." The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing.

En passant, I may mention the signal victory Russia has just won in Denmark, the royal message having passed with a majority of 119 against 28, in the following terms:

"In agreement with the 4th paragraph of the Constitution dated June 5, 1849, the United Parliament, for its part, gives its consent to the arrangement by His Majesty of the succession to the whole Danish Monarchy in accordance with the Royal message respecting the succession of October 4, 1852, renewed June 13, 1853."

XII

Austria and Russia

LONDON, July 5, 1853.

N. Y. T., July 20, 1853

THE courier bearing the rejection of the Russian *ultimatum* on the part of Reschid Pasha, reached St. Petersburg on the 24th ult., and three days later a messenger was despatched with orders for Prince Gortschakoff to cross the Pruth, and to occupy the Principalities.

The Austrian Government had sent Count Gyulai on an extraordinary mission to the Czar, no doubt with a view of cautioning him against the danger of revolution lurking behind any general European war. We may infer the answer of the Russian Cabinet in the present instance from that which it returned to similar representations from the same Power in 1829. It was as follows :

“ On this occasion the Austrian Cabinet has reproduced all the motives of alarm created by the fermentation which, according to its opinion and the information it possesses, reigns in more than one country, as well as the progress lately made by the revolutionary tendencies. These apprehensions are more particularly betrayed in the letter of the Emperor Francis to Nicholas. We are far from denying the dangers which Austria points out to us. Since by means of foreign influence the resistance of the Porte assumes a character of obstinacy which delays beyond our wishes and our hopes the term of this crisis, and even demands redoubled efforts to new sacrifices on our part, Russia will be found to devote more than ever her whole attention to interests which so immediately affect the power and the welfare of her subjects ; from that moment the means which she could oppose to the breaking out of the revolutionary spirit in the rest of Europe must necessarily be paralyzed. No Power then ought to be more interested

than Austria in the conclusion of peace, but of a peace glorious to the Emperor, and advantageous to his Empire. For if the treaty we should sign did not bear this character, the political consideration and influence of Russia would experience through it a fatal blow, the *prestige* of her strength would vanish, and the moral support which she might perhaps be called upon to lend in future contingencies to friendly and allied Powers would be precarious and inefficacious." (Secret despatch from Count Nesselrode to M. de Tatitscheff, dated St. Petersburg, 12th February, 1829.)

The Press of last Saturday stated that the Czar, in his disappointment at the conduct of England, and more especially of Lord Aberdeen, had instructed Baron Brunnow to communicate no longer with that "good" old man, but to restrict himself to his official intercourse with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

The Vienna *Lloyd*, the organ of the Austrian bankocracy, is very determinedly in favour of Austria siding with England and France for the purpose of discountenancing the aggressive policy of Russia.

3

XIII

Layard, Gladstone, Aberdeen, Palmerston

LONDON, *July 8, 1853*

N. Y. T., July 22, 1853

WITH the actual occupation of the Danubian Principalities and the drawing near of the long-predicted crisis, the English press has remarkably lowered its warlike language, and little opposition is made to the advice tendered in two consecutive leaders of *The Times* that "as the Russians could not master their propensity for civilizing barbarian provinces, England had better let them do as they desired, and avoid a disturbance of the peace by vain obstinacy."

The anxiety of the Government to withhold all information on the pending Turkish Question betrayed itself in a most ridiculous farce, acted at the same time in both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Commons Mr. Layard, the celebrated restorer of ancient Nineveh, had given notice that he would move this evening that the fullest information with regard to Turkey and Russia should be laid before the House. On this notice having been given, the following scene occurred in the Lower House:

MR. LAYARD—The notice of my motion was given for to-morrow. I received a note yesterday afternoon asking me to put off the motion to Monday, 11th inst. I was not able to return an answer yesterday afternoon—in fact, not till this morning. To my surprise, I find that without my knowledge, I was in the House yesterday; for I find from the notices of motions printed with the votes, that Mr. Layard postponed his motion from Friday the 8th to Monday 11th!

MR. GLADSTONE—I do not know by whose direction or authority the notice of postponement was placed on the notes of the House. Of one thing I can assure the hon. member, that whatever was done, was done in perfect *bona fides*.

Mr. LAYARD—I should like to know who put that notice of postponement on the paper. What reason have you for deferring the motion to Monday?

Mr. GLADSTONE—An indisposition of Lord J. Russell.

Mr. LAYARD then withdrew his motion until Monday.

The opposite side of the medal was exhibited in the House of Lords, where, at all events, the bodily indisposition of poor little Russell had nothing to do with the motion of the Marquis of Clanricarde, similar to that of Mr. Layard and likewise announced for Friday, after it had already several times been adjourned on the request of Ministers.

[Motion for information inconvenient. Withdrawn. Aberdeen promises to do what Ministers can to prevent discussion on the question in Commons.]

To resume: The House of Commons is first made to adjourn discussion by a fraud. Then, under the pretence that the House of Commons had adjourned discussion, the House of Lords is made to do the same. Then the “noble” Lords resolve to postpone the motion *ad infinitum*; and lastly, the dignity of the “noblest assembly on the face of the earth” requires that the Commons too should postpone the motion *ad infinitum*.

On the interpellation from Mr. Liddell, Lord Palmerston declared in the same sitting:

“I am bound to say, that for many years past, the Government has had reason to complain of the neglect of the Government of Russia to perform its duties as the possessor of the territory of which the Delta of the Danube is composed, and to maintain the Sulina Canal in efficient navigable state, although Russia always admitted that it was her duty to do so, by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople. While these mouths of the Danube formed parts of the Turkish territory, there was maintained a depth of 16 feet on the bar, whereas, by neglect of the Russian authorities, the depth had diminished to 11 feet. There was rivalry on the part of Odessa, where existed a desire to obstruct the export of produce by the Danube, and to divert it, if possible, by way of Odessa.”

Probably the English Ministry hope that, in case of the Principalities becoming Russian, the mouths of the Danube will reopen according as the rivalry of Odessa will be shut.

XIV

The Russo-Turkish Difficulty—Ducking and Dodging of the British Cabinet —Nesselrode's Latest Note

LONDON, *July* 12, 1853
N. Y. T., *July* 25, 1853

THE Parliamentary farce of Thursday last was continued and brought to a close in the sitting of Friday, 8th inst. Lord Palmerston requested Mr. Layard not only to put off his motion to Monday, but never to make any mention of it again. "Monday was now to go the way of Friday." Mr. Bright took the opportunity of congratulating Lord Aberdeen on his cautious policy, and generally to assure him of his entire confidence.

"Were the Peace Society itself the Cabinet," says *The Morning Advertiser*, "it could not have done more to encourage Russia, to discourage France, to endanger Turkey, and discredit England, than the very good Aberdeen. Mr. Bright's speech was meant as a sort of Manchester manifesto in favour of the tremblers of the Cabinet."

The Ministerial efforts for burking the intended question of Mr. Layard originated in a well-founded fear that the internal dissensions in the Cabinet could have been no longer kept a secret from the public. Turkey must fall to pieces, that the Coalition may keep together. Next to Lord Aberdeen, the Ministers most favourable to the tricks

of Russia are the following: The Duke of Argyle, Lord Clarendon, Lord Granville, Mr. Sidney Herbert, Mr. Cardwell, and the "Radical" Sir William Molesworth. Lord Aberdeen is said to have threatened at one time to offer his resignation. The "vigorous" Palmerston (*civis Romanus sum*) party, of course, was only wanting such a pretext for yielding. They resolved that a common representation should be addressed to the Courts of St. Petersburg and Constantinople, recommending that the "privileges demanded by the Czar for the Greek Christians should be secured to Christians of all denominations in the Turkish dominions, under a treaty of guarantee, to which the Great Powers should be parties." This identical proposition was, however, already made to Prince Mentschikoff, on the eve of his departure from Constantinople; and was made, as everybody knows, to no purpose. It is, therefore, utterly ridiculous to expect any result from its repetition, the more so as it is now a matter beyond all doubt that what Russia insists upon having is exactly a treaty which the Great Powers, viz., Austria and Prussia, now no longer resist. Count Buol, the Austrian Premier, is brother-in-law to Count Pouilly Mensdorff, the Russian Minister, and acts in perfect agreement with Russia. On the same day on which the two Coalition parties, the slumbering and the "vigorous," came to the above resolution, the *Patrie* published the following:

"The new Internuncio of Austria at Constantinople, M. de Bruck, commenced by calling upon the Porte to pay 5,000,000 piastres as an indemnity, and to consent to the delivery of the ports of Kleck and Sutorina. This demand was considered as a support given to Russia."

This is not the only support given by Austria to the Russian interests at Constantinople. In 1848 it will be remembered that, whenever the Princes wanted to shoot their people, they provided a "misunderstanding." The same stratagem is now being employed against Turkey. The Austrian Consul at Smyrna causes the kidnapping of a Hungarian from an English coffee-house on board an

Austrian vessel, and after the refugees have answered this attempt by the killing of an Austrian officer and the wounding another one, M. de Bruck demands satisfaction from the Porte within twenty-four hours. Simultaneously with this news, *The Morning Post* of Saturday reports a rumour that the Austrians had entered Bosnia. The Coalition, questioned as to the authenticity of this rumour, in yesterday's sitting of both Houses of Parliament had, of course, received "no information," Russell alone venturing the suggestion that the rumour had probably no other foundation than the fact that the Austrians had collected troops at Peterwardein. Thus is fulfilled the prediction of M. de Gatischeff in 1828, that Austria, when things were come to a decisive turn, would eagerly make ready for sharing in the spoil.

A despatch from Constantinople, dated 26th ult., states :

"The Sultan, in consequence of the rumours that the whole Russian fleet has left Sebastopol and is directing its course toward the Bosphorus, has inquired of the Ambassadors of England and France whether, in the event of the Russians making a demonstration before the Bosphorus, the combined fleets are ready to pass the Dardanelles. Both answered in the affirmative. A Turkish steamer, with French and English officers on board, has just been sent from the Bosphorus to the Black Sea in order to *reconnoître*."

The first thing the Russians did, after their entry into the Principalities, was to prohibit the publication of the Sultan's firman, confirming the privileges of all kinds of Christians, and to suppress a German paper, edited at Bucharest, which had dared to publish an article on the Eastern question. At the same time, they pressed from the Turkish Government the first annuity stipulated for in their former occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, in 1848-49. Since 1828 the Protectorate of Russia has cost the Principalities 150,000,000 piastres, besides the immense losses caused through pillage and devastation. England defrayed the expenses of Russia's wars against France, France that of her war against Persia, Persia that of her war against Turkey, Turkey and England that of her war against

Poland; Hungary and the Principalities have now to pay for her war against Turkey.

The most important event of the day is the new Circular Note of Count Nesselrode, dated St. Petersburg, 20th June, 1853. It declares that the Russian armies will not evacuate the Principalities until the Sultan shall have yielded to all the demands of the Czar, and the French and English fleets shall have left the Turkish waters. The Note in question reads like direct scorn of England and France. Thus it says :

"The position taken by the two maritime Powers is a maritime occupation which gives us a reason for re-establishing the equilibrium of the reciprocal situations by taking up a military position."

Be it remarked that Besika Bay is at a distance of 150 miles from Constantinople. The Czar claims for himself the right of occupying Turkish territory, while he defies England and France to occupy neutral waters without his special permission. He extols his own magnanimous forbearance in having left the Porte complete mistress of choosing under what form she will abdicate her sovereignty—whether "convention, sened, or other synallagmatic act, or even under the form of signing a simple note." He is persuaded that "impartial Europe" must understand that the treaty of Kainardji, which gives Russia the right of protecting a single Greek chapel at Stamboul, proclaims her *eo ipso* the Rome of the Orient. He regrets that the West is ignorant of the inoffensive character of a Russian religious Protectorate in foreign countries. He proves his solicitude for the integrity of the Turkish Empire by historical facts—"the very moderate use he made in 1829 of his victory at Adrianople," when he was only prevented from being immoderate by the miserable condition of his army, and by the threat of the English admiral, that, authorized or not authorized, he would bombard every coast-place along the Black Sea; when all he obtained was due to the "forbearance" of the Western Cabinets, and the perfidious destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino. "In 1833 he

alone in Europe saved Turkey from inevitable dismemberment." In 1833 the Czar concluded, through the famous treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, *a defensive alliance* with Turkey, by which foreign fleets were forbidden to approach Constantinople, by which Turkey was saved only from dismemberment in order to be saved entire for Russia. "In 1839, he took the initiative with the other Powers in the propositions which, executed in common, prevented the Sultan from seeing his throne give place to a new Arabian Empire." That is to say, in 1839 he made the other Powers take the initiative in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet, and in the reduction to impotence of the only man who might have converted Turkey into a vital danger to Russia, and replaced a "dressed-up turban" by a real head. "The fundamental principle of the policy of our august master has always been to maintain, as long as possible, the *status quo* of the East." Just so. He has carefully preserved the decomposition of the Turkish State, under the exclusive guardianship of Russia.

It must be granted that a more ironical document the East has never dared to throw in the face of the West. But its author is Nesselrode—a nettle, at once and a rod. It is a document, indeed, of Europe's degradation under the rod of counter-revolution. Revolutionists may congratulate the Czar on this masterpiece. If Europe withdraws, she withdraws not with a simple defeat, but passes, as it were, under *furcæ Caudinæ*.

While the English Queen is, at this moment, feasting Russian Princesses; while an enlightened English aristocracy and bourgeoisie lie prostrate before the barbarian Autocrat, the English proletariat alone protests against the impotency and degradation of the ruling classes. On the 7th July the Manchester School held a great Peace meeting in the Odd Fellows' Hall, at Halifax. Crossley, M.P. for Halifax, and all the other "great men" of the School had especially flocked to the meeting from "Town." The hall was crowded, and many thousands could obtain no admittance. Ernest Jones (whose agitation in the factory

districts is gloriously progressing, as you may infer from the number of Charter petitions presented to Parliament, and from the attacks of the middle-class provincial press) was at the time at Durham. The Chartists of Halifax, the place where he has twice been nominated and declared by show of hands as a candidate for the House of Commons, summoned him by electric telegraph, and he appeared just in time for the meeting. Already the gentlemen of the Manchester School believed they would carry their resolution, and would be able to bring home the support of the manufacturing districts to their good Aberdeen, when Ernest Jones rose and put an amendment pledging the people to *war*, and declaring that before liberty was established peace was a crime. There ensued a most violent discussion, but the amendment of Ernest Jones was carried by an immense majority.

XV

The Russian Question—Curious Diplomatic Correspondence

LONDON, *July 15, 1853*
N. Y. T., July 30, 1853

YESTERDAY, in the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli asked Ministers whether, after the latest circular note of the Russian Cabinet, Mr. Layard might not very properly bring in his motion. Lord John Russell answered, that it appeared to him by far the best not to hear Mr. Layard at present, as since the publication of that note it was more important than ever to negotiate. "The notion of the honourable member, that negotiations had now come to a dead-lock, was an erroneous notion." Lord John, while actually confessing his Aberdeen *credo*, attempted to re-vindicate the dignity of the *civis Romanus sum* party in the following words:

"I naturally supposed that a person of the experience and sagacity of Count Nesselrode would not have affixed his signature to a document declaring to all the world that the Russian Government made the removal of the combined fleets the condition of its evacuation of the Principalities."

In the subsequent Indian debate Mr. Bright moved, that from the ninth clause, which provides, "that six of the directors not elected by the Crown shall be persons who have been ten years in India in the service of the Crown or the Company," the words "in the service of the Crown or the Company" should be expunged. The amendment was

agreed to. It is significant that during the whole Indian debate no amendments are agreed to by the Ministry, and consequently carried by the House, except those of Mr. Bright. The peace Ministry at this moment does everything to secure its *entente cordiale* with the peace party, the Manchester School, who are opposed to any kind of warfare, except by cotton bales and price currents.

M. Drouyn de l'Huys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, once upper clerk at the Foreign Office under M. Guizot, and declared by his *chef* to possess hardly the necessary qualifications for that place, is now indulging freely in the pleasure of exchanging notes and circulars with Count Nesselrode. The *Moniteur* of yesterday brings his reply to the latest (2nd) *circulaire* of the Russian Minister, which concludes in the following terms :

"The moderation of France takes from her all responsibility, and gives her the right to hope that all the sacrifices which she has made to secure the tranquillity of the East will not have been in vain ; that the Russian Government will at length discover some mode of reconciling its pretensions with the prerogatives of the Sultan's sovereignty ; and that an arrangement will be devised that shall settle, without resort to force, a question on the solution of which so many interests are dependent."

I mentioned in a former letter the propositions once made by M. de Villèle to Russia, for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, by a treaty of guarantee between all the Great Powers—propositions which called forth this reply from Count Pozzo di Borgo :

"That a general guarantee of the Ottoman Empire, independently of its being unusual and surprising, would wound the rights acquired by Russia, and the principles upon which they are founded."

Well, in 1841, Russia nevertheless agreed to become party to such an unusual treaty, and Nesselrode himself, in his note of 20th June (2nd July), refers to that treaty. Why did Russia assent to it, in contradiction to her traditional policy ? Because that treaty was not one of "guarantee of the Ottoman Empire," but rather of execu-

tion against its then only vital element, Egypt, under Mehemet Ali—because it was a coalition against France, at least in its original intention.

The Paris journal *La Presse* gives in its number of to-day, which has just come to my hands, a correspondence, never before published, between the late General Sebastiani, Ambassador in London, and Mme. Adelaide, sister of Louis Philippe—a correspondence which throws a remarkable light on the diplomatic transactions of that epoch. It contains clear proofs that the treaty of 1841, far from having been originated by Russia, as Nesselrode affirms in his note, was, on the contrary, originated by France and England against Russia, and was only afterwards turned by Russia into a weapon against France. I translate from this important correspondence as much as the pressure of time permits me to :

I.]

LONDON, June 12, 1833.

I have had to-day a conference of two hours' duration with Lord Palmerston. I have been highly satisfied with him. I was not mistaken in assuring you that he was a friend of King Leopold, and, above all, a great partisan of the French Alliance. Lord Palmerston has conversed a great deal with me on Oriental affairs. He thinks that the Pasha of Egypt is decided as to his course of action. He wishes that England and France should make fresh efforts, supported by the presence of their fleets, in order to intimidate Mehemet, and that simultaneously our Ambassadors at Constantinople should inform the Sultan that they have received orders from the Courts to assure him of their support against the attempts of the Pasha of Egypt, upon condition that he will not take the initiative in hostilities. I believe this to be a prudent course, and advisable to be followed by England and France. We must maintain the Porte, and not suffer the provinces of Egypt, Syria, and Celesyria to become detached from it. Russia only awaits the moment for marching up her succours to the Sultan, and that assistance would be the end of the Ottoman Empire.

II.]

LONDON, April 21, 1836.

In this country all parties are unanimous as to the necessity of closely watching Russia, and I believe that the Tory party is more decided than the Whigs, or, at least, it seems so, because it is not moderated by office.

III.]

LONDON, July 6, 1838.

People in this country believe in the general understanding of Europe as to the Oriental question. The answer from Paris is impatiently looked for. I do not think I have surpassed the line of conduct traced out for me by the King in several conversations. As soon as the *entente* shall be established in principle, the manner of action and the position to be taken up by each of the Powers will be regulated according to contingencies. The part Russia has to play must, of course, be maritime, like that of France and England; and in order to prevent any danger that might result from the action of the fleet in the Black Sea, she must be brought to understand that her squadron in the combined fleet is to be drawn from the Baltic.

IV.]

LONDON, October 3, 1839.

England has not accepted the Russian propositions, and Lord Palmerston informed me, on the part of the Government, that she had refused, in order to remain true to the French Alliance. Induced by the same feeling, she consents that Mehemet Ali shall receive the hereditary possession of Egypt, and of that portion of Syria within a boundary to be demarked, which should go from St. Jean d'Acre to the lake of Tabariyeh. We have, not without difficulty, obtained the assent of the English Government to these latter propositions. I do not think that such an arrangement would be rejected by either France or Mehemet Ali. The Oriental question simplifies itself; it will be terminated by the concurrence of the Powers, and under the guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. All the principles are maintained. The Sublime Porte is admitted to the law of nations of Europe. *The exclusive Protectorate of Russia is annihilated.* I have asked myself why the Republican faction in France showed itself so favourable to Mehemet Ali, and why it has so warmly espoused his cause. I have not been able to find out any other motive but the revolutionary principle, that of trying to support, to encourage all that is likely to subvert established governments. I believe we ought never to give in to such a snare.

V.]

LONDON, November 30, 1839.

I learn from an authentic source that Lord Palmerston, in the last council of Ministers, when giving an account of the situation of Oriental affairs, and of the differences existing between the French and English policies, did so with a moderation and a regard for the alliance of both countries that deserve our gratitude. He has even drawn the attention of his colleagues to a system similar to that mentioned by me. In conclusion, he has yielded as to forms, and has renounced a policy of action and of inevitable complication.

VI.]

LONDON, December 12, 1839.

I have seen Lord Palmerston, as I was anxious to know whether

he had to inform me of anything respecting the communication he recently made to me. He has read to me the letter of Count Nesselrode to the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, which corresponded exactly with what he had told me. The arrival of Baron Brunnow will initiate us into the secret thoughts of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. Lord Palmerston has been charming in forms and in matter. He views with pleasure the return of good feelings between the French and English Cabinets, and the continuation of the alliance. Believe me, I do not exaggerate in this. I told him with the confidence of truth that the new situation was exactly such as France had always wished it to be. He was forced to recognise this himself. The Prince Esterhazy has written to his *Chargé d'Affaires* that he has been extremely content with the Marshal, and that he is trying at this moment to bring back the French Cabinet to an *entente* with Austria, but that he has found the King *unmanageable*. I can well believe it. The King does not lend his mind to such impracticable divagations. This I write for you alone. Indeed, I believe with your Royal Highness that *Russia will be caught in her own net*.

VII.]

LONDON, December 18, 1839.

I have received this morning a despatch, more than usually strange, from the Marshal. It is an answer to the letter in which I reported to him on the communication I made to Lord Palmerston in regard to the impression evoked at Paris on the announcement of the new mission of Baron Brunnow, and of its aim. I have read to Lord Palmerston *textuellement* the paragraph of the despatch addressed to me by the Marshal. But in the statement I made to him about it, I made use of such terms as rendered the same ideas without being identical with those of the Marshal. Now the Marshal is kind enough to assure me that there was no difference between my words and his own expressions; but he recommends me to double my circumspection and endeavour to re-establish in our negotiations the textual meaning of his own despatches. I am much mistaken if this is not a *querelle allemande*, a subtlety worthy of a *Grec du Bas-Empire*. . . . The Marshal is a novice in the career of diplomacy, and I fear that he seeks ability in *finesse*. He can find it only in sincerity and straightforwardness.

VIII.]

LONDON, January 3, 1840.

Yesterday Lord Palmerston dined with me, in common with the whole *Corps Diplomatique*. . . . He told me that ministers were going to ask for a supplementary vote for their naval forces, but he stated that he would propose to his colleagues not to demand it on account of the reinforcements of the French fleet, in order to avoid wounding an ally by the least allusion. Lord Holland and Lord

John Russell are admirable in their efforts for maintaining the alliance.

IX.]

LONDON, January 20, 1840.

Lord Palmerston has communicated to me the project of a Convention to be submitted to the Great Powers and to the Porte. . . . It is not a Convention of the five Great Powers between themselves, but a Convention of these same Powers with the Porte. . . . *Baron Brunnow objects to that form* (see Nesselrode's note, dated 2nd July, about the Russian initiative!). . . . This Convention consists of a preamble and of eight articles: in the former it is stated in a positive manner, and almost textually, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, being essentially necessary for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the five Powers are disposed to lend it the requisite support, and to make it enter into the international confidence of Europe. The articles regulate that support. . . .

P.S.—I learn, at this moment, that *Brunnow and Neumann are utterly discontented with the convention of Lord Palmerston.*

X.]

LONDON, January 21, 1840.

The project of convention drawn up by Lord Palmerston appears to me to have been rejected by the Russian and Austrian negotiators. *M. de Neumann* distinguished himself by the violence and, I venture to say, the stupidity of his complaints. He unveils the policy of his Court. Prince Metternich, who intended to keep in his hands the balance of power, openly avows his hatred of Russia. He flattered himself that he would see the propositions of Brunnow received without restrictions, and both have been disappointed to find in Lord Palmerston a Minister who desires sincerely an alliance with France, and who is anxious to operate in understanding with her.

XI.]

LONDON, January 24, 1840.

To-day I had a long conversation with Lord Melbourne, who is a thorough partisan of the alliance with our King. He repeatedly called upon me to show him some means by which a combination of the French and English propositions could be effected.

He judges in the same light as we do the intentions of Russia, and he told me, in a conference with regard to the *Vienna Cabinet*, that *it was not to be trusted, because it always turned out in the end to be the devoted partisan of Russia.*

XII.]

LONDON, January 27, 1840.

The turn now being taken by Oriental affairs is alarming to me. . . . There is no doubt that Russia is pushing on to war, and that Austria supports her with all her forces. . . . They have succeeded in frightening England with the "projects of France on the Mediterranean." Algiers and Mehemet Ali are the two means

employed by them. . . . I am making all possible efforts to obtain the rejection of the Brunnow propositions, and I had nearly succeeded when they heard of it, and Austria now presents the Brunnow propositions as her own. This is palpable trickery. But the Council has been convoked, in order to deliberate on the Austrian propositions. It is divided. On the one side there are Lord Melbourne, Lord Holland, and Mr. Labouchere; on the other, Lord Palmerston, Lord J. Russell, and Lord Minto. The other members are fluctuating between the two opinions.

XIII.]

LONDON, *January 28, 1840.*

The Council has hitherto only deliberated on one point of the project of Lord Palmerston. It has decided that the Convention shall be made between six, and not between five (Powers), as proposed by Baron Brunnow, who was not wanting in zeal for his particular interests (solicitude for the Ottoman Empire). The Porte would not consent to a Convention discussed and settled without her co-operation. *By signing a Treaty with the five Great Powers she would in consequence of this fact itself come under the European law of nations.*

XIV.]

LONDON, *January 28, 1840.*

Are the politics and the interest of the King given up to the caprices of M. Thiers and his newspaper? The system founded with such great pains, with such efforts, and maintained, notwithstanding so many difficulties, for more than ten years, is doomed to destruction.

XVI

Russia and the Western Powers

LONDON, *July 19, 1853*
N. Y. T., August 5, 1853

THE Czar has not only commenced war, he has already terminated his first campaign. The line of operations is no longer behind the Pruth, but along the Danube. Meanwhile, what are the Western Powers about? They counsel. *i.e.* compel, the Sultan to consider the war as peace. Their answers to the acts of the Autocrat are not cannons, but notes. The Emperor is assailed, not by the two fleets, but by no less than four projects of negotiation: one emanating from the English Cabinet, the other from the French, the third presented by Austria, and the fourth improvised by the "brother-in-law" of Potsdam. The Czar, it is hoped, will consent to select from this *embarras de richesses* that which is most suitable to his purposes. The (second) reply of M. Drouyn de l'Huys to the (second) note of Count Nesselrode takes infinite pains to prove that "it was not England and France who made the first demonstration." Russia only throws out so many notes to the Western diplomats, like bones to dogs, in order to set them at an innocent amusement, while she reaps the advantage of further gaining time. England and France, of course, catch the bait. As if the receipt of such a note were not a sufficient degradation, the note received a most pacific comment in the *Journal de l'Empire* in an article signed by M. de la Guéronnière, but written from notes given by the Emperor and revised by him. That article

"would permit to Russia the choice of negotiating on the right bank rather than on the left bank of the Pruth." It actually converts the second note of Count Nesselrode into an "attempt at reconciliation." This is done in the following style:

"Count Nesselrode now speaks only of a moral guarantee, and he announces that, for it, is substituted provisionally a material guarantee, *thus making a direct appeal to negotiation*. That being the case, it is impossible to consider the action of diplomatists exhausted."

The *Assemblée Nationale*, the Russian *Moniteur* at Paris, ironically congratulates the *Journal de l'Empire* on its discovery, however late it had made it, and regrets only that so much noise should have been made to no purpose.

The English press has lost all countenance. "The Czar cannot comprehend the courtesy which the Western Powers have shown to him. . . . He is incapable of courteous demeanour in his transactions with other Powers." So says *The Morning Advertiser*. *The Morning Post* is exasperated because the Czar takes so little note of the internal *embarras* of his opponents:

"To have put forward, in the mere wantonness of insolence, a claim that possessed no character of immediate urgency, and to have done so without any reference to the inflammable state of Europe, was an indiscretion almost incredible."

The writer of the Money Market article in *The Economist* finds out "that men discover now to their cost how inconvenient it is that all the most secret interests of the world [*i.e.* of the Exchange] are dependent upon the vagaries of one man."

Yet in 1848 and 1849 you could see the bust of the Emperor of Russia side by side with the golden calf itself.

Meanwhile the position of the Sultan is becoming every hour more difficult and complicated. His financial embarrassments increase the more, as he bears all the burdens, without reaping any of the good chances, of war. Popular enthusiasm turns round upon him for want of being directed against the Czar. The fanaticism of the Mussul-

man threatens him with palace revolutions, while the fanaticism of the Greek menaces him with popular insurrections. The papers of to-day contain reports of a conspiracy directed against the Sultan's life by Mussulman students belonging to the old Turkish party, who wanted to place Abdul-Aziz on the throne.

In the House of Lords yesterday, Lord Clarendon was asked by Lords Beaumont and Malmesbury to state his intentions, now that the Emperor of France had not hesitated to pronounce his. Lord Clarendon, however, beside a brief avowal that England had endorsed the note of M. Drouyn de l'Huys, concealed himself behind his entrenchment of promises that he would certainly very soon give full information to the House. On the question whether it was true that the Russians had also seized the civil government and the Post Offices of the Principalities, which they had placed under military occupation, Lord Clarendon remained "silent," of course! "He would not believe it after the proclamation of Prince Gortschakoff." Lord Beaumont replied that he seemed to be very sanguine indeed.

To a question concerning the late Smyrna affray, put by Sir J. Walmsley in the House of Commons, Lord John Russell replied that he had heard indeed of the kidnapping of one Hungarian refugee by the Consul of Austria; but as to Austria having demanded the extradition of all Hungarian and Italian refugees, he had certainly heard nothing of that. Lord John manages interpellations in a style altogether pleasant and not without convenience to himself. Official information he never receives; and in the newspapers he never reads anything that you want him or expect him to have read.

The *Kölnische Zeitung*, in a letter dated Vienna, July 11, contains the following report on the Smyrna affair :

"Shekib Effendi has been sent to Smyrna in order to commence an instruction against the authors of the sedition in which Baron Hackenberg perished. Shekib has also received orders to deliver to Austria the refugees of Austrian or Tuscan origin. Mr. Brown, *chargé*

d'affaires of the United States, has had communications on this subject with Reschid Pasha, the result of which is not yet known. I hear at this moment that the assassin of Baron Hackelberg has received from the American Consul at Smyrna a passport that places him out of the reach of the Turkish authorities. *This fact proves that the United States intend intervening in European affairs.* It is also certain that three American men-of-war are with the Turkish fleet in the Bosphorus, and further, that the American frigate *Cumberland* has brought 80,000,000 of piastres to the Turkish Government."

Whatever truth there be in this and like reports, they prove one thing; viz., that American intervention is expected everywhere, and is even looked upon with favour by portions of the English public. The behaviour of the American Captain and Consul are loudly praised in popular meetings, and an "Englishman" in *The Advertiser* of yesterday called upon the Stars and Stripes to appear in the Mediterranean, and to shame the "muddy old Union Jack" into activity.

To sum up the Eastern Question in a few words. The Czar, vexed and dissatisfied at seeing his immense Empire confined to one sole port of export, and that even situated in a sea unnavigable through one half of the year, and assailable by Englishmen through the other half, is pushing the design of his ancestors, to get access to the Mediterranean; he is separating, one after another, the remotest members of the Ottoman Empire from its main body, till at last Constantinople, the heart, must cease to beat. He repeats his periodical invasions as often as he thinks his designs on Turkey endangered by the apparent consolidation of the Turkish Government, or by the more dangerous symptoms of self-emancipation manifest amongst the Slavonians. Counting on the cowardice and apprehensions of the Western Powers, he bullies Europe, and pushes his demands as far as possible, in order to appear magnanimous afterwards, by contenting himself with what he immediately wanted.

The Western Powers, on the other hand, inconsistent, pusillanimous, suspecting each other, commence by encouraging the Sultan to resist the Czar, from fear of the

encroachments of Russia, and terminate by compelling the former to yield, from fear of a general war giving rise to a general revolution. Too impotent and too timid to undertake the reconstruction of the Ottoman Empire by the establishment of a Greek Empire, or of a Federal Republic of Slavonic States, all they aim at is to maintain the *status quo*, *i.e.* the state of putrefaction which forbids the Sultan to emancipate himself from the Czar, and the Slavonians to emancipate themselves from the Sultan.

The revolutionary party can only congratulate itself on this state of things. The humiliation of the reactionary Western Governments, and their manifest impotency to guard the interests of European civilization against Russian encroachment, cannot fail to work out a wholesome indignation in the people who have suffered themselves, since 1849, to be subjected to the rule of counter-revolution. The approaching industrial crisis, also, is affected, and accelerated quite as much by this semi-Eastern complication as by the completely Eastern complication of China. While the prices of corn are rising, business in general is suspended, at the same time that the rate of exchange is setting against England, and gold is beginning to flow to the Continent. The stock of bullion in the Bank of France has fallen off between the 9th of June and the 14th of July to the extent of £2,220,000, which is more than the entire augmentation which had taken place during the preceding three months.

XVII

Traditional Policy of Russia

LONDON, July 29, 1853
N. Y. T., August 12, 1853

THE last of the Constitutions of 1848 has now been overthrown by the *coup d'état* of the Danish king. A Russian Constitution has been conferred upon the country, which, by the abolition of the *Lex Regia*, was doomed to become a Russian province. In a subsequent letter I shall give an *exposé* of the affairs of that country.

"It is our policy to see that nothing new happens during the next four months, and I hope we shall accomplish it, because *men in general prefer waiting*; but the fifth must be fruitful in events."

Thus wrote Count Pozzo di Borgo on the 28th November, 1828, to Count Nesselrode, and Count Nesselrode is now acting on the same maxim. While the military assumption of the Principalities was completed by the assumption of their civil government by the Russians, while troops after troops are pouring into Bessarabia and the Crimea, a hint has been given to Austria that her mediation might be accepted, and another to Bonaparte that his proposals were likely to meet with a favourable reception from the Czar. The Ministers at Paris and London were comforted with the prospect that Nicholas would condescend to definitely accept their excuses. All the Courts of Europe, transformed into so many Sultanas, were anxiously awaiting which of them the magnanimous Commander of the Faithful would throw his handkerchief to. Having kept them

in this manner for weeks, nay for months, in suspense, Nicholas suddenly makes a declaration that neither England, nor France, nor Austria, nor Prussia, has any business in his quarrel with Turkey, and that with Turkey alone he could negotiate. It was probably in order to facilitate his negotiations with Turkey that he recalled his Embassy from Constantinople. But while he declares that the Powers are not to meddle in Russia's concerns, we are informed, on the other hand, that the representatives of France, England, Austria, and Russia kill their time by meeting in conference at Vienna, and in hatching projects for the arrangement of the Eastern Question, neither the Turkish nor Russian Ambassador participating in these mock conferences. The Sultan had appointed, on the 8th inst., a warlike Ministry, in order to escape from his armed suspension, but was compelled by Lord Redcliffe to dismiss it on the same evening. He has now been so much confused that he intends to send an Austrian courier to St. Petersburg with the mission of asking whether the Czar would re-enter into direct negotiations. On the return of that courier and the answer he brings will depend whether Reschid Pasha is himself to go to St. Petersburg. From St. Petersburg he is to send new draft notes to Constantinople; the new draft notes are to be returned to St. Petersburg, and nothing will be settled before the last answer is again returned from St. Petersburg to Constantinople—and then the fifth month will have arrived, and no fleets can enter the Black Sea; and then the Czar will quietly remain during the winter in the Principalities, where he pays with the same promises that still circulate there from his former occupations, and as far back as 1820.

You know that the Servian Minister Garaschanin has been removed at the instance of Russia. Russia insists now, following up that first triumph, on all anti-Russian officers being expelled the service. This measure, in its turn, was intended to be followed by the reigning Prince Alexander being replaced by Prince Michael Obrenowich, the absolute tool of Russia and Russian interests. Prince

Alexander, to escape from this calamity, and likewise under the pressure of Austria, has struck against the Sultan, and declared his intention of observing a strict neutrality. The Russian intrigues in Servia are thus described in the *Presse* of Paris :

"Everybody knows that the Russian Consulate at Orsova—a miserable village where not a single Russian subject is to be found, but situated in the midst of a Servian population—is only a poor establishment, yet it is made the hotbed of Muscovite propaganda. The hand of Russia was judiciously seized and established in the affair of Braila in 1840, and of John Lutzo in 1850, in the affair of the recent arrest of fourteen Russian officers, which arrest became the cause of the resignation of Garaschanin's Ministry. It is likewise known that Prince Mentschikoff, during his stay at Constantinople, fomented similar intrigues through his agents at Broussa and Smyrna, to those in Thessalonica, Albania, and Greece."

There is no more striking feature in the politics of Russia than the traditional identity, not only of her objects, but of her manner of pursuing them. There is no complication of the present Eastern Question, no transaction, no official note, which does not bear the stamp of quotation from known pages of history.

Russia has now no other pretext to urge against the Sultan except the treaty of Kainardji, although that treaty gave her, instead of a Protectorate over her co-religionists, only the right to build a chapel at Stamboul, and to implore the Sultan's clemency for his Christian subjects, as Reschid Pasha justly urged against the Czar in his note of the 14th inst. But already in 1794, when that treaty was signed, Russia intended to interpret it one day or the other in the sense of 1853. The then Austrian Internuncio at the Ottoman Porte, Baron Thugut, wrote in the year 1774 to his Court :

"Henceforth Russia will always be in a situation to effect, whenever she may deem the opportunity favourable, and without much preliminary arrangement, a descent upon Constantinople from her ports on the Black Sea. In that case a conspiracy concerted in advance with the chiefs of the Greek religion would no doubt burst forth, and it would only remain for the Sultan to quit his palace at

the first intelligence of this movement of the Russians, to fly into the depth of Asia, and abandon the throne of European Turkey to a more experienced possessor. When the capital shall have been conquered, terrorism and the faithful assistance of the Greek Christians will indubitably and easily reduce beneath the sceptre of Russia, the whole of the Archipelago, the coast of Asia Minor and all Greece, as far as the shore of the Adriatic. Then the possession of these countries, so much favoured by nature, with which no other part of the world can be compared in respect to the fertility and richness of the soil, will elevate Russia to a degree of superiority surpassing all the fabulous wonders which history relates of the grandeurs of the monarchies of ancient times."

In 1774, as now, Russia was tempting the ambition of Austria with the prospect of Bosnia, Servia, and Albania being incorporated with her. The same Baron Thugut writes thus on this subject:

[Inhabitants are (1) Mahommedans (who would not stay after Austria had gained the provinces); (2) Greek Christians (who would move into the Russian provinces or trouble Austria).]

Politicians are wont to refer to the Testament of Peter I., in order to show the traditional policy of Russia in general, and particularly with regard to her views on Constantinople. They might have gone back still further. More than eight centuries ago, Sviataslaff, the yet Pagan Grand Duke of Russia, declared in an assembly of his Boyards, that "not only Bulgaria, but the Greek Empire in Europe, together with Bohemia and Hungary, ought to undergo the rule of Russia." Sviataslaff conquered Silistria and threatened Constantinople, A.D. 769, as Nicholas did in 1828. The Rurik dynasty transferred, soon after the foundation of the Russian Empire, their capital from Novgorod to Kiev, in order to be nearer to Byzantium. In the eleventh century Kiev imitated in all things Constantinople, and was called the *second Constantinople*, thus expressing the everlasting aspirations of Russia. The religion and civilization of Russia are of Byzantine offspring, and that she should have aimed at subduing the Byzantine Empire, then in the same decay as the Ottoman

Empire is in now, was more natural than that the German Emperors should have aimed at the conquest of Rome and Italy. The unity, then, in the objects of Russian policy, is given by her historical past, by her geographical conditions, and by her necessity of gaining open seaports in the Archipelago as in the Baltic, if she wants to maintain her supremacy in Europe. But the traditional manner in which Russia pursues those objects is far from meriting that tribute of admiration paid to it by European politicians. If the success of her hereditary policy proves the weakness of the Western Powers, the stereotyped mannerism of that policy proves the intrinsic barbarism of Russia herself. Who would not laugh at the idea of French politics being conducted on the Testament of Richelieu, or the Capitularies of Charlemagne? Go through the most celebrated documents of Russian diplomacy, and you will find that shrewd, judicious, cunning, subtle as it is in discovering the weak points of European kings, ministers, and courts, its wisdom is at a complete dead-lock as often as the historical movements of the Western peoples themselves are concerned. Prince Lieven judged very accurately of the character of the good Aberdeen when he speculated on his connivance with the Czar, but he was grossly mistaken in his judgment of the English people when he predicted the continuance of Tory rule on the eve of the Reform movement of 1831. Count Pozzo di Borgo judged very correctly of Charles X., but he made the greatest blunder with regard to the French people when he induced his "august master" to treat with that king about the partition of Europe on the eve of his expulsion from France. Russian policy, with its traditional craft, cheats, and subterfuges, may impose upon the European Courts which are themselves but traditional things, but it will prove utterly powerless with the revolutionized peoples.

At Beirut the Americans have abstracted another Hungarian refugee from the claws of the Austrian eagle. It is cheering to see the American intervention in Europe beginning just with the Eastern Question. Besides the

commercial and military importance resulting from the situation of Constantinople, there are other important considerations, making its possession the hotly controverted and permanent subject of dispute between the East and the West—and America is the youngest and most vigorous representative of the West.

Constantinople is the eternal city—the Rome of the East. Under the ancient Greek Emperors, Western civilization amalgamated there so far with Eastern barbarism, and under the Turks, Eastern barbarism amalgamated so far with Western civilization, as to make this centre of a theoretical Empire the effectual bar against European progress. When the Greek Emperors were turned out by the Sultans of Iconium, the genius of the ancient Byzantine Empire survived this change of dynasties, and if the Sultan were to be supplanted by the Czar, the *Bas-Empire* would be restored to life with more demoralizing influences than under the ancient Emperors, and with more aggressive power than under the Sultan. The Czar would be for Byzantine civilization what Russian adventurers were for centuries to the Emperors of the Lower Empire—the *corps de garde* of their soldiers. The struggle between Western Europe and Russia about the possession of Constantinople involves the question whether Byzantinism is to fall before Western civilization, or whether its antagonism shall revive in a more terrible and conquering form than ever before. Constantinople is the golden bridge thrown between the West and the East, and Western civilization cannot, like the sun, go round the world without passing that bridge; and it cannot pass it without a struggle with Russia. The Sultan holds Constantinople only in trust for the Revolution, and the present nominal dignitaries of Western Europe, themselves finding the last stronghold of their "order" on the shores of the Neva, can do nothing but keep the question in suspense until Russia has to meet her real antagonist, the Revolution. The Revolution which will break the Rome of the West will also overpower the demoniac influences of the Rome of the East.

XVIII

The Press on Eastern Affairs—Notes of England and Russia

LONDON, August 2, 1853
N. Y. T., August 16, 1853

DAY after day the columns of the press are inundated with conflicting despatches on the Eastern affairs, manufactured in Vienna and Berlin, partly by Russian agents, in order to deceive the French and British public as to the operations of Russia, and partly on orders sent expressly from Paris for stockjobbing purposes. A declaration contained in to-day's *Morning Post* would command consideration were it not that the Palmerstonian organ had quite abused such threats, which it only proffered one day in order to withdraw them again the day after.

"By the 10th of August the whole matter will be terminated peaceably, or the combined fleets will be commanded to proceed to the Bosphorus, or perhaps to the Black Sea. Active measures will succeed patient negotiation, and the threat of danger will no longer prevent the strong means which may ensure safety. If the Czar accept the proposal now made, the first condition will be the *immediate* evacuation of the Principalities."

The Morning Post then asserts that on the 24th ult. the representatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia convened on the terms of an ultimatum immediately forwarded to St. Petersburg. This assertion, however, is contradictory to the late declarations of Lord Clarendon and Lord John Russell, who spoke only of a joint note of France

and England, and it is altogether ignored by the French press. Yet, be this as it may, it indicates, at least, that the Palmerston party in the Cabinet has handed an ultimatum to the good Aberdeen, which the latter is to answer on the 10th of August.

As though we had not yet enough of conferences at Vienna and Constantinople, we learn from the *National Zeitung* that other conferences are now to sit at Berlin too. The Emperor of Russia, to provide these conferences with the required "stuff," has complacently declared that, with all his willingness to renounce the occupation of the Principalities as the material guarantee for his religious associations, he would now be obliged to hold them as a guarantee for the indemnification for his present expenses of occupying them. While Prince Gortschakoff announced in his proclamations that Russia pledged herself to abstain from all interference with the constituted authorities of the Principalities, the Czar issues a decree forbidding the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia to pay any tribute to, or to hold any communication with, the Government of Turkey. In consequence of this notification the Hospodar of Wallachia informed the Russian Consul at Bucharest that he had already sent his tribute money to the Sultan, to which the Consul replied: *C'est de l'argent perdu*, as the Hospodar would have to pay it again to Russia.

The Patrie of yesterday communicates the fact that three of the most influential Boyards of Moldavia had left Jassy for Petersburg, with the especial consent of the Hospodar, in order to remonstrate with the Czar on the conduct of the Russian soldiers, who, in violation of the solemn promise given to the Porte, treated the Danubian Provinces as a conquered country, and committed numberless extortions therein. The Russians can certainly not be accused of seeking to make propaganda by making themselves popular in the Principalities.

Russia continues its armaments with the same ostentation as before. *The Hamburger Nachrichten* publishes the following Imperial manifesto, dated Petersburg, 23rd July :

"By the Grace of God, we, Nicholas I., by our manifesto of August 1st (13th), 1834, have ordered that every year levies shall take place in certain parts of our empire: to-day we order:,"

[*Levy of 10 per 1,000 from eastern provinces. And of 3 per 1,000 in three districts that had been exempt. The levy on the Jews, however, in these three districts to be 10 per 1,000.*]

The manifesto is followed by two ukases, regulating the details of this new and extraordinary levy. Besides the above-mentioned districts, there shall take place, according to a third ukase, a recruitment among the *odnodvortsy* and inhabitants of towns in the districts of Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia, Minsk, Grodno, Vilna, and Kovno.

The *Hamburger* correspondent reports as follows:

"The armaments in the interior of the Empire continue without interruption."

The *Post Zeitung*, of Stockholm, of July 16, announces that the Emperor of Russia has given orders for the arming and fitting out of the Baltic fleet, composed of twenty vessels of the line, and of fifteen frigates. The *Kölnische Zeitung* of 29th July states:

"The return of the Danish-Swedish fleet before the term fixed for its evolutions has taken place in consequence of an order received by the commander to immediately repair to the Baltic."

Both the French journals and *The Morning Chronicle* of to-day contain a telegraphic despatch from Vienna of the 3rd of July, stating that America has offered the Porte money and active assistance.

The impression produced on the Continental mind by the threatening attitude of Russia, combined with the threatening prospect of the harvests, is most significantly reflected in the following words of *The Economist*:

"The Czar has awakened into life and hope the revolutionary spirit of Europe, and we read of plots in Austria, plots in Italy, and plots in France; and there begins to be more alarm lest there should be fresh revolutionary disturbances, than that Governments should go to war."

A well-informed Danish gentleman, who has very recently arrived here, from fear of the cholera now raging in Copenhagen to such an extent that already 4,000 persons have been attacked by it, and no less than 15,000 applications for passports to leave the Danish capital have been made, informs me that the Royal message concerning the Succession was chiefly carried through the abstention from voting of a great number of Eydermen, who had hoped to avoid a crisis by their passive attitude. The crisis which they apprehended, however, has come upon them in the shape of the *octroyed* Constitution, and that Constitution is aimed especially against the "Peasants' friends" party, by whose support the Danish Crown has achieved its previous triumphs in the Succession question. As I propose to recur to this subject in a special letter, I will merely observe here that the Danish Government has laid before the United Diet (the Landthing and the Volksthing together) the notes exchanged with the Great Powers on the subject of its propositions.

Of these documents the most interesting pieces are, especially at this moment, the note of England and the note of Russia. The "silent" Clarendon not only approves of the Royal message, but distinctly hints to the Danish Government that it could not go on with the old Democratic Constitution, with Universal Suffrage, and with no House of Lords. The silent Clarendon therefore has taken the initiative, in the interests of Russia, to recommend and provoke the Danish *coup d'état*. The Russian note, addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Angern Steinberg, after having reviewed the articles of the Treaty of London, dated 8th of May, 1852, concludes as follows:

"The treaty of the 8th of May does not formally prescribe that the *Lex Regia* should be cancelled. But the Powers have naturally been obliged to leave to his Majesty the King of Denmark the choice of the means adequate towards realizing the object by way of legislation. His Majesty has manifested his intention of establishing an order of succession for all the States subject to his rule, by which, in case of the male descendants of Frederick II. becoming extinct, all claims arising from Articles 27 and 40 of the *Lex Regia* should be excluded,

and Prince Christian of Glücksburg called to the throne with a view to securing the Danish crown to him and his male descendants by his marriage with Princess Louisa of Hesse."

[The rest of this note is summed up by Marx himself in the following paragraph.]

Russia gives us to understand that the temporary suppression of the Lex Regia as agreed upon in the protocol of the 8th May must be interpreted as a permanent one, that the permanent resignation of the Emperor of Russia is only a temporary one, but that the Danish patriots may henceforth repose on the protection of their country's integrity by the European Powers. Do they not see how the integrity of Turkey has been protected since the treaty of 1841?

XIX

Russian Movements—Denmark—United States and Europe

LONDON, *August 5*, 1853
N. Y. T., *August 19*, 1853

THE Emperor of Russia has discovered new reasons for holding the Principalities. He will hold them no longer as a material guarantee for his spiritual aspirations, or as an indemnity for the costs of occupying them, but he must hold them now on account of "internal disturbances," as provided by the treaty of Balta-Liman. And, as the Russians have actually put everything in the Principalities topsy-turvy, the existence of such disturbances cannot be denied. Lord Clarendon confirmed, in the sitting of the House of Lords of August 2, the statement given in my last letter with regard to the Hospodars having been prohibited from transmitting their tribute to Constantinople, and from entertaining further communications with Turkey. Lord Clarendon declared with great gravity of countenance, and a pompous solemnity of manner, that he would "instruct the messenger who leaves London this night, Sir Hamilton Seymour, to demand from the Russian Cabinet the *explanation* which England is entitled to." While Clarendon sends all the way to St. Petersburg to request *explanations*, the *Patrie* of to-day has intelligence from Jassy of the 20th ultimo, that the Russians are fortifying Bucharest and Jassy; that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia are placed under a Russian Board of Control

composed of three members; that contributions in kind are levied on the people, and that some refractory Boyards have been incorporated in Russian regiments. This is the "explanation" of the manifesto of Prince Gortschakoff, according to which "his august master has no intention of modifying the institutions which governed the country, and the presence of his troops would impose upon the people neither new contributions nor charges." In the sitting of the House of Commons of the same day, Lord John Russell declared, in answer to a question put by Lord Dudley Stuart, that the four Powers had convened at Vienna on a common proposition to be made to the Czar, "acceptable" to Russia and to Turkey, and that it had been forwarded to St. Petersburg. In answer to Mr. Disraeli he stated: "The proposition was, in fact, an *Austrian proposition*, though it came originally from the Government of France." This original Frenchman, naturalized in Austria, looks very suspicious, and *The Neue Preussische Zeitung* gives, in a Vienna letter, the *explanation* that "the Russian and Austrian Cabinets have fully resolved in common not to allow English influence to predominate in the East." The *Englishman* observes, on the *explanations* of the Coalition ministry: "They are great in humiliation, strong in imbecility, and most eloquent in taciturnity."

Moldavia and Wallachia once Russified, Galicia, Hungary, and Transylvania would be transformed into Russian "*enclaves*."

I have spoken in a former letter of the "hidden treasures" in the Bank of St. Petersburg, forming the metal reserve for a three times larger paper circulation. Now, the Russian Minister of War has just applied for the transfer of a portion of this treasure into the military chest. The Minister of Finance having objected to this step, the Emperor applied himself to the Holy Synod, the depository of the Church property, for a loan of sixty millions of roubles. While the Czar is wanting in wealth, his troops are wanting in health. It is stated on very reliable authority that the troops occupying the Principalities have

suffered enormously from heat on their march, that the number of sick is extraordinary, and that many private houses at Bucharest and Jassy have been converted into hospitals.

The dissolution of a Legislative Assembly into four separate feudal provincial diets, the right of self-assessment cancelled, election by universal suffrage suppressed, liberty of the press abolished, free competition supplanted by the revival of close guilds, the whole official, *i.e.* the only intelligent class in Denmark, excluded from being eligible except on Royal permission—that you call “some modifications of the Constitution”? As well might you call Slavery a slight modification of Freedom. It is true that the Danish King has not dared to promulgate this new “fundamental law” as law. He has only sent, after the fashion of Oriental Sultans, the silken string to the Chambers with orders to strangle themselves. Such a proposition involves the threat of enforcing it, if not voluntarily submitted to. So much for the “some modifications of the Constitution.” Now as to the “Russian influence.”

In what way did the conflict between the Danish King and the Danish Chambers arise? He proposed to abrogate the *Lex Regia*; viz., the existing law of succession to the throne of Denmark. Who urged the King to take this step? Russia, as you will have seen from the note of Count Nesselrode, dated 8th May, 1853, communicated in my last letter. Who will gain by that abrogation of the *Lex Regia*? No one but Russia. The *Lex Regia* enables the female line of the reigning family to succeed to the throne. By its abrogation the agnates would remove from the succession all the claims of the cognates hitherto standing in their way. You know that the kingdom of Denmark comprehends, besides Denmark Proper, viz. the Isles and Jutland, also the two Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The succession to Denmark Proper and Schleswig is regulated by the same *Lex Regia*, while in the Duchy of Holstein, being a German fief, it devolves to the agnates, according to the *Lex Salica*. By the abrogation of the *Lex*

Regia the succession to Denmark and Schleswig would be assimilated to that of the German Duchy of Holstein, and Russia, having the next claims on Holstein, as the representative of the House of Holstein, Gottorp, would, in the quality of chief agnate, also obtain the next claim on the Danish throne. In 1848-50, Denmark, being assisted by Russian notes and fleets, made overtures to Germany in order to maintain the *Lex Regia*, which forbade Schleswig to be united with Holstein, and to be separated from Denmark. After having beaten the German revolution under the pretext of the *Lex Regia*, the Czar confiscates democratic Denmark by abrogating the same law. The Scandinavians and the Germans have thus made the experience that they must not found their respective national claims on the feudal laws of Royal succession. They have made the better experience, that, by quarrelling amongst themselves, instead of confederating, Germans and Scandinavians, both of them belonging to the same great race, only prepare the way for their hereditary enemy, the Slav.

The great event of the day is the appearance of American policy on the European horizon. Saluted by one party, detested by the other, the fact is admitted by all.

"Austria must look to the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire for indemnification for the loss of her Italian provinces—a contingency not rendered less likely by the quarrel she has had the folly to bring on her with Uncle Sam. An American squadron in the Adriatic would be a very pretty complication of an Italian insurrection, and we may all live to see it, for the Anglo-Saxon spirit is not yet dead in the West."

Thus speaks *The Morning Herald*, the old organ of the English aristocracy:

"The Koszta affair," says the *Paris Presse*, "is far from being terminated. We are informed that the Vienna Cabinet has asked from the Washington Cabinet a reparation, which it may be quite sure it will not receive. Meanwhile, Koszta remains under the safeguard of the French Consul."

"We must get out of the way of the Yankee, who is half a buccaneer, and half a backwoodsman, and no gentleman at all," whispers the *Vienna Presse*.

The German papers grumble about the secret treaty pretended to have been concluded between the United States and Turkey, according to which the latter would receive money and maritime support, and the former the harbour of Enos in Roumelia, which would afford a sure and convenient place for a commercial and military station of the American Republic in the Mediterranean.

The Brussels *Emancipation* looks upon "the conflict at Smyrna between the American Government and the Austrian one as in the first line of events of 1853. The event of Smyrna is the beginning of a new history."

An Italian paper, *Il Parlamento*, has a leader under the title "*La Politica Americana in Europa*."

[*Attempt of America to get a port on the Mediterranean, from 1840 onward. Republican opposed to Cossack. America has a voice in the Eastern Question. Suez and Panama the doorways to the East. America must be admitted to future Congresses on international political questions.*]

XX

To Withdraw or Not to Withdraw

LONDON, *August 12, 1853*

N. Y. T., August 24, 1853

BONAPARTE compensates the French Navy for their humiliating position in Besika Bay by a reduction in the price of tobacco to the sailors, as we are informed by to-day's *Moniteur*. He won his throne by sausages. Why should he not try to hold it by tobacco? At all events, the Eastern complication will have produced the *démonétisation* of Louis Bonaparte in the eyes of the French peasants and the army. They have learned that the loss of liberty at home is not made up by a gain of glory abroad. The "Empire of all the glories" has sunk even lower than the "Cabinet of all the talents."

From the Constantinople journals which have just arrived, we learn that the Sultan's manifesto to his subjects appeared on the 1st August, that the Russian Consul at Adrianople has received orders from St. Petersburg to withdraw from Turkey, that the other Russian Consuls expect similar orders, and that the Constantinople papers have been prohibited in the Principalities. The *Impartial* of Smyrna, of August 1, has the following communication with regard to Persia:

"The Shah of Persia, after the correspondence exchanged between the Porte and the Russian Cabinet on the occasion of the pending dispute had been communicated to him at his request, has officially declared that all the right was on the side of the Porte, and that in case of war, he will fairly stand by her. The news has made a

great impression on the Russian Ambassador at Herat, who is said to be going to demand his passports."

The contents of the proposition made to Russia, and accepted by the Czar, according to the mysterious Petersburg despatch, form the subject of conjecture throughout the whole European press. The Palmerstonian *Morning Post* avers:

"We believe we shall not be far wrong when we confidently affirm that the affair is settled in such a manner as to preserve intact the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. . . . By the 10th of September the last Russian soldier will have crossed the Pruth."

On the other hand, private letters from Vienna, alluding to the appearance of Russian gun-boats above the confluence of the Pruth and the Danube, confirm the statement given in my last letter, that the propositions sent to St. Petersburg do not include at all the withdrawal of the Russian armies from the Principalities, that they emanate from the Austrian Cabinet, to whose intervention the British Ambassador at Vienna, "that true lover of harmony," had appealed after the French and English proposals had been rejected by the Czar; and that they afford Russia the desired opportunity for prolonging negotiations *ad infinitum*. According to the semi-official Frankfort *Ober-Postamts-Zeitung*, Russia has only permitted Austria to enlighten Turkey with regard to her own interests.

XXI

Urquhart—Bem—The Turkish Question in the House of Lords

LONDON, *August 16, 1853*
N. Y. T., September 2, 1853

DAVID URQUHART has published four letters on the Oriental question purporting to expose four delusions: firstly, that regarding the identity of the Oriental and Russian Churches; secondly, that there is a diplomatic contest between England and Russia; thirdly, that there is a possibility of war between England and Russia; and lastly, the delusion of union between England and France. As I intend to recur another time more fully to these letters, I confine myself for the present to communicating to you the following letter addressed by Bem to Reschid Pasha, a letter published for the first time by Mr. Urquhart.

[Turkish troops excellent and anxious to fight Russia. Bem willing to lead them. With their aid the Sultan can recover the provinces taken from his ancestors by the Czars.]

The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent to all the European Courts a note relative to the conduct of the American frigate *St. Louis* in the Koszta affair, denouncing the American policy in general. Austria contends that she has the right to kidnap foreigners from the territory of a neutral Power, while the United States have no right to commence hostilities in order to defend them.

On Friday, in the House of Lords, the Earl of Malmesbury did not inquire into the mystery of the Vienna Con-

ference, or of the propositions forwarded by it to the Czar, nor did he inquire as to the present state of transactions. His curiosity was rather of a retrospective and antiquarian character. What he moved for was "simple translations" of the two manifestos addressed by the Emperor, in May and June, to his diplomatic agents, and published in the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, and also "for any answer which Her Majesty's Government might have sent to the statements therein contained." The Earl of Malmesbury is no ancient Roman. Nothing could be more repulsive to his feelings than the Roman manner of openly examining foreign Ambassadors amid the *patres conscriptis*. The two Russian circulars he stated himself to "have been published openly to all Europe by the Emperor of Russia in his own language, and to have also appeared in the English and French languages, in the public prints." What possible good, then, could result from translating them again from the language of the writers of the public prints into the language of the clerks of the foreign office? "The French Government did answer the circulars immediately and ably. . . . The English reply, as we are told, was made soon after that of the French Government." The Earl of Malmesbury was anxious to know how the indifferent prose of M. Drouyn de l'Huys might look when translated into the noble prose of the Earl of Clarendon.

He felt himself bound to remind "his noble friend opposite," that John Bull, after thirty years of peace, of commercial habits, and of industrial pursuits, had become "somewhat nervous" with regard to *war*, and that this nervousity had, since the month of March last, "increased from the continued and lengthened mystery which the Government have drawn over their operations and negotiations." In the interest of peace, therefore, Lord Malmesbury interpellates, but in the same interest of peace the Government keeps silence.

The first signs of aggression of Russia on European Turkey no one was more annoyed at than the noble Earl himself. He had never suspected such a thing as Russian

designs upon Turkey. He would not believe in what he saw. There was above all the "honour of the Emperor of Russia." But did the aggrandizement of his Empire ever damage the honour of an Emperor? There was "his conservative policy which he had emphatically proved during the revolutions of 1848." Indeed, the Autocrat did not join in the wickedness of those revolutions. Especially, in 1852, when the noble Earl held the Foreign Office, "it was impossible for any Sovereign to give more repeated assurances, or to show a more sincere interest in the maintenance of the treaties by which Europe is bound, and the maintenance of the territorial arrangements which have existed for the happiness of Europe for so many years." Certainly, when Baron Brunnow induced the Earl of Malmesbury to sign the treaty of 8th May, 1852, with regard to the succession of the Danish throne, he caught him with repeated assurances as to the foible of his august master for existing treaties; and when he persuaded him, at the time the Earl hailed the usurpation of Bonaparte, to enter into a secret alliance with Russia, Prussia, and Austria against this same Bonaparte, he made a great show of his sincere interest in the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangements.

In order to account for the sudden and unexpected change which has come over the Emperor of Russia, the Earl of Malmesbury then enters into a psychological analysis "of the new impressions made on the *Emperor of Russia's mind*." The "feelings" of the Emperor, he ventured to affirm, "were irritated at the conduct of the French Government in regard to the Holy Shrines in Palestine." Bonaparte, it is true, in order to allay those irritated feelings, despatched M. de la Cour to Constantinople, "a man of singularly mild and conciliatory conduct." But, says the Earl, "it appears that in the Emperor of Russia's mind, what had passed had not been effaced," and that there remained a residue of bitter feeling with regard to France. M. de la Cour, it must be confessed, settled the question finally and satisfactorily, before Prince Mentschikoff's arrival at Constanti-

nople. "Still the impression on the mind of the Russian Emperor remained unaltered." So strong was this impression, and the mental aberration resulting from it, "that the Emperor still suspected the Turkish Government of wishing to impose upon Russia conditions which she had no right to impose." The Earl of Malmesbury owns that it is "impossible" not only for "any human being," but even for an English lord, to "read the human mind"; nevertheless, "he cannot help thinking that he can account for those strange impressions effected upon the Emperor of Russia's mind." The moment, he says, had arrived which the Russian population had been taught for many generations to look forward to as the "predestinated epoch of their obtaining Constantinople, and restoring the Byzantine Empire." Now he supposes "these feelings" to have been shared by "the present Emperor." Originally, the sagacious Earl intended to explain the Emperor's obstinate suspicion, that the Turkish Government wanted to hurt him in his rights, and now he informs us that he suspected Turkey, because he thought the proper moment had arrived for swallowing her. Arrived at this point the noble Earl had necessarily to change the course of his deductions. Instead of accounting for the new impressions on the Emperor of Russia's mind which altered the old circumstances, he accounts now for the circumstances which restrained for some time the ambitious mind and the old traditional feeling of the Czar from "giving way to temptation." These circumstances resolve themselves into the one great fact, that at one period the Earl of Malmesbury was "in," and that at the other period he was "out."

When "in," he was the first, not only to acknowledge Boustrapa,¹ but also to apologize for his perjury, his murders, and his usurpation. But, then, "the newspapers of the day continually found fault with what they called a subservient and cringing policy to the French Emperor." The Coalition Ministry came, and with it Sir J. Graham and Sir

¹ A nickname for Napoleon III. from his three escapades at Boulogne, Strasbourg and Paris.

Charles Wood, "condemning at public meetings the policy and character of the French Emperor, and condemning the French people, too, for the choice of this prince as their sovereign." Then followed the Montenegro affair, and the Coalition "allowing Austria to insist on the Sultan giving up any further coercion of the rebellious Montenegrins, and not even securing to the Turkish army a safe and peaceable retreat, thus causing Turkey a loss of from 1,500 to 2,000 men." At a later period the recall of Colonel Rose from Constantinople, the refusal of the British Government to order simultaneously with France their fleet to Besika Bay or Smyrna — all these circumstances together produced the impression on the Emperor of Russia's mind that the people and the Government of England were hostile to the French Emperor, and that no true alliance was possible between the two countries.

Having thus traced with a delicacy worthy of a romance writer, who analyzes the undulating feelings of his heroine, the succession of circumstances belabouring the Emperor of Russia's impressionable mind and seducing him from the path of virtue, the Earl of Malmesbury flatters himself he has broken through the prejudices and antipathies which had alienated for centuries the French from the English people, by his close alliance with the oppressor of the French people, and he congratulates the present Government upon having inherited from him the intimate alliance with the Western Czar, and upon having reaped where the Tories had sown. He forgets that it is exactly this intimate alliance under the auspices of which the Sultan has been sacrificed to Russia, the Coalition being backed by the French Emperor, while the French Soulouque eagerly seizes the opportunity of slipping on the shoulders of the Mussulman into a sort of Vienna Congress and becoming respectable. In the same breath in which he congratulates the Ministry on their close alliance with Bonaparte, he denounces the very policy which has been the fruit of that *mésalliance*.

We shall not follow the Earl in his expectorations on the

importance of Turkish integrity, in his denial of her decay, in his repudiation of the Russian religious Protectorate, or in his reproaches to the Government for not having declared the invasion of the Principalities a *casus belli*, and for not having answered the crossing of the Pruth by sending out their fleet. He has nothing new except the following letter, "perfectly unsurpassed for insolence," addressed by Prince Mentschikoff to Reschid Pasha on the eve of his departure from Constantinople :

"BUJUKDERE, May 9 [21st].

"At the moment of departure from Constantinople, the undersigned Ambassador of Russia has learnt that the Sublime Porte manifested its intention to proclaim a guarantee for the exercise of the spiritual rights vested in the clergy of the Eastern Church, which, in fact, renders doubtful the maintenance of the other privileges which that Church enjoys. Whatever may be the motive of this determination, the undersigned is under the necessity of informing his Highness, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that a declaration or any other act, which, although it may preserve the integrity of the purely spiritual rights of the orthodox Eastern Church, tends to invalidate the other rights, privileges, and immunities accorded to her religion and clergy from the most ancient times, and which they enjoy at the present moment, will be considered by the Imperial Cabinet as an act of hostility to Russia and to her religion.

"The undersigned begs, etc.,

"MENTSCHIKOFF."

The Earl of Malmesbury "could hardly believe that the Russian Emperor countenanced the conduct of Prince Mentschikoff, or the manner in which he acted," a doubt confirmed by Nesselrode's notes following Mentschikoff's departure, and the Russian army following Nesselrode's notes.

The "silent" Clarendon, "painful as it was to him," was obliged "to give the same answer over and over again," viz. to give no answer at all. He felt it "his public duty not to say a word" which he had not already said, about "not laying any communication before them, and not producing any separate despatch." The noble Earl accordingly gave not one iota of information which we did not

know before. His principal aim was to establish that, during the whole time that the Austrian and Russian Cabinets were making their encroachments, he was in "constant communication" with them. Thus he was in constant communication with the Austrian Government when it sent Prince Leiningen to Constantinople and its troops to the frontier, "because"—at least this, says the innocent Clarendon, was the "reason given"—"because it apprehended an outbreak of its own subjects on the frontier." After the Sultan had yielded to Austria, by withdrawing his forces, the energetic Clarendon "was again in communication with Austria, in order to insure the full execution of the treaty." "I *believe*," continues the credulous Lord, "it was carried out, *for* the Austrian Government *assured* us that such was the case." Very good, my Lord! As to the *entente cordiale* with France, it had existed ever since 1815! As to the part the French and English Governments took "with respect to the sending of their respective fleets," there "was not a shade of difference." Bonaparte ordered his fleet to proceed to Salamis, "believing that danger was imminent," and "although he (Clarendon) told him the danger was not so imminent, and that for the moment it was not necessary for the French fleet to leave the French ports," he ordered the French fleet to leave them; but this circumstance did not make the *slightest difference*, because it was "much more handy and more advantageous to have one fleet at Salamis and the other at Malta, than to have one at Malta and the other at Toulon." Lord Clarendon further states that throughout the insolent pressure of Prince Mentschikoff on the Porte "it was a matter of satisfaction that the fleet was not ordered out, because no one could say that the Turkish Government acted under their dictation." After what has passed, it is indeed probable that, had the fleet then been ordered out, the Sultan would have been forced to draw in. As to Mentschikoff's "valedictory letter," Clarendon owned it to be correct, "but such language in diplomatic negotiations with Governments was, fortunately, rare, and he hoped would long remain so." As to the inva-

sion of the Principalities, the English and French Governments "advised the Sultan to waive his undoubted right of treating the occupation of the Principalities as a *casus belli*."

As to the negotiations yet pending, all he would say was that "an official communication had been received this morning from Sir Hamilton Seymour, that the propositions agreed upon by the Ambassadors at Vienna, *if slightly modified*, would be received at St. Petersburg." As to the terms of the settlement, he would rather die than let them slip out.

The noble Lord was responded to by Lord Beaumont, the Earl of Hardwicke, the Marquis of Clanricarde, and the Earl of Ellenborough. There was not one single voice to felicitate her Majesty's Government on the course pursued in these negotiations. There were very great apprehensions on all sides that the ministerial policy had been the wrong one; that they had acted as mediators on behalf of Russia, instead of as defenders of Turkey, and that an early display of firmness on the part of England and France would have placed them in a better position than that which they now hold. The old obstinate Aberdeen answered them, that "it was easy to speculate on what would have been the case, after the event had occurred; to say what might have been the case, had they followed a different course." However, his most startling and important statement was the following: "Their Lordships must be aware that they were not bound by any treaty. He denied that this country was bound by the stipulations of any treaty to take part in any hostilities in support of the Turkish Empire."

The Emperor of Russia, when England and France first showed their disposition to meddle with the pending Turkish affair, utterly repudiated the binding force of the treaty of 1841 upon his own dealings with the Porte, and the right of interposition resulting therefrom on the part of the Western Cabinets. At the same time he insisted upon the exclusion of the ships of war of the other Powers from the Dardanelles, in virtue of the same treaty of 1841. Now,

Lord Aberdeen, in open and solemn assembly of Parliament, endorses this arrogant interpretation of a treaty which is only respected by the Autocrat when it excludes Great Britain from the Euxine.

The Turkish Question in the Commons

LONDON, *August 18, 1853*
N. Y. T., September 2, 1853

LORD JOHN RUSSELL having postponed his explanations on the Turkish question again and again, till at length, the last week of the Parliamentary session had happily arrived, came suddenly forward on Monday last, and gave notice that he would make his long-deferred statement on Tuesday. The noble Lord had ascertained that Mr. Disraeli had left London on Monday morning. In the same manner Sir Charles Wood, when he knew Sir J. Pakington and his partisans to be out of the House, suddenly brought in his India Bill, as amended by the House of Lords, and carried, in a thin house without division, the re-enactment of the salt monopoly. Such mean and petty tricks are the nerves and sinews of Whig parliamentary tactics.

The Eastern Question in the House of Commons was a most interesting spectacle. Lord J. Russell opened the performance in a tone quite conformed to the part he had to play. This diminutive earthman, supposed to be the last representative of the once powerful Whig tribe, spoke in a dull, low, dry, monotonous, and barren-spirited manner—not like a Minister, but like a police reporter, who mitigates the horrors of his tale by the trivial, common-place, and business-like style in which he relates it. He offered no “apology,” but he made a confession. If there was any redeeming feature in his speech, it was its stiffness itself, which seemed intended to conceal some painful impressions labouring in

the little man. Even the inevitable phrase of "the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," sounded like an old reminiscence, recurring, by some inadvertence, in a funeral oration over that same Empire. The impression produced by this speech, which purported to announce the settlement of the Eastern complication, may be judged from the fact that, as soon as transmitted by telegraph to Paris, the funds fell immediately.

Lord John was right in stating that he had not to defend the Government, the Government not having been attacked; on the contrary, every disposition had been shown on the part of the House to leave negotiations in the hands of the Executive. Indeed, no motion has been put by any member of Parliament to force discussion upon Ministers, and there has not been held any meeting out of the House to force such a motion upon members of Parliament. If the ministerial policy has been one of secrecy and mystification, it was so with the silent consent of Parliament and of the public. As to the withholding of documents while negotiations were pending, Lord John asserted it to be an eternal law established by parliamentary tradition. It would be tedious to follow him in the narration of events familiar to everybody, and infused with no new life by his manner of rather enumerating than reciting them. There are, however, some important points Lord John was the first officially to confirm.

Before Prince Mentschikoff's arrival at Constantinople the Russian Ambassador informed Lord John that the Czar intended to send a special mission to Constantinople with propositions relating exclusively to the Holy Cross and the immunities of the Greek Church connected with them. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and the British Government at home suspected no other intention on the part of Russia. It was not until the beginning of March, when the Turkish Minister informed Lord Stratford (Mr. Layard, however, affirms that Colonel Rose and many other persons at Constantinople were already initiated into the secret) that Prince Mentschikoff had proposed a secret treaty

incompatible with Turkish independence, and that he had declared it to be the intention of Russia to consider any communication of the fact to either France or England as an act of direct hostility against Russia. It was known at the same time, not from mere rumour, but from authentic reports, that Russia was accumulating great masses of troops on the frontiers of Turkey and at Odessa.

As to the note forwarded by the Vienna Conference to the Czar, and agreed to by him, it had been prepared at Paris by M. Drouyn de l'Huys, who took the reply of Reschid Pasha to the last Russian note for his basis. It was afterwards taken up, in an altered form, by Austria, as her own proposition, on the 24th July, and received its final touch on the 31st of July. The Austrian Minister having previously communicated it to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, it was already, on the 24th, conveyed to St. Petersburg before it was finally arranged, and it was not sent to Constantinople till the 2nd of August, when the Czar had already agreed to it. Thus, after all, it is a Russian note addressed through the means of the Four Powers to the Sultan, instead of a note of the Four Powers addressed to Russia and Turkey. Lord John Russell states that this note has "*not the exact form of Prince Mentschikoff's note,*" owning thereby that it has its exact contents. To leave no doubt behind, he adds: "*The Emperor considers that his objects will be attained.*" The draft contains not even an allusion to the evacuation of the Principalities. "Supposing that note," says Lord John, "to be finally agreed upon by Russia and Turkey, *there will still remain the great question of the evacuation of the Principalities.*" He adds at the same time, that the British Government "*considers this evacuation to be essential,*" but upon the mode by which this object is to be obtained he asks permission to say nothing. He gives us, however, sufficiently to understand that the fleets of England and France may have to leave Besika Bay before the Cossacks shall have left the Principalities. "We ought not to consent to any arrangement by which it may be stipulated that the advance of the fleets to the neigh-

bourhood of the Dardanelles should be considered as equivalent to an actual invasion of the Turkish Territories. But, of course, if the matter is settled, if peace is secured, Besika Bay is not a station which would be of any advantage either to England or France." Now, as no man in his senses has ever supposed the French and English fleets are to remain for all time at Besika Bay, or France and England to enter into a formal stipulation forbidding them to advance to the neutral neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, these ambiguous and cumbrous phrases, if they have any meaning at all, mean that the fleets will retire, after the note shall have been accepted by the Sultan and the Cossack has promised to evacuate the Principalities. "When the Russian Government," says Lord John, "had occupied the Principalities, Austria declared that, in conformity with the spirit of the Treaty of 1841, it was absolutely necessary that the representatives of the Powers should meet in conference, and should endeavour to obtain some amicable solution of a difficulty which might otherwise threaten the peace of Europe."

Lord Aberdeen, on the contrary, declared some days ago in the House of Lords, and also, as we are informed from other sources, in a formal note communicated to the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Constantinople in the course of last June—that "the Treaty of 1841 did not in any way impose upon the Powers who signed it the obligation of actual assistance in behalf of the Porte, [but of a temporary abstention from entering the Dardanelles!] and that the Government of Her British Majesty held itself perfectly free to act or not to act, according to its own interests." Lord Aberdeen only repudiates all obligations towards Turkey, in order not to possess any right against Russia.

Lord John Russell concludes with "*a fair aspect*" of the negotiations approaching their crowning result. This seems a very sanguine view of the matter, at the moment when the Russian note, arranged at Vienna and to be presented by Turkey to the Czar, has not yet been accepted by the

Sultan, and when the *sine quâ non* of the Western Powers, viz. the evacuation of the Principalities, has not yet been pressed upon the Czar.

Mr. Layard, the first speaker who rose in response to Lord John, made by far the best and most powerful speech—bold, concise, substantial, filled with facts, and proving the illustrious scholar to be as intimately acquainted with Nicholas as with Sardanapalus, and with the actual intrigues in the Orient as with the mysterious traditions of its past.

Mr. Layard regretted that Lord Aberdeen had “on several occasions, and in several places, declared that his policy is essentially a policy based on peace.” If England shrank from maintaining her honour and interests by war, she encouraged on the part of a lawless Power like Russia, pretensions which must inevitably lead sooner or later to war. The present conduct of Russia must not be considered as a mere casual and temporary occurrence, but as part and parcel of a great scheme of policy.

As to the “concessions” made to France and the “intrigues” of M. de Lavalette, they could not even afford a pretext to Russia, because “a draught of the firman making those concessions, of which Russia complains, was delivered by the Porte to M. de Titoff some days, if not weeks, before it was issued, and no objection whatever was made to the terms of that firman.”

Russia’s designs with regard to Servia, Moldo-Wallachia and the Christian population of Turkey were not to be misunderstood. Immediately after his public entry into Constantinople, Prince Mentschikoff demanded the dismissal of M. Garaschanin, from his post of Servian Minister. That demand was complied with, although the Servian Synod protested. M. Garaschanin was one of the men brought forward by the insurrection of 1843, that national movement against Russian influence which expelled the then reigning Prince Michael from Servia; he and his family being mere tools in the hands of Russia. In 1843 the Russian Government claimed the right of interference in Servia. Com-

pletely unauthorized by any treaty, she was authorized by Lord Aberdeen, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who declared, "*That Russia had the right to place her own construction on her own treaties.*" "By her success in that transaction," says Mr. Layard, "Russia showed that she was mistress of Servia, and could check any rising independent nationality."

As to the Danubian Principalities, Russia first took advantage of the national movement of 1848 in those provinces, compelling the Porte to expel from them every man of liberal and independent opinions. Then, she forced upon the Sultan the Treaty of Balta-Liman, by which she established her right to interfere in all the internal affairs of the Principalities, "and her present occupation of them has proved that Moldavia and Wallachia are to all intents and purposes Russian provinces."

There remained the Greeks of Turkey and the Slavonians of Bulgaria professing the Christian religion. "The spirit of inquiry and independence has sprung up among the Greeks, and this, together with their commercial intercourse with the free States of Europe, has greatly alarmed the Russian Government. There was another cause, viz. the spread of the Protestant faith among the Christians of the East. Mainly through the influence and teachings of American missionaries, scarcely a considerable town exists in Turkey in which there is not a nucleus of a Protestant community. [Another motive for American intervention.] The Greek clergy, backed by the Russian mission, have done all in their power to check this movement, and, when persecution was no longer available, Prince Mentschikoff appeared at Constantinople. The great end of Russia has been to crush the spirit of religious and political independence, which has manifested itself of late years among the Christian subjects of the Porte."

As to the establishment of a so-called *Greek Empire at Constantinople*, Mr. Layard, meaning of course the Greeks in contradistinction to the Slavonians, stated that the Greeks amount hardly to 1,750,000; that the Slavonians

and Bulgarians have been struggling for years to throw off all connection with them, by refusing to accept for their clergy and bishops the priests of the Greek nation; that the Servians have created a Patriarch of their own in lieu of the one at Constantinople; and that establishing the Greeks at Constantinople would be placing the whole of Turkey in the hands of Russia.

To the members of the House, who declared that it would signify little whether Constantinople was in the hands of Russia or not, Mr. Layard replied that, Constantinople being broken, all the great provinces which constitute Turkey, as, for instance, Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, would fall into a state of confusion and anarchy. The power into whose hands they fell would command India. The power which held Constantinople would ever be looked upon in the East as the dominant power of the world.

Russia, however, was aware that no European State would permit her to take possession of Constantinople at this time. Meanwhile, "her object is to render all independent nationalities in that country impossible—to weaken the Turkish power gradually, but surely; and to show to those who would oppose her designs, that any such opposition is not only useless, but would entail upon them her vengeance; in fact, to render any other government but her own impossible in Turkey. *In those designs she has entirely succeeded on this occasion.*"

Mr. Layard represented that the Government, after the demand of a secret treaty by Prince Mentschikoff, and the great Russian armaments on the frontier and at Odessa, were satisfied with the explanations and assurances given at St. Petersburg, and failed to declare that England and France would consider the passing of the Pruth as a *casus belli*, and that they had not interdicted Russia from entering into any treaties or engagements with Turkey without their participation. "If we had taken that step, Russia would never have dared to cross the Pruth."

Mr. Layard then exposed how the Principalities, independent, united with Bessarabia and leaning on Hungary,

would ultimately be the only means of preserving Constantinople from the Russians, and of cutting the great Slav race in two. He thinks that Russia *will* evacuate the Principalities. "It would not be worth the while of Russia to engage in a war with the great Powers of Europe on account of those provinces, which are already, to all intents and purposes, her own. Russia has gained, without firing a shot, what is worth to her a bloody and expensive campaign; she has established her power in the East; she has humiliated Turkey; she has compelled her to go to all the expense of a war, and has exhausted her resources; but, what is more, she has humiliated this country and France in the eyes of their own subjects and of the populations of the East."

The note drawn up by the Vienna Conference will have the result that, "if the Porte declines to adhere to it, Russia will have turned the tables completely upon us, and made us her ally against Turkey in compelling her to accept an unjust proposal. If she accepts, England has directly sanctioned the right of Russia to interfere in behalf of twelve millions of Christians, the subjects of the Porte. . . . Look at the question as we will, it is clear that we have taken the place of a second-rate Power in it, and conceded that of a first-rate Power to Russia alone. . . . We had an opportunity which, perhaps, will never occur again of settling on a proper basis this great Eastern question. . . . Russia has been enabled to strike a blow from which Turkey will never recover. . . . The result of the policy which this country has pursued will not end here. Sweden, Denmark, every weak State of Europe, which has placed dependence on the character of this country, will see that it is useless any more to struggle against the encroachments of Russia."

Sir John Pakington next made some remarks, which were important as declaratory of the views of the Tory Opposition. He regretted that Lord John Russell could not make a statement more satisfactory to the House and to the country. He assured the Government that its determina-

tion to consider the evacuation of the Principalities as a *sine quâ non* will "be supported not only by the opinion of this House, but by the almost unanimous opinion of the people of this country." Till the papers should have been produced, he must reserve his judgment on the policy of advising Turkey not to consider the occupation of the Principalities as a *casus belli*, of not following a more vigorous and decisive policy at an earlier period, of injuring and holding in suspense the interests of Turkey and of Great Britain and their commerce, by transactions protracted for six months.

Lord Dudley Stuart indulged in one of his habitual good-natured democratic declamations, which are certainly more gratifying to the man who spouts them than to anybody else. If you compress inflated balloons or blown-up phrases, there remains nothing in your hands, not even the wind that made them appear like something. Dudley Stuart repeated the often-repeated statements on the improvements going on in Turkey, and on the greater liberality of the Sultan's rule, whether in regard to religion or commerce, when compared with that of Russia. He remarked, justly, that it was useless to boast of peace, while the unhappy inhabitants of the Danubian Principalities actually endured the horrors of war. He claimed for the inhabitants of these provinces the protection of Europe against the terrible oppression to which they were now subjected. He showed, by facts from Parliamentary history, that the members of the House had the right of speechifying, even while negotiations were going on. He forgot hardly anything which must be familiar to a true and constant reader of *The Daily News*. There were two "points" in his speech: "Although the explanation of the noble lord (J. Russell) had not been very full, for he told the House nothing but what it knew before, still, from its very omissions, he was afraid that they must come to the conclusion *that the noble lord had been doing something of which he ought to be ashamed.*" As to the Earl of Aberdeen, "he had told them that peace had been preserved for thirty years, with great advantage to

the prosperity and liberty of Europe, but he (Dudley Stuart) denied that the liberty of Europe had been benefited by the peace. Where, he would ask, was Poland? where Italy? where Hungary?—nay, where Germany?" Borne along by the power of fluency, that fatal gift of third-rate orators, the democratic Lord cannot stop, till he arrives, from the despots of the Continent, to his native monarch, "who rules in the hearts of her subjects."

Mr. M. Milnes, one of those ministerial retainers on whose brow you read:

"Do not talk of him
But as a property,"

did not dare to make a decidedly ministerial speech. He made an alternative speech. On the one side he found that Ministers, by withholding the papers from the table of the House, "acted with very great prudence and judgment," but, on the other hand, he gave them to understand that they would have acted "more strongly and firmly" the other way. On the one hand he thought the Government might have been right in submitting to the demands of Russia, but, on the other hand, it seemed questionable to him whether they had not, in some degree, encouraged Turkey to pursue a line of policy which they were not prepared to support, etc., etc. On the whole, he made out that "the more he reflected on those subjects, the more extreme were the difficulties which they presented to his mind"—the less he understood those subjects, the better he understood the temporizing policy of the Government.

After the alternative juggle and perplexed mind of Mr. Monckton Milnes, we are refreshed by the rough straightforwardness of Mr. Muntz, M.P. for Birmingham, and one of the matadores of the Reform-House of 1831. "The Emperor of Russia knew, that nothing would make this country go to war; witness Poland, witness Hungary. He considered the state of this country in relation to its foreign affairs was a very objectionable and a very unsatisfactory one. And he believed that the people of

England felt that their character had been degraded, and that all sense of honour on the part of the Government was absorbed in consideration of mere pounds, shillings and pence. The only questions mooted by the Government now were simply, what would be the expense, and would war be agreeable to the different tradesmen of the nation?" Birmingham happening to be the centre of an armament-manufacturing and musket-selling population, the men of that town naturally scoff at the Manchester Cotton-Peace Fraternity.

Mr. Blackett, the member for Newcastle-on-Tyne, did not believe that the Russians would evacuate the Principalities. He warned the Government "*not to be swayed by any dynastic sympathies or antipathies.*"

Assailed on all sides, from all shades of opinion, the Ministers sat there mournful, depressed, inanimate, broken down; when Richard Cobden suddenly arose, congratulating them for having adopted his peace doctrines and applying that doctrine to the given case, with all the sharp ingenuity and fair sincerity of the monomaniac, with all the contradictions of the *idéologue*, and with all the calculating cowardice of the shopkeeper. He preached what the Ministry had openly acted, what the Parliament had silently approved, and what the ruling classes had enabled the Ministry to do and the Parliament to accept. From fear of war he attained for the first time to something like historical ideas. He betrayed the mystery of middle-class policy, and therefore he was repudiated as a traitor. He forced middle-class England to see herself as in a mirror, and as the image was by no means a flattering one, he was ignominiously hissed. He was inconsistent, but his inconsistency itself was consistent. Was it his fault if the traditional fierce phrases of the aristocratic past did not harmonize with the pusillanimous facts of the stock-jobbing present?

He commenced by declaring that there was no difference of opinion on the question: "Still, there was apparently very great uneasiness on the subject of Turkey." Why was this? Within the last twenty years there had been

a growing conviction that the Turks in Europe were intruders in Europe; that they were not domiciled there; that their home was Asia; that Mohammedanism could not exist in civilized States; that we could not maintain the independence of any country, if she could not maintain it for herself; that it was now known that there were three Christians to every Turk in European Turkey. "We could not take a course which would insure Turkey in Europe as an independent Power against Russia, unless the great bulk of the population were with us in our desire to prevent another Power from taking possession of that country . . . As to sending our fleets up to Besika Bay, and keeping out the Russians, no doubt we could do that, because Russia would not come into collision with a maritime Power; but we were keeping up these enormous armaments, and were not settling the Eastern Question. . . . The question was, what were they going to do with Turkey, and with the Christian population of Turkey? Mohammedanism could not be maintained; and we should be sorry to see this country fighting for Mohammedanism in Europe." Lord Dudley Stuart had talked about maintaining Turkey on account of commerce. He (Cobden) never would fight for a tariff. He had too much faith in free trade principles to think that they needed fighting for. The exports to Turkey had been overrated. Very little of it was consumed in the countries under the dominion of the Turks. "All the commerce which we had in the Black Sea was owing to the encroachments of Russia upon the Turkish coast. Our grain and flax we did not now get from Turkey, but from Russia. And would not Russia be as glad to send us her tallow, hemp, and corn, whatever aggressions she might make on Turkey? We had a trade with Russia in the Baltic. . . . What prospect had we of a trade with Turkey? . . . It was a country without a road. Russia was the more commercial people. Let us look at St. Petersburg, at her quays, and wharves, and warehouses. . . . What national alliance then could we have with such a country as Turkey? . . . Something had been said

about the balance of power. That was a political view of the question. . . . A great deal had been said about the power of Russia, and the danger to England in consequence of her occupying those countries on the Bosphorus. Why, what an absurdity it was to talk of Russia coming to invade England! Russia could not move an army across her own frontiers, without coming to Western Europe for a loan. . . . A country so poor, a mere aggregate of villages without capital and without resources, as compared with England, never could come and injure us, or America, or France. . . . England was ten times more powerful than she had ever been, and far more able to resist the aggressions of a country like Russia."

And now Cobden passed to the incomparably greater dangers of war to England in her present condition than at former epochs. The manufacturing population had greatly increased. They were far more dependent on the export of their produce and on the import of raw materials. They possessed no longer the monopoly of manufacture. The repeal of the navigation laws had thrown England open to the competition of the world in shipping as well as in everything else. "He begged Mr. Blackett to consider that no port would suffer more than that which he represented. The Government had done wisely in disregarding the cry of thoughtless men. . . . Their taking up a position for maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire he did not blame, as that was a traditional policy handed down to them. . . . The Government of the day would obtain credit for having been as peaceable as the people would allow them to be."

Richard Cobden was the true hero of the drama, and shared the fate of all true heroes—a tragical one. But then came the sham hero; the fosterer of all delusions, the man of fashionable lies and of courtly promises; the mouth-piece of all brave words that may be said in the act of running away; Lord Palmerston came. This old, experienced and crafty debater saw at once that the criminal might escape sentence by disavowing his advocate. He saw that the

Ministry, attacked on all sides, might turn the tables by a brilliant diatribe against the only man who dared to defend it, and by refuting the only grounds on which its policy possibly might have been excused. There was nothing easier than to show the contradictions of Mr. Cobden. He had stated his perfect concurrence with the precedent orators, and ended by differing from them on every point. He had defended the integrity of Turkey, and did everything to show that she was worth no defence. He, the preacher of peace, had advocated the aggressions of Russia. Russia was weak, but a war with Russia would be inevitable ruin to England. Russia was a conglomerate of mere villages, but St. Petersburg being a finer city than Constantinople, Russia was entitled to possess them both. He was a free trader, but he preferred the protective system of Russia to the free trade system of Turkey. Whether Turkey herself consumed, or was a canal through which passed articles of consumption to other parts of Asia, was it indifferent to England that she should remain a free passage? Mr. Cobden was a great advocate for the principle of non-intervention, and now he would dispose, by parliamentary enactments, of the destinies of the Mahommedans, Greeks, Slavonians, and other races inhabiting the Turkish Empire. Lord Palmerston exalted the progress Turkey had made, and the forces she now commanded. "Turkey, it is certain, has no Poland and no Siberia." Because Turkey possessed so much strength, Lord Palmerston would, of course, compel her to suffer a few provinces to be invaded by the Russians. A strong empire can suffer anything. Lord Palmerston proved to Richard Cobden that there existed not one sound reason for adopting the course adopted by Lord Palmerston and his colleagues, and, interrupted at each sentence by enthusiastic cheers, the old histrion contrived to sit down, with the impudent and self-contradictory phrase: "I am satisfied that Turkey has within itself the elements of life and prosperity, and I believe that the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government is a sound policy, deserving the approbation of the country, and which it will be the duty

of every English Government to pursue." (Cheers.) Palmerston was great in "*fearful bravery*," as Shakspeare calls it. He showed, as Sydney said, "a fearful boldness, daring to do that which he knew that he knew not how to do."

XXIII

Affairs Continental and English

LONDON, *August 23, 1853*

N. Y. T., September 5, 1853

THE German and Belgian papers affirm, on the authority of telegraphic despatches from Constantinople of the 13th inst., that the Porte has acceded to the proposals of the Vienna Conference. The French papers, however, having received despatches from Constantinople of the same date, state merely that the Divan had shown a willingness to receive those proposals. The definite answer could hardly reach Vienna before the 20th inst. The pending question, and a very serious one, is, whether the Porte will send its Ambassador to St. Petersburg before or after the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Principalities.

The last accounts from the Black Sea announce that the north-east winds have begun to disturb the navigation. Several ships anchored at Heraclea and other places on the coast have been compelled to quit their anchorage to avoid being driven ashore.

You know that after the events in Moldavia and Wallachia, the Sultan had ordered the Hospodars to leave the Principalities for Constantinople, and that the Hospodars refused to comply with their sovereign's demands. The Sultan has now deposed the Hospodar of Wallachia on account of his favourable reception of the Russian troops and the support he gave them. On the 9th inst. this firman was read to the Assembly of Boyards, who resolved to

petition the Hospodar not to abandon the Government in the present critical circumstances. The Prince acted accordingly. Mano, the Secretary of State, and Yvandis, the Director of the Ministry of the Interior, have also been summoned to Constantinople; they, however, refused to go, on the pretext that public order might be disturbed. The French and British Consuls, upon this, suspended immediately all relations with the rebel Government.

Affairs in Servia are taking a complicated turn. The Paris *Constitutionnel* of last Friday had the following Constantinople intelligence. Austria, taking advantage of the Sultan's difficulties, has pressed certain demands upon him. An Austrian Consul-General, having lately made a tour of inspection through Bosnia and Servia, declared to Alexander, the Prince of Servia, that Austria was prepared to occupy Servia with her troops in order to suppress any dangerous movement among the population. The Prince, having refused the offer of the Consul General, at once despatched a special messenger to Constantinople with an account of this Austrian overture, and Reschid Pasha referred to the Baron Bruck for explanations. The latter said that the Consul-General had previously communicated with the Prince, alleging the fear Austria was in, lest her subjects on the borders of Servia, should become involved in any disturbances arising in that province. The reply of Reschid Pasha was to the effect that any occupation of Servia by Austrian troops would be considered an act of hostility by the Porte, which would itself be answerable for the tranquillity of that province; moreover, the Pasha promised that a special Commissioner should be at once sent to see and report on the state of affairs in Servia.

The day after, several London papers announced the entrance into Servia of the Austrian troops, an announcement which, however, has turned out to be unfounded. Yesterday the same papers communicated the outbreak of a counter-revolution in Servia, yet this news likewise rested on no better foundation than a false translation of the German word *Auflauf*, the fact being that only a small riot

had taken place. To-day the German papers publish news from Constantinople of the 9th inst. According to them, several divans had been held on Servian affairs. The conduct of Prince Alexander was much approved of, and the decision arrived at that, if Austrian troops should attempt to occupy that province, they should, if necessary, be expelled by force. A division of troops has actually been directed towards the frontiers of Bosnia. Private letters received at Constantinople on the 8th inst. conveyed thither the news of Prince Alexander having, in consequence of his conflict with the Austrian Consul, appealed to the decision of the Consuls of France and England, and absented himself momentarily from Belgrade. It is said that he went to Nish, there to wait for orders from the Porte.

Mr. D. Urquhart, in a letter addressed to *The Morning Advertiser* of this day, remarks, with regard to the Servian complication :

"War with Turkey is not at present contemplated by Russia, for, by the co-operation of Austria, she would lose her Greek allies, but she involves Austria in a preparatory collision, which will bring Servia into a condition parallel to that of the Principalities. Thus will be introduced a religious warfare between Latins and Greeks. . . . Russia, by a sudden shifting of decorations, may render her own occupation of the Principalities acceptable to Turkey, as a protection against the Austrian occupation of Servia, and thus mutually engage Austria and Turkey in projects of dismemberment, and support them therein."

The Hospodar of Moldavia proposes to contract a loan with Russian bankers in order to meet the extraordinary expenses of the occupation.

The want of provisions is so great in the fortresses of Bulgaria that the strictest economy has to be observed, and the garrisons are suffering severely.

The *Journal de Constantinople* reports from Aleppo :

[Threatened rising of Turks against Christians in Aleppo. Attempt suppressed. Thanks from Greek and Armenian churches to Turkey for protection of Christians.]

The German *St. Petersburg Gazette* has the following in a leader on Oriental affairs:

"The work of mediation between Russia and Turkey is now definitely placed in the hands of Austria. At Vienna there will be devised a solution of the Eastern question, which in these latter times has kept in suspense all the action between the Black Sea and the Ocean, and which alone has prevented European Diplomacy from taking its habitual holidays."

Observe the studious affectation with which, in lieu of the Four Powers, Austria alone is constituted mediator, and which places the suspense of nations, in the true Russian style, only on a scale with the interrupted holidays of diplomacy.

The Berlin *National Zeitung* publishes a letter from Georgia, dated July 15, stating that Russia intends a new campaign against the people of the Caucasus at the end of the present month, and that a fleet in the Sea of Azof is fitted out in order to support the operations of the land army.

The session of 1853 was brought to a close on Saturday last—Parliament being prorogued until October 27. A very indifferent and meagre speech, purporting to be the Queen's message, was read by commission. In answer to Mr. Milnes Lord Palmerston assured Parliament that it could safely disband, as far as the evacuation of the Principalities was concerned, giving, however, no pledge of any kind but "his confidence in the honour and the character of the Russian Emperor," which would move him to withdraw his troops *voluntarily* from the Principalities. The Coalition Cabinet thus revenged itself for his speech against Mr. Cobden, by forcing him to record solemnly "his confidence in the character and the honour" of the Czar. The same Palmerston received on the same day a deputation from the aristocratic fraction of the Polish Emigration at Paris and its collateral branch at London, presenting his Lordship with an address and medallions in gold, silver and bronze of Prince Adam Czartoryski, in testimony of their gratitude to his Lordship for allowing the sequestration of Cracow in 1846, and for

otherwise exhibiting sympathy with the cause of Poland. The inevitable Lord Dudley Stuart, the patron of the London branch of the Paris Society, was of course the master of ceremonies. Lord Palmerston assured these simple-minded men "of his deep interest in the history of Poland, which was a very painful history." The noble Lord did not omit to remind them that he spoke not as a member of the Cabinet, but received them only as a private amateur.

XXIV

The Vienna Note

LONDON, *September 9, 1853*
N. Y. T., *September 24, 1853*

WHEN I told you in my letter published August 30,¹ that the Vienna Note was "rejected" by the Porte, inasmuch as the alterations demanded by it and the condition of immediate and previous evacuation cannot be considered otherwise than as a refusal of Russia's pretensions, I found myself in contradiction with the whole Press, which assured us that the alterations were insignificant, not worth speaking of, and that the whole affair might be regarded as settled. Some days later, *The Morning Chronicle* startled the confiding stockjobbers with the announcement that the alterations proposed by the Porte were of a very serious character, and by no means easy to be dealt with. At this moment there exists only one opinion, namely, that the whole Eastern Question has come back to its starting point, an impression in no way impaired by the complete publication in yesterday's papers of the official Note addressed by Reschid Pasha to the representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, dated August 19, 1853.

That the Russian Emperor will reject the Turkish "alterations" there is not the slightest doubt. Already we are informed by the *Assemblée Nationale*, the Paris Moniteur of the Emperor of Russia, that "the first impressions produced on the Cabinet of St. Petersburg were by no means favourable to the modifications proposed by the Porte. But even

¹ There is no letter in the New York Tribune of this date.

were the Russian Cabinet to refuse the proposed change of the Note, there would remain the resource of fresh negotiation at Constantinople." The intimation contained in this last hint, that Russia will attempt to gain another delay of the decision of the dispute is confirmed by the Berlin *Lithographic Correspondence*. In a letter published by the Vienna *Wanderer* from Odessa, dated August 26th, the solution of the Oriental question is stated "to be not so near at hand as was expected by some people." The Cronstadt *Satellite* positively announces that the Russian troops will take up their winter quarters in the Principalities.

A note issued from Washington could scarcely have produced a greater sensation in Europe than your editorial remarks on Capt. Ingraham.¹ They have found their way, with and without commentaries, into almost the whole weekly press of London, into many French papers, the Brussels *Nation*, the Turin *Parlamento*, the Basel *Gazette*, and every liberal newspaper of Germany. Your article on the Swiss-American alliance having simultaneously been reprinted in a number of German journals, you may consider the following passage from an article of the Berlin *Lithographic Correspondence* as partly addressed to you. [*Reference to Koszta affair at Smyrna. Then—*] "The journals hold out the prospect of an intervention on the part of the United States in favour of Switzerland, if it should be threatened by an attack. To-day we are informed that several Powers have the intention of making a collective declaration against the doctrine of international right put forth by the United States. If the American intervention theories were not *refuted* in a peremptory manner, *the extirpation of the revolutionary spirit in Europe would meet with an insuperable obstacle.*

¹ The passage referred to is the following:—"We state an obvious fact in saying that Capt. Ingraham, had he sunk the Austrian corvette in Smyrna harbour, as it was but a chance he did not, would almost inevitably have been the next President of the United States. Had the two ships been cruising off the harbour, instead of at anchor within it, where action must have been a gross outrage on neutral rights and resulted in a woeful destruction of life and property on shore, the collision could not have been averted." [*New York Tribune*, August 6, 1853.]

France is among the Powers ready to participate in this remonstrance." On this last point, the *Constitutionnel* of Tuesday last takes good care not to leave any doubt, when it says: "It is necessary to be candid in all things. It is not as a citizen of the United States that Koszta is defended against Austria by the agents of the American Republic, but as a revolutionist. But none of the European Powers will ever admit as a principle of public law that the Government of the United States has the right to protect revolution in Europe by force of arms. On no grounds would it be permitted to throw obstacles in the way of the exercise of the jurisdiction of a Government, under the ridiculous pretence that the offenders have renounced their allegiance, and from the real motive that they are in revolt against the political constitution of their country. The Navy of the American Union might not always have such an easy triumph, and such headstrong conduct as that pursued by the Captain of the *St. Louis* might on another occasion be attended with very disastrous consequences."

The *Impartial* of Smyrna, received to-day, publishes the following interesting letters from Schumla:

"SCHUMLA, Aug. 8, 1853.

"The Commander-in-Chief, Omer Pasha, has so ably distributed his troops, that on the first emergency, he can within 24 hours concentrate at any point on the Danube, a mass of 65,000 men, infantry and cavalry, and 180 pieces of cannon. A letter I received from Wallachia, states that typhus is making frightful havoc in the Russian army, and that it has lost not less than 13,000 men since its entry into campaign. Care is taken to bury the dead during the night. The mortality is also very high among the horses. Our army enjoys perfect health. Russian detachments, composed of 30 to 60 soldiers, and dressed in Moldavian uniform, appear from time to time on the opposite bank of the Danube. Our general is informed of all their movements. Yesterday 1,000 Roman Catholic Albanians arrived. They form the vanguard of a corps of 13,000 men expected without delay. They are sharpshooters. Yesterday there arrived also 3,000 horse, all of them old soldiers, perfectly armed and equipped. The number of our troops is increasing every day. Ahmet Pasha started yesterday for

Varna. He will wait there for the Egyptian forces, in order to direct them to the points they are to occupy.

"SCHUMLA, *Friday, Aug. 12, 1853.*

"On the 9th inst. two regiments of infantry and one battery of light artillery, belonging to the guards of the Sultan, started for Rasgrad. On the 10th we got news that 5,000 Russians had encamped themselves on the bank of the Danube near the fort of Totragan, in consequence of which the outposts of the two armies are only at the distance of a rifle-shot from each other. The gallant Colonel Skander Bey has left for that post, with several officers. Omer Pasha has established telegraphs, with a view to communicating to headquarters at any time of day or night the events passing on every point of the river. We have had continual rains for some days past, but the works of fortification have none the less been continued with great activity. A salute of cannon is fired twice a day, at sunrise and sunset. We hear nothing of this sort from the opposite side of the river. The Egyptian troops, after having undergone their quarantine at Constantinople, will embark for Varna, whence they are to be directed to Baba Dag. The Brigadier Izzet Pasha expects them there. In the district of Dobrudscha-Ovassi 20,000 Tartars have assembled, in order to participate in the war against the Russians. They are for the greater part ex-emigrants, who left the Crimea at the time of its conquest by Russia. The Ottoman army, whose strength augments every day by the arrival of troops, both regular and irregular, is tired of passiveness, and burns with the desire of going to war. It is to be feared that we shall have one of these days a transit across the Danube without superior orders, especially now that the presence of the Russians, who show themselves on the opposite bank, adds to the excitement. Several physicians, Mussulmans and Christians, left some days ago, in order to establish military hospitals on the European plan at Plevna, at Rasgrad, at Widdin, and at Silistria. On the 11th there arrived from Varna two superior English officers. They have had a long audience with Omer Pasha, and have visited the fortifications, attended by several Turkish officers. They have found them in a perfect state of defence, provided with ample magazines, baking-stoves, fountains of fresh water, etc. All these fortifications are constructed with the greatest solidity. The most severe discipline prevails among our troops.

"SCHUMLA, *Monday, Aug. 15, 1853.*

"On the 13th, the English general O'Donnell arrived from Constantinople. He had an interview of two hours' duration with Omer Pasha, and left on the following day, attended by an aide-de-camp of the Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of inspecting the fortifica-

tions. Yesterday three batteries and an immense train of ammunition arrived from Varna. To-morrow a reinforcement of one battery, two battalions of infantry, and 1,000 horse, will leave for the fort of Crissova. The engineers at this place are busily engaged in restoring the fortifications destroyed by the Russians in 1828. Turkey may have unbroken confidence in her army."

XXV

The Vienna Note (*Continued*)

LONDON, *September 20, 1853*

N. Y. T., October 4, 1853

IN my letter of July 19 (article xvi.), I said :

"The Western Powers *commence* by encouraging the Sultan to resist the Czar, from fear of the encroachments of Russia, and *terminate by compelling the former to yield*, from fear of a general war giving rise to a general revolution."

Now, at this moment the strength of the combined fleets is intended to be used *for Russia against Turkey*. If the Anglo-French fleet enter the Dardanelles at all, it will be done not to bombard Sebastopol, but to reduce to terms the Mussulmans who might prevent the Sultan from accepting *without conditions* the Vienna Note.

"On the 13th of September," says D. Urquhart, "the four foreign Secretaries decided to send orders to Constantinople to enforce upon the Porte the withdrawal of the modifications which the European Conference had accepted. They sent orders for the squadron to advance into the waters of the Bosphorus to support him against his subjects. They have consequently contemplated the rebellion as the result of their despatch, and provided means for putting it down."

It was from Sunday's *Journal des Débats* that the English public became acquainted with this news. The *Journal des Débats* stated that Mr. Reeves, having left London on the 12th inst., with despatches for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, arrived in Paris on the morning and left it on the evening of the 14th, after he had communicated to the French Government the tenor of his instructions, ordering the

English Ambassador to demand the entire adhesion of the Porte to the Vienna proposals, the retraction of its modifications of the 19th August, threatening it with the withdrawal of the support of the four Powers in the event of a war arising from its refusal to yield, and offering it the assistance of the French and English fleets for putting down any insurrection that might break out in Constantinople if the Porte were to comply with the Vienna Note, and against Omer Pasha, if he dared to act in disobedience to the orders of the Porte. Before the arrival of the *Journal des Débats*, we were informed that the Vienna Conference, on receipt of the Emperor's refusal, sent proposals to the Sultan that he should recall his words, that he should sign the note he had refused to sign, and be content with an assurance that the Conference would put any interpretation on the Note agreeable to the Sultan himself. *The Times* avoids speaking of the compromising revelations made by the *Journal des Débats*. So do *The Morning Chronicle*, *The Morning Post*, and the whole of the governmental London press. In the meantime *The Morning Post* denounces the fanaticism of the Constantinople mob; *The Morning Chronicle* is exciting its dull readers by romantic descriptions of the fierce and undisciplined Asiatic hordes inundating European Turkey, and swelling Omer Pasha's army; the gallant *Globe* publishes day after day carefully selected extracts from the peace-mongering press of the Manchester School, and, in due time, the respectable classes of England will be prepared "to annihilate Paganism," and to shout with Prince Gortschakoff, "Long life to the Czar! Long life to the God of the Russians!"

In its to-day's number *The Times* discovers that "*the Turkish question has plainly become a question of words*," the inference to be drawn from its premisses being, that the Sultan, who intends exposing the peace of the world for mere words, must be forcibly brought to reason by the more sober-minded Palmerstons and Aberdeens. The Czar, we are told by *The Times*, having preferred unjust demands upon the Sultan, the Sultan rejected them; the Czar seized

the Danubian Principalities; England and France despatched their fleets to Besika Bay, and the representatives of these Powers met those of Austria and Prussia in Vienna.

Why did they meet them in Vienna? *In favour of Turkey*, says *The Times*. "Not only could there be *no desire of coercing the Ottoman Government*, but there was *no occasion for such an action*." If, then, there is now a desire on the part of the four Powers for *coercing* the Ottoman Government, "it is simply because there is now" an *occasion* for "such an action." Would it then be wrong to suppose that the sole and principal aim of the Vienna Conference, and of the interference of Palmerston and Aberdeen, has been the affording of such an occasion, that they made only a show of resistance to Russia, in order to gain a pretext for coercing Turkey into submission to her?

"The demands of Russia," continues *The Times*, were "thought unjustifiable by the other great Powers, incompatible with the sovereign rights of the Sultan," and, therefore, the great Powers drew up a Note to be presented by the Sultan to the Czar, ratifying all the demands of the Czar and something more. "The terms of this document," says *The Times*, "were *liable to misconstruction*, but two points were unimpeachably clear: first, that the four Powers intended to maintain the territorial and administrative rights of the Porte; and, next, that in the event of dispute *they would have been bound by this intention*."

Why should the Sultan not subscribe a Note, derogatory of his sovereign rights, and surrendering the protectorate of twelve millions of his subjects to the control of the Autocrat, while he feels himself backed by the good "*intentions*" of the four Powers, and by their being *bound* by hidden "*good intentions*" in the case of a dispute? As the Sultan has had occasion to learn, the four Powers feel themselves not bound either by the law of nations, or by explicit treaties, to defend him in the event of a dispute with Russia; why should he not trust to their valour in the event of a dispute arising from a note which endows Russia with open claims and Turkey with "*hidden intentions*"?

"Let us take," says *The Times*, "the extreme case of supposing that, after the acceptance *pure et simple* of the original Vienna Note, the Czar should have availed himself of those opportunities with which the Note is thought to have provided him." What then? "*The Sultan would have protested*, and the case would have arisen from the application of the adjustment of 1853." As if there had arisen no case from the application of the adjustment of 1840 and 1841, of the treaty of Balta-Liman, and of the violation of the law of nations, characterised by Lord Clarendon himself as "an act of piracy"! "The ambiguity," says *The Times*, "would merely have misled the Emperor of Russia." Exactly so, as the Treaty of 1841 has "misled" him to keep the united fleets out of the Dardanelles while he himself entered the Principalities.

The Sultan, however, is stiff-necked. He has refused compliance with a Note which was able to express its good intentions for Turkey only by delivering her up to Russia. He proposed certain modifications in this Note, and "the four Powers," says *The Times*, "showed by their approval of the Turkish modifications, that they believed them to coincide with their own proposals." But, as the Emperor of Russia is of a contrary opinion, and as *The Times* thinks it most undoubtedly true, that the Czar's "proceedings in this dispute deserve *no consideration whatever*," *The Times* comes to the conclusion that, as Russia will not yield to the reasonable conditions of Turkey, Turkey must yield to the unreasonable conditions of Russia, and that "a State which is yet so impotent as to require European protection at every menace of aggression from without or insurrection from within, *must at least so far pay the penalty of its weakness as to receive aid indispensable to its existence on the terms least onerous to its supporters*." The four Powers, of course, must join Russia against Turkey, because Turkey is supposed to want their aid in order to resist Russia. Turkey must pay the penalty for its weakness," in having had "recourse to the four great Powers she is obliged by treaties to appeal to.

"There is no alternative. Either the laws of England have to be exercised in their penal rigour upon the persons of four traitors (Aberdeen, Clarendon, Palmerston, and Russell), or the Czar of Russia commands the world." Such declamation as this uttered in *The Morning Advertiser*, by D. Urquhart, is good for nothing. Who is to judge the four traitors? Parliament? Who forms that Parliament? The representatives of the Stockjobbers, the Millocrats, and the Aristocrats. And what foreign policy do these representatives represent? That of the *paix partout et toujours*. And who execute their ideas of foreign policy? The identical four men to be condemned by them as traitors, according to the simple-minded *Morning Advertiser*. (One thing must be evident at least, that it is the stockjobbers, and the peacemongering bourgeoisie, represented in the Government by the oligarchy, who surrender Europe to Russia, and that in order to resist the encroachments of the Czar, we must, above all, overthrow the inglorious Empire of those mean, cringing, and infamous adorers of the golden calf. —)

Immediately after the arrival of the Vienna Note at Constantinople, the Ottoman Porte called 80,000 men of the Redifs under arms. According to a telegraphic despatch, dated Constantinople, September 5, the Turkish Ministry had resolved, after a Conference held at the house of the Grand Vizier, to maintain their last Note at the hazard of war. The enthusiasm of the Mussulman population has reached its highest pitch. The Sultan, having reviewed the Egyptian troops, and being received with deafening acclamations, was, after the review, lifted from his horse by the multitude and carried in triumph through the streets of Stamboul. He has reiterated to the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia his order to quiet the Principalities. As the Russian subjects resident at Constantinople have been convicted of intriguing against the Turkish Government, Reschid Pasha has given a warning to the Russian Consul about them. A Constantinople journal states that the Israelite community at Constantinople has offered to the Sultan a million of piastres in order to contribute to

the expenses occasioned by the military preparations of the Empire. The Smyrna Israelites are said to have come to a similar resolution. A letter in *The Vienna Press* informs us that several Boyards have been arrested at Galatz, because they had entered into a secret correspondence with Omer Pasha, informing him of all details with regard to the state of the Russian army in the Principalities. A letter of Omer Pasha has been found inviting these Boyards to enlist as many foreigners as possible.

Prince Mentschikoff had arrived at Vienna on the 13th inst., accompanied by a secretary, and as the bearer of a new manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas, addressed to the European Powers, and explaining his reasons for rejecting the Turkish modifications. The Emperor himself will arrive at Olmütz on the 21st inst., accompanied by Count Nesselrode and by Baron Meyendorff. The King of Prussia, whom he had summoned by the Prince de Lieven to the Olmütz Conference, has refused to make his appearance on the ground that under existing circumstances such a step on his part would have too much *éclat*. A Russian *corps d'armée*, 30,000 strong, is stationed now at Crajova, on the frontiers of Bulgaria. Until now there have existed only eight army commissariats in the Russian Empire. A regular ninth commissariat has just been established at Bucharest—a sure indication that the Russians do not think of evacuating the Principalities.

XXVI

The English Ministry Outwitted—Panic

LONDON, *September 23, 1853*

N. Y. T., October 7, 1853

THE *Globe*, in its number of Sept. 20, denies the authenticity of the statement of the *Journal des Débats* with regard to the mission of Mr. Reeves, and *The Times* of Wednesday reprints the article of *The Globe* under the head of *gobemoucherie*, accusing the French press of trading in *canards*. But did not the leading article of *The Times* I analyzed in my last letter wholly confirm the statement of the *Journal des Débats*? Has there appeared any refutation in the *Paris Moniteur*? Did not, on the same day that *The Globe* gave the lie to the *Débats*, the *Assemblée Nationale* reiterate that "Lord Redcliffe was to notify to the Sultan that, if he refused to withdraw his modification, the English fleet would enter the Dardanelles, and the French fleet would not be slow to follow"? Did not *The Times*, on the same day on which it reproduced the denial of *The Globe*, explicitly declare that "England and France had no business to interfere between Russia and Turkey, except on the terms proposed by the four allied Powers, and accepted by Russia, whether these terms were *agreeable* to the haughty spirit of Turkey or not"? Were we not told by *The Morning Post*, before the *Journal des Débats* had arrived in London, that "on the receipt of the Emperor of Russia's answer to the proposal for the modifications of the Vienna Note, the

Conference of the representatives of the Great Powers had immediately assembled, and on the 4th inst. despatched a courier to Constantinople with *certain communications* from the Conference to the Divan, which it was hoped would *induce* the Porte to accept the Vienna Note"? Finally, we read in a morning paper of to-day that "Mr. Reeves is going to Constantinople, that he is the bearer of despatches from Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and that a connection of the most intimate kind exists between him and the Foreign Office, he having been the channel of communication between Downing Street and Printing-House Square."

The truth is, that since the last revelations made by the French press, the Eastern Question has again assumed quite a new aspect, and the ignominious resolutions the English Ministry had decided upon are likely to be frustrated by events contrary to all their calculations and expectations.

Austria has seceded from the joint action with her pretended allies; the Vienna Conference has been broken off, at least for a moment. Russia has pulled off the mask she thinks no longer of any avail, and the English Ministry is driven out of its last entrenchments.

"Lord Aberdeen," as *The Liverpool Courier* justly remarks, "recommended that the Emperor of Russia having refused point-blank to adopt the Sultan's modifications, the Powers should hold themselves prepared, hereafter, to *act as if those modifications had been received.*"

M. Drouyn de l'Hûys suggested to the Vienna Conference an explanatory note conceived in that hypocritical sense, and to be communicated to the Porte; but Count Buol rejected this proposition, declaring that it "was too friendly to the Porte, that the time was gone by for collective action, and that each Power was free to act as it pleased." Thus the English Ministry has lost the resource of covering itself with the *common* arbitration of the European Areopagus, that joint-stock company disappearing before one word of the Austrian Minister, as it had been conjured up by him.

In the beginning Austria wanted no Conference at all till Russia had crossed the Pruth. Russia having advanced to the Danube, Austria wants the Conference no more, at least no more on its primitive conditions. On the other hand, Count Nesselrode has published two circulars, which do not any longer allow backing the original Vienna Note by hidden "good intentions," or interpreting it in any other sense than its literal one.

The modifications proposed by the Porte have reduced the whole question to "a mere question of words," shouted the whole Ministerial press.

By no means, says Nesselrode. The Czar puts the same interpretation upon the original text as the Sultan did. The original note is nothing and has never been intended to be anything but a second edition of Mentschikoff's note, and we do abide by the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text. The ministerial *Globe* is, of course, amazed at the discovery that both the Czar and the Sultan regard the original note "as implying recognition of those demands which Russia had preferred, which Turkey had refused, and which the four Powers did not (?) intend to endorse," and that "Russia insists upon an *absolute* recognition of the claims which she first advanced." And why should she not? If she was bold enough to advance those claims four months ago, why should she desist now after having won the first campaign?

The same *Globe* which pretended some days ago that the Turkish modifications were scholastic *quibbles*, *superfluous* subtilities, is now obliged to own that "the Russian interpretation shows that they were *necessary*."

The *first* despatch of Nesselrode is not yet made public, but *The Morning Post* assures us that it declares "the Vienna Note to be neither more nor less than the equivalent of Prince Mentschikoff's Note," and *The Evening Globe* adds that, according to it:

"The Emperor regarded the Vienna Note as securing for him that recognition in Turkey, and that hold upon the Government, which

the Porte, with the support of the four Powers, had refused, and which it was the object of the mediation to prevent. . . . The Emperor never ceased to reserve to himself the right of dealing directly with Turkey alone, setting aside the mediators whom he affected to acknowledge."

At no time did he affect to acknowledge them as mediators. He permitted three of them to march in the rear of Austria, while he allowed Austria herself to come an humble supplicant to him.

As to the *second* despatch, dated St. Petersburg, 7th, published by the Berlin *Zeit*, on the 18th inst., and addressed to Baron Meyendorff at Vienna, Nesselrode is perfectly right in stating that the original Note was described to him as an ultimatum by the Austrian Envoy, which Russia obliged herself to give her consent to upon the express condition of its being accepted by the Porte *without any alteration whatever*. "Will any one refuse to hear this testimony to the *loyauté* of the Emperor?" It is true that he has committed a little act of "piracy" on the Principalities; that he has overrun them, seized them, taxed them, governed them, plundered them, appropriated them, eaten them up, notwithstanding the proclamations of Gortschakoff; but never mind. Did he not, on the other hand, "on the receipt of a first draft of a Note, notify his accession to it by telegraph, *without waiting to learn if it had been approved in London or in Paris?*" Could he be expected to do more than to notify by telegraph, that a Note, dictated by a Russian Minister at Vienna, would not be rejected by a Russian Minister at St. Petersburg? Could he do more for Paris and London than not even to wait for their approval? But he did more, indeed. The draft, whose acceptance he condescended to notify by telegraph, was "*altered*" at Paris and London, and "did he retract his consent, or raise the smallest difficulty?" It is true that, according to his own statement, the Note in its "final form" is "neither more nor less than an *equivalent* of Prince Mentschikoff's Note"; but an equivalent Note remains, in all instances, "*different*" from the original one; and had he "not stipulated the acceptance of the Mentschikoff Note

without *any* alteration"? Might he not, "on this ground alone, have refused to take it into consideration"? He did not do so. "Could a more conciliatory spirit be shown?" The ultimatum of the Vienna Conference is no business of his; it is their own property. "It is *their affair* to consider the *delays* which will result" from the Sultan not yielding. He, for his part, does not care about staying some months longer in the Principalities, where his troops are clothed and fed for nothing.

Odessa does not suffer from the mouth of the Danube being blocked, and, if the occupation of the Principalities contributes to raise the price of wheat in Mark Lane, the profane Imperials will find their way back the quicker to Holy Russia. It is, therefore, for Austria and the Powers to "declare to the Porte, frankly and firmly, that they, after having in vain opened up to it the only road that could lead to an immediate restoration of its relations with us, henceforth leave *the task for itself alone*." They did enough for the Sultan by having opened the road to the Danube to the Czar and closed the road to the Black Sea to the Allied Squadron. Nesselrode's "august master" denounces, then, "the *warlike* inspiration which seems at present to influence the Sultan and the majority of his Ministers." He, on his part, would certainly prefer the Sultan taking it coolly, opposing peace tracts to gunboats, and compliments to Cossacks. "He has exhausted the measure of concessions, without the Porte having yet made a single one. His Majesty can go no further." Certainly not, he *can go no further*, without crossing the Danube. Nesselrode compresses his whole argument into a masterly dilemma not to be escaped from. Either the alterations proposed by the Porte mean nothing, or they mean something. If they mean nothing, why should the Porte insist upon them? If they mean something, "it is very simple that we refuse to accede to them."

"The evacuation of the Principalities," said Lord Clarendon, "is a *sine quâ non*, *preliminary* to any settlement." Quite the contrary, answers Nesselrode. "The settlement,

i.e. the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador bearing the Austrian Note *without alterations*, is a *sine quâ non* preliminary to the evacuation of the Principalities."

In one word, the magnanimous Czar is ready to part with the Vienna Conference humbug, as it is no longer wanted for terminating his first campaign; but he will hold the Principalities the closer, as they are the indispensable condition for commencing the second one.

If it be true, as we are informed to-day by telegraphic despatch, that the Conference has resumed business, the Powers will repeat to Nicholas the song Alexander was received with by the Paris mob:

"Vive Alexandre,
Vive le roi des rois,
Sans rien prétendre
Il nous donne des lois."

The Czar himself, however, holds no longer his former control over the Eastern complication. The Sultan has been forced to conjure up the old fanatic spirit, to cause a new invasion of Europe by the rude warlike tribes of Asia, not to be smoothed down with diplomatic notes and conventional lies, and there seems transpiring, even through the insolent Note of the Muscovite, something like apprehension at the "warlike spirit" domineering over Stamboul. The manifesto, addressed by the Sultan to the Mussulmans, declines any other concession to Russia, and a deputation of the Ulemas is said to have called upon the Sultan to abdicate or to declare war without further delay. The division in the Divan is extreme, and the pacific influence of Reschid Pasha and Mustapha Pasha is giving way to that of Mehemet Ali, the Seraskier.

The infatuation of the so-called *radical* London press is quite incredible. After having told us some days ago, that "the laws of England have to be exercised in their *penal rigour upon the persons of four traitors*" (Aberdeen, Clarendon, Palmerston, and Russell), *The Morning Advertiser* of yesterday says: "There is but one man to whom the country

points at this important junction, as fit to be entrusted with the helm of affairs. *That man is Lord Palmerston.*" *The Morning Advertiser* being unable to read events and facts, should at least be able to read the articles of Mr. Urquhart, published day after day in its own columns.

On Tuesday evening a meeting of the inhabitants of Sheffield was called, by requisition to the Mayor, "to take into consideration the present unsettled and unsatisfactory state of the Eastern Question and the propriety of memorializing Government on the subject." A similar meeting is to be held at Stafford, and many other attempts are afloat at getting up public demonstrations against Russia and the Ministry of "all the talents." But, generally, public attention is absorbed by the rate of discount, corn prices, strikes, and commercial apprehensions, and more yet by the *cholera* ravaging Newcastle and being met with explanatory notes by the London Board of Health. An order in council has been issued, putting in force the provisions of the *Epidemic Disease Act* for the next six months throughout the Islands; and hasty preparations for the due reception of the scourge are making in London and other great towns. If I shared the opinions of Mr. Urquhart, I should say that the Czar had despatched the cholera morbus to England with the "*secret mission*" to break down the last remnant of what is called the Anglo-Saxon spirit.

[In the succeeding letter Marx briefly refers to the effect on the Stock Exchange of the fleet passing up the Dardanelles, in the following passage.]

LONDON, September 29, 1853

N. Y. T., October 17, 1853

The intelligence that the combined fleets had passed up the Dardanelles, concurrent with rumours of a change in the Ministry and of commercial difficulties, produced a real panic at the Stock Exchange on Saturday :

"To describe the state of the English funds, or the scene that has

prevailed in the Stock Exchange, would be a task of no small difficulty. It is rare that such excitement is witnessed, and it is well that it is infrequent. . . . It is perhaps no inflation to assert that the *Bearing* at the present time equals almost what took place during the French Revolution. . . . Funds have this week been down to $91\frac{1}{2}$ and have not been so low since 1849. . . . In the railway market there has been an incessant fall."

Thus says the Ministerial *Observer*.

XXVII

The War Question

LONDON, October 7, 1853
N. Y. T., October 21, 1853

ON Friday last, *The Morning Chronicle*, in its fourth edition, communicated a telegraphic despatch, according to which the Sultan had declared war against Russia. The Paris *Patrie* of yesterday evening announces, in a semi-official note, that the intelligence received from the East does not confirm the statement of *The Morning Chronicle*. According to another Ministerial paper, *The Constitutionnel*, it was on the reiterated representations of M. de Bruck, the Austrian internuncio, that the Divan assembled on the 25th, with the view to deliberate on the Vienna Note, when it declared it would abide by the last Note of Reschid Pasha. A Grand Council was convoked on the following day. This Council, consisting of 120 of the principal Ministers, Councillors, Pashas, and religious dignitaries, resolved that "it would be contrary to the dignity, and subversive of the sovereign authority of the Sultan to sign the Vienna Note without the modifications suggested by the Divan, and that, inasmuch as the Czar had declared those modifications to be totally inadmissible, and refused to abandon his demand for an engagement destructive of the independence of the Ottoman Empire, it only remained for the Council to advise the Sultan to proceed at once to adopt the measures necessary for the preservation of his Empire, and to free his dominions from the presence of the invader." As to the

formal declaration of war, it has not yet been confirmed by any authentic despatch. This time, at least, the Porte has caught the Western diplomats. The English and French Governments, not daring to call their fleets home, unable to hold any longer their ridiculous position at Besika Bay, unwilling to pass the Straits in open defiance of the Czar, wanted the Porte to send for ships from Besika Bay on the pretext that danger to the Christians at Constantinople was to be apprehended during the *fêtes* of the Bairam. The Porte refused, observing that there was no danger; that if there was, it would protect the Christians without foreign aid, and that it did not wish to summon the ships until after the *fêtes*. But the vanguard of the united fleets had hardly crossed the Straits, when the Porte, having now put its vacillating and treacherous allies into a fix, declared for war. As to the war itself, it commenced three months ago, when the Russian forces crossed the Pruth. The first campaign was even brought to a close when the Russian legions reached the banks of the Danube. The only change that can now take place will be that the war will cease to be a one-sided one.

Not only the Bey of Tunis, but the Shah of Persia, notwithstanding the intrigues of Russia, has placed at the disposal of the Sultan a corps of 60,000 of his best troops. The Turkish army, then, may truly be said to be a mustering of all the available forces of Mohammedanism in Europe, Africa, and Western Asia. The hosts of the two religions which have long struggled for supremacy in the East, the Russo-Greek and the Mohammedan, are now fronting each other, the one summoned by the arbitrary will of a single man—the other by the fatal force of circumstances; according to their mutual creeds, as the Russo-Greek Church rejects the dogma of predestination, while Mohammedanism centres upon fatalism.

To-day two meetings are to be held, the one in Downing Street, the other at the London Tavern; the one by the Ministers, the other against them; the one in favour of the Czar, the other in favour of the Sultan. From the

leaders of *The Times* and *Morning Chronicle*, we might infer if there could exist any doubt about the intention of the Coalition, that it will try to the utmost to prevent war, to resume negotiations, to kill time, to paralyze the Sultan's army, and to support the Czar in the Principalities.

"The Czar has declared for peace," *The Times* is happy to state, upon undoubted authority. The Czar has expressed "pacific sentiments at Olmütz *by his own lips*." He will not accept the modifications the Porte has proposed; he will abide by the original Vienna Note; but he will allow the Vienna Conference to interpret the Note in a *preternatural sense*, contradictory to his own Nesselrode's interpretation. He will allow them to occupy themselves with Conferences, provided they allow him, meanwhile, to occupy the Principalities.

The Times, in its peace paroxysm, compares the two Emperors of Russia and Austria to a couple of savage chiefs in the interior of Africa, in order to arrive at the conclusion: "After all, what does the world care for the Emperor of Russia, *that it should go to war out of deference to his political mistakes?*"

XXVIII

The Turkish Manifesto

LONDON, *October 18, 1853*

N. Y. T., October 31, 1853

THE Turkish manifesto addressed on the 1st of October to the four Great Powers as a justification of the Sultan's declaration of war against the Czar is, in every respect, superior to the huge mass of State papers which Europe has been inundated with since May, 1853.

The Sultan, it states, has given no motive for quarrel. There remained not even a pretext for it, after the question of the Holy Shrines had been settled. On the part of Russia all treaties were infringed, on the part of Turkey all means of conciliation exhausted. According to the Powers themselves, the Sultan was not to subscribe to Prince Mentschikoff's note. How, then, could he be expected to adopt the Vienna Note, which, as a whole, was not different from that of Prince Mentschikoff? The explanatory epistle of the Vienna Conference could not change the condition of affairs. The *clear* and *precise* paragraph of the Treaty of Kainardji being misconstrued by Russia, what would not be the risk of "placing in her hands *vague* and *obscure* paragraphs affording her a solid pretext for her pretensions to a religious Protectorate"? Moreover, the modifications proposed by the Sultan have been fully justified by the subsequent explanations published by Nesselrode. The occupation of the Principalities had, at first sight, constituted a *casus belli*, and the Porte has now de-

cided to proclaim it a *casus belli*. Prince Gortschakoff has accordingly been summoned to evacuate the Danubian provinces. If fifteen days after the arrival of that notification he should answer in the negative, Omer Pasha is to commence hostilities, the Russian agents are to quit the Ottoman States, and the commercial relations of the two countries to be broken off. No embargo, however, will be laid upon Russian merchant vessels, but they will receive orders to leave the Turkish ports. The Straits will remain open to the mercantile navy of friendly Powers.

Such is the substance of the Sultan's manifesto.

The Turkish ultimatum was intimated to Prince Gortschakoff on the 9th inst. Accordingly, the term for evacuating the Principalities expires on the 25th inst. The threat, however, of commencing hostilities cannot be understood in a literal sense, as Omer Pasha is certain not to abandon his strong positions, with a view to attacking the Russians.

In *The Morning Herald* of yesterday you will find confirmed my observations on the westward movement of the Russian Army, and the secret understanding with Austria which this movement indicates.

Russia, true to the old Asiatic system of cheating and petty tricks, now plays upon the credulity of the Western world by spreading the rumour that the Czar had "*just* sent a courier in *all* haste to Vienna to declare that he accepted freely and completely the whole of the conditions proposed by the mediating Powers," when, unfortunately, "he became informed of the declaration of war on the side of the Porte." Then, of course, the God of the Russians retracted at once *all the concessions* he had ever made, and exclaimed that "nothing remained but war, and war to the knife" (*guerre à outrance*). Thus the Czar, it appears, has been forced into war by the Sultan.

M. de Bruck, the Austrian Internuncio, is said to have interrogated the Porte whether it intended to appeal to the political refugees in order to form a foreign legion. Reschid Pasha replied that, notwithstanding the propositions incessantly made to the Porte, he had not yet come to any

decision ; but that in the case of Turkey being abandoned by her allies, she would believe herself perfectly justified in making use of all means for her proper defence, and in employing the services of the political refugees disseminated throughout the several countries of Europe.

We read in the *Constitutionnel* :

“ We have reason to believe that there has arrived at this moment in Paris and London an official demand for the succour of France and England on the part of the Sublime Porte.”

You will read in the newspapers that the Emperor of Austria has reduced his army by about 100,000 men. The truth is that this number have been dismissed on furlough, but they are revocable at any moment. The financial pressure on the one side, and the hope of thus catching the money-lenders on the other, have induced the Vienna Cabinet to take this step.

XXIX

The Northern Powers

LONDON, *October 21, 1853*

N. Y. T., November 5, 1853

I TOLD you in my last letter that the Austrian decree reducing the army was intended merely to entrap the money-lenders; and now that all chance of obtaining a loan has vanished—now that the Government declare they never intended to contract any loan—now that they have entered upon a fresh emission of paper, we are informed that “no arrangements are being made for carrying into execution the Imperial decree relative to the reduction of the army.”

A Paris correspondent writes as follows to *The Morning Post* with reference to the proceedings of the Emperor of Russia during his late visits to Olmütz and Berlin :

“The Czar's chief object was to make a new alliance between the Northern Powers.”

As to the reported successes of the Russians over Schamyl, letters have arrived at Paris which show them to be nothing but inventions, no engagement of any description having taken place in the Caucasus since the month of May, when the victory at Mendoh was gained by Schamyl, and the Russians were driven back from their attempts upon the Malka.

“We quite understand the popularity of a war with Russia on behalf of the Poles or the Hungarians, even if there was no ground for our interference, except political sympathy. . . . But a war in be-

half of Turkey is one for which the strongest possible ground would never give us an actual relish."

Thus wrote *The Times* on October 12. A week later we are told by the same paper :

"The first collision between British and Russian armies would be a signal of revolution all over the Continent, and we think it by no means unlikely, nor indeed altogether objectionable, that such a consideration may have occasionally passed through the minds of our aristocratic, plutocratic, timocratic, despotic, and anything but democratic rulers. . . . We are deliberately to go to war with Russia, in defence of the Turkish *nominal* sovereignty over certain really independent provinces, because by so doing we shall provoke a rebellion in the Austrian Empire."

One day England is not to go to war with Russia, because by so doing it would defend the Turks, instead of the Poles and Hungarians; and the next day because any war in behalf of Turkey would be simultaneously a war in behalf of the Poles and the Hungarians.

The Vienna *Presse* states that Abd-el-Kader has been asked by the Sultan to accept a military command in the case of war with Russia. The negotiations were managed by the Sheik-ul-Islam, and the Emir declared his willingness to enter the service of Turkey on the condition that the advice of Bonaparte was previously asked. The command destined for him was that of the Asiatic army.

XXX

War

LONDON, *November 1, 1853*

N. Y. T., *November 15, 1853*

THE news of the cannonade of Isaktschi had hardly reached London, when the intelligence was telegraphed from Vienna to London and Paris, that the Porte, at the request of the representatives of the four Powers, had issued orders for the adjournment of hostilities, if they should not have already commenced, till the 1st November. Is the exchange of cannon shots at Isaktschi to be or not to be considered as a commencement of hostilities? That is the question now stirring the Stock Exchange and the Press. In my opinion it is a very indifferent one, as in any event the armistice would have elapsed to-day.

It is rumoured that the Turkish army had crossed the Danube at Widdin and Matschin, viz. at the north-western and north-eastern frontiers of Bulgaria. The accuracy of this despatch appears very doubtful. According to the *Paris Presse* of to-day, it was resolved by a military council held in the Seraskiat on the 15th or 16th Oct., that as soon as the refusal of Prince Gortschakoff to evacuate the Principalities should be officially known, hostilities were to commence in Asia, at two different points: against the fortress of Poti, on the Black Sea, and on the frontier of Georgia. The same paper informs us, that General Barraguay d'Hilliers, the newly appointed French Ambassador at Constantinople, has set out accompanied by a staff composed

of officers of the *génie* and of the artillery. M. Barraguay is known as a bad general and a good intriguer. I remind you of his exploits at the famous Club of the Rue de Poitiers.

While the first cannon bullets have been exchanged in the war of the Russian against Europe, the first blood has been spilt in the war now raging in the manufacturing districts, of capital against labour. . . .

While the hypocritical, phrase-mongering, squint-eyed set of Manchester humbugs spoke peace to the Czar at Edinburgh, they acted war with their own countrymen at Manchester. While they preached *arbitration* between Russia and Europe, they were rejecting scornfully all appeals to arbitration from their own fellow-citizens. The workmen of Preston had carried in an open-air meeting the resolution "that the delegates of the factory operatives recommend the Mayor to call a public meeting of the manufacturers and the operatives to agree to an amicable settlement of the dispute now pending." But the masters do not want *arbitration*. What they aim at is dictation. While at the very moment of a European struggle, these Russian propagandists cry for a reduction of the army, they are at the same time augmenting the army of civil war, the police force in Lancashire and Yorkshire. To the workmen we can only say with *The People's Paper* :

"If they close the mills of Lancashire, do you send delegates to Yorkshire and enlist the support of the gallant men of the West Riding. If the mills of the West Riding are closed, appeal to Nottingham and Derby, to Birmingham and Leicester, to Bristol and Norwich, to Glasgow and Kidderminster, to Edinburgh and Ipswich. Further and further, wider and wider, extend your appeals, and rally your class through every town and trade. If the employers choose to array all their order against you, do you array your entire class against them. If they will have the vast class struggle, *let them have it*, and we will abide the issue of that tremendous trial. . . ."

Consequent on the prohibitions or the threatened prohibitions of the export of corn from the Continent, the corn merchants thought fit to warehouse their stores mean-

while in England, where they will be only available hereafter in case of the corn prices ranging higher in England than on the Continent. Besides, in contradistinction to 1847, the supply of the countries likely to be affected by a Russo-Turkish war amounts to 2,438,139 quarters of grain and 43,727 cwt. of flour. From Egypt, too, exportation will be prohibited after 30th November next. Finally, England has this year to look only to the usual *annual* surplus of other nations, while, before the abrogation of the corn laws, it had at its disposition, in seasons of want, the foreign stocks accumulated during the favourable seasons.

The Weekly Times, from its point of view, sums up the situation in the following terms :

"The quartern loaf is a shilling—the weather is worse than it has been for half a century, at this season of the year—the operative classes are in the delirium of strikes—Asiatic cholera is raging among us once more, and we have got a war mania. We only want war taxes and famine to make up the orthodox number of the plagues of England."

XXXI

The Holy War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, November 15, 1853

THE war has at last opened on the Danube—a war of religious fanaticism on both sides, of traditional ambition with the Russians, of life and death with the Turks. As was to have been expected, Omer Pasha has been the first to begin positive hostilities; it was in the line of his duty to make some demonstration towards the forcible expulsion of the invaders from the Ottoman territory; but it is by no means certain that he has thrown from thirty to fifty thousand men across the Danube, as is rumoured from Vienna, and there is reason to fear that if he has done so he has committed a fatal blunder. On the shore he leaves, he has ample resources of defence and a good position; on the shore he seeks, he has inferior power of attack and no retreat in case of disaster. The report of his crossing with such numbers must therefore be doubted till more positive advices.

While the struggle in Europe is commenced under disadvantageous circumstances for the Turks, the case is otherwise in Asia. There, the frontier territories of Russia and Turkey divide themselves, in a military point of view, into two quite distinct theatres of operation. It is the high ridge, or rather concatenation of ridges, connecting the Caucasus with the tableland of Central Armenia, and dividing the waters that run toward the Black Sea from those which the Araxes leads to the Caspian Sea, or the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf; it is this ridge which

formerly parted Armenia from Pontus, that now forms the partition of the two distinct districts where the war is to be waged. This range of abrupt and generally barren rocks is traversed by very few roads—the two principal of which are those from Trebizond and Batum to Erzerum. Thus, for all military purposes, the hills in question may be considered as nearly impassable, forcing both parties to have distinct corps on either side, operating more or less independently of each other.

The country on the shore of the Black Sea is intersected by a number of rivers and mountain torrents, which form as many military positions for defence. Both the Russians and the Turks have fortified posts on important points. In this generally broken country (the valley of the river Rion is the only one which forms anything like a plain), a defensive war might be carried on with great success against a superior army (as very few positions are liable to be turned on the land side, on account of the mountains), were it not for the co-operation of the respective fleets. By advancing, and, in case of need, landing troops, upon the flank of the enemy, while the army engages him in front, a fleet might turn all these strong positions, one by one, and neutralize, if not destroy, fortifications which, on neither side of the frontier, are very respectable. Thus the possession of the Black Sea coast belongs to him who is master of the sea; or, in other words, unless the allied fleets co-operate actively with the Turks, it will, in all likelihood, belong to the Russians.

The country in the interior, on the inland side of the mountains, comprises the territory in which the Euphrates, the Araxes, and the Kur (Cyrus) take their rise; the Turkish province of Armenia is on the one, the Russian province of Georgia on the other side of the frontier. This country, too, is extremely mountainous and generally impassable to armies. Erzerum on the part of the Turks, Tiflis on the part of the Russians, may be said to be the two immediate bases of operation, with the loss of which the possession of the whole neighbouring country would

be inevitably lost. Thus the storming of Erzerum by the Russians decided the Asiatic campaign of 1829.

But what is the immediate *basis* of operations for one party will be the direct *object* of operations to the other. Thus the roads connecting Tiflis and Erzerum will be the lines of operations for both. There are three roads: one by the upper Kur and Akhalzikh, the other by the upper Araxes and Erivan, the third in the midst between these two, across the mountains by way of Kars. All these roads are guarded on either side by fortified towns and posts, and it would be difficult to say which would be for Turks or Russians the most eligible. Suffice it to say that the road by Akhalzikh is the one which would lead a Turkish army most directly upon the insurgent districts of the Caucasus, but that very advance of the Turks could be turned by a Russian corps advancing from Batum up the valley of the Tschoruk by Otta upon Erzerum; the road from Batum joins that from Tiflis only about fifteen miles from Erzerum, which would enable a Russian corps, advancing in the direction alluded to, to cut off the communication of the Turks, and, if strong enough, to take possession even of Erzerum, the fortifications of which are of a merely Asiatic character and not capable of serious resistance.

The key to the theatre of war, in Asia, and on either side of the hills, then, is Batum, and considering this, as well as its commercial importance, we need not wonder at the efforts the Czar has always been making to get hold of it. And Batum is the key to the theatre of war, nay, of all Turkey in Asia, because it commands the only passable road from the coast to the interior—a road which turns all the Turkish positions in advance of Erzerum. And whichever of the two fleets in the Black Sea drives the other back into its harbours, that fleet commands Batum.

The Russians are perfectly aware of the importance of this post. They have sent, by land and by water, reinforcements to the Transcaucasian coast. A short time ago it might have been believed that the Turks, if weaker in Europe, enjoyed a decided superiority in Asia. Abdi Pasha,

who commands the Asiatic army, was said to have collected 60,000 or 80,000, nay 120,000 men, and swarms of Bedouins, Kurds, and other warlike irregulars were reported to flock daily to his standard. Arms and ammunitions were said to be in store for the Caucasian insurgents; and as soon as war was declared, an advance was to be made into the very heart of these centres of resistance to Russia. It may, however, be as well to observe that Abdi Pasha cannot possibly have more than about 30,000 regular troops, and that before the Caucasus is reached, with these, and with these alone, he will have to encounter the stubborn resistance of Russian battalions. His Bedouins and Kurdish horsemen may be capital for mountain warfare, for forcing the Russians to detach largely and to weaken their main body; they may do a great deal of damage to the Georgian and Colonist villages in the Russian Territory, and even open some sort of an underhand communication with the Caucasian mountaineers. But unless Abdi Pasha's regulars are capable of blocking up the road from Batum to Erzerum, and can defeat whatever nucleus of an active army the Russians may be enabled to bring together, the success of the irregulars will be of a very ephemeral nature. The support of a regular army is now-a-days necessary to the progress of all insurrectionary or irregular warfare against a powerful regular army. The position of the Turks on this frontier would be similar to that of Wellington in Spain, and it remains to be seen whether Abdi Pasha will know how to husband his resources as well as the British general did, against an enemy decidedly his superior in regular warfare and the means of carrying it on. In 1829 the Russian forces in Asia amounted, before Erzerum, to 18,000 men only, and considering the improvements that have since then taken place in the Turkish army (although that of Asia has least participated in them), we should say the Russians would have a fair chance of success if they could unite 30,000 men in a body before the same place now.

Whether they will be able to do so or not, who can decide

at the present time, when there are even less of real facts known, and more idle rumours spread as to the Russian army in Asia than as to that in Europe? The Caucasian army is officially computed at 200,000 men, at its full complement; 21,000 Cossacks of the Black Sea have been marched toward the Turkish frontier; several divisions are said to have been embarked from Odessa for Redut Kaleh, on the South Caucasian coast. But everybody knows that the Caucasian army does not count half its official complement, that the reinforcements sent beyond the Caucasus cannot, from obvious causes, have the strength reported by Russian papers, and from the conflicting evidence we receive we are absolutely at a loss to make anything like an estimate of the Russian forces on the Asiatic frontier. But this we may say, that in all probability the forces of both parties (an immediate general insurrection of the Caucasians left out of the question) will be pretty nearly balanced, that the Turks may, perhaps, be a little stronger than the Russians, and therefore will be, on this theatre of war, justly entitled to undertake *offensive* operations.

The chances for the Turks are, indeed, far more encouraging in Asia than in Europe. In Asia they have but one important post to guard, Batum; and an advance, be it from Batum, or from Erzerum, towards the Caucasus, opens to them, in case of success, a direct communication with their allies, the mountaineers, and may at once cut off the communication, at least by land, of the Russian army south of the Caucasus with Russia; a result which may lead to the entire destruction of that army. On the other hand, if defeated, the Turks risk losing Batum, Trebizond, and Erzerum; but even if that be the case, the Russians will then not be strong enough to advance any further. The advantages are far superior to the loss to be undergone in case of defeat; and it is therefore, for sound and satisfactory reasons, that the Turks appear to have decided upon offensive warfare in those regions.

XXXII

Persia—Denmark

LONDON, *November 4, 1853*
N. Y. T., *November 18, 1853*

SHAFI KHAN, the Persian Ambassador at the Court of St. James', has been suddenly recalled from England by the Shah. This recall coincides strangely with the operations of Persia in Afghanistan, where it was said to have taken Herat, and with the Russian expedition upon Khiva, the capital of the Khanat of Khiva. The Persian expedition and the Russian one may be considered as two movements, the one from the west, the other from the north, centred on the Punjab, the northern outpost of the British dominions in the East. The Russian expedition is commanded by General Perovski, the same whose Khiva expedition in 1839-40 proved abortive. The Russians having organized, of late years, a flotilla in the Aral Sea, are now able to ascend the river Djihun.

A large Russian fleet is cruising in the Baltic, where it recently took an opportunity to inspect the fortifications of Slito, the harbour of the Swedish island of Gothland, of which Russia is covetous, in the manner she got possession of the island of Oland, close to the coast of Sweden, and strongly fortified by Russia in 1836. From Gothland the Russian fleet proceeded to the Cattegat and the Sound, with a view to support the King of Denmark's intended *coup d'état* in the very probable case of the Copenhagen Diet not quietly accepting the so-called Whole-State Constitution (*Gesamt-Staats-Verfassung*) *octroyed* by the magnanimous Czar.

The state of affairs at Copenhagen is this: The Danish Government has succeeded in carrying the abolition of the *Lex Regia*, and introducing the new law of royal succession, by the support they received from the peasant-leaguers. This party, under the leadership of Colonel Tscherning, aims principally at the transformation of the *Feste Gut*, a sort of feudal peasant-tenure, into free property; and the introduction of municipal laws favourable to the interests and the development of the peasantry. The properly called national and Liberal party—the party of the Eyder Danes, who formed the Casino Ministry in 1848, forced the Constitution of 1849 upon the King, and carried the war against Schleswig-Holstein—consisting chiefly of professional gentlemen, had neglected, like the rest of the Liberal party all over the Continent, to consult the interests of the mass of the people, formed in Denmark by the peasantry. Thus their influence on the people was lost, and the Government has succeeded in excluding them almost altogether from the present Folkething, where they can hardly be said to muster more than ten men. The Government, however, having got rid of the obnoxious opposition of the Eyder Danes by the aid of the peasant-leaguers, threw off the mask, called Ørsted, who was odious to both parties, to the Ministry; and so far from any longer cajoling the peasant party, a royal veto prevented the publication of the new Municipal law, originally introduced by the Government itself in order to catch the peasants. The peasant-leaguers, duped and abused by the Government, have entered into a coalition with the Eyder Danes, and appointed Monrad, a clergyman, and one of the leaders of the Eyder Danes, as Vice-President of the Committee sitting on the Constitutional question. This coalition has baffled all hope of overthrowing the Constitution in a constitutional way, and accordingly the whole plan having been formed by and for the Muscovites, a Russian fleet appears in the Danish waters at the very moment of the crisis.

All the journals of Vienna and Berlin confirm the intelligence of the passage of the Danube by strong divisions of

the Turkish army. According to the *Oesterreichische Correspondenz*, the Turks have been repulsed by the Russians in Little Wallachia. A telegraphic despatch states that a serious engagement took place on the 21st ult. between the two armies in Asia. We must wait for more ample and authentic information to account for the circumstances which may have induced the Turkish Commander-in-Chief to cross the Danube at Widdin, a manœuvre which, at first view, must be regarded as a gross blunder. The *Kölnische Zeitung* announces that Prince Gortschakoff has seized upon all the treasure-chests (it is not said whether governmental or other) of Wallachia; and, according to another German paper, the same general has removed to the interior all deposits of corn on the Danube designed to be exported to foreign countries.

The news of advantages gained by Schamyl over Prince Woronzow are confirmed by the French papers of to-day. We read in the *Agram Gazette* that an important letter has been received by Prince Danilo from Russia, and the Prince, after having received it, gave orders to have all the corn which had been gathered in from the Montenegrin territory removed to Chabliak. Cartridges are being made and bullets cast. It is said that Russia has informed the Vladika that a collision between the Turks and Russians was imminent, and that the war had a patriotic and sacred character; and that the Montenegrins ought to watch their frontiers narrowly, in order that neighbouring provinces should not furnish aid to the Porte.

The *Wanderer* of Vienna, of the 27th ult., says that a letter from St. Petersburg states that the Emperor Nicholas has ordered the formation of an army of reserves, the headquarters of which are to be in Volhynia.

XXXIII

Diplomacy Again

LONDON, *December 2, 1853*

N. Y. T., *December 16, 1853*

No more fighting of any account has taken place in Turkey since my last letter, but Russian diplomacy, more dangerous than Russian generalship, is again at work, and the revival of the famous London Conferences of 1840 and 1841, which terminated with sanctioning the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, under a slightly altered form, is more or less clearly announced through the medium of the Ministerial papers on both sides of the Channel. *The Times* even hints at "*vigorous measures of pacification*," viz. a sort of *armed pacification* directed *against* Turkey by her self-styled protectors. There is one great diplomatic fact not to be misunderstood, namely, the last Note sent by the English Cabinet to Constantinople, presented by the British Ambassador to the Porte, rejected by the Divan on the 14th November, and turning out to be but a second edition of Reschid Pasha's answer to Prince Mentschikoff's ultimatum in the month of May last. This is the manner in which the Palmerstons and Aberdeens give the Sultan to understand that, however the face of things may have otherwise changed, the relative situations of Turkey and Russia have undergone no change whatever since the month of May last, Turkey having won nothing nor Russia lost anything in the eyes of Western diplomacy.

As Prince Alexander of Servia forbids the Turkish troops to cross his territory, asks for the return of the Russian

Consul-General, and treats, in his declaration to the Sultan, Turkey and Russia as the two protecting Powers placed on the same footing with regard to the Principality, serious conflicts with Servia may be apprehended, which, fatal as they might have proved to Turkey at any other moment, are at present, perhaps, the only means of saving her from the claws of Western diplomacy. Every new incident, adding to the present complication, driving bankrupt Austria out of her dangerous neutrality, augmenting the chances of a European war, and enforcing upon Turkey the alliance with the revolutionary party, must turn out favourable to her, at least in her conflict with Russia. The constitutional causes of her decay will, of course, continue to do their work, if not counteracted by thorough transformation of the Turkish rule in Europe.

XXXIV

The War on the Danube

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, December 16, 1853

THE retreat of the Turks from Oltenitza appears to indicate the conclusion of the first epoch of the Turko-Russian war ; with it, at least, a first and distinct series of operations, beginning with the passage at Kalafat, seems to be concluded, to make room either for the tranquillity of winter quarters, or for the execution of new plans not yet developed. The moment seems opportune for a review of the campaign up to that epoch, the more so as the official and non-official reports of the only action of consequence fought on the Danube, the Russian attack upon the Turkish *tête-du-pont* at Oltenitza, are just come to hand.

On the 28th of October the Turks crossed from Widdin to Kalafat. They were hardly disturbed in their occupation of this point, except by reconnoitring skirmishes ; for when the Russians were on the point of concentrating an effective force at Crajova for the attack on Kalafat, they were disturbed by the news of a second and more dangerous advance of the Turks, who, on the 2nd of November, had crossed the Danube at Oltenitza, whence they seriously menaced the Russian communications. Simulated and secondary attacks were at the same time made by the Turks on the whole line of the Danube from Widdin to Oltenitza, but these either found the Russians well prepared, or were not undertaken with a sufficient force to deceive the enemy and lead him into any serious error.

The corps of Kalafat, therefore, remained unmolested, and gradually received reinforcements, which are said to have swelled it to something like 24,000 men. But as this corps has neither advanced nor suffered a repulse, we may for the present leave it out of consideration.

The passage at Oltenitza took place according to Omer Pasha's report in the following way. Oltenitza is a village situated near the confluence of the Arjish River and the Danube. Opposite the mouth of the Arjish there is an island in the Danube; on the southern bank of this river the village and fort of Turtukai are situated, on a steep bank rising to some 600 or 700 feet, on the top of which elevation the fort of Turtukai is constructed. The guns of Turtukai, therefore, form a most effective support to any corps crossing the river at this point. On the 1st November the Turks crossed over to the island, and there threw up solid entrenchments during the night. On the 2nd they crossed from this island to the Wallachian shore, east of the Arjish. Two battalions, with 100 horsemen and two guns, passed in boats to the Wallachian side; a few gunshots from Turtukai drove the Russian outposts from a lazaretto building situated near the river side, and this building, which was immediately taken possession of by the Turks, proved a great advantage to them. It was massively constructed, with vaulted chambers, thereby offering, with hardly any additional labour, all the advantages of that great desideratum in field fortification, a redoubt. Consequently the Turks at once began throwing up entrenchments from the Arjish to the Danube; four hundred men were kept constantly employed, gabions and fascines having been prepared beforehand. From all the reports we receive, we can only conclude that these entrenchments were continuous lines, cutting off entirely every communication from the Russian positions to the Turkish points of landing. Fortification by continuous entrenched lines has been long since generally condemned and found ineffective; but the special destination of this entrenchment as a bridge-head, the fact that a capital redoubt was found ready made, the

want of engineers among the Turks, and other circumstances peculiar to the Turkish army, may have rendered it, after all, more advisable to employ this antiquated system. In the Arjish the Turks found a number of boats, which were at once employed, together with what they had before, in the construction of a bridge across the Danube. All these works were nearly completed by the morning of November 4.

At Oltenitza, then, the Turks had a mere bridge-head on the left bank of the Danube; the Turkish army had not crossed the river, nor has it done so since; but it had a safe *débouché* on the left bank, which might be turned to account the very moment when a sufficient force was concentrated at Turtukai. They had the means, besides, of taking either the right or the left of the Arjish; and, finally, all their operations in the vicinity of the river were protected by ten heavy guns in the fort on the heights of Turtukai, whose range, consequent upon this elevated position and the narrowness of the river at that point, extended at least half a mile beyond the bridge-head.

The bridge-head was occupied by three battalions of the line (2,400 men), two companies of guards (100 men), two of sharpshooters (200 men), 100 cavalry and some artillery, who attended to the twelve heavy guns placed in the lazaretto. The right wing of the entrenchment was enfiladed and flanked by the guns of Turtukai, which, besides, could sweep the whole of the plain in front of the centre of the bridge-head. The left wing, resting on the river Arjish, was flanked by the battery on the island; but part of this ground was thickly studded with brushwood, so as to offer considerable shelter to the Russians in approaching.

When, on November 4, the Russians attacked the Turkish lines, they had, according to Omer Pasha, 20 battalions, 4 regiments of cavalry, and 32 guns, altogether about 24,000 men. It appears they formed in the following order: twelve battalions and fourteen guns opposite the centre of the bridge-head; two battalions and two guns in the wood

to the left (Russian right) on the river Arjish; six battalions, *en échelon*, with four guns against the Turkish right, toward the Danube, their line being prolonged and out-flanked by the cavalry. The centre first formed a column of attack, after the fire of the Russian guns had been kept up for a time; the two wings followed; then the artillery, which had first fired at a distance of some 1,200 yards from the parapets, came up to effective grape range (600 to 700 yards), and the columns of attack were hurried forward. As may be anticipated, the column of the Russian left (nearest the Danube) was shattered by the fire of the Turtukai guns; that of the centre very soon shared the same fate; that of the right (on the Arjish) was crushed by the fire from the island, and appears to have been far too weak to do any good. The attack was once or twice repeated, but without the *ensemble* of the first assault, and then the Russians had had enough of it. They had marched resolutely up to the brink of the ditch (which must not be too literally understood), but the Turkish fire proved overwhelming before they came to a hand-to-hand fight.

During the fight Omer Pasha sent a battalion of regulars across the river to act as reserves. Thus the Turks engaged may be estimated at 3,600 infantry, with 44 heavy guns.

The forces of the Russians are less easily ascertained. While Omer Pasha speaks of twenty battalions, two British officers in his camp agree in reducing the force actually engaged to some 8,000 men. These two statements are not exactly contradictory. The Russians might have some twenty battalions in order of battle, and yet from the nature of the ground, or from contempt of their opponents, the actual mass of the attacking columns might not exceed eight battalions at a time; and a circumstance which the British officers do not mention, but which Omer Pasha reports, shows that the Russians had ample reserves. It is this, that every fresh attack was headed by a fresh battalion drawn from the reserves for the purpose. Besides, the reports of the two "officers of Her Majesty's Guards"

bear in every line the stamp of that ignorant and inexperienced self-sufficiency which belongs to subalterns of the privileged corps of all armies.

Upon the whole, therefore, we think Omer Pasha's statement entitled to credit. There may have been eighteen or twenty Russian battalions present during the action, of which ten or twelve may successively have been brought to act, although from six to eight thousand may be the number of those who at a given time advanced simultaneously and ineffectually upon the Turkish entrenchments. The loss of the Russians, which must have amounted to at least 1,500 or 2,000, also proves what numbers they must have brought into the field. They were finally repulsed, leaving 500 muskets, plenty of baggage and ammunition, and 800 killed and wounded in the hands of the Turks, and retreated partially in disorder.

If we look at the tactics of this conflict on either side, we are surprised to find a gross blunder committed by the Russians, which was deservedly expiated by their signal defeat. They showed a contempt of their adversaries which has been seldom equalled. They had to attack pretty strong lines, with a capital redoubt flanked by ten heavy guns on the island, commanded by twenty-two guns at Turtukai, which also commanded the ground in front of the lines; altogether, forty-four, or at least thirty-eight guns, all or mostly of heavy metal. Now, every officer knows that in attacking a field fortification, you have first by your artillery to silence its guns and the batteries that may support it; then to destroy as much as possible the parapets, palisades and other defences; then, by approaching your batteries still closer to the attacked works, to sweep the parapets with a continual hailstorm of grape-shot, until at last you can risk launching your columns of attack upon the half-demolished work and its demoralized defenders. In order to do all this, you must have a decided superiority in the number and calibre of your artillery. But what do we see the Russians attempt? To storm a bridge-head, defended by artillery superior to their own in

number, superior in calibre, and still more superior in practice, after a short cannonade from twelve 12-pounders and twenty 6-pounders! This Russian cannonade can only be considered as a mere formality, a sort of civility offered to the Turks, for it could have no serious purpose; and if, as all reports agree, the Russian batteries advanced up to within 650 yards of the bridge-head, it is a wonder that we do not hear of a number of dismounted guns. At the same time we must acknowledge the bravery of the Russian troops, who, very likely for the first time exposed to fire, and that under such adverse circumstances, yet advanced to within fifty yards of the Turkish lines before they were crushed by the superior fire poured in upon them.

As to the Turks, we cannot say much in favour of their tactics either. It was very well that Omer Pasha during the assaults did not crowd together more troops in the bridge-head than were necessary for its defence. But how is it that he did not concentrate a reserve, especially of cavalry, on the Turtukai end of the bridge and on the island? That, as soon as the repulse of the Russians was becoming manifest, he did not launch his cavalry on the beaten foe? And that, after all, he was satisfied with the moral effect of the victory and neglected to gather all its fruits, by which he might have decided the campaign? We can only find two excuses: Firstly, that the system of continuous lines in field-fortification does not easily admit of any vigorous offensive action after the repulse of the enemy, as the uninterrupted lines do not offer any wide space for sudden and energetic sallies of masses of troops; and, secondly, either that Omer Pasha distrusted the capacity of his troops for fighting in the open field, or that he had not troops enough at hand to follow up the victory.

This leads us to the strategic questions connected with this action. If Omer Pasha had had at Oltenitza the troops who were lounging without anything to do at Kalafat, would he not have acted with more decision? How was

it that a corps of 12,000 men, with a reserve of equal force, was directed upon Kalafat, to menace that point of the Russian position where of all points it must have been most desirable to the Russians to be attacked? How came it that at the point where the Turks could gain decisive advantages these 24,000 men were not present?

But this is only one point. The Russians, it is now ascertained beyond doubt, could not muster more than 50,000 or 55,000 combatants in Wallachia at the end of October. Taking into consideration the want of roads, the intersected nature of the country, detachments not to be avoided, the regular wear and tear of an active army, the Russians, it is certain, could on no point muster more than 30,000 men in a single mass. Forty thousand Turks collected upon any given spot of Wallachia were sure to beat them, and there is no doubt that the Turks, if they had been so minded, and taken proper steps in proper time, could have collected that body, or even twice as many, with comparative ease. But the interference of European diplomacy, irresolution in the Divan, vacillation in the Turkish policy towards Servia, and other similar considerations, appear to have produced a series of half-measures, which placed Omer Pasha in a very singular position when hostilities broke out. He knew the weakness of the Russians; he himself had a far superior army, eager to go to war; but his army was spread over an extent of country three hundred and fifty miles long and fifty to one hundred miles wide. The lameness of his operations in the first half of November was the necessary consequence of this. The passage at Kalafat, otherwise a mistake, thus became a sort of necessity; Widdin being the natural point of concentration of some twenty thousand men, who, without that passage, would have been entirely inactive, being too far distant from the main army. This passage enabled them at least to paralyze a portion of the Russian forces, and to create a moral impression in favour of the Turks.

The passage at Oltenitza—which was intended evidently as the main attack by which Bucharest was to be taken,

and the Russians allured westward by the Kalafat operation to be cut off from their retreat—had no effect whatever, because the necessary forces for a march on Bucharest appear not to have been forthcoming. The moral effect of the combat at Oltenitza was certainly a great gain; but the inactivity after the victory—an inactivity which lasted *nine days*, and ended in the voluntary retreat of the Turks behind the Danube, in consequence of the rains setting in—this inactivity and retreat may not destroy the flush of victory on the cheek of the Turkish soldier, but it undermines the reputation of the Turkish general, most probably more than he deserves. But here, if the original fault lies with the Divan, there must be some fault with Omer Pasha. To pass twelve days on the left bank of the Danube, to possess a bridge, and a bridge-head strong enough to repel the united force of the Russians, to have behind him an army numerous and eager to fight, and not to find means to carry 30,000 or 40,000 men across—why, all this cannot have been done without some negligence on the part of the general. The Russians may be thankful for their escape. Never did a Russian army get out of a scrape half as bad as this with so little material damage. They deserved to be cut to pieces, and they are all safe. Whether they will ever be taken at such advantage again may well be doubted.

XXXV

The Quadruple Convention—England and the War

LONDON, *December 9, 1853*
N. Y. T., *December 26, 1853*

YOUR readers have followed, step by step, the diplomatic movements of the Coalition Cabinet, and they will not be surprised at any new attempt, on the part of the Palmerstons and the Aberdeens, to back the Czar under the pretext of protecting Turkey and securing the peace of Europe. Even the resurrection of a Vienna Conference or of a London Congress they are fully prepared for. The metropolitan Stock Exchange was first informed by *The Morning Chronicle*, on Friday last, of England having succeeded in inducing Austria and Prussia to support the Western Powers in their attempt at a new mediation between the belligerent parties. Then came *The Morning Post* with the news of "this attempt," and with the consolatory announcement that :

[*England, France, Prussia, Austria have signed protocol :*
(1) *maintaining present territorial distribution of Europe,*
(2) *inviting Russia and Turkey to Conference. Bases of negotiation to be settled and plenipotentiaries sent. Suggestion of treaties* (1) *between Russia and Turkey of amity and peace and commerce,* (2) *between Turkey and the other five ; Turkey to leave alone the Principalities and Servia and the Christians in her dominions.*]

At last came the thunderer of Printing-House Square,

announcing in a first edition that the alliance between the four Powers had been definitively concluded, and that they had laid down conditions which Russia and the Porte would, if necessary, "be *forced* to accept." Instantly the funds rose; but the satisfaction of the stock-jobbers proved short-lived, as the same *Times* announced in its second edition that the four Powers had indeed drawn up a protocol and presented the draft of a collective note, without having, however, bound themselves to *enforce* its acceptance. Down went the funds again. At last the "startling news" was reduced to the old story of the resurrection of the dead body of the late Vienna Conference—it would be preposterous to speak of its ghost—and a telegraphic despatch confirmed the report that:

[*The Conference had forwarded to Constantinople another proposal founded on a new project. Peace negotiations to go on though fighting continues.*]

On the very eve of war the Vienna Conference, that retrospective Pythia, had just proposed to Turkey to accept Prince Mentschikoff's ultimatum. After the first defeat Russia had undergone, England and France took up Reschid Pasha's answer to Prince Mentschikoff's ultimatum. What phase of the past transactions they will now have arrived at in their retrograde movement, it is impossible to predict. The *Augsburger Zeitung* states that the *new* propositions of the Conference express the desire of the four Powers to "prevent war." A startling novelty this!

Inspid as all this diplomatic gossip may appear at a moment when the *status quo* has been supplanted by a *status belli*, we must not forget that the hidden intentions of the British Cabinet transpire through these fantastical projects of Conferences and Congresses; that the Ministerial papers throw out their feelers to ascertain how far the Ministry may venture to go; and that the unfounded rumours of to-day more than once have foreshadowed the events of to-morrow. So much is sure, that if not accepted by Austria, the quadruple alliance *has* been proposed by England with a view to enforce upon Turkey the resolu-

tions to be agreed upon by the four Powers. If no alliance has been concluded, a "protocol" has at least been signed by the four Powers, establishing the principles upon which to conduct the transactions. It is no less sure that the Vienna Conference, which prevented Turkey from moving till the Russian army had occupied the Principalities and reached the frontiers of Bulgaria, has again resumed its work and already despatched a new note to the Sultan. That the step from a Vienna Conference to a European Congress, at London, is by no means a great one, was proved in 1839 at the epoch of Mehemet Ali's insurrection. The Congress pursuing its work of "pacification," while Russia pursued her war against Turkey, would be but a repetition of the London Congress of 1827-29, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino, and the loss of Turkish independence by the Treaty of Adrianople. The bases upon which the British Cabinet have proposed, and the other Powers agreed to conduct negotiations, are clearly indicated by the Ministerial papers. Maintenance of the "present territorial distribution of Europe." It would be a great mistake to consider this proposition as a simple return to the provisions of the Peace of Vienna. The extinction of the kingdom of Poland, the possession of the mouths of the Danube by Russia, the incorporation of Cracow, the transformation of Hungary into an Austrian province,—all these "territorial arrangements" have never been sanctioned by any European Congress. A sanction, then, of the present "territorial distribution of Europe" would be, instead of a simple admission of Turkey to the Treaty of Vienna, as is pretended, rather a sanction of all the violations of that treaty by Russia and Austria since 1830. "A treaty of amity, and peace, and commerce between Russia and Turkey,"—such are the identical terms in the preamble of the Treaties of Kainardji, Adrianople, and Unkiar Skelessi. "A treaty like that of the Dardanelles of 1841," says the Palmerston paper. Exactly so. A treaty like that which excluded Europe from the Dardanelles, and transformed the Euxine into a Russian lake. But, says

The Times, why should we not stipulate for the free entrance of the Dardanelles for men-of-war, and the free navigation of the Danube? Let us read the letter addressed by Lord Palmerston, in September, 1839, to Mr. Bulwer, the then Envoy at Paris, and we shall find that similar hopes were held out at that epoch.

"The Sultan, bound to respect the existing constitutions of the Principalities and Servia." But these existing constitutions distribute the sovereignty over the provinces between the Czar and the Sultan, and they have, till now, never been acknowledged by any European Congress. The new Congress, then, would add to the *de facto* Protectorate of Russia over Turkish provinces, the sanction of Europe. The Sultan would then be bound, not to the Czar, but to Europe, to protect "the Christian religion within his dominions." That is to say, the right of interference between the Sultan and his Christian subjects by foreign Powers would become a paragraph of European international law, and in case of any new conflicts occurring, Europe would be bound by treaty to back the pretensions of Russia, who, as a party to the treaty, would have a right to interpret in her sense the protection to be asked for by the Christians in the Sultan's dominions. The new treaty, then, as projected by the Coalition Cabinet, and as explained by its own organs, is the most comprehensive plan of European surrender to Russia ever conceived, and a wholesale sanction of all the changes brought about by the counter-revolutions since 1830. There is, therefore, no occasion for throwing up caps and being astonished at the change in the policy of Austria—a change, as *The Morning Post* feigns to believe, "effected suddenly within the last ten days." As to Bonaparte, whatever his ulterior designs may be, for the moment, the parvenu Emperor is content enough to climb up into the heaven of the old legitimate Powers, with Turkey as his ladder.

The views of the Coalition Cabinet are clearly expressed by *The Guardian*, the Ministerial weekly paper :

[*Russia not beaten; only foiled and angry. Czar proud, passionate, prudent. Russian policy to gain by threatening rather than waging war; to turn minor reverses to profitable account. Business in hand, not humiliation of Russia, but pacification of Europe. Coming treaty will try to settle relations of Turkey to Europe and to her Christian subjects. Any arrangement leaving Turkish Empire in Europe must be provisional.*]

The ultimate object, then, the Powers aim at, is to help the Czar "to turn minor reverses to profitable account," and "to leave no Turkish Empire in Europe." The provisional arrangement will, of course, prepare that ultimate consummation as far as "the thing is now practicable."

Some circumstances, however, have singularly confounded the calculations of the Coalition politicians. There is intelligence of new victories gained by Turkey on the shores of the Black Sea, and on the frontiers of Georgia. There is, on the other hand, a peremptory assertion representing the whole army in Poland as under orders for the Pruth; while we are informed from the frontiers of Poland that "on the night, from the 23rd and 24th ult., the *brinka*, or levy of men for the army, took place, and in places where formerly one or two men were taken, eight or ten have now been drawn." This, at least, proves little confidence on the part of the Czar in the pacifying genius of the four Powers. The official declaration on the part of Austria "that no alliance had been concluded between the four Courts" proves on her part that, willing as she is to enforce conditions upon Turkey, she dares not assume even the appearance of coercing the Czar to submit to conditions projected in his own interest. Lastly, the Sultan's reply to the French Ambassador that "at present an amicable arrangement is quite unacceptable without the complete abandonment by Russia of the pretensions which she has raised and without the immediate evacuation of the Principalities," has struck the Congress-mongers like a thunderbolt, and the organ of the crafty and experienced Palmerston now frankly tells the other fellows of the brotherhood the

following piece of truth : [*Russia cannot evacuate and abandon claims. Negotiations must, therefore, fail*].

Defeated, Russia can accept no negotiations at all. The business in hand is, therefore, to turn the balance of war. But how to effect this but by enabling Russia to gain time? The only thing she wants is procrastination, time to levy new troops, to distribute them throughout the Empire, to concentrate them, and to stop the war with Turkey till she has done with the mountaineers of the Caucasus. In this way the chances of Russia may improve, and the attempt at negotiation "may be successful when Russia proves victorious instead of defeated." Accordingly, as stated by the Vienna *Ostdeutsche Post* and the Ministerial *Morning Chronicle*, England has urged on Turkey the propriety of consenting to a three months' armistice. Lord Redcliffe had a five hours' interview with the Sultan for the purpose of obtaining from His Highness that consent to the suggested armistice which his Ministers had refused, and the result was, that an extraordinary Council of Ministers was convened to take the matter into consideration. The Porte definitively refused to accede to the proposed armistice, and could not accede to it without openly betraying the Ottoman people. "In the present state of feeling," remarks to-day's *Times*, "it will not be easy to bring the pretensions of the Porte within the bounds of moderation."

The Porte is immoderate enough to understand that it is perfectly irreconcilable with the dignity of the Czar to be defeated, and that it must therefore grant him a three months' armistice in order to frustrate its own success, and to help him to become again victorious and "magnanimous." All hope of bringing about the three months' armistice has not yet been parted with. "Possibly," says *The Times*, "an armistice recommended by the four Powers may fare better."

The good-natured *Morning Advertiser* is [*unwilling to assume statements correct. They mean betrayal of Turkey to Czar*].

The confidence of the *Radical Morning Advertiser* in "the honour and the good faith" of Palmerston, and its ignorance of the history of England's diplomatic past, seem equally incommensurable. This paper being the property of the Licensed Victuallers' Association, I suspect that those very victuallers themselves write from time to time the editorial articles.

While England is thus occupied at Constantinople and Vienna, the outpost of Russia, let us see how, on the other hand, the Russians manage affairs in England.

I have already, in a previous letter, informed your readers that at this very epoch, when the Coalition feigns to threaten Russia in the Black Sea, Russian men-of-war—the two frigates *Aurora* and *Navarin*—are fitting out in the Queen's dockyards at Portsmouth. On Saturday last we were informed by *The Morning Herald* and *The Daily News*, that six sailors had escaped from the Russian frigate *Aurora*, and nearly reached Guildford, when they were overtaken by an officer of the Russian frigate *Aurora* and an English inspector of police, brought back to Portsmouth, placed on board the *Victorious*—an English ship occupied by the crew of the *Aurora* while outfitting—subjected to cruel corporal punishment, and placed in irons. When this became known in London, some gentlemen obtained through the instrumentality of Mr. Charles Ronalds, solicitor, a writ of *habeas corpus*, directed to Rear-Admiral Martin, some other English officers of the navy, and to the Russian captain, commander of the frigate *Aurora*, ordering them to bring the six sailors before the Lord Chief Justice of England. The English dockyard authorities declined to obey the writ, the English captain appealing to the Vice-Admiral, and the Vice-Admiral to the Admiral, and the Admiral feeling himself obliged to communicate with the Lord of the Admiralty, the famous Sir James Graham, who, ten years before, in the case of the *Bandieras*, placed the British Post-Office at the service of Metternich. As to the Russian captain, though the Queen's writ was served on him on board the English ship the *Victorious*, and

though he was fully informed of its nature by an interpreter, he threw it contemptuously from the vessel, and when thrust through a port-hole it was thrown out again. "If," said the Russian captain, "it came from Her Majesty in reality, it would be sent to his Ambassador or Consul." The Consul being absent, the Vice-Consul refused to interfere. On December 6, fresh writs were served on the naval authorities at Portsmouth, commanding them, in the Queen's name, to produce not only the six men in question before the Lord Chief Justice, but the Russian captain also. Instead of the writ being complied with, the Admiralty used every effort to tow the ship out of the harbour and to get her to sea; and the other day, the *Aurora*, Captain Izelmatieff, was seen, by daylight, sailing for the Pacific, defying the writ of the *habeas corpus*. In the meantime, as we are informed by yesterday's *Daily News*, [*the Russian corvette "Navarin" is still in dock repairing*].

Now mark in what manner this "startling" case has been dealt with by the Ministerial press.

The Morning Chronicle, the Peelite organ, chose to remain silent, its own Graham being the most compromised man in the whole affair.

The Palmerstonian *Morning Post* was the first to break silence, as its lord could not let escape such an occasion of proving his mastership in making pleasant apparently difficult cases. The whole case, it stated, was greatly exaggerated and overrated. The six deserters, it stated on the authority of the Russian captain, who ordered them to be cruelly flogged and hulked, [*were not deserters. Had been inveigled away by English seamen*]. These seamen having also contrived against the inclination of the Russians, and against the orders of the Russian captain to get them ashore at Portsmouth, [*made them drunk, and told them how to get to London*].

The absurd story is invented by the Palmerstonian organ with a view to induce the public to believe that the "deserters gave themselves up to the police"—a lie too gross to be re-echoed by *The Times* itself. The whole

affair, insinuates *The Post*, with a great show of moral indignation, was got up by some Polish refugees, who probably intended wounding the feelings of Lord Palmerston's magnanimous master.

Another Ministerial organ, *The Globe*, states that [*the plea that a foreigner need only recognise writs from his own ambassador is untenable*].

The Globe arrives, therefore, at the moderate conclusion that the reply of the Russian captain to the clerk who served on him the writ of *habeas corpus* "is not perfectly satisfactory." But in human matters it would be idle to aspire to anything like perfection.

[*Had the Russian captain hanged them, he would have been beyond control of English law,*] exclaims *The Times*. And why? Because in the Treaty of Navigation, concluded between Russia and Great Britain in 1840 (under the direction of Lord Palmerston), there is a provision to this effect:

"The Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and commercial agents of the high contracting parties, residing in the dominions of the other, shall receive from the local authorities such assistance as can by law be given them for the recovery of deserters from the ships of war or merchant vessels of their respective countries."

But, good *Times*, the question is exactly what assistance the English authorities were warranted by law to give the Russian captain? As to the Russian authorities themselves, "sending their vessels to England to be repaired at this crisis in political affairs," it appears to *The Times* an act of great indelicacy and bad taste. [*Position of officers of these vessels that of spies.*] And therefore the British Government's contempt is best expressed by admitting the Russian spies into the Queen's own dockyards, by placing at their disposal British men-of-war, employing the dockyard men, paid out of the pockets of the British people, in their service, and firing parting salutes to them when they run away after having insulted the laws of England.

XXXVI

The Russian Victory—Position of England and France

LONDON, *December 13, 1853*

N. Y. T., *December 27, 1853*

[*English and French fleets in Black Sea. Turkish ship captured by Russian with impunity. Sultan surprised. The spring will bring him further wonders.*]

THUS we were informed by last Saturday's *Press*. The following Monday brought the "further wonders," not expected until spring. Defeat of a Turkish squadron by a Russian fleet in the Black Sea, off Sinope—such were the contents of a Russian despatch from Odessa, dated 5th inst., confirmed afterwards by the French *Moniteur*. Although we are not yet in possession of the exact details of this occurrence, so much is clear: that the Russian report greatly exaggerates the case; that the whole matter in question is to be reduced to the surprise of some Turkish frigates and a certain number of transports, which had on board troops, provisions, ammunition, and arms, destined for Batum; that the Russian force was largely superior in number to the Turkish one, and that, nevertheless, the latter only surrendered after a desperate engagement, lasting an hour.

"Our fleet," says *The Englishman*, "at all events, is *not* there to prevent the Russians from attacking Turkey. . . . The fleet is *not* there to see that the Black Sea is *not* a Russian lake. . . . The fleet is *not* there to help our ally. . . . Russian admirals may manœuvre . . . within gun-shot of Constantinople, and the screws

of England will continue as impassive as the prince screw, Lord Aberdeen, himself."

The Coalition is exasperated at the Czar having beaten the Turks at sea instead of on *terra firma*. A victory of the latter sort they wanted. Russian successes at sea may endanger their places, just at the moment when Count Buol has assured the Sultan of the Czar's strictly *defensive* intentions, and when Lord Redcliffe was urging on him a three months' armistice. It is very amusing to observe how the business of soothing down the public has been distributed between the several organs of the Coalition Ministry.

The Times, as the representative of the whole of the Cabinet, expresses its *general* indignation at the ingratitude of the Czar, and ventures even upon some menaces.

The Morning Post, of course, is still more warlike, and gives its readers to understand that the "untoward" event at Sinope could never have occurred if Lord Palmerston were the Premier, or, at least, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The philosophical *Morning Chronicle*, the special organ of the Peelites, thinks "it not improbable that the power which has disturbed the peace of the world may *now* be disposed to acquiesce in the termination of the war."

The Emperor Nicholas, on the plea that "he does not wish to oppose the *expression of the freewill*" of the Hospodars Stirbei and Ghika to withdraw from the government of Moldavia and Wallachia, has, by rescript of November 8, entrusted their functions to General von Budberg, placed, however, under the superior control of Prince Gortschakoff.

The fact of England urging upon Turkey an armistice at a moment when this cannot but assist the Czar in gaining time to concentrate his troops and to work at the decomposition of the ostensible alliance between France and England; the simultaneous intrigues of Nicholas to upset Bonaparte, and to replace him by Henry V.; the loudly-boasted-of "fusion" of the two Bourbon branches, negotiated in common by King Leopold, Prince Albert, and the Princes

of Orleans;—such are the circumstances which induce the public to direct anew their attention to Windsor Castle, and to suspect it of a secret conspiracy with the Courts of Brussels, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

[English policy must not be subordinated to Orleanist, Belgian, and German interests.—“Morning Herald.” Conspirators whose names appear in the “Court Circular.” Duke of Nemours, guest of the Queen, trying to restore Bourbons.—“Lloyd’s.” Your ministers do what Victoria tells them. Victoria wishes what Leopold wishes. Leopold desires what Nicholas desires. Nicholas de facto King of England.—“Leader.”]

The position of Bonaparte is at this moment more critical than ever before, although, at first view, his chances of fortune never seemed more promising. He has succeeded in slipping into the circle of European royalty. The character Nicholas has lost, he has won. For the first time in his life he has become “respectable.” The Power which, combined with Russia, tumbled down his uncle from his gigantic throne, *i.e.* England, has been forced into an apparent alliance with himself against Russia. Circumstances have almost constituted him the arbiter of Europe. The prospect of a European war, dragging along with it insurrectionary movements in Italy, Hungary, and Poland—countries where the people, looking almost exclusively to the recovery of their national independence, are by no means too scrupulous as to the quarter from which to receive assistance—these eventualities seem to allow the man of the 2nd of December to lead the dance of the peoples, if he should fail to play the pacificator with the kings. The enormous blunders committed by his predecessors have given his policy even the appearance of national vigour, as he, at least, evokes apprehensions on the part of the Powers, while they, from the Provisional Government down to the *Burgraves* of the *Assemblée Legislative*, had assumed only the power to tremble at everything and everybody.

XXXVII

Private News from St. Petersburg

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, December 29, 1853

[The following leader was probably not written by Marx, but the private information on which it is founded was undoubtedly supplied by him.]

WE have private information from St. Petersburg of the most positive nature and of incontestable truthfulness, brought by the *Pacific*, which throws some light on the complicated Eastern drama. The Russian disposable forces on the Danube at the beginning of hostilities amounted to no more than 35,000 men. Only a single army corps, that of General Dannenberg, originally crossed the Pruth. General Lüders, with another corps, remained in Bessarabia and near Odessa, in order to be able to send reinforcements both to Asia and the Principalities. The corps under Osten-Sacken was cantoned still further north, in the Ukraine. Each army corps numbers 50,000 men, and seldom more. Deducting the thousands in hospitals and the detachments occupying the fortified places in the Principalities, Gortschakoff could scarcely dispose of as many as 35,000 to oppose the attacks of Omer Pasha. Nobody in St. Petersburg imagined that open hostilities would so soon begin. The declaration of war by the Sultan, as well as the almost immediate crossing of the Danube, took the Russians both in Bucharest and St. Petersburg wholly unawares. The Czar and his councillors believed to the last that bullying Turkey and her supporters would suffice

to bend them to his demands. Now Nicholas is taught better, and is exceedingly dissatisfied with Mentschikoff. The Emperor never seriously wished for war, and does not now wish it, though he says that he will never submit to be dictated to by England and France. It is, therefore, impossible to foresee what will be the influence in St. Petersburg of the recent military and diplomatic events. The excitement in Russia, and, above all, in Moscow, the heart of the Empire, whose pulsations act powerfully on the masses of the people through the whole country—this excitement is on the increase, and of the most dangerous character, because it is religious. The wealthiest merchants of that capital are among the dissenters from the Orthodox Russian Church, and are generally not on good terms with the Government, but now they have offered to furnish millions of roubles to carry on the holy war. This example will be followed by other cities and communities in the interior. On the other hand, we are informed the Servians and Montenegrins are kept quiet as yet by the united exertions of Russia and Austria. If, however, no pacification should take place during the winter, Europe is really on the eve of a terrible conflagration. In such a case it is decided in the Imperial Councils to open a serious campaign by stirring up all the elements of general discord. Paskewitch will then be put at the head of the active army, numbering above 300,000 men, and will march—if he can—directly on Constantinople. Other *corps d'élite*, such as that of the Grenadiers and the Guards, 130,000 in all, under the personal command of the Grand Duke Alexander, the heir apparent, will be drawn up in echelons between the theatre of war and Poland, which will be occupied by some 20,000 men of the Guards of the Interior, all of whom are veterans. In Poland the peasantry take no interest in anything, and no chance exists there for a successful insurrection. Preparations on an extensive scale are now being made in the military colonies of cavalry near the borders of the Principalities, and the signal to rise will be given to the Montenegrins and Servians when their

services are wanted. As yet, however, the chances are about equal. With the spring we may see displayed the white flag of peace or the blood-red flag of war. Should the latter be the case, Europe will be paralleled into two hostile camps, no power of the second or third order being able to remain neutral. How they will divide, it is difficult to foresee precisely, but peace will be nowhere. The first hostile acts will be marked by blockading the Baltic, the Euxine, and very likely the Mediterranean. The American will be the only neutral flag. Even Holland, Sweden, and the German free cities will soon be obliged to side with one or the other of the belligerents.

XXXVIII

Russian Policy

[Probably the first sentence or so was not written by Marx ; as the last sentence in the original, which we have omitted, with its phrase " God grant " so and so, certainly was not.]

LEADER, N. Y. T., December 30, 1853

THOSE readers who have followed with any attention the expositions which from time to time *The Tribune* has given of the Eastern Question, will not be surprised at the exhibit which our statement of yesterday makes of the great lever of Russian aggrandizement. They will have learned before that the idea of Russian diplomatic supremacy owes its efficacy to the imbecility and the timidity of the Western nations, and that the belief in Russia's superior military power is hardly less a delusion. But they were, perhaps, scarcely prepared for the strong and sudden light in which our informant held up this phantasm as an element relied upon in the calculations of the Imperial Government. Bullying Turkey and her supporters—France and England—we are told, was relied on to the last by the Czar as sufficient to bend them to his demands. Accordingly, instead of sending into the Principalities a force of 120,000 men, as we were first informed had been done, or of 70,000, which we were afterwards assured was the whole number, we now learn that he sent only 50,000, or the army corps of General Dannenberg alone—a fact there was reason to suspect before, since no other general commanding an army corps has been heard of in any of the actions fought there, and it is well known that long after hostilities began

neither Lüders nor Osten-Sacken had crossed the Pruth. The same state of facts has also been indicated by the disgrace of Mentschikoff, reported from Sweden and Paris, and most conclusively confirmed by our informant, and by the Prince's setting off in a most inclement season of the year, as a courier, to convey to the Czar the news of Nachimoff's victory over the squadron of Omer Pasha. When a man of seventy years of age voluntarily undertakes such a journey, riding night and day, there can be no doubt that he has some most imperative reason for propitiating the favour of the monarch.

But the great point is that Nicholas has perfectly relied upon bullying Turkey and her allies. This has been manifest throughout the affair, though never before avowed by any authority claiming to express the feeling of the Russian Court itself. It has been a bullying business all along. The appearance and conduct of Mentschikoff at Constantinople were simply those of a bully; the manifestoes of Nesselrode were the menaces of a bully; and the entry of Gortschakoff into the Principalities with a single army corps was nothing but the bold presumption of a bully. It has all been justified by the result. England, especially, has been imposed on. She has been bullied, and is so still. She has not dared to declare her soul to be her own from the beginning to the present day. France, too, has been bullied, though not so seriously. But both together have been frightened out of the only policy which could at once have guaranteed the preservation of peace, while maintaining their own respectability. To the arrogance of the Autocrat they have replied with the symptoms of cowardice. They have encouraged the very assumptions they have deprecated, just as poltroons always encourage bullies to be overbearing. If, at the outset, they had used a manly style of language, adequate to the position they hold, and the pretensions they set up before the world, if they had proved that bluster and swagger could not impose on them, the Autocrat would not only have refrained from attempting it, but would have entertained for them a very different

feeling from that contempt which must now animate his bosom. At that time, to show that they seriously meant to preserve Turkey intact, and were ready to back up their intention with the last reason of kings—fleets and armies, was the sure means of maintaining peace. There is only one way to deal with a Power like Russia, and that is the fearless way.

It is not to be denied that Turkey, the weak State, has shown more true courage, as well as more wise statesmanship, than either of her powerful allies. She has risen to the height of the occasion; they have cowered beneath it. She has rejected the demands of her hereditary foe, not with braggadocio, but with grave and worthy earnestness and dignity; they have faltered and sought to evade the crisis. She has acted with decision; they have prevented her from acting with effect. For we may justly attribute the delays and hesitation shown in the manœuvres of Omer Pasha to the paralyzing and temporizing influence of Lord Redcliffe and M. de la Cour, over the Divan. At the moment when he was opening the campaign, they procured orders to be sent to him to delay the beginning of hostilities. Just when he was surprising Europe by advantages gained over the enemy, they prepared new terms of mediation and asked for an armistice. Thus at every step they have exhibited that dread of Russia on which we are assured the Emperor and his advisers have continually placed their dependence. They have been bullied, and have accordingly done their utmost to bring on the very evil they are so afraid of. If there be a general war, it will not be the fault of Turkey, but next to Russia, of France and England. They might have prevented it infallibly, but they did not.

As matters now stand we incline to follow our wishes and predict peace. The decision rests with the Czar, and peace is his interest. The prestige of his diplomacy and the renown of his arms can be maintained in peace much more easily and safely than in war. The naval success of Nachimoff enables him to cease fighting with more than

an equal share of victory on his side. A general breaking up of Europe has its possibility of loss and even of destruction for him as well as for Turkey, while even if he triumphs, it must be at a far heavier cost than that of his recent vast acquisitions of power and influence. The bullying system is much less expensive than actual warfare, as we see illustrated in the small army under Gortschakoff. There is, then, a considerable chance that some one of the schemes of mediation already on foot, or to be generated during the winter, may be fixed on. Then the work of Russian encroachments in Europe will once again be confined to the slower but surer processes of diplomacy and intrigue, animated by unscrupulous arrogance on one side, and aided by weakness and pusillanimity on the other. In view of such a possibility it is impossible not to agree with Mr. Douglas when he assigns to Russia the attributes of the future, and to Western Europe those of the past. There is an energy and vigour in that despotic Government and that barbarous race which we seek in vain among the monarchies of the older States. But if we look a little deeper into the cause of this relative weakness, we find it full of encouragement. Western Europe is feeble and timid because her Governments feel that they are outgrown and no longer believed in by their people. The nations are beyond their rulers, and trust in them no more. It is not that they are really imbecile, but that there is new wine working in the old bottles. With a worthier and more equal social state, with the abolition of caste and privilege, with free political constitutions, unfettered industry, and emancipated thought, the people of the West will rise again to power and unity of purpose, while the Russian Colossus itself will be shattered by the progress of the masses and the explosive force of ideas. There is no good reason to fear the conquest of Europe by the Cossacks. The very divisions and apparent weakness which would seem to render such an event easy are the sure pledge of its impossibility.

XXXIX

Palmerston's Resignation

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, December 31, 1853

THE most interesting and important piece of intelligence brought by the steamer *Africa* is the resignation of Lord Palmerston as a member of the Coalition Ministry under Lord Aberdeen. This is a master-stroke of that unscrupulous and consummate tactician. Those journals in London which speak for the Ministry carefully inform the public that the event does not grow out of the Eastern difficulty, but that his conscientious lordship, like a true guardian of the British Constitution, quits office because he cannot give his consent to a measure of Parliamentary Reform, even of the pigmy dimensions natural to such a Whig as Lord John Russell. Such is, indeed, the official motive of resignation he has condescended to communicate to his colleagues of the Coalition. But he has taken good care that the public shall have a different impression, and, in spite of all the declarations of the official organs, it is generally believed that while the Reform Bill is the pretext, the Russian policy of the Cabinet is the real cause. Such has been for some time, and especially since the close of the last session of Parliament, the tenor of all the journals in his interest. On various keys, and in multiform styles, they have played a single tune, representing Lord Palmerston as vainly struggling against the influence of the Premier, and re-

volting at the ignominious part forced upon him in the Eastern drama. Rumours have been incessantly circulated concerning the division of the Ministry into two great parties, and nothing has been omitted to prepare the British public for an exhibition of characteristic energy from the chivalrous Viscount. The comedy having been thus introduced, the *mise en scène* arranged, the noble Lord, placed behind the curtain, has chosen with astonishing sagacity the exact moment when his appearance on the stage would be most startling and effective.

Lord Palmerston secedes from his friends of the Coalition just as Austria has eagerly seized the proposition for new conferences; just as the Czar is spreading wider his nets of intrigue and war, effecting an armed collision between the Servians and Bosnians, and threatening the reigning prince of Servia with deposition should he persist in remaining neutral in the conflict; just as the Turks, relying on the presence of the British and French fleets, have suffered the destruction of a flotilla and the slaughter of 5,000 men by a Russian fleet three times as powerful; when Russian captains are allowed to defy the British law in British ports, and on board of British vessels; when the dynastic intrigues of the "spotless Queen" and her "German Consort" have become matters of public notoriety; and, lastly, when the dull British people, injured in their national pride abroad, and tortured by strikes, famine, and commercial stagnation at home, begin to assume a threatening attitude, and have nobody upon whom to avenge themselves but their own pitiful Government. By retiring at such a moment, Lord Palmerston throws off all responsibility from his own shoulders upon those of his late partners. His act becomes a great national event. He is transformed at once into the representative of the people against the Government from which he secedes. He not only saves his own popularity, but he gives the last finish to the unpopularity of his colleagues. The inevitable downfall of the present Ministry appearing to be his work, he becomes a necessary element of any that may succeed it.

He not only deserts a doomed Cabinet, but he imposes himself on its successor.

Besides saving his popularity and securing a prominent place in the new administration, Lord Palmerston directly benefits the cause of Russia, by withdrawing at the present momentous crisis. The Coalition Cabinet, at whose procrastinating ingenuity Russian diplomacy has mocked, whose Orleanist and Coburg predilections have ever been suspected by Bonaparte, whose treacherous and pusillanimous weakness begins even to be understood at Constantinople—this Ministry will now lose what little influence it may have retained in the councils of the world. An administration disunited, unpopular, not relied upon by its friends, nor respected by its foes; considered as merely provisional, and on the eve of dissolution; whose very existence has become a matter of doubt—such an administration is the least adapted to make the weight of Great Britain felt in the balance of the European powers. Lord Palmerston's withdrawal reduces the Coalition, and with it England herself, to a nullity as far as foreign policy is concerned; and never has there existed an epoch when the disappearance of England from the public stage, even for a week or a fortnight, could do so much for the Autocrat. The pacific element has triumphed over the warlike one in the councils of Great Britain. Such is the interpretation that must be given at the courts of Berlin, Paris, and Vienna to Lord Palmerston's resignation; and this interpretation they will press upon the Divan, already shaken in its self-confidence by the last success of Russia, and consulting under the guns of the united fleets.

It should not be forgotten that since Lord Palmerston became a member of the Coalition Ministry, his public acts, as far as foreign policy is concerned, have been limited to the famous gunpowder plot, and the avowed employment of the British police as spies against the political refugees; to a speech wherein he jocosely treated the obstruction by Russia of the navigation of the Danube as of no account; and, lastly, to the oration with which he dismissed Parlia-

ment, assuring the Commons that all the Government had done in the Eastern complication had been right—that they might quietly disband since the Ministers remained at their posts, and pledging himself “for the honour and good faith of the Emperor of Russia.”

Besides the general causes we have enumerated, Lord Palmerston has had a special reason for surprising the world with this last act of self-sacrificing patriotism. He has been found out. His prestige has begun to wane, his past career to be known to the public. The people of England, who had not been undeceived by his avowed participation in the conspiracy of the 2nd of December, which overthrew the French Republic, and by his gun-powder comedy, have been aroused by the revelations of Mr. David Urquhart, who has vigorously taken his lordship in hand. This gentleman, by a recently published work called the *Progress of Russia*, by articles in the English journals, and especially by speeches at the anti-Russian meetings held throughout the kingdom, has struck a blow at the political reputation of Palmerston, which future history will but confirm. Our own labours in the cause of historical justice have also had a share, which we were far from counting upon, in the formation of a new opinion in England with regard to this busy and wily statesman. [We¹ learn from London, quite unexpectedly, that Mr. Tucker has reprinted there and gratuitously circulated fifty thousand copies of an elaborate article in which, some two months since, we exposed his lordship's true character, and dragged the mask from his public career. The change in public feeling is not a pleasing one for its subject, and he thinks, perhaps, to escape from the rising tide of reprehension, or to suppress it by his present *coup*. We predict that it will not succeed, and that his lengthened career of official life will ere long come to a barren and unhappy end.]

¹ From here to the end of the article is editorial. The “article” referred to is printed, along with others, in the present volume as “The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston.”

XL

Progress of the Turkish War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, January 9, 1854

AFTER a long delay we are at last in possession of official documents in relation to the two victories which Russia so loudly boasts of and so liberally rewards. We allude, of course, to the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope and the engagement near Akhaltzikh, in Asia. These documents are the Russian bulletins; but the fact that the Turkish official organ has maintained a profound silence on the subject, when its communications, if it had any to make, should have reached us before those from St. Petersburg, makes it certain that the Porte has nothing agreeable to publish. Accordingly we proceed, on the information we have, to analyze the events in question in order to make our readers acquainted with the real state of the case.

The battle of Sinope was the result of such an unparalleled series of blunders on the part of the Turks that the whole affair can only be explained by the mischievous interference of Western diplomacy or by the collusion with the Russians of some parties in Constantinople connected with the French and English Embassies. In November, the whole Turkish and Egyptian fleet proceeded to the Black Sea, in order to draw the attention of the Russian Admirals from an expedition sent to the coast of the Caucasus in order to land supplies of arms and ammunition for the insurgent mountaineers. The fleet remained

eighteen days at sea without meeting with a single Russian man-of-war; some say the Russian squadron never left Sebastopol during all that time, whereby the expedition to the Caucasus was enabled to effect its object; others report that, being well informed of the plans of the Turks, it withdrew eastward, and merely watched the vessels conveying stores, which, in consequence, never reached the Caucasian shore, and had to return to Sinope, while the main fleet re-entered the Bosphorus. The great amount of powder on board the Sinope squadron, which caused the explosion of several of them at a comparatively early period of the engagement, appears to be a proof that the latter version is correct.

Thus seven Turkish frigates, two steamers, three sloops, and one or two smaller ships, together with some transports, were abandoned in the harbour of Sinope, which is little better than an open roadstead, formed by a bay open towards the sea, and protected by a few neglected and ill-constructed batteries, the best of which was a castle constructed at the time of the Greek Emperors, and most likely before artillery was known in Europe. How it happened that a squadron of some three hundred guns, mostly of inferior calibre, was thus abandoned to the tender mercies of a fleet of three times its force and weight of metal, at that point of the Turkish shore which from its proximity to Sebastopol is most exposed to a Russian attack, while the main fleet was enjoying the tranquil ripple of the Bosphorus, we have yet to learn. We know that the dangerous position of this squadron was well appreciated and warmly debated at headquarters; that the discordant voices of Turkish, French, and British admirals were loudly heard in the councils of war, and that the ever-meddling Ambassadors were there also, in order to speak their minds upon the matter; but nothing was done.

In the meantime it appears, according to one statement, that an Austrian steamer reported at Sebastopol the position of the squadron. The Russian official report maintains, on the contrary, that Nachimoff, while cruising off the coast of

Asia, descried the squadron, and took measures to attack it. But, if the Russians descried the Turks at Sinope, the Turks from the tower and minarets of the town must necessarily have descried the Russians long before. How then came it to pass that the Turkish batteries were in such bad trim, when a couple of days' labour might have done a great deal towards their repair? How happened it that the Turkish vessels were at anchor in places where they obstructed the fire of the batteries, and were not shifted to moorings more fit to meet the threatened danger? There was time enough for all this, for Admiral Nachimoff states that he first sent to Sebastopol for three three-deckers before he ventured on attack. Six days, from November 24 to November 30, would not have been allowed to elapse without some effort on the part of the Turks; but, indeed, the report of the Turkish steamer *Taif*, which escaped to Constantinople, amply proves that the Turks were taken by surprise. So far, then, the Russian report cannot be correct.

Admiral Nachimoff had under his command three ships of the line, one of them a three-decker, six frigates, several steamers, and six or eight smaller vessels, a force of at least twice the weight of metal of the Turkish squadron. Yet he did not attack until he got three more three-deckers, which, by themselves, should have been quite sufficient to perform the exploit. With this disproportionate superiority he proceeded to the assault. A fog, or, as some say, the use of the British flag, enabled him to approach unmolested to a distance of 500 yards. Then the fight began. The Russians, not liking to stand under canvas on a lee shore, dropped their anchors. Then the firing from the two moored fleets, without any naval manœuvres, and having rather the character of a cannonade on shore, went on for four hours. The possibility of doing away with all naval tactics, with all movements, was very favourable to the Russians, whose Black Sea fleet, manned almost exclusively with "land-lubbers," and especially with Polish Jews, might have had very poor success if opposed to the well-manned Turkish ships in deep water. Four hours were required by the

Russians before they could silence the feeble ships of their opponents. They had, besides, this advantage, that any stray shot on their part would do harm either in the batteries or in the town; and what a number of misses, in comparison to the hits, they must have made, appears from the almost total destruction of the place, accomplished long before the hostile fleet was silenced. The Russian report says only the Turkish quarter was burnt down, and that the Greek quarter escaped as if by miracle. This is, however, contradicted by better authorities, who state that the whole town is in ruins.

Three Turkish frigates were burnt during the action, four were run ashore and burnt afterwards, along with one steamer and the smaller vessels. The steamer *Taif*, however, cut her cables, boldly steamed through the Russian lines and escaped to Constantinople, although chased by Admiral Korniloff with three Russian steamers. Considering the clumsiness of Russian naval manœuvres, the bad position of the Turkish fleet in front, and in the line of fire, of their own batteries, and above all the *absolute certainty of destruction*, it would have perhaps been better if the whole Turkish squadron had got under weigh and borne down as far as the wind permitted upon the enemy. The ruin of some, which could by no means be avoided, might have saved at least a portion of the squadron. Of course the direction of the wind must have decided as to such a manœuvre, but it seems doubtful whether Osman Pasha ever thought of such a step at all.

The victory of Sinope has no glory for the Russians, while the Turks fought with almost unheard-of bravery, not a single ship having struck its flag during the whole action. And this loss of a valuable portion of their naval force, the momentary conquest of the Black Sea, and the dejecting moral consequences of such an event upon the Turkish population, army, and navy, is entirely due to the "good offices" of Western diplomacy, which prevented the Turkish fleet from standing out and protecting and fetching home the Sinope squadron. And it is equally due to the

secret information given to the Russians, enabling them to strike the blow with certainty and safety.

The second victory of which the Russians boast came off at Akhaltzikh, in Armenia. The Turks have for some time past been checked in the offensive movements which they had effected on the Georgian frontier. Since the taking of Shefkatil, or St. Nicolas, not a place of any importance has been taken, nor any victory gained of more than ephemeral effect. And this in a country where the Russians must fight under all imaginable disadvantages, where their land communications with Russia are reduced to two roads infested by insurgent Circassians, where their sea communications might very easily be cut off or endangered, and where the Transcaucasian country occupied by them, with Tiflis for its centre, might be considered more as an independent State than as part and parcel of a mighty empire. How is this check of the Turkish advance to be explained? The Turks accuse Abdi Pasha of treason, and have recalled him; and certainly it is very curious that Abdi Pasha is the only Turkish general in Asia who has been allowed by the Russians to gain local and partial victories. But there are two mistakes on the part of the Turks which explain the want of success in the beginning and the actual defeat in due course afterwards. They have spread and divided their army upon all the long line from Batum to Bayazid; their masses are nowhere strong enough for a concentric attack upon Tiflis, though part of them are at the present moment enjoying the undisputed and useless possession of the city of Erivan. The country is barren and rocky, and it may be difficult to feed a large army there; but quick concentration of all resources and rapid movements are the best means against famine in an army. Two corps—one for covering Batum and attacking on the coast line, another for a direct march upon Tiflis through the valley of the Kur—would have been sufficient. But the Turkish forces have been divided and subdivided without any necessity whatever, and to the almost entire disabling of every one of the different corps.

In the second place the inactivity in which diplomacy held the Turkish fleet allowed the Russians to land two divisions of infantry (of the 5th corps) in Mingrelia, and thus to reinforce Prince Woronzow's Caucasian army by nearly 20,000 men. Thus strengthened, he not only arrested the Turks on the coast, but has now had the satisfaction of seeing a corps under General Andronikoff deliver the beleaguered fortress of Akhaltzikh, and beat the enemy on the open field near that town. The Russians declare that with about 10,000 men they have routed 18,000 Turks. Of course we cannot rely upon such statements, but must confess that the great number of irregulars in the Turkish Anatolian army and the almost total absence of European officers, particularly in the higher commands and on the staff, must make them but a poor match for an equal number of Russians. The Russians declare they have taken ten or twelve pieces of cannon, which may be true, as in that impassable country the vanquished party must necessarily abandon most of its guns. At the same time they confess they have made only 120 prisoners. This amounts to a confession that they have massacred almost all the wounded on the field of battle, they being necessarily left in their hands. Besides, they prove that their measures for pursuit and intercepting the retreat of at least part of the enemy, must have been wretchedly planned. They had plenty of cavalry; a bold charge in the midst of the fugitives would have cut off whole battalions. But this action offers, so far as our reports go, but little military or political interest.

On the Danube the Russians have done nothing more than repeat the affair by which they opened the campaign at Matschin, a fort, or a projecting rock, opposite Braila. They appear to have made little impression. We have also, on good authority, a detailed statement of the Turkish troops concentrated at Widdin. They consist of 34,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 2,000 artillery, with 66 field guns, besides heavy artillery on the walls of Widdin and on the redoubts of Kalafat. Thus, 40,000 Turks are wasted

in order to occupy the direct route from Bucharest into Servia. Forty thousand men, chained down to extensive fortifications which they have to defend, are too few to withstand the attack of a large army, and a great deal too many to defeat roving expeditions of small bodies. With the force already collected at Schumla, these 40,000 men would there be worth twice their number elsewhere. Their absence, next to diplomatic interference, ruined the operation of Oltenitza. It is impossible that Omer Pasha should not know, that if he stands with 100,000 men between Silistria and Rustchuk, the Russians, in numbers sufficient to do mischief, will never attempt to pass by him in order to throw themselves into the mountains of Servia. Such a disposition of his troops cannot accord with his judgment, and he must chafe desperately at the maleficent influences which force it upon him.

England and Russia

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, January 11, 1854

LORD PALMERSTON's resignation seems to be working in England all the marvels he could have hoped from it. While the public indignation is becoming more and more active against the Cabinet he has abandoned, and whose policy he has on all occasions, up to the last moment of his connection with it, emphatically endorsed, the very parties loudest in their denunciations of the Coalition vie with each other in the praise of Palmerston. And while they call for energetic and honourable resistance to the encroachments of Russia, on the one hand, they seem to desire nothing so much as the restoration of their favourite statesman to high office on the other. Thus the accomplished and relentless actor deludes the world. It would be an amusing spectacle were the interests involved less momentous. How deep is the delusion we have already had occasion to show, and now add below a new demonstration of the truth that, for some reason or other, Lord Palmerston has steadily laboured for the advancement of Russia, and has used England for that purpose. Those who seek to look behind the scenes of current history, and to judge events and men at their real value, will, we think, find our exposure instructive.

One glance over the map of Europe will show us on the western side of the Black Sea the outlets of the Danube, the only river which springs up in the very heart of Europe,

and may be said to form a natural highway to Asia. Exactly opposite, on the eastern side of the Euxine, southwards of the river Kuban, begins the mountainous range of the Caucasus, which, stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian, in a south-easterly direction for some 700 miles, separates Europe from Asia.

The Power which holds the outlets of the Danube necessarily holds the Danube also, the highway to Asia, and with it controls a great deal of the commerce of Switzerland, Germany, Hungary, Turkey, and, above all, of Moldavia and Wallachia. But give the same Power the Caucasus in addition, and the Black Sea will exclusively belong to it as a *mare clausum*, and only Constantinople and the Dardanelles are wanted in order to shut its door. The possession of the Caucasian mountains insures at once the control of Trebizond, and, through its position with reference to the Caspian Sea, of the northern seaboard of Persia.

The greedy eye of Russia has embraced at once the outlets of the Danube and the mountainous range of the Caucasus. There the business in hand was to conquer supremacy; here, to maintain it. The chains of the Caucasus mountains separate Southern Russia from the luxurious provinces of Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeritia, and Gurjel, which the Muscovite had wrested from the Mussulman. Thus the foot of the monster empire is cut off from its main body. The only military road winds from Mozdok to Tiflis through the narrow pass of Darien, secured by a continuous chain of entrenched places, and exposed on both sides to eternal attacks from the hostile Caucasian tribes. The union of the Caucasian tribes under one military chief might even endanger the bordering country of the Cossacks. "The thought of the dreadful consequences which a union of the hostile Caucasians under one head would produce in the south of Russia fills one with terror," exclaims Mr. Kapffer, a German, who presided over the scientific commission which in 1829 accompanied the expedition of General Etrennel to Elbruz.

At this very moment our attention is directed with equal

anxiety to the banks of the Danube, where Russia has seized the two granaries of Europe, and to the Caucasus, where she is menaced with expulsion from Georgia. Her movements in both these regions have a common origin. It was by the Treaty of Adrianople that the usurpation of Moldo-Wallachia was prepared, and that her claims on the Caucasus were founded.

Art. IV. of the treaty has the following stipulation :

"All the countries situated to the north and east of the line of demarcation between the two empires (Russia and Turkey) towards Georgia, Imeritia, and Gurriel, as well as all the shore of the Black Sea, from the mouth of the Kuban as far as the port of St. Nicholas inclusively, shall remain under the domination of Russia."

With regard to the Danube the same treaty stipulates :

"The frontier line will follow the course of the Danube to the mouth of St. George, leaving all the islands formed by the different branches in the possession of Russia. The right bank will remain, as formerly, in the possession of the Ottoman Porte. It is, however, agreed that that right bank, from the point where the arm of St. George departs from that of Sulina, shall remain *uninhabited* to a distance of two hours (six miles) from the river, and that no kind of structure shall be raised there; and, in *like manner*, on the islands which still remain in the possession of Russia. With the exception of quarantines which will be there established, it will not be permitted to make any other establishment or fortification."

Both these paragraphs, inasmuch as they secured to Russia new possessions and exclusive commercial advantages, infringe on the protocol of April 4, 1826, drawn up by the Duke of Wellington at St. Petersburg, and on the treaty of July 6, 1827, concluded between Russia and the other Powers at London. The English Government, therefore, refused to recognise the Treaty of Adrianople. The Duke of Wellington protested against it. Lord Aberdeen protested against it, as Lord Mahon says :

"In a despatch to Lord Heytesbury, dated 31st October, 1829, he commented with no small dissatisfaction on many parts of the Treaty of Adrianople, and especially noticed the stipulations respecting the islands of the Danube. He denies that that treaty has respected the territorial rights of sovereignty of the Porte, and the condition and the interests of all maritime States in the Mediterranean."

Earl Grey said :

“That the independence of the Porte would be sacrificed, and the peace of Europe endangered by this being agreed to.”

Lord Palmerston himself, in his speech of March 17, 1837, informs us :

“As far as the extension of the Russian frontier is concerned on the mouth of the Danube, the south of the Caucasus, and the shores of the Black Sea, it is certainly not consistent with the solemn declaration made by Russia in the face of Europe previous to the commencement of the Turkish war.”

The eastern shores of the Black Sea, by blockading which, and cutting off the supply of arms and gunpowder to the north-western Circassian districts, Russia could alone hope to realize her claim on the Caucasus she had wrested from Turkey—the shore of the Black Sea, as well as the outlets of the Danube, are certainly not places “where no English action could possibly take place,” as was lamented by Lord Palmerston in the case of Cracow. By what mysterious contrivance, then, has the Muscovite, nevertheless, succeeded in blocking up the Danube, in blockading the shore of the Euxine, and in forcing England to submit not only to the Treaty of Adrianople, but at the same time to the violations by Russia herself of that identical treaty?

These questions were put to the noble Viscount in the House of Commons on April 20, 1836. Petitions were simultaneously presented from the merchants of London, Glasgow, and other commercial towns, against the fiscal regulations of Russia on the Black Sea, and her enactments and restrictions, intended to interrupt English commerce on the Danube.

There had appeared on February 7, 1836, a ukase which, by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople, established a quarantine on one of the islands formed by the mouths of the Danube. In order to execute the quarantine regulations, Russia claimed a right of boarding and search, of levying fees, and seizing and marching off to Odessa refractory sailors proceeding on their voyage up the Danube. Before

the quarantine was established, or rather before, under the false pretence of a quarantine, a fort and a custom house were erected, the Russian authorities had thrown out feelers to ascertain what risk they would run with the British Government. Lord Durham, acting upon instructions received from England, remonstrated with the Russian Government for these hindrances to British trade. He was referred to Count Nesselrode. Count Nesselrode referred to the Governor of South Russia, and the Governor of South Russia again referred to the Consul at Galatz, who communicated with the British Consul at Braila, who was instructed to send down the captains from whom toll had been exacted to the mouth of the Danube, the scene of their injuries, in order that inquiry might be made into the subject, it being well known that the captains referred to were then in England.

The formal ukase of February 7, 1836, aroused, however, the general attention of British merchants, since, as Mr. Stewart stated in the House of Commons on April 20, 1836,

“many ships had sailed, and others were going out, to whose captains strict orders had been given not to submit to the right of boarding and search which Russia claimed. The fate of these ships must be inevitable, unless some expression of opinion was made on the part of the House. Unless that were done British shipping, to the amount of not less than 5,000 tons, would be seized and marched off to Odessa, until the insolent commands of Russia were complied with.”

We have stated that Russia acquired the marshy islands at the mouths of the Danube in virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople, which treaty was a violation of that which she had previously concluded with England and the other Powers on July 26, 1827. Her bristling the mouths of the Danube with fortifications, and these fortifications with guns, was also a violation of the Treaty of Adrianople, which expressly prohibited any fortifications being erected within six miles of the river. The exacting of tolls and the obstruction of the navigation was a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, which declared that “the navigation of rivers along their whole course, from the point where each of them

became navigable to its mouth, shall be entirely free"; that "the amount of the duties shall, in no case, exceed those now (in 1815) paid"; and that "no increase shall take place except with the common consent of the States bordering on this river." Thus, then, the only points on which Russia could plead "not guilty," were an infraction of the treaty of 1827, by the Treaty of Adrianople, an open violation by herself of the Treaty of Adrianople, and an insolent rupture of the Treaty of Vienna.

It appeared quite impossible to wring out of Lord Palmerston any declaration whether he did, or did not, recognise the Treaty of Adrianople. As to the Treaty of Vienna, "he had received no *official* information that anything had occurred which was not warranted by the treaty. When such a statement should be made by the parties concerned, it would be dealt with in such a manner as the law advisers of the Crown should deem consistent with the rights of the subjects of England."

By Art. V. of the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia guarantees "the prosperity of the Danubian Principalities and full liberty of trade for them." Now Mr. Patrick Stewart proved that the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were objects of deadly jealousy to Russia, as their trade had taken a sudden development since 1834, as they vied with Russia's own staple production, as Galatz was becoming the great depot of all the grain of the Danube and driving Odessa out of the market. To this Lord Palmerston answered in these words:

"If my honourable friend had been able to show, that whereas some years ago we had had a large and important commerce with Turkey, and that the commerce had by the aggression of other countries or by the neglect of the Government of this, dwindled down to an inconsiderable trade, then there might have been ground to call upon Parliament. In lieu of such an occurrence, my honourable friend has shown that during the last few years the trade with Turkey has risen from next to nothing to a very considerable amount."

"Russia obstructs the Danube navigation, because the trade of the Principalities is growing important," says Mr.

Stewart. "But she did not do so when that trade was next to nothing," answers Lord Palmerston. "You neglect to oppose Russia's recent encroachments on the Danube," says Mr. Stewart. "But did we do so before these encroachments were ventured upon?" asks Lord Palmerston. His lordship succeeded in preventing the House from coming to a resolution by assuring it that "there was no disposition of Her Majesty's Government to submit to aggressions on the part of any Power, be that Power what it may, and be it more or less strong," and by warning the House that "they should also cautiously abstain from anything which might be construed by other Powers, and reasonably so, as being a provocation on their part."

A week after these debates had taken place in the House of Commons, a British merchant addressed a letter to Lord Palmerston with regard to the Russian ukase. He was answered by the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office as follows:

"I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to acquaint you that his lordship has called upon the law adviser for the Crown for his opinion as to the regulations promulgated by the Russian ukase on February 7, 1836; but, in the meantime, Lord Palmerston directs me to acquaint you, with respect to the latter part of your letter, that it is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that no toll is justly demanded by the Russian authorities at the mouth of the Danube, and you have acted properly in directing your agents to refuse to pay it."

The merchant, on acting according to this letter, was abandoned to Russia by the noble Lord; a Russian toll, as Mr. Urquhart states, is now exacted in London and Liverpool by Russian Consuls on every English ship sailing for the Turkish ports of the Danube, and the quarantine still stands on the island of Leti.

But Russia did not limit her invasion of the Danube to a quarantine established, to fortifications erected, and to tolls exacted. The only mouth of the Danube still navigable, the Sulina mouth, came into the possession of Russia through the Treaty of Adrianople. As long as it was possessed by the Turks, a depth of water was kept in the

channel from 14 to 16 feet. Since it has been possessed by Russia, the water has become reduced to 8 feet, a depth wholly inadequate to the conveyance of vessels employed in the corn trade. Now Russia is a party to the Treaty of Vienna, and that treaty stipulates in article 113, that "each State shall be at the expense of keeping in good repair the towing paths, and shall maintain the necessary works in order that no obstruction shall be experienced by the navigation." Russia found no better means for keeping the channel in a navigable state than choking up its mouth with an accumulation of sand and mud, and paving its bar with shipwrecks. To this systematic and protracted violation of the Treaty of Vienna, Russia has added another violation of the Treaty of Adrianople, which forbids the erecting of any establishment at the mouth of the Sulina, except for quarantine and lighthouse purposes, since, at her dictation, there has sprung up there a small Russian town, supported by the extortions, the occasion for which has been afforded by the delays and expenses for lighterage consequent upon the obstruction of the channel.

"Of what use," said Lord Palmerston, on April 30, 1823, "is it to dwell upon abstract principles with despotic Governments who are accused of measuring right by power, and of ruling their conduct by expediency, and not by justice?" According to his own maxim the noble Lord took good care to content himself with dwelling upon abstract principles with the despotic Government of Russia. But he went further. While he assured the House on July 6, 1840, that the freedom of the Danube was "guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna"; and while he lamented on July 13, 1840, that although the occupation of Cracow was a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, "there were no means of enforcing the opinion of England, because Cracow was evidently a place where no English action could possibly take place," he, two days later, concluded a treaty with Russia, by virtue of which treaty the Dardanelles were hermetically closed to English men-of-war during peace with Turkey, thus bereaving England of the only means

of enforcing the Treaty of Vienna, and transforming the Euxine into "a place where no English action could possibly take place." This point once obtained, he gave a sham satisfaction to public opinion by firing off a whole battery of papers reminding "the despotic Government," which "measures might by power, and rules its conduct by expediency, and not by justice," in a very sententious and sentimental manner, that "Russia, when she compelled Turkey to cede to her the outlet of a great European river which forms the commercial highway for the mutual intercourse of many nations, undertook duties and responsibilities to other States, which she should take a pride in making good." To such a homily upon abstract principles, Count Nesselrode answered steadily and phlegmatically that "the subject should be carefully examined," and from time to time he carefully expressed "a feeling of soreness on the part of the Imperial Government at the mistrust manifested as to their intentions."

Thus, through the management of the noble Lord, things have arrived in 1853 at the point where the navigation of the Danube has been declared *impossible*, and wheat is rotting in the mouth of the Sulina, while famine threatens to invade France, England, and the south of Europe. Thus Russia has added, as *The Times* said, "to her other important possessions, that of an iron gate between the Danube and the Euxine." She has acquired the key of the Danube and of a bread-screw which she can put on whenever the policy of Western Europe becomes obnoxious to punishment.

The mystery, however, of Lord Palmerston's transactions with Russia as to her schemes on the Danube, was not revealed till during the course of the debates on Circassia. Then it was proved by Mr. Anstey on February 23, 1848, that "the noble Viscount's first act on coming into office (as the Minister of Foreign Affairs) was to accept the Treaty of Adrianople,"—the same treaty against which the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen had protested.

How this was done, and how Circassia was delivered by Lord Palmerston to Russia, as far as he had the power to deliver it, may perhaps form the subject of another article.

XLII

More Documents

LONDON, *January 10, 1854*
N. Y. T., *January 28, 1854*

To the huge mass of diplomatic papers communicated to the public are now added a *Note of the Four Powers*, dated the 12th of December, and jointly addressed by their respective Ambassadors at Constantinople to the Porte, and a new circular of M. Drouyn de l'Huys to the French diplomatic agents, dated Paris, December 30. On perusing the Note of the Four Powers, we understand the extreme agitation which prevailed at Constantinople after the acceptance of the Note by the Porte became known, the insurrectionary movement occurring on the 21st, and the necessity the Turkish Ministry was placed in, solemnly to proclaim that the operations of the war would not be interrupted nor interfered with by the renewed peace negotiations. Just nine days after the intelligence of the treacherous and cowardly butchery at Sinope had reached Constantinople, and aroused throughout the Ottoman Empire one tremendous cry for revenge, the Four Powers coolly invite, and the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France force, the Porte to enter into negotiations with the Czar, the base of which is that all the *ancient treaties shall be renewed*; that the firmans relative to the spiritual privileges *octroyed* by the Sultan to his Christian subjects shall be accompanied by new assurances given to each of these Powers, consequently to the Czar; that the Porte shall name a plenipotentiary to establish an armistice; that it shall allow Russia to

erect a church and a hospital at Jerusalem, and pledge itself to the Powers, consequently to the Czar, to ameliorate its internal administrative system. The Porte shall not only not receive any indemnity at all for the heavy losses it has undergone consequent on the piratical acts of the Muscovite, all the chains in which Russia has made Turkey dance for a quarter of a century shall not only be forged anew, but the prisoner shall be kept closer than before; the Porte shall place itself at the mercy of the Autocrat by giving him humble assurances with regard to the firmans relative to the spiritual privileges of its Christian subjects, and pledging itself to him with regard to its internal administrative system; thus surrendering at once the religious protectorate and the dictation over its civil government to the Czar. In compensation for such a surrender the Porte receives the promise of "the most speedy evacuation possible of the Principalities," the invasion of which Lord Clarendon declared to be "an act of piracy," and the assurance that the preamble of the treaty of July 13, 1841,—which has proved so trustworthy a safeguard against Russia—shall be formally confirmed.

Although the unfathomable abjectness of these pitiful "Powers" reached its highest possible pitch in frightening, some days after the event of Sinope, the Porte into a negotiation on such bases, they will not get rid of their embarrassment in this sneaking way. The Czar has gone too far to suffer even the appearance of his pretended exclusive protectorate over the Christian subjects of Turkey to be supplanted by a European one, and already we are informed by the Vienna correspondent of *The Times* that:

[*Austria asks Russia if she objects to a European Protectorate of Christians in Turkey. Russia answers point-blank, "Yes." Russia will settle with Turkey alone.*]

We are also informed by *The Standard*:

[*Nicholas will only deal with Turkey direct. A deserved insult to the Powers.*]

The only important passage in the circular of Monsieur Drouyn de l'Huys is that announcing the entrance of the united squadrons into the Black Sea, with a view to "combine their movements in such a manner as to prevent the territory or the flag of Turkey from being the object of any fresh attack on the part of the naval forces of Russia." *Non bis in idem.* *La moutarde après la viande.* The *Morning Chronicle* of yesterday published a telegraphic despatch from its correspondent at Constantinople, dated the 30th, stating that the combined fleets had entered the Black Sea. "Only to do nothing," says *The Daily News*.

[*One English, one French vessel to enter Sebastopol and tell Russian admiral if he leaves port they will fire on him.—*
"The Press."]

Although the Russian fleet, at this not very propitious season, and after their glorious exploit at Sinope, have nothing whatever to call them out into the Black Sea, the Czar will not allow England and France to exclude him, even temporarily, from waters from which he has succeeded in excluding them ever since 1833. His prestige would be gone were he not to answer this communication by a declaration of war.

[*War between Russia and England and France more likely than peace between Russia and Turkey.—*"*Neue Preussische Zeitung.*"]

At Newry (Ulster) a great meeting was held for the purpose of taking into consideration the unprovoked aggression of Russia against Turkey. Mr. Urquhart spoke. Having explained, on several occasions, my own views of the Oriental question, I need not point out those topics on which I must disagree with Mr. Urquhart. Let me only remark that his views are confirmed by the intelligence that "the peasants of Lesser Wallachia, assisted by the Wallachian soldiery, have risen against the Russians. The whole country in the environs of Kalafat, and along the left shore of the Danube, is in motion. The Russian functionaries have evacuated Turnu."

[*Here follows Mr. Urquhart's speech.*]

I may add to Mr. Urquhart's speech that Lord Palmerston's last *coup d'éclat*, and the favour of the people bestowed upon him, have made him Prime Minister in reality, if not in name.

XLIII

The European War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, February 2, 1854

AT last the long-pending question of Turkey appears to have reached a stage where diplomacy will not much longer be able to monopolize the ground for its ever-shifting, ever-cowardly, and ever-resultless movements. The French and the British fleets have entered the Black Sea in order to prevent the Russian navy from doing harm either to the Turkish fleet or the Turkish coast. The Czar Nicholas long since declared that such a step would be, for him, the signal for a declaration of war. Will he now stand it quietly?

It is not to be expected that the combined fleets will at once attack and destroy either the Russian squadron or the fortifications and navy-yards of Sebastopol. On the contrary, we may rest assured that the instructions which diplomacy has provided for the two admirals are so contrived as to evade, as much as possible, the chance of a collision. But naval and military movements once ordered, are subject not to the desires and plans of diplomacy, but to laws of their own which cannot be violated without endangering the safety of the whole expedition. Diplomacy never intended the Russians to be beaten at Oltenitza; but a little latitude once given to Omer Pasha, and military movements once begun, the action of the two hostile commanders was carried on in a sphere which was to a great extent uncontrollable by the Ambassadors at Constantinople. Thus, the fleets once removed from their moorings

in the Beicos Roads, there is no telling how soon they may find themselves in a position from which Lord Aberdeen's prayers for peace, or Lord Palmerston's collusion with Russia, cannot draw them, and where they will have to choose between an infamous retreat or a resolute struggle. A narrow land-locked sea like the Euxine, where the opposing navies can hardly contrive to get out of sight of each other, is precisely the locality in which conflicts under such circumstances may become necessary almost daily. And it is not to be expected that the Czar will allow, without opposition, his fleet to be blockaded in Sebastopol.

If, then, a European war is to follow from this step, it will be, in all likelihood, a war between Russia on the one hand, and England, France, and Turkey on the other. The event is probable enough to warrant us in comparing the chances of success and striking the balance of active strength on each side, so far as we can.

But will Russia stand alone? What part will Austria, Prussia, and the German and Italian States, their dependants, take in a general war? It is reported that Louis Bonaparte has notified the Austrian Government that if, in case of a conflict with Russia, Austria should side with that Power, the French Government would avail itself of the elements of insurrection which in Italy and Hungary only require a spark to be kindled again into a raging fire, and that then the restoration of Italian and Hungarian nationality would be attempted by France. Such a threat may have its effect upon Austria; it may contribute to keep her neutral as long as possible, but it is not to be expected that Austria will long be enabled to keep aloof from such a struggle, should it come to pass. The very fact of the threat having been uttered may call forth partial insurrectionary movements in Italy, which could not but make Austria a still more dependent and still more subservient vassal of Russia. And then, after all, has not this Napoleonic game been played once already? Is it to be expected that the man who restored the Pope to his temporal throne, and who has a candidate cut and dried for

the Neapolitan monarchy, will give to the Italians what they want as much as independence from Austria—unity? Is it to be expected that the Italian people will rush headlong into such a snare? No doubt they are sorely oppressed by Austrian rule, but they will not be very anxious to contribute to the glory of an Empire which is already tottering in its native soil of France, and of a man who was the first to combat their own revolution. The Austrian Government knows all this, and therefore we may assume that it will be more influenced by its own financial embarrassments than by these Bonapartistic threats; we may also be certain that, at the decisive moment, the influence of the Czar will be paramount at Vienna, and will entangle Austria on the side of Russia.

Prussia is attempting the same game which she played in 1780, 1800, and 1805. Her plan is to form a league of neutral Baltic, or North German, States, at the head of which she can play a part of some importance, and turn to whichever side offers her the greatest advantages. The almost comical uniformity with which all these attempts have ended by throwing the greedy, vacillating, and pusillanimous Prussian Government into the arms of Russia, belongs to history. It is not to be expected that Prussia will now escape her habitual fate. She will put out feelers in every direction, offer herself at public auction, intrigue in both camps, swallow camels and strain at gnats, lose whatever character may perchance yet be left to her, get beaten, and at last be knocked down to the lowest bidder, who in this, and in every other instance, will be Russia. She will not be an ally, but an incumbrance to Russia, for she will take care to have her army destroyed beforehand, for her own account and gratification.

Until at least one of the German Powers is involved in a European war, the conflict can only rage in Turkey, on the Black Sea, and in the Baltic. The naval struggle must, during this period, be the most important. That the allied fleets can destroy Sebastopol and the Russian Black Sea fleet; that they can take and hold the Crimea, occupy

Odessa, close the Sea of Azof, and let loose the mountaineers of the Caucasus, there is no doubt. With rapid and energetic action nothing is more easy. Supposing this to occupy the first month of active operations, another month might bring the steamers of the combined fleets to the British Channel, leaving the sailing vessels to follow; for the Turkish fleet would then be capable of doing all the work which might be required in the Black Sea. To coal in the Channel, and make other preparations, might take another fortnight; and then, united to the Atlantic and Channel fleets of France and Britain, they might appear before the end of May in the roads of Cronstadt in such a force as to ensure the success of an attack. The measures to be taken in the Baltic are as self-evident as those in the Black Sea. They consist in an alliance, at any price, with Sweden; an act of intimidation against Denmark, if necessary; an insurrection in Finland, which would break out upon landing a sufficient number of troops, and a guarantee that no peace would be concluded except upon the condition of this province being reunited to Sweden. The troops landed in Finland would menace Petersburg, while the fleets would bombard Cronstadt. This place is certainly very strong by its position. The channel of deep water leading up to the roads will hardly admit of two men-of-war abreast presenting their broadsides to the batteries, which are established not only on the main island, but on smaller rocks, banks, and islands about it. A certain sacrifice, not only of men, but of ships is unavoidable. But if this be taken into account in the very plan of the attack, if it be once resolved that such and such a ship must be sacrificed, and if the plan be carried out vigorously and unflinchingly, Cronstadt must fall. The masonry of its battlements cannot for any length of time withstand the concentrated fire of heavy Paixhan guns, that most destructive of all arms when employed against stone walls. Large screw-steamers, with a full complement of such guns, amidships, would very soon produce an irresistible effect, though of course they would in the attempt risk their own

existence. But what are three or four screw-ships of the line in comparison with Cronstadt, the key of the Russian Empire, whose possession would leave St. Petersburg without defence?

Without Odessa, Cronstadt, Riga, Sebastopol, with Finland emancipated, and a hostile army at the gates of the capital, with all her rivers and harbours closed up, what would Russia be? A giant without arms, without eyes, with no other resource than trying to crush her opponents under the weight of her clumsy torso, thrown here and there at random, wherever a hostile battle-cry was heard. If the maritime powers of Europe should act thus resolutely and vigorously, then Prussia and Austria might so far be relieved from the control of Russia that they might even join the allies. For both the German Powers, if secure at home, would be ready to profit by the embarrassments of Russia. But it is not to be expected that Lord Aberdeen and M. Drouyn de l'Huys should attempt such energetic steps. The Powers that be are not for striking their blows *home*, and if a general war breaks out, the energy of the commanders will be shackled so as to render them innocuous. If, nevertheless, decisive victories occur, care will be taken that it is by mere chance, and that their consequences are as harmless as possible for the enemy.

The war on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea might at once be put an end to by the fleets; that on the European side would go on comparatively uninterrupted. The Russians, beaten out of the Black Sea, deprived of Odessa and Sebastopol, could not cross the Danube without great risk (except in the direction of Servia, for insurrectionary purposes), but they might very well hold the Principalities, until superior forces and the risk of large bodies of troops being landed on their flank and rear, should drive them out of Wallachia. Moldavia they need not evacuate without a general action, for flank and rear demonstrations would there be of little importance, as long as Chotin and Kishineff offered them a safe communication with Russia.

But as long as the war is confined to the Western Powers

and Turkey on the one hand, and Russia on the other, it will not be a European war such as we have seen since 1792. However, let it once commence, and the indolence of the Western Powers and the activity of Russia will soon compel Austria and Prussia to decide for the Autocrat. Prussia will probably be of no great account, as it is more than likely that her army, whatever its capacities may be, will be wasted by presumption at some second Jena. Austria, notwithstanding her bankrupt condition, notwithstanding the insurrections that may occur in Italy and Hungary, will be no contemptible opponent. Russia herself, obliged to keep up her army in the Principalities and on the Caucasian frontier, to occupy Poland, to have an army for the defence of the Baltic coast, and especially of St. Petersburg and Finland, will have very few troops to spare for offensive operations. If Austria, Russia, and Prussia (always supposing the latter not yet put to rout) can muster five or six hundred thousand men on the Rhine and the Alps, it will be more than can be reasonably expected. And for five hundred thousand allies the French alone are a match, supposing them to be led by generals not inferior to those of their opponents, among whom the Austrians alone possess commanders worthy of the name. The Russian generals are not formidable, and as to the Prussians, they have no generals at all; their officers are hereditary subalterns.

But we must not forget that there is a sixth power in Europe, which at given moments asserts its supremacy over the whole of the five so-called "great" Powers, and makes them tremble, every one of them. That power is the Revolution. Long silent and retired, it is now again called to action by the commercial crisis and by the scarcity of food. From Manchester to Rome, from Paris to Warsaw and Pesth, it is omnipresent, lifting up its head and awakening from its slumbers. Manifold are the symptoms of its returning life, everywhere visible in the agitation and disquietude which have seized the proletarian class. A signal only is wanted, and the sixth and greatest European power

will come forward, in shining armour and sword in hand, like Minerva from the head of the Olympian. This signal the impending European war will give, and then all calculations as to the balance of power will be upset by the addition of a new element which, ever buoyant and youthful, will as much baffle the plans of the old European Powers, and their generals, as it did from 1792 to 1800.

XLIV

The War in Asia

LONDON, *January* 20, 1854

N. Y. T., *February* 8, 1854

THE latest mails have brought us some supplementary news with regard to the military events which lately took place in Asia. It appears that the Turks have been compelled entirely to evacuate the Russo-Armenian territory, but the precise result of the engagements which determined their retreat is not known. The Turks had penetrated on the direct road to Akhaltzikh from Ardahan, while another body took the more southern road from Kars by Alexandropol (in Georgian, Gumri) to Tiflis. Both these corps, it appears, were met by the Russians. According to the Russian accounts, the Turks were routed on either line, and lost about forty pieces of cannon; as to the Turkish accounts, we have nothing official, but in private correspondence the retreat is explained by the necessity of going into winter quarters.

The only thing certain is this, that the Turks have evacuated the Russian territory with the exception of the Fort St. Nicholas;¹ that the Russians followed them, and that their advanced guard even ventured to within a mile of Kars, where it was repulsed. We know, besides, that the Turkish army of Anatolia, recruited as it is from the Asiatic provinces, the seat of the old Moslem barbarism, and counting in its ranks a great number of irregulars, unreliable though generally brave, soldiers of adventure,

¹ *i.e.* Shefkatil.

fancy warriors and filibusters, that this army of Anatolia is nothing like the stern, disciplined, and drilled army of the Rumili, whose commander knows how many and what men he has from day to day under his command, and where the thirst for independent adventure and private plunder is held in check by articles of war and courts-martial. We know that the Russians, who were very hard up for troops in the beginning of the Asiatic campaign, have been reinforced by 16,000 men under Lieut.-General Obrutscheff, and by a body of Cossacks from the Don; we know that they have been able to keep the mountaineers within bounds, to maintain their communication as well across the Caucasus by Vladikavkas as by sea to Odessa and Sebastopol.

Under these circumstances, and considering that the Turkish commander Abdi Pasha was either a traitor or a dunce (he has been recalled since and placed under arrest at Kars; Ahmed Pasha was sent in his place), we should not wonder at all if the Turks had been worsted, although there can be no doubt of the exaggeration prevailing in the Russian bulletins. We read in the *Augsburger Zeitung* that [*Attempt of Schamyl to get south and join Turks. Fails.*] This, however, wants confirmation.

At last the murder is out, as regards the affair at Sinope. One of the finest three-deckers of the Russian fleet—the *Rastislav*, 120-gun ship—was sunk there by the Turks. This fact—kept back hitherto under the specious pretext that the *Rastislav* did not sink during the action, but immediately afterwards—is now admitted by the Russians, and forms a good set-off against the destroyed Turkish ships. If one three-decker was actually sunk, we may suppose that the other Russian vessels received very serious harm indeed during the action; and, after all, the victory at Sinope may have more disabled the Russian than the Turkish fleet. Altogether the Turks appear to fight like Turks when on the water. The Egyptian steam-frigate *Pervaz Bahri*, disabled and taken after nearly five hours struggle by the far larger Russian steam-frigate *Vladimir*,

was so riddled with shot that she could hardly be brought into Sebastopol, and when there sank at once. So far, then, the prizes carried off by the Russians amount to nothing, and indeed the impossibility for them to carry off a single prize from Sinope shows both the obstinacy of the Turkish defence and the mutilated state of the Russian fleet after the action.

There is a report that the combined French and English fleets, together with the first division of the Turkish navy, are transporting 17,000 Turks to Batum. If this be true, it is as much an act of war as if they made a direct attack upon Sebastopol, and the Czar cannot but declare war at once. Immediately prior to the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, the Czar is said to have sent his mandate for the withdrawal of all his vessels of war from the waters of the Euxine to Sebastopol. A letter dated Odessa, December 24, reports that "the commander of the Russian flotilla in the Sea of Azof had sent one of his *aides-de-camp* to Sebastopol to explain how critical his position was. Two corps of 12,000 men each were ready to be embarked at Sebastopol, when this operation of war was paralyzed by the news of the imminent entrance of the united fleets into the Euxine."

From the last telegraphic news received it appears that the Russians intended attempting a general attack on the Turkish lines at Kalafat on the 13th inst., the Russian New Year's Day. They had already pushed forward about 10,000 men in entrenchments at Tchetalea, a village nine English miles north of Kalafat, but were prevented from concentrating their whole available force by the Turkish general's getting the start of them, storming the enemy's entrenchments with 15,000 or 18,000 men, proving victorious in a series of most murderous encounters that took place on the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th inst., and finally forcing the Russians to retire in the direction of Crajova. The Russians themselves confess a loss of 1,000 killed and 4,000 wounded. General Aurep, we are told by the telegraph, "who commanded the Russians, was severely

wounded, as well as General Tuinont." On the 10th, it is stated, the Turks, who were commanded by Selim Pasha (the Pole Zedlinsky), again *retired* to Kalafat. Thus far the telegraphic news, hitherto the only source of information about these most important events. The report winding up, on the one hand, with the retirement of the Russians on Crajova, and of the Turks, on the other, to Kalafat, evokes a suspicion that great strategical faults have again been committed on both sides. There is one report afloat that Omer Pasha caused a whole corps to pass between the Aluta and the Schyl, thus menacing the communications of the Russian corps at Crajova. But how could the Turks cross the Danube, which is filled with floating masses of ice, at any other point than Kalafat, where alone they were prepared for such an emergency?

The defeats the Russians met with at Kalafat are perhaps more important in a political than a military view. Coupled with the entrance of the united fleets into the Black Sea, they cut off the last probability of the Czar's yielding to the humble supplication for peace forwarded by the courier of the Vienna Conference to St. Petersburg. On the other hand, they must produce the immediate effect on neighbouring Servia of strengthening the National party and intimidating the Russian one, who have lately been lifting up their heads with amazing impudence at Belgrade. Prince Alexander, it is true, and the mass of the Servian people, could not be prevailed upon to break the bonds between their country and the Sultan, although a crowd of Russian agents are simultaneously overrunning Servia, carrying on their intrigues in opposite senses—seeking out and applying themselves to the places and persons formerly known for their attachment to the banished family of the Obrenovitch—speaking to some of the young Prince Michael, to others of his old father Milosh—now making them hope, through the protection of Russia, for the extension of the limits of Servia—the formation of a new kingdom of Illyria, which would unite all those who speak the Servian language now under the domination of Turkey

and Austria—and now announcing to them, in case of resistance, innumerable armies and utter subjugation. You are aware that Prince Milosh, residing at Vienna, is the old *protégé* of Metternich, while Michael, his son, is a mere creature of Russia, who in 1842 rendered the principedom vacant by flying from Servia. The Russian defeat at Kalafat will, at the same time, relieve Austria from the fear of a Russian army appearing before Belgrade and evoking among the subjects of Austria, of common origin and faith with herself, the consciousness of their own strength and of the degradation they endure in the domination of the Germans.

As to Persia the news continues to be contradictory. According to one report the Persian army is marching upon Erzerum and Bagdad; according to another the Russian intrigue has been baffled by the British *chargé d'affaires* Mr. Thompson, who menaced withdrawal from Teheran, by the dread of an immediate explosion of the dislike of the Persian people for Russia, and by the arrival of an Afghan Embassy, threatening, if Persia formed an alliance with Russia, an invasion of the Persian territory by the Afghans.

According to private correspondence from Constantinople, published in the *Patrie*, the Divan has resolved to fortify Constantinople on the land side. A mixed commission, consisting of European and Ottoman officers, is said to have already commenced the preparatory survey of the localities. The fortification of Constantinople would altogether change the character of Russo-Turkish warfare, and prove the heaviest blow ever dealt to the eternal dreams of the self-styled heir of the Byzantine Emperors.

The rumour of Austria's concentrating a *corps d'armée* in the Banat, to be placed under the command of General Count Schlik, is contradicted by the German press.

The *Correspondenz* of Berlin states that general orders have been given to the authorities to hold themselves prepared in case of a mobilization of the Landwehr.

Overtures have been made from St. Petersburg to the

Cabinet of Copenhagen for the cession of the island of Bornholm to Russia. [*The Malta or Gibraltar of the Baltic.* —“*Daily News.*”]

In the message sent by Lord Redcliffe to the Governor of Sebastopol, and intimating to him the appearance of the united squadron in the Black Sea, the only object of the movement is stated to be “the protection of the *Ottoman territory* from all aggression or hostile act,” *no mention* being made of the protection of the *Ottoman flag*.

As all the accounts received from Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Constantinople, and St. Petersburg indicate the prospect of war, prices have generally declined in all stock markets on both sides of the Channel.

XLV

The Czar's Views—Prince Albert

LONDON, *January 24, 1854*
N. Y. T., *February 11, 1854*

THE attempts of the Russian army to cross the Danube simultaneously on the whole line of operations—at Matschin, Giurgevo, and Kalafat—are to be considered as reconnoitring manœuvres rather than as serious attacks, which can hardly be ventured upon with the present forces General Gortschakoff has to dispose of.

Last Saturday's *Press*—the Disraeli paper—published a note of a conversation very recently held at Gatchina between the Czar and a “distinguished” Englishman. Almost the whole of the daily London press has reprinted this note, which, besides the known and worn-out commonplaces of Russian diplomacy, contains some interesting statements.

[*Mentschikoff ultimatum satisfactory to English Government, as they were informed Turkey would probably accept it.*]

This would only prove that poor John Russell was *falsely informed* by Baron Brunnow as to the “probable” intentions of the Sublime Porte, and that the Porte's refusing to yield to the Mentschikoff ultimatum at once was by no means the fault of the Coalition Cabinet. The Czar goes on:

[*After Sinope victory, Castelbajac, French ambassador, sent congratulations to Czar.*]

Let me remark that General Castelbajac, an old Legitimist and a relative of Larochejaquelein's, gained his generalship, not by services in the camp, but by less dangerous service in the ante-chambers of the Court, and the ardent confession of exalted royalist principles. Bonaparte appointed him as Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg, with a view to give the Czar a proof of deference to his personal wishes, although he was fully aware that Castelbajac was to conspire with the Czar for the restoration of the Bourbons rather than further the interests of his nominal master. This Castelbajac, then, is the very man to have congratulated the Czar, "as a soldier and a Christian," on the resultless butchery of Sinope. "He did not believe," the Czar is stated to have said, "that England, with a *bourgeois* Parliament, could carry on a war with glory." There is no doubt that the Czar knows his Cobdens and his Brights, and estimates at its just value the mean and abject spirit of the European middle classes. Finally, the Czar is quite right in stating that, on the one hand, he had not been prepared for war—fully convinced as he was that he should obtain all he cared for by the simple act of bullying—and that, on the other hand, if war were brought about, it would be the "war of incapacities," making it inevitable by their anxious efforts to prevent it, and plunging into it finally in order to cover their blunders and save their places.

[*Rumour that Prince Albert attends meetings of Queen and Ministers, interferes in counsels, influences Queen, communicates information to foreign cabinets, is a traitor, and has been arrested for high treason and sent to the Tower.*]

I quote the above passage from *The Spectator*, in order to show your readers how public rumour has been induced by the Palmerstonian press to make a poor stupid young man the scapegoat of the responsible ministers. Prince Albert is a German Prince, connected with most of the absolute and despotic Governments of the Continent. Raised to the rank of Prince Consort in Great Britain, he has devoted his time partly to fattening pigs, to inventing ridiculous hats for

the army, to planning model-lodging houses of a peculiarly transparent and uncomfortable kind, to the Hyde Park Exhibition, and to amateur soldiery. He has been considered amiable and harmless, in point of intellect below the general average of human beings, a prolific father, and an obsequious husband. Of late, however, he has been deliberately magnified into the most influential man, and the most dangerous character in the United Kingdom, and is said to dispose of the whole State machinery at the secret dictation of Russia. Now there can exist but little doubt that the Prince exercises a direct influence in Court affairs, and, of course, in the interest of despotism. The Prince cannot but act a Prince's part, and who was ever silly enough to suppose he would not? But I need not inform your readers of the utter impotency to which British Royalty itself has been reduced by the British oligarchy, so that, for instance, King William IV., a decided foe to Russia, was forced by his Foreign Minister—a member of the Whig oligarchy—to act as a foe to Turkey. How preposterous, then, to suppose Prince Albert to be able to carry one single point in defiance of the Ministry, except so far as little Court affairs, a dirty riband, or a tinsel star, are concerned! Use is made of his absolutist *penchants* to blind the people's eyes as to the plots and treacheries of the responsible ministers. If the outcry and attack means anything, it means an attack on Royalist institutions. If there were no Queen, there would be no Prince—if there were no throne, there would be no Court influences. Princes would lose their power, if thrones were not there to back them, and for them to lean upon. But, now mark! the papers which go the furthest in their "fearful boldness," which cry the loudest and try to make a sort of political capital out of Prince Albert, are the most eager in their assertions of loyalty to the throne, and in fulsome adulation of the Queen. As to the Tory papers this proposition is self-evident. As to the Radical *Morning Advertiser*, it is the same journal which hailed Bonaparte's *coup d'état*, and recently attacked an Irish paper for having dared to find fault with the Queen on the occasion of

her presence at Dublin, which reproaches the French Revolutionists with professing Republicanism, and continues to designate Lord Palmerston as the saviour of England. The whole is a Palmerstonian trick. Palmerston, by the revelations of his Russianism and his opposition to the new Reform Bill, has become unpopular. The latter act has taken the Liberal gilding off his musty gingerbread. Nevertheless, he wants popularity in order to become Premier, or at least Foreign Minister. What an admirable opportunity to stamp himself a Liberal again, and to play the part of Brutus persecuted by secret Court influences. Attack a Prince Consort—how taking for the people! He'll be the most popular statesman of the age. What an admirable opportunity of casting obloquy on his present colleagues, of stigmatizing them as the tools of Prince Albert, and of convincing the Court that Palmerston must be accepted on his own terms! The Tories, of course, join in the cry, for Church and Crown are little to them compared with pounds and acres, and these the cotton-lords are winning from them fast. And if the Tories, in the name of "constitution" and "liberty," talk daggers against a Prince, what enlightened Liberal would not throw himself worshipping at their feet!

XLVI

Cobden and Russia

LONDON, *January 27, 1854*
N. Y. T., *February 16, 1854*

THE fortification of Constantinople would be, as I stated in my last letter, but one, the most important step the Turks could take. Constantinople fortified, with suitable strengthening of the forts on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the independence of Turkey, or of any Power holding that capital, would require no foreign guarantee. There is no town more easy to be fortified than Constantinople. One single side of the triangle only—the one towards the land—would require a continuous rampart; the second towards the Sea of Marmora, and the third towards the Golden Horn, require no fortifications. A line of detached forts, at a convenient distance from the enceinte, and continued eastward so as to protect Pera, Galata, and the north-eastern bank of the Golden Horn, would both strengthen the enceinte and prevent an enemy from turning it and carrying on works of siege on the hills commanding the town from behind Pera and Galata.

Such a fortress would be almost impregnable. Its communications cannot be cut off, unless the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus is forced; and if that were the case, the city would be at once lost. But two such narrow passages may easily be fortified so strongly that no hostile fleet can pass through. A Russian army coming from the land side would have to rely upon perilous sea communication with Sebastopol and Odessa, and could hardly hold out for the

time required to take the town, while its continuous falling off in numbers would expose it to defeats from the garrison of the town and the reserves arriving from Asia.

The reply of Russia to the declaration of neutrality on the part of Denmark arrived at Copenhagen on the 20th inst. Russia is stated to refuse consent to the neutrality, calling on Denmark to take one side or the other. Immediately after this notification, the Ambassadors of France, England, and Russia are said to have had a conference with the Danish Ministers. Now, I am informed from a very trustworthy source, although I can, of course, not vouch for the correctness of the information, that the protest is but a feint on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, calculated to drive the other Powers the faster into a formal acknowledgment of the terms on which the Danish neutrality is proposed. I am assured that recent negotiations were going on between Denmark on the one side, and France and England on the other, according to which, in the case of war, England was to occupy the Sound with her men-of-war; and France the Duchy of Schleswig, with a *corps d'armée*. To thwart this combination, communicated to Nesselrode by the Minister Oersted, Russia is said to have intimated to the Copenhagen Cabinet to propose the declaration of neutrality. He now feigns to oppose, and this, if adhered to by France and England, will not only break up their original plan, but also, by exempting from the laws of war goods carried in neutral vessels, will secure the export of Russian merchandise by the Baltic.

The Czar's protests against the purchase, on the part of Prussia, of an Oldenburg port in the North Sea, is a *bonâ fide* protest, astonished as the Berlin public is said to have been at this other symptom of the ubiquitous intermeddling of Timour Tamerlane's successor.

The great "Manchester Reform meeting" has "come off, and a great piece of humbug it was," as *The Englishman* justly remarks. The Aberdeen policy extolled, Turkey insulted, Russia glorified, all interference between foreign States disclaimed—these few topics which, as far as foreign

policy is concerned, form the regular stock-in-trade of the Manchester School—have again been expatiated on by Messrs. Cobden, Bright, and the other “umble and ’omely men,” who want to have a “man of peace” at the “Horse Guards,” and a “lock-out” at the House of Lords, to sell the English and to undersell all other nations.

Mr. Cobden’s speech was a mere repetition, and a disingenuous one too, of the speech he made at the closing of Parliament. The only luxury of novelty he indulged in consisted of two arguments—the one directed against France, the other against America. It looks rather suspicious that the same man who took so prominent a part in bringing about the alliance with France at the time when the exploits of the Decembrists had aroused a cry of indignation in England, is now busied in undoing his own work by sneering at that alliance, and denouncing it as “inconsiderate” and “untimely.” As to America, Mr. Cobden declares that it is from the growth of its manufactures and commerce, and not from the warlike policy of Russia, that England may fear to see endangered the grandeur of her commercial and national prosperity. How does this tally with his professional free trade cant, according to which the commercial prosperity of one people depends on the *growth* of the commerce and industry of all other peoples, the notion of any dangerous rivalry between two industrial peoples being disclaimed as a fallacy of protectionist “quacks”? How does this tally with

[*England’s machinery having made Europe and America absolutely interdependent*]?

It is not the first time that Mr. Cobden, in order to divert from Russia the suspicions and the animosity of the English people, is anxious to turn them against the United States of America. In 1836 the seizure of an English vessel on the Circassian coast by a Russian man-of-war, and the fiscal regulations of the St. Petersburg Cabinet with regard to the navigation of the Danube, together with the revelations published in *The Portfolio*, having evoked the wrath

of the English people, and, above all, the commercial classes, against Russia—Mr. Cobden, at that epoch yet “an infant in literary life and unlearned in public speaking,” published a small anonymous pamphlet, entitled “Russia: a Cure for Russophobia. By a Manchester Manufacturer.” In this pamphlet it is argued that—

[In less than twenty years English sentiment will be fear of America and not of Russia, and the Government be forced to agree with this].

In this same pamphlet he professed that

[English hostility to Russia is due to aristocratic government in England. If Russia had Constantinople, its huts would become a city, science, art, and business would prosper, capital accumulate, cities grow, civilization and freedom increase, slavery be replaced by commerce].

As a proof of Russia's civilization, and consequently her right to appropriate Turkey, Mr. Cobden told his astonished readers that the Russian merchant possessed of 10,000 to 15,000 roubles, not only engages in foreign commerce, but is “*exempt from corporal punishment, and qualified to drive about in a carriage and pair.*” Are we then to be astonished at the Russian Emperor's recently expressed conviction that “England, with a bourgeois Parliament, could not carry on a war with glory”? So deeply imbued was Mr. Cobden in 1836 with the “wickedness of the public writers and speakers,” who ventured to find fault with the Autocrat of all the Russias, that he wound up his pamphlet with the question: “And who and what are those writers and speakers? How long shall political quacks be permitted, without fear of punishment, to inflame the minds and disorder the understandings of a whole nation?” Those “public writers and speakers,” we presume, who possess 10,000 to 15,000 roubles, are able to drive about in a carriage and pair, and are exempted at least from “*corporal punishment.*” Till now, Mr. Cobden's Philo-Russian mania had been considered by some as one of the multifarious crotchets he uses to trade in, by others as the necessary

offspring of his peace doctrine. Of late, however, the public has been informed by one who justly describes himself as the "literary horse, or ass if you like," of the late Anti-Corn Law League, that, when Mr. Cobden wrote his first pamphlet, "he had been to Russia on a commercial errand of his own, in 1834-35, and was successful," that his "heart and calico were both in Russia in 1836"; and that his anger at the "English writers, speakers, authors, and reviewers," originated from their criticising his new customer, Nicholas of Russia.

XLVII

War Finance

LONDON, *February 3, 1854*
N. Y. T., *February 20, 1854*

I WAS able to see the State procession of the Queen to open Parliament, as it passed the Horse Guards. The Turkish Ambassador was received with loud cheers and hurrahs. Prince Albert, whose countenance was deadly pale, was furiously hissed by the crowds on both sides of the streets, while the Queen was sparing of her usual salutes and morbidly smiled at the unwonted manifestations of popular discontent. In a previous letter I have reduced the anti-Albert movement to its true dimensions, proving it to be a mere party trick. The public demonstration is, nevertheless, of a very grave character, as it proves the ostensible loyalty of the British people to be a mere conventional formality, a ceremonious affectation, which cannot withstand the slightest shock. Probably it may induce the Crown to dismiss a Ministry, the anti-national policy of which threatens to endanger its own security.

When the recent mission of Count Orloff to the Vienna Cabinet became known, *The Times* informed its credulous readers that Orloff was the very man the Czar used to employ on pacific errands. Now I need not inform you that this same Orloff appeared in the spring of 1833 at Constantinople to squeeze out of the Porte the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. What he now asks from the Cabinet at Vienna is the permission to send a Russian corps from Warsaw, by way of Hungary, to the Danubian seat of

war. It may be considered as the first result of his presence at Vienna, that Austria now insists upon the Porte's dismissing its present commanders on the Danube—Selim Pasha, Ismail Pasha, and Omer Pasha—on the plea that they are renegades and revolutionists. Every one acquainted with the past history of Turkey knows that from the beginning of the Osman power all her great generals, admirals, diplomatists, and ministers have always been Christian renegades, Servians, Greeks, Albanians, etc. Why not ask Russia to dismiss the forty or fifty men she has bought from all parts of Europe, and who constitute her whole stock of diplomatic ingenuity, political intelligence, and military ability? In the meantime, Austria has concentrated 80,000 men on the Turkish frontiers in Transylvania and Hungary, and ordered a Bohemian corps, mustering some 30,000 men, to join them. The Prussian Government on its part is stated to have declined to comply with the command of the Czar, ordering Frederick William IV. to send a corps of 100,000 men to occupy Poland in the name and interest of Russia, and thus set the garrisons there at liberty to march to the south for the prosecution of the campaign in the Principalities.

As to the Russian Exchequer, I had on a previous occasion, at the beginning of what is called the Eastern complication, to warn your readers against the industriously circulated statement of the "hidden" treasures slumbering in the vaults of the Bank of St. Petersburg, and the ridiculous exaggeration of the vast monetary power that Russia can wield at a given moment. My views are fully confirmed by what has happened since. Not only has the Czar been forced to withdraw his metallic deposits from the banks of England and France, but, moreover, to commit an act of fraudulent confiscation. Prince Paskevitch has informed the Warsaw mortgage or discount bank that its capital will be taken as a forced loan, although the statutes of that bank forbid its advancing money upon any security but landed property. We are also informed that the Russian Government intends issuing a sum of 60,000,000

roubles in inconvertible paper, to defray the expenses of the war. This contrivance is no new one on the part of the Petersburg Cabinet. At the close of 1768, Catherine II., in order to meet the expenses of the war with Turkey, founded a bank of assignats, ostensibly instituted on the principle of issuing convertible notes payable to the bearer. But by a well-managed oversight, she forgot to tell the public in what sort of money these notes were to be payable, and some months later the payments were only made in copper coin. By another untoward "accident" it happened that these copper coins were overvalued by 50 per cent. when compared with the uncoined metal, and only circulated at their nominal value in consequence of their great scarcity and the want of small money for retail purposes. The convertibility of the notes was, therefore, a mere trick.

One of the European Governments after the other comes forward appealing to the pockets of its beloved subjects. Even the King of sober-minded Holland demands of the States-General 600,000 rix-dollars for works of fortification and defence, adding "that circumstances may determine him to mobilize a portion of the army, and to send out his fleets."

If it were possible to meet real wants and to fill the general vacuum of money chests by any ingenious art of book-keeping, the contriver of the French Budget, as published some days ago in the *Moniteur*, would have done the thing; but there is not the smallest shopkeeper in Paris unaware of the fact that, by the most skilful grouping of figures, one cannot get out of the books of his creditor, and that the hero of the 2nd of December, deeming the public pocket to be inexhaustible, has recklessly run into the nation's debt.

XLVIII

Blue Books—Ambassadors Withdrawing

LONDON, *February 7, 1854*
N. Y. T., *February 21, 1854*

THE "Rights and Privileges of the Greek and Latin Churches," as the ministerial blue book on the Eastern Question has been ingeniously baptized, have been subjected by me to a scrutinizing perusal, and I intend shortly to give your readers a condensed survey of this diplomatic labyrinth. For the present I content myself with the simple assurance that a more monstrous monument of Governmental infamies and imbecility has, perhaps, never been bequeathed to history. And let us remember what Mr. Baillie said in the House of Commons on the value of these blue books:

[Carefully prepared. Concealed all that a Government might desire to conceal.]

I know very well that Lord Palmerston, when once accused of having perverted the documents relating to the Afghan war, of having suppressed most important passages in despatches, and even of having deliberately falsified others, made the following ingenious reply: "Sir, if any such thing had been done, what was to prevent the two adverse Governments, who succeeded us in power, one of which endured for five years, from proclaiming the facts and producing the real documents?" But I know equally well that the secret of these blue book dodges is the very secret of the alternate Whig and Tory succession in govern-

ment, each party having a greater interest to maintain the capability of its opponent for succession, than by ruining their mutual political "honour" to compromise the government of the ruling classes altogether. This is what the British are pleased to call the operation of their glorious Constitution.

Lord Clanricarde had given notice that he would move a discussion of the Eastern Question in the House of Lords yesterday. Consequently, great expectations were entertained, and the House was almost crowded. Mr. Urquhart did not hesitate even to designate, in yesterday's *Morning Advertiser*, Lord Clanricarde as the future leader of the national party, remembering that he was the only man who opposed, in 1829, the Russians in crossing the Balkans, but forgetting, no doubt, that the same noble Marquis was, during the momentous epoch of 1839-40, Lord Palmerston's Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, and his chief instrument in bringing about the separate treaty of 1840, and the rupture with France.

The public has been decidedly disappointed by the debates, as the Marquis of Clanricarde, inferring from the reports in the public papers, that—

[Vienna negotiations were still going on]

gave notice of his intention to bring forward a motion on the same subject this day week. The noble Marquis contented himself with asking Lord Clarendon—

[Russia's reply to Vienna proposals? Instructions to British Ambassador in Russia?]

Lord Clarendon's reply was—

[Official statement only received from Vienna that afternoon but]

the Emperor of Russia had rejected the Vienna note, and offered, in its stead, a counter project. On the 2nd inst. the Conference had been called together, and had rejected on its part the counter project.

[Russian counter project wholly unacceptable. Fresh negotiations not likely. No expectation of peace.]

With regard to the other question put by Lord Clanricarde ;

[Diplomatic relations between Russia and England were suspended.]

M. de Kisseleff, we are informed by telegraph, left Paris yesterday and is gone to Brussels. The official or Government journals state that all the Embassy at London would be broken up, and every Russian leave England. But I happen to know, from an excellent source, that, on the contrary, the number of Russians in England will only be diminished by the person of the Ambassador, and that the whole *personnel* remains at London under the superintendence of M. de Bergh, First Secretary of the Embassy. As to the position of the British Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, Lord Clarendon declared that—

[The British Government had communicated with the French Ambassador. English and French Ambassadors in Russia would be withdrawn.]

Lord John Russell repeated in the House of Commons the declaration of Lord Clarendon in the Upper House, and Lord Palmerston announced—

[Militia to be enrolled for Scotland and Ireland.]

The English army is to be augmented immediately by 11,000 men ; 1,500 coastguards are also to be embarked forthwith, intended to form a stock for the crews of the newly commissioned ships. A royal proclamation has been issued forbidding the exportation of any vessels of war, military stores and ammunition to Russia. Embargo has been laid by the naval authorities visiting the private dockyards on the Thames on two vessels in course of construction for Russian account. A contract, on behalf of the British Government, for coal sufficient for steamers of the aggregate amount of 11,000 horse-power, has been concluded at Copenhagen. Admiral Sir Charles Napier is to have command of the Baltic fleet about to be formed.

The official *Wiener Zeitung* announces that—

[*Russia declares to the four Powers that she is released from her Olmütz promise to remain on the defensive in the Principalities.*]

Concerning the object of the mission of Count Orloff at Vienna, a number of conflicting rumours are afloat; the most credible of which appears to be contained in the Berlin correspondence of to-day's *Times*.

[*Russia invites German Powers to make a treaty of neutrality; will help the German Bund if it is attacked; at end of war will conclude no peace without considering German Powers' interests in any territorial changes suggested. Reference in this proposal to Holy Alliance, 1815.*]

As to the decision probably come to by Austria and Prussia, I can only repeat the convictions already recorded by me on this question. Austria will endeavour by every means to maintain her position of neutrality as long as she is permitted to do so, and she will declare for Russia when the proper time has arrived. Prussia, on the other hand, is likely again to miss the proper time for abandoning her neutrality, and will end by calling upon herself the fate of another Jena.

We learn from Constantinople that the combined fleet has returned to its anchorage at Beicos, notwithstanding the following order, sent out to them, on behalf of the Ambassadors, by the *Samson* :

[*Ambassadors surprised at the sudden resolution of the Admirals. Orders of French and British Governments formal and precise, [they were indeed, but not the original orders with which the Admirals were despatched, but only those just received,] respecting protection by combined fleets of Turkey. Admirals appear to consider the measures entrusted to their execution may be equally well effected, whether the force under their command be stationed at Beicos or Sinope. [In this case, it would appear to others, that the same instructions might have been carried out by the fleets quietly remaining at Malta and Toulon.] Matter depends on their judgment; responsibility rests on them.*]

The Russian fleet is known to be at Kaffa, near the Strait of Yenikalé, whence the distance to Batum is only one-

third of the distance between Batum and Beicos. Will the admirals be able to prevent a Sinope at Batum, "whether they be stationed at Beicos or elsewhere"?

You will remember that the Czar's first proclamation accused the Sultan of enlisting under his banner the revolutionary dregs of all Europe. Now, while Lord Stratford de Redcliffe declares to Lord Dudley Stuart that he could not assist him in organizing any of those dregs as a voluntary legion, the Czar has himself been the first to establish a revolutionary corps, the so-called Greco-Slavonian Legion, with the direct intention of provoking the Sultan's subjects to revolt. The corps is being organized in Wallachia, and numbers already, according to Russian statements, above 3,000 men,—not to be paid in *bons à perpétuité*, as the Wallachians themselves,—colonels are promised five ducats per day; majors, three ducats; captains, two; subaltern officers, one; and soldiers two zwanzigers; the arms to be supplied by Russia.

Meanwhile the armaments of France seem no longer to be intended to remain on paper. As you know, the reserves of 1851 have been called out, and in the last few days immense military stores have been sent from Arras to Metz and Strasburg. General Pelissier has left for Algiers with orders to select the different corps which are to form the expedition to Constantinople, for which Sir J. Burgoyne and Colonel Alard have gone to prepare quarters.

The rumoured passage of Omer Pasha at the head of a large army—though, if attempted, it could hardly be executed at a more opportune moment, since the Russians are known to be concentrated at Crajova, between Bucharest and Kalafat—yet needs confirmation.

XLIX

Russian Diplomacy—The Shrines— Montenegro

LONDON, *February 10, 1854*

N. Y. T., February 27, 1854

At the the time when the treaty of neutrality was concluded between Denmark and Sweden, I stated my conviction, contrary to the current opinion in England and France, that it was not by any means to be looked upon as a triumph of the Western Powers, and that the pretended protest of Russia against that treaty was nothing but a feint. The Scandinavian papers, and *The Times* correspondent, quoting from them, are now unanimous in recording the same opinion, declaring the whole treaty to be the work of Russia.

The propositions submitted by Count Orloff to the Vienna Conference, and rejected by it, were as follows :

1. Renewal of the old treaties.
2. Protectorate of Russia over the Greek Christians of Turkey.
3. Expulsion of all political refugees from the Ottoman Empire.
4. Refusal to admit the mediation of any other Power, and to negotiate otherwise than directly with a Russian Envoy to be sent to St. Petersburg.

On the latter point Count Orloff declared his readiness to compromise, but the Conference refused. Why did the Conference refuse? Or why did the Emperor of Russia

refuse the last terms of the Conference? The propositions are the same on both sides. The renewal of the old treaties had been stipulated, the Russian Protectorate admitted, with only a modification in the form; and, as the last point had been abandoned by Russia herself, the Austrian demand for the expulsion of the refugees could not have been the cause of a rupture between Russia and the West. It is evident, then, that the position of the Emperor of Russia is now such as to prevent him from accepting *any* terms at the hands of England and France, and that he *must* bring Turkey to his feet, either with or without the chance of a European war.

In military circles the latter is now regarded as inevitable, and the preparations for it are going on in every quarter. Admiral Bruat has already left Brest for Algiers, where he is to embark 10,000 men, and sixteen English regiments stationed in Ireland are ordered to hold themselves ready to go to Constantinople. The expedition can only have a twofold object: either to coerce the Turks into submission to Russia, as Mr. Urquhart announces, or to carry on the war against Russia in real earnest. In both cases the fate of the Turks is equally certain. Once more handed over to Russia, not indeed directly, but to her dissolving agencies, the power of the Ottoman Empire would soon be reduced, like that of the Lower Empire, to the precincts of the capital. Taken under the absolute tutorship of France and England, the sovereignty of the Ottomans over their European estates would be no less at an end. If we are to take the war into our hands, observes *The Times*, we must have the control over all the operations. In this case, then, the Turkish Ministry would be placed under the direct administration of the Western Ambassadors, the Turkish War Office under the War Offices of England and France, and the Turkish armies under the command of French and English generals. The Turkish Empire, in its ancient conditions of existence, has ceased to be.

After his complete "failure" at Vienna, Count Orloff is

now gone back to St. Petersburg, "with the assurance of the Austrian and Prussian neutrality under all circumstances." On the other hand, the telegraph reports from Vienna that a change has taken place in the Turkish Ministry, the Seraskier and Kapudan Pasha having resigned. *The Times* cannot understand how the war party could have been defeated at the very time that France and England were going to war. For my part, if the news be true, I can very well understand the "god-sent" occurrence as the work of the English Coalition representative at Constantinople, whom we find so repeatedly regretting, in his blue book despatches, that "he could hardly yet go so far in his pressure on the Turkish Cabinet as it might be desirable."

The blue books begin with despatches relating to the demands put forward on the part of France with respect to the Holy Shrines—demands not wholly borne out by the ancient capitulations, and ostensibly made with the view to enforce the supremacy of the Latin over the Greek Church. I am far from participating in the opinion of Mr. Urquhart, according to which the Czar had, by secret influences at Paris, seduced Bonaparte to rush into this quarrel in order to afford Russia a pretext for interfering herself in behalf of the privileges of the Greek Catholics. It is well known that Bonaparte wanted to buy, *coute que coute*, the support of the Catholic party, which he regarded from the very first as the main condition for the success of his usurpation. Bonaparte was fully aware of the ascendancy of the Catholic Church over the peasant population of France, and the peasantry were to make him Emperor in spite of the bourgeoisie and in spite of the proletariat. M. de Falloux, the Jesuit, was the most influential member of the first ministry he formed, and of which Odilon Barrot, the *soi-disant* Voltairian, was the nominal head. The first resolution adopted by this ministry, on the very day after the inauguration of Bonaparte as President, was the famous expedition against the Roman Republic. M. de Montalbert, the chief of the Jesuit party, was his most active

tool in preparing the overthrow of the parliamentary régime and the *coup d'état* of the 2nd December. In 1850 the *Univers*, the official organ of the Jesuit party, called day after day on the French Government to take active steps for the protection of the interests of the Latin Church in the East. Anxious to cajole and win over the Pope, and to be crowned by him, Bonaparte had reasons to accept the challenge, and make himself appear the "most Catholic" Emperor of France. *The Bonapartist usurpation, therefore, is the true origin of the present Eastern complication.* It is true that Bonaparte wisely withdrew his pretensions as soon as he perceived the Emperor Nicholas ready to make them the pretext for excluding him from the conclave of Europe, and Russia was, as usual, eager to utilise the events which she had not the power to create, as Mr. Urquhart imagines. But it remains a most curious phenomenon in history, that the present crisis of the Ottoman Empire has been produced by the same conflict between the Latin and Greek Churches which once gave rise to the foundation of that Empire in Europe.

It is not my intention to investigate the whole contents of the "Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches" before having considered a most important incident entirely suppressed in these blue books, viz., the Austro-Turkish quarrel about Montenegro. The necessity to treat this affair first is the more urgent, as it will establish the existence of a concerted plan between Russia and Austria for the subversion and division of the Turkish Empire, and as the very fact of England's putting the subsequent negotiations between the Court of St. Petersburg and the Porte into the hands of Austria cannot fail to throw a most curious light on the conduct of the English Cabinet throughout this Eastern Question. In the absence of any official documents on the Montenegro affair, I refer to a book, which has only just been published, on this subject, and is entitled the *Handbook of the Eastern Question*, by L. F. Simpson.

The Turkish fortress of Chabliak (on the frontiers of

Montenegro and Albania) was stormed by a band of Montenegrins in December, 1852. It will be remembered that Omer Pasha was ordered by the Porte to repel the aggressors. The Sublime Porte declared the whole coast of Albania in a state of blockade, a measure which apparently could be directed only against Austria and her navy, and which indicated the conviction of the Turkish Ministry that Austria had provoked the Montenegrin revolt.

The following article, under date of Vienna, December 19, 1852, appeared then in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* :

[*Austria can help Montenegro despite blockade; does not approve Montenegrin incursion, nor the revolution among Christians about to break out in Herzegovina and Bosnia; always protests against persecution of Christians; must be neutral to Eastern Church, and try to keep peace between Greek and Latin Christians in Austrian Empire.*]

From this article we glean, firstly, that coming revolutions of the Turkish Christians were anticipated as *certain*, that the way for the Russian complaints concerning the oppression of the Greek Church was paved by Austria, and that the religious complication about the Holy Shrines was expected to give occasion for Austria's "neutrality."

In the same month a note was addressed to the Porte by Russia, who offered her mediation in Montenegro, which was declined on the ground that the Sultan was able himself to uphold his own rights. Here we see Russia operating exactly as she did at the time of the Greek revolution—first offering to protect the Sultan against his subjects, with the view of protecting afterwards his subjects against the Sultan, if her assistance should not be accepted.

The fact that there existed a concert between Russia and Austria for the occupation of the Principalities, even at this early time, may be gleaned from another extract from the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* of 30th December, 1852 :

[*Russia recently recognised the independence of Montenegro. Cannot remain idle. Russian troops swarming from Volhynia to mouth of Pruth.*]

Simultaneously the Vienna journals announced that an Austrian army of observation was assembling on the Austro-Turkish frontiers.

On December 6, 1852, Lord Stanley interpellated Lord Malmesbury with respect to the affairs of Montenegro, and Bonaparte's noble friend made the following declaration :

[No change in political relations of Montenegro. But ecclesiastically is under Russia. Montenegro has been independent 150 years, in spite of Turkey's attempts to subdue it.]

In this speech Lord Malmesbury, the then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, quietly dissects the Ottoman Empire by separating from it a country that had ever belonged to it, recognising at the same time the Emperor of Russia's spiritual pretensions over subjects of the Porte. What are we to say of these two sets of oligarchs, except that they rival each other in imbecility?

The Porte was, of course, seriously alarmed at this speech of a British minister, and there appeared shortly afterward in an English newspaper, the following letter from Constantinople, dated January 5, 1853 :

"The Porte has experienced the greatest irritation owing to Lord Malmesbury's declaration in the House of Lords that Montenegro was independent. He thus played into the hands of Russia and Austria, by which England will lose that influence and confidence which she has hitherto enjoyed. In the first article of the Treaty of Sistowa, concluded between the Porte and Austria in 1791 (to which treaty England, Holland, and Russia were mediating parties), it is expressly stipulated that an amnesty should be granted to the subjects of both Powers who had taken part against their *rightful sovereigns*, viz., the Servians, *Montenegrins*, Moldavians, and Wallachians, named as rebel subjects of the Porte. The Montenegrins who reside in Constantinople, of whom there are 2,000 to 3,000, pay the *haratch*, or capitation tax, and in judicial procedure with subjects of other Powers at Constantinople the Montenegrins are always considered and treated as Turkish subjects without objection."

In the beginning of January, 1853, the Austrian Government sent Baron Kollen von Kollenstein, an *aide-de-camp* of the Emperor, to Cattaro to watch the course of events, while M. D'Ozeroff, the Russian Envoy at Constantinople,

handed in a protest to the Divan against the concessions made to the Latins in the question of the Holy Shrines. At the end of January Count Leiningen arrived at Constantinople, and was admitted on the 3rd February to a private audience with the Sultan, to whom he delivered a letter from the Austrian Emperor. The Porte refused to comply with his demands, and Count Leiningen thereupon gave in an ultimatum, allowing the Porte four days to answer. The Porte immediately placed itself under the protection of England and France, who did not protect her, while Count Leiningen refused their mediation. On February 15 he had obtained everything he had asked for (with the exception of Art. III.), and his ultimatum was accepted. It contained the following articles:

"I. Immediate evacuation of Montenegro and the establishment of the *status quo ante bellum*.

"II. A declaration by which the Porte is to engage herself to maintain the *status quo* of the territories of Kleck and Sutorina, and to recognise the *mare clausum* in favour of Austria.

"III. A strict inquiry to take place concerning the acts of Mussulman fanaticism committed against the Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"IV. Removal of all the political refugees and renegades at present in the provinces adjoining the Austrian frontiers.

"V. Indemnity of 200,000 florins to certain Austrian merchants whose contracts had been arbitrarily annulled, and the maintenance of those contracts for all the time they were agreed on.

"VI. Indemnity of 56,000 florins to a merchant whose ship and cargo had been unjustly confiscated.

"VII. Establishment of numerous consulates in Bosnia, Servia, Herzegovina, and all over Roumelia.

"VIII. Disavowal of the conduct maintained in 1850 in the affair of the refugees."

Before acceding to this ultimatum, the Ottoman Porte, as Mr. Simpson states, addressed a note to the ambassadors of England and France, demanding a promise from them of positive assistance in the event of a war with Austria. "The two ministers not being able to pledge themselves in a definite manner," the Turkish Government yielded to the energetic proceedings of Count Leiningen.

On February 28 Count Leiningen arrived at Vienna and Prince Mentschikoff at Constantinople. On the 3rd March Lord John Russell had the impudence to declare, in answer to an interpellation of Lord Dudley Stuart, that—

[English and Austrian Governments held same views on this subject. Intervention of France and England had been successful. Maintenance of Turkey's integrity and independence ruling point of England's foreign policy.]

L

Count Orloff's Proposals

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, March 9, 1854

[*The first paragraph was, of course, written at New York: the "information" was supplied by Marx.*]

The following information, which, if true, is of the highest importance, and a portion only of which has appeared in the European journals, and that in a partial and disguised form, we have received from a most trustworthy source in London:—

I. On the 3rd of February the following declaration on the part of the Prussian Cabinet was despatched to Paris and London:

"1. The explanations of Count Orloff leaving no doubt whatever as to the uselessness of any further attempt at mediation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet, Prussia hereby withdraws her mediation, the opportunity for which can no longer be said to exist.

"2. Count Orloff's proposals of a *formal* and binding treaty of neutrality have met with an absolute refusal, communicated to him in a note, Prussia being decided upon observing, even without the concurrence of Austria, the most strict neutrality on her part, which she is determined to enforce by *suitable armaments*, as soon as the proper moment shall have arrived.

"3. Whether Prussia shall propose, in common with Austria, a general arming of the German Confederation, will depend on the conduct of the maritime Powers towards Germany."

II. Louis Napoleon has sent a confidential agent (M. Brennier) to Turin with the following message for the King of Piedmont and M. Cavour: At a given time insurrectionary movements are to break out in Parma, Piacenza, Guastalla, and Modena. Sardinia must then occupy those countries, from which the now reigning princes are to be expelled. Napoleon is to guarantee to the King the incorporation with Sardinia of the three former Principalities, and perhaps of Modena also, in compensation for which territories the County of Savoy is to be ceded to France. This arrangement England may be said to have as good as agreed to, although reluctantly and with very bad grace. M. Brennier then proceeded further on his tour through Italy till he reached Naples, where his arrival evoked the "most painful sensation." His mission is that of preparing an Italian insurrection, as Napoleon is seriously convinced that he is *the* man, not only to set Italy on fire, but also to draw the exact line which the flame shall be forbidden to cross. He proposes to concentrate the following armies:

1. 100,000 men on the frontier of Savoy.
2. 60,000 men at Metz.
3. 80,000 men at Strasburg.

III. Prussia does not object to the assembling of a French army of 100,000 men on the frontiers of Savoy, but she considers the concentration of an army at Metz, and of another at Strasburg, to be a direct menace against herself. She already fancies Baden, Hesse, Würtemberg, etc., in full insurrection, and some 100,000 peasants marching from the south of Germany on her own frontiers. She has, therefore, protested against these two measures, and it is this eventually which is alluded to in Section 3 of the Prussian declaration. At all events Prussia will put her army on a war footing *by* and perhaps *before* the end of March. She intends calling out a force of 200,000 to 300,000 men according to circumstances. But if Napoleon insists on concentrating the two armies at Metz and Strasburg the Prussian Government *has* already resolved to augment its

force to 500,000 men. In the Berlin Cabinet, where the King, with the great majority of his Ministers, had chosen to side with Russia, and Manteuffel alone, backed by the Prince of Prussia, carried the declaration of neutrality (Manteuffel originally proposed a formal alliance with England), fear and confusion are asserted to reign supreme. There exists already a formal resolution of the Cabinet (Cabinets-Beschluss) according to which under certain circumstances, all the more notorious democrats of the monarchy, and, above all, of Rhenish Prussia, are to be arrested on the same night, and to be transported to the eastern fortresses in order to prevent them from favouring the subversive plans of Napoleon (die Umsturzpläne Napoleon's!!) or from getting up popular movements generally. This measure, it is proposed, shall be executed instantly in the case of Italian disorders breaking out, or if Napoleon concentrates the two armies at Metz and Strasburg. This resolution, we are assured, has been taken *unanimously*, although all the eventualities are not provided for, under which the Cabinet might think fit to put it into execution.

LI

Debates in Parliament

LONDON, *February 21, 1854*

N. Y. T., March 9, 1854

[*We here give only a summary of Marx' summary of the debate.*]

THE military and naval estimates have been laid before Parliament. In the army, the total number of men asked for the current year shows an increase upon last year of 10,694. The total cost of the land forces is £3,923,288. The naval estimates for the year ending March 31, 1855, show an increase upon last year of £1,172,446. The charge for the conveyance of troops and ordnance an increase of £72,100.

Mr. Layard had given notice that he would call attention to the Eastern Question on last Friday evening, and he seized upon the very moment when the Speaker was to leave the chair, in order that the House might consider the navy estimates.

Mr. Layard began by stating that before they could vote the demanded advances, it was the duty of the Government to state what their intentions were. But before asking the Government what they were about to do, he wished to know what they had already done. The Ministry had overlooked the most obvious facts, had misunderstood the most unmistakable tendencies, and trusted to the most evidently fallacious assurances. As to the tragedy of Sinope, the Admirals of the united fleets might have prevented the

catastrophe, or the Turks might have averted it, if it had not been for the British Government.

Sir James Graham, with his notorious effrontery, answered him that they must either put their confidence in Ministers or turn them out. But "meanwhile, don't let us potter over blue books." They had been deceived by Russia, but "dark, malignant suspicions did not easily take root in generous minds." This old fox, Sir Robert Peel's "dirty little boy," the murderer of the Bandieras, was quite charming with his "generous mind" and his "slowness to suspect."

Then came Lord Jocelyn and Lord Dudley Stuart, whose speeches filled the papers the next day, but emptied the House on this evening. Mr. Roebuck next commenced by defending the Ministers for their conduct in a delicate situation, but ended by declaring that it was now time for the Ministry to declare clearly what they intended to do. Lord John Russell feigned to be willing to tell them "what they intended to do"; a thing he himself may not have been quite sure of. They had entered into some vague sort of alliance with France, proposing to Turkey a sort of treaty, by virtue of which the Porte should not sue for peace without their consent. They had been cruelly overcome by the incredible perfidy of the Czar. He despaired of peace. He consequently wanted some £3,000,000 more than last year. The House, in its enthusiasm, was on the point of voting the estimates, when Mr. Disraeli intervened and succeeded in adjourning the discussion to Monday evening.

The debates were resumed yesterday evening, and only concluded at 2 o'clock a.m.

Mr. Cobden took great pains to prove what was denied by nobody, that the French Government had originated "this melancholy dispute." The French President might have had some wish to make a little political capital by making demands upon Turkey on behalf of the Latin Christians. The first movement of Russia, therefore, was traceable to the proceedings of France. The non-signature of the Vienna Note had been the fault of the allies. We were

going to war because we insisted upon Turkey refusing to do that which we intended to ask her to do; viz., to give us a guarantee for the better treatment of the Christians. "And without total abandonment of the law of the Koran, it was impossible to put the Christians of Turkey upon an equality with the Turks." We may as well ask Mr. Cobden whether, with the existing State Church and laws of England, it is possible to put her working-men upon an equality with the Cobdens and the Brights? Mr. Cobden proceeded to show that there reigns a general dissatisfaction throughout the Christian population in Turkey, threatening to end in a general insurrection. Now, let us again ask Mr. Cobden whether there does not exist a general dissatisfaction with their Governments and their ruling classes, among all peoples of Europe, which discontent soon threatens to terminate in a general revolution? Mr. Cobden went on: In entering upon a war in defence of Turkey, England would be fighting for the domination of the Ottoman population and against the interest of the great body of the people of that country. This is merely a religious question. British interests were all on the side of Russia. The extent of their trade with Russia was enormous. Mr. Cobden concluded, "he was opposed to the war with Russia. The best thing was to fall back upon the Vienna Note."

Lord John Manners considered that the communications originally made by Lord Clarendon to Russia, France, and Turkey had induced the Emperor of Russia to give Prince Mentschikoff the orders which led to the whole catastrophe. The prolonged diplomatic negotiations of the British Government had been very prejudicial to the interests of Turkey, and very serviceable to those of Russia. What were the objects which the Government contemplated? The honour and independence of Turkey were to be maintained; but what was meant by this?

Mr. Horsfall said the real question was not what Turkey is, but what Russia would become. Russia's aim was territorial aggrandizement. From the monstrous mendacity of the first step taken in this matter by the Russian Auto-

crat, down to the atrocious massacre of Sinope, his course had been one of ferocity and fraud. On the other hand, the conduct of the intended victim had been admirable.

Mr. Drummond believed we are going to engage in a religious war. The author of the mischief has been the Pope. England had not the least interest in the Turkish question. They must begin by proclaiming the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland. Above all, he wanted to be informed what the Government was about.

Mr. Butt stated that the House had a right to know, on voting these supplies, what was delaying the declaration of war against Russia?

Mr. S. Herbert, the Minister of War, made the most vulgar and silly speech that could possibly be expected even from a Coalition Minister at such a momentous crisis. The Government had no facts to deal with—they had only to speculate as to the future. They were inclined to embark in this war not so much for the purpose of defending Turkey as of opposing Russia. This was all the information the House could get from poor Mr. Herbert “as to the future.” But no; he told them something very new. “Mr. Cobden is,” according to Mr. Herbert, “the representative of the feeling of the largest class of the people of this country.” This assertion being denied in all parts of the House, Mr. Herbert proceeds to state: “If not the largest class, the honourable member was a representative, at any rate, of a great portion of the working classes of this country.” Poor Mr. Herbert! It was quite refreshing to see Mr. Disraeli rise after him, and thus to have the babbler supplanted by a real debater.

Mr. Disraeli declared they must clearly comprehend the cause and the object of the present war. Russia had no intention whatever of forcibly conquering the Ottoman Empire; but, by adroit policy, she intended to obtain such an influence over the Christian population of the Turkish Empire that she would obtain all that authority which would have been the result of her possessing perhaps the seat of the Sultan’s Empire. That policy is

to be accomplished, not by conquest, but by maintaining treaties that exist, and by extending the spirit of those treaties.

[Here follows a very close analysis by Disraeli of the military and diplomatic events, leading to the conclusion that]

“ Either the Government were influenced by a degree of confidence which assumed a morbid character of credulity, or they were influenced by connivance.”

After Mr. Disraeli's splendid speech, of which I have, of course, only given the outlines, Lord Palmerston rose and made a complete failure. He repeated part of the speech he had made at the close of last session, defended in a very inconclusive manner the Ministerial policy, and was anxiously cautious not to drop one word of new information.

On the motion of Sir J. Graham, certain votes for the navy estimates were then agreed to without discussion.

After all, the most curious feature of these agitated debates is that the House completely failed in wresting from the Ministers either a formal declaration of war with Russia, or a description of the objects for which they are to plunge into war. The House and the public know no more than they knew already. They have got no new information at all.

LII

Kossuth—Disraeli and Hume—United States—France and England—Greece

LONDON, *February* 24, 1854

N. Y. T., *March* 13, 1854

A GOOD deal of idle talk about Kossuth's "warlike preparations" and probable "movements" has infested the public press. Now I happen to know from a Polish officer, who is setting out for Constantinople, and consulted the ex-Governor about the course he should take, that Kossuth dissuaded him from leaving London, and expressed himself by no means favourable to the participation of Hungarian and Polish officers in the present Turkish war, because they must either enlist themselves under the banner of Czartorisky or abjure their Christian faith, the one step being contradictory to his policy and the other to his principles.

So deep was the impression produced by Mr. Disraeli's masterly exposure of the Ministerial policy that the Cabinet of all the Talents thought fit to make a posthumous attempt to burke him in a little comedy arranged between themselves and Mr. Hume, and performed in Wednesday morning's sitting of the Commons. Lord Palmerston had concluded his lame reply to Mr. Disraeli's epigrammatic alternative of a morbid "credulity" or a treacherous "connivance" by appealing from faction to the impartial judgment of the country, and Mr. Hume was the man chosen to answer in the name of the country, just as Snug, the joiner, was chosen to play the lion's part in "The most

cruel death of Pyramus and Thisbe." Mr. Hume's whole Parliamentary life has been spent in making opposition pleasant, moving amendments in order to withdraw them afterwards—constituting, in fact, the so-called independent opposition, the rear-guard of every Whig Ministry, sure of coming forward to rescue it from danger whenever its own registered partisans may show any signs of vacillation. He is the great Parliamentary "extinguisher" *par excellence*. He is not only the oldest member of Parliament, but an independent member; and not only an independent, but a radical; and not only a radical, but the pedantic and notorious Cerberus of the public purse, with the mission of making pounds slip unnoticed by while picking quarrels about the fractional part of a farthing. For the first time in his Parliamentary life, as he himself emphatically stated, Mr. Hume rose not to condemn, but to express his approval of the "Estimates." This extraordinary event, as he did not fail to remark himself, was the most incontestable proof that the Ministry had not in vain appealed to the sound judgment of the country from the unmerited slanders of faction, but had received a solemn acquittal from the charge of credulity and connivance. His arguments were characteristic. In order to rescue the Ministers from the alternative of credulity or connivance, he proved the credulity of the Ministers in their transactions with Russia. He had, then, understood the true sense of Lord Palmerston's appeal. All the Ministry asked for was the discharge from intentional treason. As to credulity, had not that excellent Sir James Graham already declared that "a generous mind is slow to suspect"? Because the impending war was brought about by the Ministry's own diplomatic mismanagement, certainly it was a war of their own, and they, therefore, were, of all men, as Mr. Hume thought, the very men to carry it cunningly. The relative littleness of the proposed war estimates was, in Mr. Hume's opinion, the most convincing proof of the greatness of the war intended. Lord Palmerston, of course, thanked Mr. Hume for the sentence Mr. Hume had pronounced in the

name of the country, and in compensation favoured his audience with his own doctrine of State papers, which papers, according to him, must never be laid before the House and the country until matters are sufficiently embroiled to deprive their publication of any use whatever. Such was all the after-wit the Coalition had to dispose of after due deliberation. Lord Palmerston, their manager, had not only to weaken the impression of their antagonist's speech, but to annihilate also his own theatrical appeal from the House to the country.

On Tuesday night, Mr. Horsfall, the member for Liverpool, asked the question :

[Could privateers be fitted out in neutral ports to interfere with British shipping?]

The answer given by Lord Palmerston was :

[The question could not be answered.]

In quoting this answer of its master, *The Morning Post*, Palmerston's private *Moniteur*, remarks :

[No other answer is possible without entering on difficult, delicate subjects.]

On the one hand, the Palmerston organ declares the "difficult topic" to form the subject of pending negotiations, and, on the other, the necessity of leaving it to the "spontaneous sense of justice" of the interested Powers. If the much-boasted treaty of neutrality with Denmark and Sweden was not dictated by the St. Petersburg Cabinet, it must, of course, have forbidden privateers being fitted out in their ports; but, in fact, the whole question can only be understood to refer to the United States of America, as the Baltic is to be occupied by English line-of-battle ships, and Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and the Italian ports on the Mediterranean are completely in the hands of England and France. Now, what is the opinion of the St. Petersburg Cabinet as to the part to be performed by the United States in case the Turkish war should lead to a war between England and Russia? We

may answer this question authentically from a despatch addressed by Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode in the autumn of 1825. At that time Russia had resolved upon invading Turkey. As now she proposed to begin by a pacific occupation of the Principalities.

"In supposing the adoption of this plan," says Pozzo di Borgo, "it would be requisite to enter into explanations with the Porte in the most measured terms, and to assure it that if it did not wish to precipitate itself into a war, the Emperor was willing to terminate these differences by conciliation."

After having enumerated all the steps they would be obliged to take, Pozzo di Borgo continues as follows :

"It would be advisable to communicate all these acts to the United States of America as an evidence of the regard of the Imperial Cabinet, and of the importance which it attaches to enlightening its opinion, and even obtaining its suffrage."

In case of England's siding with Turkey and undertaking a war with Russia, Pozzo di Borgo remarks that—

"in blockading our ports they (England) would exercise their pretended maritime rights in respect to neutrals. This the United States would not suffer ! Thence would arise bitter dissensions and dangerous situations."

Now, as the Russian historian Karamsin justly remarks that "nothing changes in our (Russian) external policy," we are justified in presuming that, at the present moment, and perhaps as long ago as February, 1853, Russia has "communicated all her acts to the United States," and done her best to cajole the Washington Cabinet into at least a neutral attitude. At the same time, in the case of a war with England, she bases her hopes upon eventual quarrels about the "maritime rights of the neutrals" producing "bitter dissensions and dangerous situations," and involving the United States in a more or less avowed alliance with St. Petersburg.

As I am quoting the most celebrated of Pozzo di Borgo's despatches, I may as well cite the passage respecting Austria, the contents of which have certainly lost nothing of

their actuality by the events that have passed since 1825 in Galicia, Italy, and Hungary.

"Our policy," says Pozzo, "commands that we should show ourselves to this State under a terrible aspect, and by our preparations to persuade it that, if it makes movements against us, *the fiercest of storms that it has yet had to bear will burst upon its head*. Either Prince Metternich will declare to the Turks that our entry into the Principalities is a resolution that they themselves have provoked, or he will throw himself *on other provinces of the Ottoman Empire* more to his convenience. In the first case we *shall* be agreed, *in the second we shall become so*. The only chance that we have to run is that of an open declaration against us. If Prince Metternich is wise, he will avoid war; if he is violent, *he will be punished*. With a Ministry placed in such a situation as his, a Cabinet such as ours will find in events a thousand ways of terminating differences."

/ Lord John's stump-oratory, the beating of big drums about English honour, the show of great moral indignation at Russian perfidy, the vision of England's floating batteries defiling along the walls of Sebastopol and Cronstadt, the tumult of arms and the ostentatious embarkation of troops,—all these dramatic incidents quite bewilder the public understanding, and raise a mist before its eyes, which allows it to see nothing save its own delusions. Can there exist a greater delusion than believing this Ministry, after the revelations made by the blue books, to have been all at once transformed, not only into a warlike Ministry, but into a Ministry that could undertake any war against Russia, except a simulated one, or one carried on in the very interest of the enemy against whom it is ostensibly directed? Let us look at the circumstances under which the warlike preparations are made.

No formal declaration of war is made against Russia. The very object of the war the Ministry is not able to avow. Troops are embarked without the place of their destination being distinctly described. The estimates asked for are too small for a great war and too great for a small one. The Coalition, who have grown notorious for ingenuity displayed in hatching pretexts for not keeping their most solemn promises and reasons for delaying the most urgent reforms,

all at once feel themselves bound by over-scrupulous adherence to pledges rashly given to complicate this momentous crisis by surprising the country with a new Reform Bill, deemed inopportune by the most ardent reformers, imposed by no pressure from without, and received on all sides with the utmost indifference and suspicion. What, then, can be their plan but to divert public attention from their external policy by getting up a subject of overwhelming domestic interest?

Transparent efforts are now made to mislead the public as to the situation of England in respect to foreign States. No binding treaty has as yet been concluded with France, but a substitute has been provided by "Notes exchanged." Now, such Notes were exchanged in 1839, with the Cabinet of Louis Philippe, by virtue of which the allied fleets were to enter the Dardanelles, and to stop the intervention of Russia in the affairs of the East, either singly or collectively with other Powers, and we all know what came of the Notes exchanged then—a Holy Alliance against France and the Treaty of the Dardanelles. The sincerity and the earnestness of the Anglo-French alliance may be inferred from a Parliamentary incident in yesterday's sitting of the Commons. Bonaparte, as you have seen in the *Moniteur*, threatens the Greek insurrectionists, and has sent a similar remonstrance to the Government of King Otho. Sir T. Walsh, having interrogated the Ministry on this point, Lord John Russell declared that "he was aware of no understanding between the French and English Governments in the matter alluded to."

If the British Government intend a real war with Russia, why do they anxiously eschew the international forms of declaring war? If they intend a real alliance with France, why do they studiously shun the legalized forms of international alliances? As to the German Powers, Sir James Graham declares that they have entered into an alliance with England, and Lord John Russell on the same evening contradicts him, stating that the relations with those Powers are, in fact, the same as at the beginning of the Eastern complication. According to the very statement of

the Ministers, they are just now about to come to terms with Turkey, and to propose a treaty with her. They are embarking troops with a view to occupying Constantinople without having beforehand concluded a treaty with Turkey. We are, then, not to be surprised at learning from a Constantinople letter that a secret agent of the Porte has been sent from Vienna to St. Petersburg to propose to the Czar a private settlement. "It would be rational," says the correspondent, "that the Turks, after discovering the treachery and folly of their pretended friends, should seek to avenge themselves by contracting an alliance with a wise enemy. The terms of settlement the former are endeavouring to settle on Turkey, are ten times more ruinous than the Mentschikoff claims."

The prospect of what the embarked troops are intended to do, at least in the opinion of the English Ministry, may be justly inferred from what the united squadrons have done and are doing at the present moment. Twenty days after having entered the Black Sea, they returned to the Bosphorus. A few days previous, "The Ministers of the Porte, out of deference to the remonstrances of the British Ambassador, had to put in prison the editor of the Greek journal, *The Telegraph of the Bosphorus*, for having said in his paper that both the English and French fleets would shortly return from the Euxine to the Bosphorus. The editor of the *Journal of Constantinople* was authorized to declare that both the fleets were to continue their stay in the Euxine." In order to show his deference to the intimation received from the British and French admirals, the Russian admiral, on the 19th ult., sends out two steamers to bombard the Turks at Shefkatil, and Russian steamers cruise in sight of Trebizond, while no vessels belonging to the united squadron are in the Black Sea, except an English and a French steamer off Sebastopol. Sinope, then, and the bombardment of Shefkatil by Russian steamers are the only feats the united squadrons have to boast of. The quarrel between the Ambassadors and the Admirals, all relations between whom have come to a dead

stand—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe refusing to receive Admiral Dundas, and Baraguay d’Hilliers excluding from a State ball the French Admiral and his officers—this quarrel is of minor importance, as the diplomatic triflers being compromised by the publication of their despatches in London and Paris, may strive to rescue, at any risk of ships and crews, their lost reputation.

But the serious side of the question is that the public instructions given to the Ambassadors were countermanded by a set of secret instructions forwarded to the Admirals, and that the latter are really incapable of executing instructions which are self-contradictory. And how could they be otherwise, no declaration of war having preceded them? On the one hand they are ordered to attack Russian ships in order to enforce their withdrawal from the Euxine to Sebastopol, and, on the other, not to swerve from the mere *defensive*. Lastly, if a serious war be intended, how could the British Ambassador at Constantinople have regarded it as an important triumph to have got the leader of the war party in the Turkish Ministry—Mehemet Ali Pasha—turned out of his office as War Minister, having him replaced by the peace-mongering Riza Pasha, while he entrusted Mehemet Pasha, a creature of Reschid Pasha, with the office of Grand Admiral!

Now look at another most important point. The embarkation of the British and French troops is only proceeded with after the news of a Greek insurrection having broken out in Albania, and being spread over Thessaly and Macedonia, has reached London and Paris. This insurrection was from the first anxiously waited for on the part of the English Cabinet, as is proved by the despatches of Russell, Clarendon, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. It gives them the best occasion to interfere between the Sultan and his own Christian subjects, on the plea of interfering between the Russians and the Turks. From the moment that the Latins interfere with the Greeks (I use this word here only in the religious sense) you may be sure of a concert becoming established between 11,000,000 inhabi-

tants of European Turkey and the Czar, who will then really appear as their religious protector. There exists no polemical schism between the Mussulmans and their Greek subjects, but the religious animosity against the Latins may be said to form the only common bond between the different races inhabiting Turkey and professing the Greek creed. In this respect things have not changed since the period when Mohammed II. laid siege to Constantinople, when the Greek Admiral, Lucas Notaras, the most influential man in the Byzantine Empire, publicly declared that he would prefer seeing the Turkish turban triumphant in the capital rather than the Latin hat, while, on the other hand, there was a Hungarian prophecy afloat that the Christians would never be fortunate till the damned heretical Greeks should be extirpated, and Constantinople destroyed by the Turks. Any interference, then, on the part of the Western Powers between the Sultan and his Greek subjects must favour the plans of the Czar. A similar result will be brought about should Austria, as she did in 1791, undertake to occupy Servia on the pretext of thwarting the treasonable designs of the Russian party in that Principality. Let me add that it is rumoured in London that the insurgent Epirotes were supported and joined by Greeks from the Ionian Islands, who had not been checked by the English authorities, and that the news of the Greek insurrection was announced by *The Times*, the Coalition organ, in Saturday's number, as a most opportune event.

I, for my part, have no doubt at all that treachery lurks behind the clamorous war preparations of the Coalition. Bonaparte is, of course, in good earnest in embarking in the war. He has no alternative left but revolution at home or war abroad. He cannot any longer continue, as he does, to couple the cruel despotism of Napoleon I. with the corrupt peace policy of Louis Philippe. He must stop sending new batches of prisoners to Cayenne, if he dare not simultaneously send French armies beyond the frontiers. But the conflict between the avowed intentions of Bonaparte and the secret plans of the Coalition can only con-

tribute to further embroil matters. What I conclude from all this is, not that there will be no war, but, on the contrary, that it will assume such terrible and revolutionary dimensions as are not even suspected by the little men of the Coalition. Their very perfidy is the means of transforming a local conflict into a European conflagration.

Even if the British Ministry were as sincere as they are false, their intervention could not but accelerate the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. They cannot interfere without demanding pledges for the Christian subjects of the Porte, and these pledges they cannot wrest from it without dooming it to ruin. Even the Constantinople correspondent I quoted before, and who is an avowed Turkophile, cannot but own that "the proposal of the Western Powers to put all the subjects of the Porte on a perfect footing of civil and religious equality, will lead at once to anarchy, intestine warfare, and a final and speedy overthrow of the Empire."

LIII

France and England—The Greek Rising —Asia

LONDON, *March 3, 1854*
N. Y. T., March 18, 1854

IN my last letter I mentioned ¹ that Sir Charles Napier owed his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic fleet to his public expression of mistrust in the French alliance; to his accusing France of having betrayed England in 1840, while in fact the English Government at that time conspired with Nicholas against Louis Philippe. I ought to have added that the second Admiral in the Black Sea, Sir Edmund Lyons, during his stay in Greece, as English Minister, showed himself the avowed enemy of France, and was removed from that office on the representations of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Thus in the ministerial appointments the greatest possible care is taken to insure a crop of misunderstandings, not only between the French and English commanders, but also between the Admirals and the English Ambassador at Constantinople.

These facts are not denied and certainly not refuted by Bonaparte's congratulating himself, in the opening speech he addressed to his own representatives, upon his close alliance with England. The *entente cordiale* is certainly somewhat older than the restoration of the Imperial etiquette. The most remarkable passage in Bonaparte's speech is neither this reminiscence from Louis Philippe's

¹ We have been unable to find any trace of this letter.

harangues, nor his denunciations of the Czar's ambitious plans, but rather his proclaiming himself the protector of Germany, and especially of Austria, against the foe from without and the enemy from within.

The ratifications of the Treaty entered into by the Porte with the Western Powers, containing the clause that it was not to conclude peace with Russia without their concurrence, had hardly been exchanged at Constantinople on the 5th inst., when negotiations relative to the future position of the Christians in Turkey were also opened between the representatives of the four Powers and the Porte. The real end aimed at in these negotiations is betrayed in the following passage from Wednesday's *Times* :

[The condition of several parts of the Turkish Empire (internal autonomy but Turkey sovereign) is a precedent which may be extended].

In other words, the Coalition Cabinet intends securing the integrity of the Turkish Empire in Europe by the transformation of Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Albania, Roumelia, and Thessaly into so many Danubian Principalities. The acceptance on the part of the Porte of these conditions must infallibly lead, if the Turkish armies prove victorious, to a civil war among the Turks themselves.

It is now ascertained that the discovery of the conspiracy at Widdin only hastened the Greek explosion, which at Bucharest was considered as an accomplished fact before it had broken out. The Pasha of Scutari is concentrating all his troops with a view to prevent the Montenegrins from joining the insurgent Greeks.

The Anglo-French expedition may be set down as far as the *present* intentions of the British Government go, as another piece of humbug. The landing-places are fixed for the French at Rodosto, for the British at Enos. The latter town lies on a small peninsula at the entrance of a marshy bay, at the rear of which the extensive marshes of the valley of the Maritza will no doubt greatly contribute to the salubrity of the camp. It lies *outside* not only the

Bosphorus, but of the Dardanelles also, and the troops, in order to get to the Black Sea, would have either to re-embark and enjoy 250 miles' roundabout sail against the currents of the straits, or to march through a roadless country for the distance of 160 miles—a march which no doubt could be completed in a fortnight. The French at Rodosto are at least on the Sea of Marmora, and only a week's march from Constantinople.

But what are the troops to do in this inexplicable position? Why, they are either to march upon Adrianople, there to cover the capital, or in the worst case, to unite at the neck of the Thracian Chersonesus, to defend the Dardanelles. So says *The Times* "by authority," and even quotes Marshal Marmont's strategic observations in support of the wisdom of the plan.

One hundred thousand French and English troops to defend a capital which is not menaced, which cannot possibly be menaced for the next twelve months! Why, they might as well have stopped at home.

This plan, if it is to be carried out, is decidedly the worst that can be devised. It is based on the very worst sort of defensive warfare; viz., that which seeks strength in absolute inactivity. Supposing the expedition was to be of a mainly defensive character, it is evident that this object would be best obtained by enabling the Turks, based upon such a reserve, to pass into the offensive, or else by taking up a position in which a casual and partial offensive, where opportunities offer, could be taken. But at Enos and Rodosto the French and British troops are entirely useless.

The worst of it is, that an army of 100,000 men, with plenty of steam transports, and supported by a fleet of twenty sail of the line, is in itself a force competent to take the most decided offensive action in any part of the Black Sea. Such a force must either take the Crimea and Sebastopol, Odessa and Kherson, close the Sea of Azof, destroy the Russian forts on the Caucasian coasts, and bring the Russian fleet safe into the Bosphorus, or it has no idea of

its strength and its duty as an active army. It is affirmed on the part of the Ministerial partisans, that when the 100,000 men are once concentrated in Turkey, such operations may be undertaken, and that the landing of the first divisions at Enos and Rodosto is merely contrived to deceive the enemy. But even in this case it is an unnecessary loss of time and expense not to land the troops at once at some point on the Black Sea. The enemy cannot be misled. As soon as the Emperor Nicholas hears of this pompously announced expedition of 100,000 men, he is bound to send every soldier he can spare to Sebastopol, Kaffa, Perekop, and Yenikale. You cannot first frighten your enemy by enormous armaments, and then try to make him believe that they are not intended to do any harm. The trick would be too shallow; and if it is expected to mislead the Russians by such paltry prettexts, British diplomacy has made another egregious blunder.

I therefore believe that those who have planned the expedition intend betraying the Sultan directly, and, on the plea of frightening Russia as much as possible, will take good care to do her by all means the least possible harm.

England and France occupying Constantinople and part of Roumelia, Austria occupying Servia, and perhaps Bosnia and Montenegro, and Russia being allowed to reinforce herself in Moldo-Wallachia,—this looks like an eventual partition of Turkey in Europe rather than anything else. Turkey is placed in worse circumstances than in 1772, when the King of Prussia, in order to induce the Empress Catherine to retire from the Danubian Principalities, the occupation of which threatened to lead to a European conflict, proposed the first partition of Poland, which was to defray the expenses of the Russo-Turkish war. Be it remembered that, at that time, the Porte originally rushed into the war with Catherine with the view of defending Poland from Prussian aggression, and that, in the end, Poland was sacrificed at the shrine of the “independence and integrity” of the Ottoman Empire.

The treacherous policy of procrastination pursued by the Coalition Cabinet has given the Muscovite emissaries the opportunity for planning and maturing the Greek insurrection, so anxiously expected by Lord Clarendon. The insurrection commenced on the 28th January, and, according to the last despatches from Vienna, assumed more threatening dimensions on the 13th inst. The districts of Acarnania and Ætolia, and circles of Jlussa and Delonia, are said to be in a state of revolt. An insurrection is stated to have broken out at Egripo, the capital of Eubœa, equal in gravity to that in Albania. The fact of the towns of Arta and Janina being quitted by the Turks and occupied by the Greeks is of smaller importance, as the domineering citadels remain in the hand of Ottoman troops, and, as we know from the numerous wars carried on between the Christians and the Turks in Albania, the final possession of these towns depended always on the possession of the citadels. The Gulfs of Centessa and Salonica and the coasts of Albania will be declared in a state of siege. I stated in my last letter that one of the results of the Greek insurrection, the most to be apprehended on the part of the Porte, would be the opportunity it afforded the Western Powers for interfering between the Sultan and his subjects, instead of fighting the Russians, and thus driving the Greek Christians into alliance with the Czar. How eager these Powers are to grasp at this opportunity may be inferred from the fact of the same post bringing the news of the Porte having accepted the Convention proposed by England and France, and of the French and English Ambassadors having sent two steamers to the assistance of the Turks, while the British Minister at Athens has informed the Cabinet of King Otho that England will interfere in the insurgent districts. The immediate result of the insurrection from a military point of view is clearly described by the Vienna correspondent of to-day's *Times* as follows :

[Reinforcements for Widdin countermanded and sent southwest. Arnauts and Albanians clamouring to go home. All

influence over them lost. West wing of Turkish army may have to retire].

These are some of the first results of that policy of procrastination so rhetorically praised by Graham, Russell, Clarendon, and Palmerston, in vindication of the Ministerial management of Eastern affairs. As they were informed, late on last Friday night, that the Czar, without having waited for the recall of Sir Hamilton Seymour from England, had ordered him off in the most abrupt and uncereemonious manner, they held two Cabinet Councils, one on Saturday, and the other on Sunday afternoon—the result of their consultations being to allow the Czar once more a delay of three or four weeks, which delay is to be granted under the form of a summons, “calling upon the Czar to give within six days from the receipt of that communication a solemn pledge and engagement that he will cause his troops to evacuate the Principalities of the Danube on or before the 30th of April.”

But mark that this summons is *not* followed with the menace of a *declaration of war* in case of a refusal on the part of the Czar. It may be said, and it is said by *The Times*, that notwithstanding this new delay granted, war preparations are actively pursued; but you will observe that, on the one hand, all decisive action of the Porte on the Danube is prevented by the prospect held out of the Western Powers being resolved upon directly participating in the war—and every day of delay in that quarter puts the Turks in a worse position, as it allows the Russians to reinforce themselves in the front, and the Greek rebels to grow more dangerous in the rear of the Danubian army; while, on the other hand, the embarkation of troops for Enos and Rodosto may embarrass the Sultan, but will certainly not stop the Russians.

It has been settled that the British expeditionary force shall consist of about 30,000 and the French of about 80,000 men. Should it happen to appear, in the course of events, that Austria, while apparently joining the Western Powers, only proposed to mask her understanding with Russia,

Bonaparte would have much to regret this most injudicious dispersion of his troops.

There is another insurrection which may be considered as a diversion made in favour of Russia—the insurrection in Spain. Any movement in Spain is sure to produce dissension between France and England. In 1823, the French intervention in Spain was, as we know from Chateaubriand's "Congress of Verona," instigated by Russia. That the Anglo-French intervention in 1834, which finally broke up the *entente cordiale* between the two States, proceeded from the same source, we may infer from Palmerston having been its author. The "Spanish marriages" prepared the way for the downfall of the Orleans dynasty. At the present moment, a dethronement of the "innocent" Isabella would allow a son of Louis Philippe, the Duke of Montpensier, to bring forward his claims to the throne of Spain; while, on the other hand, Bonaparte would be reminded of one of his uncles having once resided at Madrid. The Orleans would be supported by the Coburgs, and resisted by the Bonapartes. A Spanish insurrection, then, which is far from meaning a popular revolution, must prove a most powerful agency in dissolving so superficial a combination as what is termed the Anglo-French alliance.

A treaty of alliance is said to have been concluded between Russia, Khiva, Bokhara, and Cabul.

As to Dost Mahomed, the Ameer of Cabul, it would be quite natural that after having proposed, in 1838, to England to place for ever a *feud of blood* between himself and Russia, if the English Government required it, by causing the agent despatched to him by the Czar to be killed, and his anger against England being renewed in 1839 on the part of England by the Afghan expedition, by his expulsion from the throne and by the most cruel and unscrupulous devastation of his country—it would be quite natural that Dost Mahomed should now endeavour to avenge himself upon his faithless ally. However, as the populations of Khiva, Bokhara, and Cabul belong to the orthodox Mussulman faith of the Sunnites, while the Persians

adhere to the schismatic tenets of the Shiites, it is not to be supposed that they will ally themselves with Russia, being the ally of the Persians, whom they detest and hate, against England, the ostensible ally of the Padishah, whom they regard as the supreme Commander of the Faithful.

There is some probability of Russia having an ally in Thibet and the Tartar Emperor of China, if the latter be forced to retire into Manchuria and to resign the sceptre of China proper. The Chinese rebels, as you know, have undertaken a regular crusade against Buddhism, destroying its temples and slaying its Banzes. But the religion of the Tartars is Buddhism, and Thibet, the seat of the great Lama and recognising the suzerainty of China, is the sanctuary of the Buddhist faith. Tae-ping-wang, if he succeed in driving the Manchu dynasty out of China, will therefore have to enter on a religious war with the Buddhist powers of Tartary. Now, as on both sides of the Himalayas, Buddhism is confessed, and as England cannot but support the new Chinese dynasty, the Czar is sure to side with the Tartar tribes, put them in motion against England, and awake religious revolts in Nepal itself. By the last Oriental mails we are informed that "the Emperor of China, in anticipation of the loss of Pekin, has directed the Governors of the various provinces to send the Imperial revenue to Getol, their old family seat and present summer residence in Manchuria, about eighty miles north-east of the Great Wall." The great religious war between the Chinese and the Tartars, which will spread over the Indian frontiers, may consequently be regarded as near at hand.

The Russian Retreat

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, *March 30, 1854*

THE Russians have retreated from Kalafat, and have, it is stated, entirely remodelled their plan of operations. This is the glorious end of the efforts and risks of a three months' campaign, during which the last resources of Wallachia have been completely exhausted. This is the fruit of that inconceivable march into Lesser Wallachia, which appeared to have been undertaken in utter contempt of the simplest rules of strategy. In order to take Kalafat, a simple bridge-head held by the Turks on the left bank of the Danube, the mass of the Russian army was concentrated on its extreme right, in a position where the weakened centre and left appeared completely abandoned to any attack that the enemy might chance to undertake, and where a degree of indifference was shown to the lines of communication and retreat which is without parallel in the history of warfare. How it happened that Omer Pasha has not profited by this blunder, we have already had occasion to show. How it is that after all the Russians have to retreat disgracefully, without having effected their purpose, we shall now demonstrate. We say that they have to retreat disgracefully, because an advance preceded by blustering, crowned by taking up a merely threatening position, and ending in a quiet and modest retreat, without even an attempt at serious fighting—because a movement composed of an unin-

terraptured series of mistakes and errors, resulting in nothing but the General's conviction that he has made a complete fool of himself—is in the very highest degree disgraceful. Now to the state of the case :

The Russians had, by the end of 1853, the following troops in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia :

I. 4th army corps (Dannenberg), three divisions infantry, one division cavalry, four brigades artillery ; total, after deducting losses, 45,000 men.

II. Of the 5th corps (Lüders), one division of infantry, one division cavalry, two brigades artillery ; say 15,000 men.

III. 3rd corps (Osten-Sacken), three divisions infantry, one division cavalry, four brigades artillery ; say 55,000 men.

Total, about 115,000 men, besides non-combatants and one division of Lüders' corps in the neighbourhood of Odessa, which, being wanted for garrison duty, cannot be taken into account.

The troops under Dannenberg and Lüders were the only forces in the Principalities up to the beginning of December. The approach of Osten-Sacken's corps was to be the signal for the grand concentration and the attack on Kalafat. His place on the Bug and the Pruth was to be filled by the 6th corps (Tsheodayeff), then on the road from Moscow. After the junction of this latter corps the Danubian army would have consisted of about 170,000 men, but might have turned out to be stronger if the new levies of recruits from the south-western provinces were at once directed to the theatre of war. However, 115,000 to 120,000 men appeared to the Russian commander a sufficient force to defend the whole line of the Danube from Braila to Nicopolis, and to spare a sufficient number from the extreme right to be concentrated for an attack on Kalafat. When this movement was commenced, towards the end of December, Kalafat could hardly shelter more than 10,000 to 12,000 defenders, with 8,000 more at Widdin, whose support might be considered dubious, as they would have to cross a violent river in a

bad season. The slowness of the Russian movements, however, the indecision of Prince Gortschakoff, and, above all, the activity and boldness of Ismail Pasha, the commander at Kalafat, permitted the Turks to concentrate some forty thousand men on the menaced point, and to change Kalafat from a simple bridge-head, stormable by a force the double of its defenders, into a fortification which could shelter at least 30,000 men, and withstand any but a regular siege attack. It has been justly said that the highest triumph in the construction of a field fortification is the necessity for the enemy to open his trenches against it; if the Russians did not actually open their trenches, it was merely because, even with that extreme means, they saw no way of taking Kalafat in the time they could set apart for the operation. Kalafat will henceforth rank with Frederic II.'s camp at Bunzelwitz, with the lines of Torres Vedras, and with the Archduke Charles's intrenchments behind Verona, as one of those efforts of field fortification to be named as classical applications of the art in warlike history.

Now let us look at the Russian means of attack. That they meant in good earnest to take Kalafat is shown by their parks of siege artillery having been brought forward as far as Crajova. That Omer Pasha, we may state by the way, allowed these guns to go and return freely, is one of the many military inconceivabilities of this war, to be explained only by diplomatic influence. The only thing necessary, then, for the Russians was a sufficient mass of troops to drive in the Turks, to protect the trenches and batteries, and to storm the breaches as soon as they could have been opened. Here again Ismail Pasha acted like an energetic and clever commander. His sally towards Tchetalea on the 6th of January, his vigorous attack ending in the defeat of a superior Russian force, and the continued attacks of a similar nature which he executed, while the Russian concentration was still going on, and until he was fairly blockaded on his small Danubian peninsula by a superior force—in short, his system of defending himself by concentrated offensive blows against single points of the

Russian line, and thereby destroying his enemy as far as he could in detail, was exactly what a commander under his circumstances should have done, and forms a cheering contrast to Omer Pasha's previous defence at Oltenitza, or his lazy passivity all this while on the Lower Danube. For the petty attacks carried on by him here and there, which appear never to have been broken off at the proper moment, but continued for days and days on the same point with blind obstinacy, even when no result could be expected from them—these petty attacks do not count when a movement across the Danube with forty to sixty thousand men was what was wanted.

After all, the Russians completed, by the latter end of January, their concentration around Kalafat. They were evidently superior in the open field, and must therefore have had there some 30,000 or 40,000 men. Now, deduct these from 115,000, and then deduct, say, 20,000 or 30,000 men more for the defence of the line from Braila to the sea, and there remain for the whole of Greater Wallachia, inclusive of garrisons, from 50,000 to 65,000 men—an army far from sufficient to defend such a long line of attack and a line of communication *running parallel with the line of attack* at a short distance behind it. A vigorous assault on any point, even with a force inferior to the whole of these 65,000 men, could not but have ended in the utter defeat in detail of all these dispersed Russian corps, and in the capture of all the Russian magazines. Omer Pasha will, some time or other, have to explain his motives for neglecting such an opportunity.

With all their efforts, then, the Russians could merely concentrate before Kalafat a force barely sufficient to drive in the Turkish outposts, but not to attack the stronghold itself. They took nearly five weeks to effect even this momentary and illusory success. General Schilders, of the Engineers, was sent with positive orders to take Kalafat. He came, he saw, and he resolved to do nothing, until the arrival of Tsheddayeff should allow fresh troops to come up from the centre and left. Five weeks the Russians stood in

this dangerous position, their rear and flanks exposed, as if provoking that attack which they could not have resisted a moment. And five weeks Omer Pasha stood menacing their flank and rear in a position where he could see their weakness without spectacles or telescopes, and he did nothing. Verily this system of modern warfare under the patronage of the Allied Powers is above comprehension !

All at once the news reaches us that the Russians are in full retreat from Kalafat. The English journals hereupon exclaim that it is the effect of their Allies, the Austrians, having concentrated an army in Transylvania, in the rear of the Russians ! That it is the effect of the glorious Austrian alliance, which is again the effect of the glorious policy of Lord Aberdeen. But presently an authentic Austrian manifesto shows that no Austrian alliance exists, and that the Austrians have not said, and as yet do not appear to know themselves, for what purpose they have sent that army where it is. And consequently our British contemporaries are in great uncertainty as to the cause of the Russian retreat. But what is the cause of it ? Why, simply this : French and British troops are to go to Constantinople. Nothing more easy or more plain than to send them thence to Odessa or Bessarabia and cut off the communications of the Russians.

However harmless the real intentions of the Coalition may be, pressure from without may force them to act seriously. Gortschakoff evidently does not trust in the merely diplomatic mission of the Western armies. If he were quite sure of England, he could not be so of France. If he were sure of all the Cabinets, he could not be so of the Generals. He might risk flank marches in the presence of the Turks, but he supposes the matter must become serious as soon as French and British troops arrive and threaten to fall on his flanks. Consequently, Tsheodayeff is stopped in his march to form a camp of 30,000 or 40,000 men above Odessa. Consequently he cannot furnish any troops for the Pruth or Sereth. Consequently, no troops can come to reinforce Gortschakoff before Kalafat. Consequently, the

attack upon that place becomes an impossibility. Consequently, Prince Gortschakoff has to retreat in as good order as he came. And thus ends the great tragi-comedy of the Russian march against Kalafat.

The Documents on the Partition of Turkey

LONDON, *March 21, 1854*
N. Y. T., April 5, 1854

A most important event is the compulsory publication by Ministers of their secret correspondence with the Emperor of Russia during the first three months of their administration, as also of the memorandum of the interview between the Czar and Lord Aberdeen in 1844, which the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* challenged the latter to produce.

I begin with an analysis of the memorandum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on communications from the Emperor of Russia, subsequent to his visit to England in June, 1844. The present *status quo* of the Ottoman Empire is "the most compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace." England and Russia agree on this principle, and therefore unite their efforts to keep up that *status quo*. "With this object, the essential object is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering, without absolute necessity, in its internal affairs." Now, how is this "system of forbearance" to be successfully carried out? Firstly, by Great Britain not interfering with the interpretation Russia may think fit to put upon her treaties with the Porte, but forcing the latter, on the contrary, to act in conformity with those treaties as interpreted by Russia; and, in the second place, by allowing Russia "constantly"

to meddle between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. In a word, the system of forbearance toward the Porte means a system of complicity with Russia. This strange proposition is, however, far from being expressed in rude terms.

The memorandum affects to speak of "all the great Powers," but at the same time plainly intimates that there exist no great Powers at all besides Russia and England. France, it is said, will "find herself *obliged* to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg and London." Austria is represented as a mere appendage to Russia, enjoying no life of her own, following no distinct policy, but one "closely united by the principle of *perfect identity*" with that of Russia. Prussia is treated as a nonentity not worth mentioning, and consequently is not so much as mentioned. All the great Powers, then, is only a rhetorical figure for the two Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London; and the line of conduct to be agreed upon by all the great Powers means the line of conduct drawn up at St. Petersburg, and to be acted upon at London. The memorandum says:

"The Porte has a constant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other Powers. It hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the Cabinets. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements toward one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility.

"It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations toward one of the great Powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly towards the Cabinet which demands just reparation.

"*As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will give way, and the differences which have arisen will be arranged in a conciliatory manner without any conflict resulting from them.*"

This is the formula by which England is called upon to assist Russia in her policy of extorting new concessions from Turkey, on the ground of her ancient treaties.

"In the present state of feeling in Europe, the Cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression or religious intolerance. It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman Ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the great Powers on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness.

"It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation."

In this mild way England is taught how to back Russia's pretensions to a *religious protectorate* over the Christians of Turkey.

Having thus laid down the premisses of her "policy of forbearance," Russia cannot conceal from her confidante that this very forbearance may prove more fatal than any policy of aggression, and fearfully contribute to develop all the "elements of dissolution" the Ottoman Empire contains: so that some fine morning "*unforeseen circumstances* may hasten its *fall*, without its being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it." The question is then raised, what would have to be done in the event of such unforeseen circumstances producing a final catastrophe in Turkey?

The only thing wanted, it is said, in the event of Turkey's fall becoming imminent, is *England and Russia's "coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action."* "This notion," we are assured by the memorandum, "was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London" [in the long conferences held between the Autocrat on the one hand, and the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel and the Earl of Aberdeen on the other hand]. "The result was the *eventual engagement* that, if *anything unforeseen* occurred in Turkey, *Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common.*"

Now, what means this *eventual engagement*? Firstly, that

Russia and England should previously come to a common understanding as to the *partition of Turkey*; and secondly, that in such a case England was to bind herself to form a Holy Alliance with Russia and Austria, described as Russia's *alter ego*, against France, who would be "*obliged*," *i.e.* forced to act in conformity with their views. The natural result of such a common understanding would be to involve England in a deadly war with France, and thus to give Russia full sway to carry out her own policy on Turkey.

Great stress is again and again laid upon the "unforeseen circumstances" that may accelerate the downfall of Turkey. At the conclusion of the memorandum the mysterious phrase, however, disappears, to be replaced by the more distinct formulation: "If we foresee that the Ottoman Empire must crumble to pieces, England and Russia have to enter into a previous concert, etc. . . ." The only unforeseen circumstance, then, was the unforeseen declaration on the part of Russia that the Ottoman Empire must now crumble to pieces. The main point gained by the eventual engagement is the liberty granted to Russia to foresee, at a given moment, the sudden downfall of Turkey, and to oblige England to enter into negotiations, on the common understanding of such a catastrophe being at hand.

Accordingly, about ten years after the memorandum had been drawn up, due notice is given to England that the vitality of the Ottoman Empire is gone, and that they have now to enter upon their previously arranged concert, to the exclusion of France, *i.e.* to conspire behind the backs of Turkey and France. This overture opens the series of secret and confidential papers exchanged between St. Petersburg and the Coalition Cabinet.

Sir G. H. Seymour, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, sends his first secret and confidential despatch to Lord J. Russell, the then Foreign Minister, on January 11, 1853. On the evening of the 9th January he had the "honour" to see the Emperor at the Palace of the Grand Duchess Helen, who had condescended to invite Lady Seymour and himself to meet the Imperial family. The

Emperor came up to him in his most gracious manner, expressing his great pleasure at the news of the formation of the Coalition Cabinet, to which he wished long life, desiring the Ambassador to convey to old Aberdeen his congratulation on his part, and to beat into Lord John Russell's brains "that it was very essential that the two Governments—the English Government and I, and I and the English Government—should be on the best terms; and that the necessity was never greater than at present."

Mark that these words were spoken in January, 1853, at the very time when Austria, "between whom and Russia"—according to the memorandum—"there exists an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey," was openly engaged in troubling the waters at Montenegro.

"When *we* are agreed," said the Czar, "it is immaterial what the others may think or do. Turkey," he continued, in a hypocritical manner of condolence, "is in a very critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble." Having said so much, the Czar proceeded to shake hands with Sir H. Seymour, very graciously, as if about to take leave of him; but Sir Hamilton, to whom it "instantly occurred that the conversation was incomplete," took "the great liberty" humbly to pray the Autocrat to speak "a little more explicitly with regard to the affairs of Turkey." "The Emperor's words and manner," remarks this observer, "although still very kind, showed that his Majesty had no intention of speaking to me of the *demonstration which he is about to make in the south.*"

Be it remarked that already in his despatch of January 7, 1853, Sir Hamilton had informed the British Government that "orders had been despatched to the *5th Corps d'Armée* to advance to the frontiers of the Danubian provinces, and that the *4th Corps* would be ordered to hold itself in readiness to march if necessary"; and in a despatch dated January 8, 1853, that Nesselrode had expressed to him his opinion of the "necessity that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported by a demonstration of force."

"The Emperor," Sir Hamilton continues his despatch, "said, at first with a little hesitation, but, as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating manner :

"The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganized condition ; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces (*menace ruine*) : the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised.

"Stay !" he exclaimed ; ' we have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man ; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. But, however, this is not the time to speak to you on that matter.' "

The patient, in this bear's eyes, is so weak that he *must* eat him. Sir Hamilton, somewhat frightened at this "unforeseen" diagnosis of the Muscovite physician, answers in the true spirit of courtesy :

"Your Majesty is so gracious that you will allow me one further observation. Your Majesty says the man is sick ; it is very true ; but your Majesty will deign to excuse me, if I remark that it is the part of the generous and strong to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man."

The British Ambassador comforts himself by this consideration, that this concurrence on his part in the Czar's view of Turkey and sickness, and his appeal for forbearance with the sick man, did "at least not give offence." Thus ends Sir H. Seymour's report on his first confidential conversation with the Czar ; but although appearing a perfect courtier in this *vis-à-vis*, he has sufficient good sense to warn his Cabinet, and to tell them what follows :

"Any overture of this kind only tends to establish a dilemma. The dilemma seems to be this : If Her Majesty's Government do not come to an understanding with Russia as to what is to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey, they will have the less reason for complaining if results displeasing to England should be prepared. If, on the contrary, Her Majesty's Government should enter into the consideration of such eventualities, they make themselves in some degree consenting parties to a catastrophe which they have so much interest in warding off as long as possible."

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Sir Hamilton winds up his despatch with the following epigrammatic sentence :

"The sum is probably this, that England has to desire a close concert with Russia, with a view to preventing the downfall of Turkey; while Russia would be well pleased that the concert should apply to the events by which this downfall is to be followed."

On the 14th of January, as Sir G. H. Seymour informs Lord J. Russell in his despatch dated 22nd January, 1853, he had another confidential interview with the Czar, whom "he found alone." The Autocrat condescended to give the English Ambassador a lesson in Eastern affairs. The dreams and plans of the Empress Catherine II. were known, but he did not indulge in them. On the contrary, in his opinion there existed perhaps only one danger for Russia, that of a further extension of his already too vast dominions. (Your readers will recollect that I alluded to this in extracting a passage from the despatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo.) The *status quo* of Turkey was the most consonant with Russian interests. On the one hand, the Turks had lost their spirit of military enterprise; and on the other, "this country was strong enough, *or had hitherto been* strong enough, to preserve its independence, and to ensure respectful treatment from other countries." But in that Empire there happened to be several millions of Christians he must take care of, hard and "inconvenient" as the task might be. To do this he was bound at once by his right, his duty, and his religion. Then all of a sudden the Czar returned to his parable of the sick man, the very sick man, whom they must by no means allow "to suddenly die on their hands" (*de leur échapper*). "Chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, must attend the catastrophe, if it should occur unexpectedly, and *before some ulterior scheme had been sketched.*"

Having then again given notice of the impending death of the Ottoman Empire, the summons to England followed in conformity with the "eventual engagement" to discount the heritage in common with Russia. Still he avoids sketching his own "ulterior system," contenting himself by

establishing, in a Parliamentary way, the main point to be kept in view in the event of a partition.

"I desire to speak to you as a friend and a *gentleman*. If England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest, it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly; for my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor that is to say, for as occupier I do not say; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople."

England, therefore, will be forbidden to establish herself at Constantinople. The Czar will do so, if not as proprietor, at least in the quality of a temporary occupier. The British Ambassador thanked his Majesty for the frankness of this declaration. Nicholas then alluded to his past conversation with the Duke of Wellington, of which the memorandum of 1844 is the record and, as it were, the *résumé*. Passing to the question of the day—to his claims to the Holy Places—the British Ambassador expressed his fears:

"Two consequences might be anticipated from the appearance of a Russian army—the one being the counter-demonstration which might be provoked on the part of France; the other, and the more serious, the rising, on the part of the Christian population, against the Sultan's authority, already so much weakened by revolts and by a severe financial crisis. The Emperor assured me that no movement of his forces had yet taken place (*n'ont pas bougé*), and expressed his hope that no advance would be required. *With regard to a French expedition to the Sultan's dominions*, his Majesty intimated that such a step would bring affairs to an immediate crisis; that a sense of honour would compel him to send his forces into Turkey without delay or hesitation; that if the result of such an advance should prove to be the overthrow of the Great Turk (*le Grand Turc*), he should regret the event, but should feel that he had acted as he was compelled to do."

The Czar has now given England the theme she has to work out, viz., to sketch an "ulterior system" for super-

seding the Ottoman Empire, and "to enter into a previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists." He encouraged his pupil by holding forth the prize he might gain from a successful solution of this problem, dismissing him with the paternal advice:

"A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilization of the nineteenth century, if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey."

England being thus summoned, Lord J. Russell appears and sends in his answer in a secret and confidential despatch, dated February 9, 1853. If Lord John had been fully aware of the Czar's perfidious plan to press England into a false position by the mere fact of her entering into secret communications with him as to the future partition of an allied State he would have acted like the Czar, and have contented himself with making a verbal reply to Baron Brunnov, instead of despatching an official State paper to St. Petersburg. Before the secret papers were laid before the House, *The Times* had described Lord John's despatch as a most powerful and "indignant refusal" of the Czar's proposals. In its yesterday's number it withdraws its own eulogy of Lord John, declaring that "the document does not deserve the praise it had been led, on imperfect information, to apply to it." Lord John incurred the wrath of *The Times* in consequence of his declaration, in Friday's sitting of the Commons, that he certainly was not in the habit of making communications to *that* paper, and that he had not even read the article alluding to his answer to Sir G. H. Seymour until three days after its publication.

Any one acquainted with the humble and abject tone assumed by every English Minister since 1814, Canning not even excepted, in their communications with Russia, will be forced to own that Lord John's despatch is to be

regarded as a heroic performance on the part of that little earthman.

The document having the character of an important contribution to history, and being proper to illustrate the development of negotiations, your readers will be glad to be acquainted with it *in extenso* :

“LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO SIR G. H. SEYMOUR.

(Secret and Confidential.)

FOREIGN OFFICE,

February 9, 1853.

SIR,—

I have received, and laid before the Queen, your secret and confidential despatch of the 22nd of January. Her Majesty, upon this as upon former occasions, is happy to acknowledge the moderation, the frankness, and the friendly disposition of his Imperial Majesty. Her Majesty has directed me to reply in the same spirit of temperate, candid, and amicable discussion. The question raised by his Imperial Majesty is a very serious one. It is, supposing the contingency of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire to be probable or even imminent, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched; this is the point, said his Imperial Majesty, to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government. In considering this grave question, the first reflection that occurs to her Majesty's Government is that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem. Disputes have arisen respecting the Holy Places, but these are without the sphere of the internal government of Turkey, and concern Russia and France rather than the Sublime Porte. Some disturbance of the relations between Austria and the Porte has been caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro; but this again relates rather to dangers affecting the frontier of Austria than the authority and safety of the Sultan; so that there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours. It occurs further to her Majesty's Government to remark that the event which is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time. When William III. and Louis XIV. disposed, by treaty, of the succession of Charles II. of Spain, they were providing for an event which could not be far off. The infirmities of the sovereign

of Spain, and the certain end of any human life, made the contingency in prospect both sure and near. The death of the Spanish king was in no way hastened by the treaty of partition. The same thing may be said of the provision made in the last century for the disposal of Tuscany, upon the decease of the last prince of the house of Medici. But the contingency of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is of another kind. It may happen twenty, fifty, or a hundred years hence. *In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings toward the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion.* Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction, nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing a European war. Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by his Imperial Majesty. It is to be inferred that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the Great Powers of Europe. An agreement thus made and thus communicated would not be very long a secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict. They would fight with the conviction that they must ultimately triumph, while the Sultan's generals and troops would feel that no immediate success could save their cause from final overthrow. Thus would be produced and strengthened that very anarchy which is now feared, and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove the cause of his death. Her Majesty's Government need scarcely enlarge on the dangers attendant on the execution of any similar Convention. The example of the Succession War is enough to show how little such agreements are respected when a pressing temptation urges their violation. The position of the Emperor of Russia, as depositary, but not proprietor, of Constantinople, would be exposed to numberless hazards, both from the long-cherished ambition of his own nation and the jealousies of Europe. The ultimate proprietor, whoever he might be, would hardly be satisfied with the inert, supine attitude of the heirs of Mahomet II. A great influence on the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the Sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. That influence might be used in favour of Russia; it might be used to curb and control her power. His Imperial Majesty has justly and wisely said: My country is so vast, so happily circumstanced in every way, that it would be unreasonable in me to

desire more territory, or more power than I possess. On the contrary, he observed, our great, perhaps our only danger, is that which would arise from an extension given to an Empire already too large. A vigorous and ambitious State, replacing the Sublime Porte, might, however, render war on the part of Russia a necessity for the Emperor or his successors. Thus European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent it; for neither England nor France, nor probably Austria, would be content to see Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia. On the part of Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government at once declare that they renounce all intention or wish to hold Constantinople. His Imperial Majesty may be quite secure upon this head. They are likewise ready to give an assurance that they will enter into no agreement to provide for the contingency of the fall of Turkey without previous communication with the Emperor of Russia. Upon the whole, then, Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe, than that which his Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory. With a view to the success of this policy, it is desirable that the utmost forbearance should be maintained towards Turkey; that any demands which the Great Powers of Europe may have to make should be made matter of friendly negotiation rather than of peremptory demand; that military and naval demonstrations to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; that differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within the competence of the Sublime Porte, should be decided after mutual concert between the Great Powers, and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government. To these cautions Her Majesty's Government wish to add that, in their view, it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burthensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty. You may read this despatch to Count Nesselrode, and if it is desired, you may yourself place a copy in the hands of the Emperor. In that case you will accompany its presentation with those assurances of friendship and confidence on the part of her Majesty the Queen which the conduct of his Imperial Majesty was so sure to inspire.

"I am, etc.,

"J. RUSSELL."

I am obliged to postpone the conclusion of this analysis to my next letter. Before concluding, however, I will give you, in addition to previous communications, the most recent news I have obtained, from a source not otherwise accessible to the public, regarding the attitude and plans of Prussia.

When the conflict between Russia on the one hand, and the Anglo-French Alliance on the other, already reached a certain climax, the Emperor Nicholas despatched an autograph letter to his brother-in-law at Berlin, in which he stated that though England and France might do him some damage at sea, he feared nothing from them on land, having 600,000 soldiers ready to take the field at the end of April. Of these he would place 200,000 at the disposition of Frederic William, if the latter engaged himself to march on Paris and dethrone Louis Napoleon. The imbecile king was so much taken in by this proposition that Manteuffel required three days' discussion to dissuade him from taking the pledge. So much for the King.

As to Herr von Manteuffel himself, the "great character" of whom the Prussian middle classes are so proud, the whole man lies open, as in a nutshell, in his secret instructions sent to Bunsen, his Ambassador at London, at the same period as the above Russian letter was received, and which came into my possession, though certainly in a different manner from that in which Bunsen possessed himself of my private letters. The contents of these instructions, betraying in the arrant ambiguity of their style at once the schoolmaster and the drill-sergeant, are nearly as follows: "Look sharp which way the wind blows. If you observe that England is in earnest alliance with France, and determined to push on the war, take your stand on the 'integrity and independence' of Turkey. If you observe her wavering in policy and disinclined to war, out with your lance and break it cheerfully for the honour and character of the king, my master and yours."

Is the Autocrat wrong, then, in treating Prussia as a nonentity?

LVI

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence

LONDON, *March 24, 1854*

N. Y. T., April 11, 1854

ALTHOUGH Lord J. Russell's despatch may, upon the whole, be described as a polite refusal of the Czar's proposition to enter into a previous concert on the eventual partition of Turkey, there occur some very strange passages, to which I call the attention of your readers. Lord John says :

"There is no sufficient reason for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours."

Now, nowhere in the confidential communications of Sir H. Seymour do we meet an allusion to the Czar having proposed to intimate to the Sultan anything of the sort. We must therefore conclude either that Lord Russell, while stimulating opposition to such a step, meant to insinuate it himself, or that some of Sir Hamilton's confidential communications are suppressed in the papers laid before the House. The latter looks the more suspicious as, only sixteen days later, on February 25, 1853, Lord Clarendon, on his accession to the Foreign Office, gave the following instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe :

[Explain to Sultan why English Government fear Turkey is in danger. ACCUMULATED GRIEVANCES OF FOREIGN NATIONS, MAL-ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS, AND INCREASING WEAKNESS OF EXECUTIVE in Turkey have forced Turkey's allies to assume a new, alarming tone, that may lead to a general revolt of Turkey's Christian subjects, and prove fatal to her

independence and integrity. (Blue books, "*Rights, etc., of Latin and Greek Churches,*" vol. i. pp. 31, 32.)]

Was this not "*intimating*" to the Sultan on the part of England, in plain words, "that he cannot keep peace at home or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours"? The Czar had told Sir Hamilton in a very offhand way that he would not *allow* England to establish herself at Constantinople, but that he, on his part, intended to establish himself there, if not as *proprietor*, at least as depositary. How does Lord John reply to this impertinent announcement? In the name of Great Britain he renounces "all intention to wish to hold Constantinople." He exacts no similar pledge from the Czar.

[Quotation page 295, lines 12 to 9 from end. "*The position*"—"jealousies of Europe."]

The jealousies of Europe, but not the opposition of England! As to England, she would not allow—no, Lord John Russell dares not speak to Russia in the same tone in which Russia speaks to England—she would "*not be content* to see Constantinople *permanently* in the hands of Russia." She will then be content to see it *temporarily* so. In other words, she fully concurs in the Czar's own proposal. She will not allow what he himself renounces, but is prepared to suffer what he intends doing.

Not "content" with installing the Czar as the eventual depositary of Constantinople, Lord John declares, in the name of the English Government, that "they will enter into no agreement to provide for the contingency of the fall of Turkey without *previous* communications with Russia."

That is to say, although the Czar told Sir H. Seymour that he *had* entered into an agreement with Austria before making any previous communication to England, she on her part pledges herself to communicate with Russia previously to entering into an agreement with France. Says Lord John :

[*Russian policy wise, disinterested, beneficial to Europe.*]

His Cossack Majesty happens to have followed, without

ever swerving from it, the policy inaugurated at his accession to the throne, and which the liberal Lord John declares to have been so disinterested and so beneficial to Europe.

The ostensible and main point of dispute in the present Eastern complications is Russia's claim to a religious protectorate over the Greek Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The Czar, far from disguising his pretensions, told Sir Hamilton plainly that "by treaty he has a right to watch over those several millions," that he "made a moderate and sparing use of his right," and that it was "attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient." Does Lord John Russell give him to understand that there exists no such treaty, and that the Czar had no such right? That he had no more right to meddle with the Greek subjects of Turkey than England with the Protestant subjects of Russia, or France with the Irishmen of Great Britain? Let him answer for himself.

[p. 296, lines 16 to 7 from end. "Her Majesty's Government"
—"sanctioned by treaty."]

Russia's *exceptional protectorate* over the subjects of the Porte *sanctioned by treaty*! No doubt about that, says Lord John; and Lord John is an honest man; and Lord John speaks in the name of Her Majesty's Government; and Lord John addresses the Autocrat himself. What, then, is England quarrelling about with Russia? And why doubling the income-tax, and troubling the world with warlike preparation? What was Lord John's business when, some weeks ago, he arose in Parliament with the aspect and in the tone of a Cassandra, screaming and bouncing and gesticulating bombastic imprecations against the faithlessness and perfidy of the Czar? Had he not himself declared to Cæsar that Cæsar's claims to the *exclusive protectorate* were "prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty!"

What the Coalition had to complain of was certainly no dissimulation or reserve of the Czar's, but, on the contrary, the impudent familiarity with which he dared to unbosom himself before them, and make them the vessels of his most

secret designs, thus transforming the Cabinet of Downing Street into a private cabinet in the Alexander Newski. A man confides to you his intention to murder your friend. He entreats you to enter with him into a previous concert about the booty. If the man be Emperor of Russia and you an English Minister, you will not call him to the bar, but thank him in humble terms for the great confidence placed in you, and feel happy "to acknowledge his moderation, frankness, and friendly disposition," as Lord John Russell did.

Let us return to St. Petersburg. On the night of the 20th February—only eight days before Prince Mentschikoff's arrival at Constantinople—the Autocrat came up to Sir Hamilton Seymour at the *soirée* of the Grand Duchess Hereditary, when the following conversation takes place between these two "gentlemen":

[THE CZAR: *You have your answer, and bring it to-morrow?*

SIR HAMILTON: *Your Majesty knows the answer is what I led you to expect.*

CZAR: *Sorry to hear it. Your Government does not understand my objects. I am less anxious to know WHAT SHALL BE DONE WHEN THE SICK MAN DIES than to arrange with England WHAT SHALL NOT BE DONE.*

SIR H.: *No reason to think he is dying. Turkey will last long unless an unforeseen crisis occurs. To prevent such a crisis the English Government relies on your aid.*

CZAR: *THE SICK MAN IS DYING. We must not be taken by surprise. We must come to an understanding. I do not ask for a treaty or protocol. A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GENTLEMEN IS ENOUGH.]*

Sir Hamilton "thanked his Majesty very cordially," but having hardly left the Imperial salon and returned home, suspicion overcomes him; he sits down at his desk, reports to Lord John on the conversation, and sums up his letter with these striking marginal notes:

[*The Sovereign who INSISTS WITH SUCH PERTINACITY UPON THE IMPENDING FALL OF A NEIGHBOURING STATE must have settled in his own mind that dissolution is near. This assumption could hardly be WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING*

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. CZAR'S OBJECT TO ENGAGE ENGLAND, AUSTRIA, RUSSIA IN A SCHEME FOR PARTITION OF TURKEY, LEAVING FRANCE OUT.]

This despatch arrived at London on the 6th of March, when Lord John was already supplanted in the Foreign Office by Lord Clarendon. The impression produced on the mind of this whining lover of Turkey by the Ambassador's anxious warnings is quite surprising. Being fully aware of the Czar's treacherous design to partition Turkey to the exclusion of France, he tells Count Walewski, the French Ambassador in London, that "they," in contradistinction to France, were "disposed to place reliance on the Emperor of Russia," that "a policy of suspicion was neither wise nor safe," that

[while hoping England and France would always act together, RECENT PROCEEDINGS OF FRANCE WERE NOT CALCULATED TO SECURE THIS. (*Blue books*, vol. i. pp. 93, 98.)]

Be it also remarked, *en passant*, that at the same time when the Czar indoctrinated the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, *The Times* was repeating in London, day after day, that the state of Turkey was desperate, that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling to pieces, and that there remained nothing of it except the phantom of "a Turk's head dressed up in a turban."

The morning after the interview at the Imperial *soirée*, Sir G. H. Seymour, according to the invitation received, waits upon the Czar, and a "*dialogue*, lasting one hour and twelve minutes," takes place between them, on which he reports again in his despatch to Lord J. Russell, dated February 22, 1853.

The Emperor began by desiring Sir Hamilton to read to him aloud Lord John's secret and confidential despatch of the 9th of February. The declarations contained in this despatch he declared, of course, to be very satisfactory; he "could only desire that they should be a little amplified." He repeated that a Turkish catastrophe was constantly impending from

[*a war, or a feud between the Old Turkish party and that of the "New superficial French reforms," or a rising of the Christians.*]

He does not allow the opportunity to slip without bringing forth his worn-out bravado, that "if he had not stopped the victorious progress of General Diebitsch" in 1829, the Sultan's authority would have been at an end — while it is a notorious fact that, of the 200,000 men he had then marched into Turkey, 500 only returned to their homes, and the rest of Diebitsch's army would have been annihilated on the plains of Adrianople but for the combined treason of Turkish Pashas and foreign Ambassadors.

He insists on his not requiring a system altogether arranged between England and Russia as to the previous disposal of the provinces ruled by the Sultan, and still less a formal agreement to be concluded between the two Cabinets, but only some general understanding or exchange of opinions, each party confidentially stating what it did not wish,

"what would be contrary to English interests, what would be contrary to Russian interests in order that, the case occurring, they might avoid acting in opposition to each other."

By such a *negative* understanding the Czar would obtain all he cares for: First, the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire settled between England and Russia as a *fait accompli*, although in a negative and conditional form, while it would rest with him so to embroil matters as to be able to declare to England, with some show of reason, that the contingency foreseen *had* arrived. Secondly, a secret plan of action between England and Russia, however vague and negative, brought about behind the back and to the exclusion of France, and thus necessarily setting England and France by the ears. Thirdly, England being restrained by her negative pledges as to what she would *not* do, he would have liberty to elaborate very tranquilly his own plan of positive action. Besides, it is evident that two parties agreeing as to what they will *not* allow each other to do in a given case, are only settling in an evasive

way what they *will*. This negative sort of understanding gives only the greater facilities to the more cunning of the two parties.

"Perhaps your Majesty," perplexed Sir Hamilton muttered, "would be good enough to explain your own ideas upon this *negative policy*." The Czar, after some show of coy resistance, feigned to yield under the gentle pressure, and made the following highly remarkable declaration :

[*I will not tolerate (1) PERMANENT occupation of Constantinople by Russia, (2) its being held by any other great nation, (3) reconstruction of Byzantine Empire, (4) extension of Greece, making her a powerful State, (5) breaking up Turkey into small republics, asylums for revolutionists. Rather than any of these, war.*]

No Byzantine empire, no powerful extension of Greece, no confederation of little republics—nothing of the sort. What, then, does he want? There was no need for the British Ambassador to guess. The Emperor himself, in the course of the dialogue, bursts upon his interlocutor with the following proposition :

[*Principalities are, in fact, an independent State under my protection. Let them remain so. Servia and Bulgaria might become the same. England can have Egypt and Crete.*]

Thus he proves that "in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed." He declares frankly what he wants—the *partition of Turkey*—and he gives the clearest possible outlines of that partition, clear as well from what he reveals as from what his silence conceals. Egypt and Crete for England ; the Principalities, Servia, Bulgaria, to exist as vassal states of Russia ; Turkish Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, which he intentionally abstains from mentioning, to be incorporated with Austria ; Greece to be extended in a "not powerful way"—say Lower Thessaly and part of Albania. Constantinople to be temporarily occupied by the Czar, and then to become the capital of a State comprising Macedonia,

Thracia, and what remains of Turkey in Europe. But who is to be the definite possessor of that little Empire, perhaps to be aggrandized by some portions of Anatolia? He keeps close upon that point; but it is no secret that he has some one in reserve for that post, viz., his younger son, who longs for an Empire of his own. And France—is she to receive nothing at all? Perhaps so. But no; she is to be put off with—who will believe it?—with TUNIS. “One of her objects,” he tells Sir Hamilton, “is the possession of Tunis;” and perhaps, in the event of a partition of the Ottoman Empire, he might be so magnanimous as to indulge her appetite for Tunis.

The Czar speaks throughout in an affected tone of the most haughty disdain of France. “It looks very much,” he says, “as if the French Government were endeavouring to embroil us all in the East.” As for himself, he cares not a straw about it.

[I care little what line France takes. Recently I told the Sultan my assistance was at his service against France. All I want is an understanding with England as to what shall not be done.]

“But your Majesty has forgotten Austria!” exclaims Sir Hamilton.

[THE CZAR: When I speak of Russia I speak of Austria. Our interests are identical.]

When he says Russia he says Austria. As to Montenegro he *[approves Austria's action]*.

Having treated in a former conversation the Sultan as the “Grand Turk” of the *Vaudeville*, he designates him now after the fashion of Paul de Kock as “*ce monsieur*.” And how forbearingly did he not behave towards *ce monsieur*? He has only despatched a Mentschikoff to Constantinople. “If he chose, he certainly could send an army there—there is nothing to stop them,” as he proved afterwards at Oltenitza and Tchetalea, and by his own army's glorious retirement from Kalafat.

His Cossack Majesty dismissed Sir Hamilton with the

words: "Well, induce your Government to write again on these subjects—to write more fully, and to do so without hesitation."

On the 7th of March, shortly after this curious dialogue, or rather monologue, the British Ambassador is summoned to appear before Count Nesselrode, who places in his hands "a very confidential memorandum which his Imperial Majesty had caused to be drawn up, and which was intended as an answer to, or a comment upon, the communication of Lord John Russell." Count Nesselrode invites him to read the paper, "which, in fact, was intended for his use." Sir Hamilton accordingly peruses the document, and he who had not found a single word of protest against the Muscovite's elaborate insults against France, all of a sudden trembles at discovering that the impression under which

[it had been framed was incorrect, the impression being that in disputes between Russia and France, the English Government had favoured France].

The very next morning he hastily sends a *billet doux* to Count Nesselrode, asserting that

[FAR FROM HAVING INCLINED to France, the English Government has desired, TO THE FULL EXTENT (!) PERMITTED to a Government COMPELLED (! !) to be NEUTRAL, the satisfaction of the demands Russia was JUSTIFIED in making].

In consequence of this begging letter, Sir Hamilton has, of course, another "very amicable and satisfactory conversation with the Chancellor," who comforts the British Ambassador with the assurance that he had misunderstood one passage of the Emperor's memorandum, which did not intend reproaching England with any partiality for France. "All," said Count Nesselrode,

[desired here was that the British Government, WHILE APPEALING TO THE CZAR'S MAGNANIMITY AND JUSTICE, should try to open the eyes of the French Minister.]

There is nothing wanted "*here*" but England's creeping and cringing before the Calmuk, and assuming a tone of dictatory severity against the Frenchman. To convince

the Chancellor of the conscientious manner in which the British Government had executed the latter part of their service, Sir Hamilton reads him an extract from one of Lord John Russell's despatches, "as a specimen of the language held by an English Minister against the French Government." Count Nesselrode finds his boldest expectations surpassed. He only "regretted that he had not long ago been put in possession of *evidence so conclusive*."

The Russian memorandum in answer to Lord John's despatch is described by Sir Hamilton as "one of the most remarkable papers which have been issued, not from the Russian Chancellery, but from the Emperor's secret Cabinet." So it is. But it is superfluous to dwell on it, as it merely sums up the views of the Czar as developed in his "dialogue." It impresses upon the British Government that "the result, whatever it might be, of these communications, should remain a *secret* between the two sovereigns." The Czar's system, it observes, has, "as *admitted* by the English Cabinet itself, been *always* one of forbearance" against the Porte. France had adopted another line of conduct, thus compelling Russia and Austria to act in their turn by intimidation. In the whole memorandum Russia and Austria are identified. One of the causes which might lead to the immediate downfall of Turkey is expressly stated to be the *question of the Holy Shrines*, and "the religious sentiments of the orthodox Greeks offended by the concessions made to the Latins." At the close of the memorandum, "no less precious" than the assurances contained in Russell's despatch, are declared to be "the *proofs of friendship and personal confidence on the part of Her Majesty the Queen*, which Sir Hamilton Seymour has been directed on this occasion to impart to the Emperor." These "*proofs*" of Queen Victoria's allegiance to the Czar have been wisely withheld from the British public, but may, perhaps, one of these days, appear in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*.

In commenting upon his dialogue with the Emperor, and on the Muscovite memorandum, Sir Hamilton again draws the attention of his Cabinet to the position of Austria :

[Compact between Russia and Austria an acknowledged fact. Query its extent? Basis laid down when the Czar and Emperor met in the autumn; worked out by Meyendorff, Russian Ambassador to Vienna, whilst at St. Petersburg in the winter.]

Does the British Government, on receiving these revelations, call Austria to account? No, it finds fault with France only. After the Russian invasion of the Principalities, it appoints Austria as mediator, chooses Vienna, of all other towns, for the seat of the Conference, hands over to Count Buol the direction of the negotiations, and to this very moment continues to stultify France into the belief that Austria is likely to be a sincere ally in a war against the Muscovite for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, although it knew for more than a twelve-month that Austria had agreed to the dismemberment of that Empire.

On March 19, Sir Hamilton's report on his dialogue with the Czar arrived in London. Lord Clarendon now fills the place of Lord John, and continues to improve upon his predecessor. Four days after the receipt of that startling communication, in which the Czar no longer deigns to dissimulate, but frankly reveals his conspiracy against Turkey and France, the noble Earl sends to Sir Hamilton the following despatch :

[Government regrets French fleet gone to Greece. But position of French and English Governments different. Former has not assurances from Czar as to his Turkish policy.—Blue book, vol. i. p. 90.]

If the Czar had communicated to France also that "the sick man was dying," and a complete plan for sharing his succession, France, of course, would have felt neither alarm nor hesitation as to the fate of Turkey, the real objects of Prince Mentschikoff's mission, and the Emperor of Russia's immovable determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Empire, which, he averred, contained "no elements of existence."

On the same 23rd of March, the Earl of Clarendon sends

another despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, one not "cooked" for the Blue books, but the secret answer to the secret communication from St. Petersburg. Sir Hamilton had closed his report of the dialogue with the very judicious suggestion of

[Some expression in despatch to me, which might put an end to further consideration of points which it is desirable should not be debated.]

The Earl of Clarendon, who feels himself the true man to handle hot coals, acts in strict compliance with the Czar's invitation, and in direct contravention to his own Ambassador's warning. He commences his despatch by declaring that "Her Majesty's Government gladly comply with the Emperor's wish that the subject should be further and frankly discussed." The Emperor is "ENTITLED" to "the most cordial declaration of opinion" on their part, because of the "generous confidence" placed in them that they will help him in dismembering Turkey, in betraying France, and, in the contingency of the overthrow of the Ottoman rule, suppressing all possible efforts on the part of the Christian populations to form free and independent States.

The free-born Briton continues :

[THE WORD OF THE CZAR IS PREFERABLE to any Convention.]

At all events, his word must be as good as any Convention that could be framed with him, *the law advisers of the British Crown having long ago declared all treaties with Russia at an end, through violations on her part.*

"Her Majesty's Government persevere in the belief that Turkey still preserves the elements of existence." To prove the sincerity of that belief, the Earl gently adds :

[If the Czar's opinion that Turkey's days are numbered was known, her downfall would be hastened.]

The Calmuk, then, has only to divulge his opinion that the sick man is dying, and the man is dead. An enviable sort of vitality this! There is wanted no blast of the

trumpets of Jericho. One breath from the Emperor's august mouth, and the Ottoman Empire falls to pieces.

[*British Government ENTIRELY share Czar's opinion. Occupation of Constantinople by any great Power impossible; no elements for reconstruction of Byzantine Empire; no encouragement to extend Greece's territory; NO MATERIAL FOR PROVINCIAL OR COMMUNAL GOVERNMENT in Turkish provinces, and therefore anarchy would follow if they are left alone or turned into separate republics.*]

Observe that the British Minister, prostrate at the feet of his Tartar master, and servilely re-echoing his words, is not ashamed even to repeat the monstrous lie that in Turkey there are "no elements for provincial or communal government," while it is precisely the great development of communal and provincial life that has enabled Turkey to withstand till now the heaviest shocks both from without and from within. By endorsing all the Czar's premisses, the British Ministry justifies all the conclusions he intends to draw therefrom.

"In the contingency of a dissolution of the Turkish Empire," says the gallant Earl, "the only mode by which a pacific solution could be attempted would be that of a European Congress." But he is afraid of the consequences of such a Congress—not because of Russian trickery, which cheated England at the Congress of Vienna to such a degree that Napoleon at St. Helena exclaimed, "Had he been victorious at Waterloo, he could not have imposed more humiliating conditions upon England"—but from fear of France.

[*Treaties of 1815 would be open to revision, and France might risk a European war to get rid of her obligations.*]

Her Majesty's Government "desires to uphold the Turkish Empire," not as a bulwark against Russia, and because its downfall would force England to fight out with Russia her *diametrically opposed* interests in the East. Oh, no, says the Earl. "*The interests of Russia and England in the East are completely identical.*" They desire to uphold the Turkish Empire, not from any

Eastern consideration at all, but "from their conviction that no great question can be agitated in the East *without becoming a source of discord in the West.*" An Eastern question, therefore, will not bring about *a war of the Western Powers against Russia*, but a war of the Western Powers among themselves—*a war of England against France*. And the same Minister who wrote, and his colleagues who sanctioned, these lines, would stultify us into the belief that they are about to carry on a serious war with France against Russia, and this "on a question agitated in the East," and although "the interests of Russia and England in the East are completely identical."

The brave Earl goes further. Why does he fear *a war with France*, which he declares must be the "necessary result" of the dissolution and dismemberment of the Turkish Empire? A war with France, considered in itself, would be a very pleasant thing. But there is this delicate circumstance connected with it.

[*Every great question in the West will assume a revolutionary character, and embrace a revision of the entire social system.*]

Hence, exclaims the sincere peacemonger, "hence the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to *avert the catastrophe.*" If there lurked no war with France behind the partition of Turkey, and no revolution behind the war with France, Her Majesty's Government would be as ready to swallow the Grand Turk as his Cossack Majesty.

According to the instructions received from the Russian Chancellery, through the means of Sir H. Seymour, the gallant Clarendon winds up his despatch with appealing "to the Emperor's magnanimity and feelings of justice."

In a second despatch of our Earl, dated April 5, 1853, Sir Hamilton is directed to instruct the Russian Chancellor that:—

[*Redcliffe is ordered to Turkey. SPECIAL CHARACTER given to his mission by an autograph letter from the Queen. Turkey may listen to MODERATE counsels from him. He is to advise Turkey to treat leniently her Christian subjects.*]

The same Clarendon who gave his *particular* instructions had written in his secret despatch dated 23rd March, 1853:

[Treatment of Christians not harsh. Turkey really sets an example to some other Governments.]

In this secret despatch it is avowed that Lord Stratford was sent to Constantinople as the most able and willing tool for intimidating the Sultan. In the Ministerial papers at the time his errand was represented as a strong demonstration against the Czar, that nobleman having long since played the part of Russia's personal antagonist.

The series of secret documents laid before the House concludes with the Russian memorandum, wherein Nicholas congratulates himself on perceiving that his views and those of the English Cabinet entirely coincide on the subject of the political combinations which it would be chiefly necessary to avoid in the extreme case of the contingency occurring in the East.

The memorandum is dated 15th April, 1853. It asserts "that the best means of upholding the duration of the Turkish Government is *not to harass it by overwhelming demands supported in a manner humiliating to its independence and its dignity.*" This was exactly the line of action of the Mentschikoff comedy, who, on the 19th of April, sent in his impudent "verbal note," and used "language fortunately very rare in diplomacy," as declared by the Earl of Clarendon in the House of Lords. The more firmly was his Lordship convinced of the Czar's determination to gently manage the sick man. His conviction grows yet stronger when the Principalities are invaded by the Cossack.

The Coalition Cabinet have discovered but one hole to slip through from these branding documents. The ostensible object of Prince Mentschikoff's mission, they say, was the question of the Holy Shrines, while the communications about the partition of Turkey only related to an uncertain and distant epoch. But the Czar had plainly told them in his first memorandum that the question of Turkey's down-

fall was "by no means an idle and imaginary question, a contingency too remote"; that the English Ministry were wrong "in perceiving in the two questions of Montenegro and the Holy Shrines mere disputes which would not differ in their bearing from difficulties which form the ordinary business of diplomacy," and that the question of the Holy Shrines might "take a most serious turn," and lead to the "catastrophe." They had admitted themselves, not only that he was wronged in the affair of the Holy Shrines, but that he had "a right, sanctioned by treaty, to the exceptional protection" of eleven millions of the Sultan's subjects. When, therefore, they failed in pressing the Porte into the acceptance of the Mentschikoff demands, the Czar acted according to the spirit of the memorandum of 1844, to their own agreement with him, and to his verbal declaration to Sir G. Hamilton Seymour that "he would not be trifled with," when he prepared to put *ce monsieur* to death. There is no question as to whether he is in the right against them; the only question is whether they are not, even at this moment, "all right" with him. So much must be clear to whoever closely peruses these documents that, if this scandalous Ministry remain in office, the English people may be driven, by the mere influence of external complications, into a terrible revolution, sweeping away at once Throne, Parliament, and the governing classes, who have lost the faculty and the will to maintain England's position in the world.

In challenging, by the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, the Coalition to produce the secret proofs of their own infamy, Nicholas proved true to his own dictum: "*Je hais ceux qui me résistent ; je méprise ceux qui me servent.*"

LVII

War Declared—Mussulman and Christian

LONDON, *March 24*, 1854

N. Y. T., *April 15*, 1854

WAR has at length been declared. The Royal message was read yesterday in both Houses of Parliament—by Lord Aberdeen in the Lords, and by Lord J. Russell in the Commons. It describes the measures about to be taken as “active steps to oppose the encroachments of Russia upon Turkey.” To-morrow *The London Gazette* will publish the official notification of war, and on Friday the address in reply to the message will become the subject of the Parliamentary debates.

Simultaneously with the English declaration, Louis Napoleon communicated a similar message to his Senate and *Corps Législatif*.

The declaration of war against Russia could no longer be delayed after Captain Blackwood, the bearer of the Anglo-French ultimatum to the Czar, returned on Saturday last with the answer that Russia would give to that paper no answer at all. The mission of Captain Blackwood, however, has not been altogether a gratuitous one. It has afforded to Russia the month of March, that most dangerous epoch of the year to Russian arms.

The publication of the secret correspondence between the Czar and the English Government, instead of provoking a burst of public indignation against the latter, has—*incredibile dictu*—been the signal for the Press, both weekly and daily, to congratulate England on the possession of so

truly national a Ministry. I understand, however, that a meeting will be called together for the purpose of opening the eyes of a blinded British public to the real conduct of the Government. It is to be held on Thursday next in the Music Hall, Store Street, and Lord Ponsonby, Mr. Layard, Mr. Urquhart, etc., are expected to take part in the proceedings.

The *Hamburger Correspondent* has the following :

[*Russian Government proposes to publish other documents on the Eastern Question. Some letters by Prince Albert among them.*]

We are informed that on the 12th inst., a treaty of triple alliance was signed between France, England, and Turkey, but that, notwithstanding the personal application of the Sultan to the Grand Mufti, the latter, supported by the *corps* of the Ulemas, refused to issue his *fetva* sanctioning the stipulation about the changes in the situation of the Christians in Turkey, as being in contradiction to the precepts of the Koran. This intelligence must be looked upon as being most important, as it caused Lord Derby to make the following observation :

[*Anxious that the Government should state if in this Convention articles occur establishing for England the protectorate we object to for Russia.*]

The Times of to-day, while declaring that the policy of the Government is directly opposed to that of Lord Derby, adds : " We should deeply regret if the bigotry of the Mufti or the Ulemas succeeded in opposing any serious resistance to this policy."

In order to understand both the nature of the relations between the Turkish Government and the spiritual authorities of Turkey, and the difficulties in which the former is at present involved with respect to the question of a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, that question which ostensibly lies at the bottom of all the actual complications in the East, it is necessary to cast a retrospective glance at its past history and development.

The Koran and the Mussulman legislation emanating from it reduce the geography and ethnography of the various peoples to the simple and convenient distinction of two nations and of two countries; those of the Faithful and of the Infidels. The Infidel is "*harby*," *i.e.*, the enemy. Islamism proscribes the nation of the Infidels, constituting a state of permanent hostility between the Mussulman and the unbeliever. In that sense the corsair ships of the Berber States were the holy fleet of Islam. How, then, is the existence of Christian subjects of the Porte to be reconciled with the Koran?

[If a town capitulates, says Mussulman legislation, its inhabitants may become rayahs (Mussulman subjects, but not Mohammedans). If they pay haratch (capitation tax), no one can touch their houses or estates. They can worship in and repair their old churches, but not build new ones. If a town is conquered, the churches may be retained as abodes or refuges, but not worshipped in.]

Constantinople having surrendered by capitulation, as in like manner the greater portion of European Turkey, the Christians there enjoy the privileges they have, exclusively by virtue of their agreeing to accept the Mussulman protection. It is, therefore, owing to this circumstance alone that the Christians submit to be governed by the Mussulmans, according to Mussulman law, and that the Patriarch of Constantinople, their spiritual chief, is at the same time their political representative, and their chief justice. Wherever, in the Ottoman Empire, we find an agglomeration of Greek rayahs, the Archbishops and Bishops are by law members of the Municipal Councils, and, under the direction of the Patriarch, rule over the repartition of the taxes imposed upon the Greeks. The Patriarch is responsible to the Porte as to the conduct of his co-religionists. Invested with the right of judging the rayahs of his Church, he delegates this right to the Metropolitans and Bishops within the limits of their dioceses, their sentences being obligatory for the executive officers, cadis, etc., of the Porte to carry out. The punishments which they have the

right to pronounce are fines, imprisonment, bastonado, and exile. Besides, their own Church gives them the power of excommunication. Independent of the produce of the fines, they receive variable taxes on the civil and commercial law-suits. Every hierarchic scale among the clergy has its moneyed price. The Patriarch pays to the Divan a heavy tribute in order to obtain his investiture, but he sells, in his turn, the archbishoprics and bishoprics to the clergy of his worship. The latter indemnify themselves by the sale of subaltern dignities, and the tribute exacted from the popes. These again sell by retail the powers they have bought from their superiors, and traffic in all acts of their ministry, such as baptisms, marriages, divorces, and testaments.

It is evident from this *exposé* that this fabric of theocracy over the Greek Christians of Turkey, and the whole structure of their society, has its keystone in the subjection of the rayahs under the Koran, which, in its turn, by treating them as infidels—*i.e.*, as a nation only in a religious sense—sanctions the combined spiritual and temporal power of their priests. Then, if you abolish their subjection under the Koran, by a civil emancipation, you cancel at the same time their subjection to the clergy, and provoke a revolution in their social, political, and religious relations, which, in the first instance, must inevitably hand them over to Russia. If you supplant the Koran by a *code civil*, you must occidentalize the entire structure of Byzantine society.

Having described the relations between the Mussulman and his Christian subject, the question arises: What are the relations between the Mussulman and the unbelieving foreigner?

As the Koran treats all foreigners as foes, nobody will dare to present himself in a Mussulman country without having taken his precautions. The first European merchants, therefore, who risked the chances of commerce with such a people, contrived to secure themselves an exceptional treatment and privileges originally personal, but

afterwards extended to their whole nation. Hence the origin of capitulations. Capitulations are imperial diplomas, letters of privilege, granted by the Porte to different European nations, and authorizing their subjects to freely enter Mohammedan countries, and there to pursue in tranquillity their affairs, and to practise their worship. They differ from treaties in this essential point, that they are not reciprocal acts, contradictorily debated between the contracting parties, and accepted by them on the condition of mutual advantages and concessions. On the contrary, the capitulations are one-sided concessions on the part of the Government granting them, in consequence of which they may be revoked at its pleasure. The Porte has, indeed, at different times nullified the privileges granted to one nation by extending them to others, or repealed them altogether by refusing to continue their application. This precarious character of the capitulations made them an eternal source of disputes, of complaints on the part of Ambassadors, and of a prodigious exchange of contradictory notes and firmans revived at the commencement of every new reign.

It was from these capitulations that arose the right of a *protectorate* of foreign Powers, not over the Christian subjects of the Porte—the rayahs—but over their co-religionists visiting Turkey, or residing there as foreigners. The first Power that obtained such a protectorate was France. The capitulations between France and the Ottoman Porte made in 1535 under Soliman the Great and Francis I., in 1604 under Ahmet I. and Henry IV., and in 1673 under Mustapha II. and Louis XIV., were renewed, confirmed, recapitulated, and augmented in the compilation of 1740, called “ancient and recent capitulations and treaties between the Court of France and the Ottoman Porte.”

Art. 32 of this agreement constitutes the right of France to a protectorate over all monasteries professing the French religion, to whatever nation they may belong, and over the Frank visitors to the Holy Places.

Russia was the first Power that, in 1774, inserted the

capitulation, imitated after the example of France, into a *treaty*, the Treaty of Kainardji. Thus, in 1802, Napoleon thought fit to make the existence and maintenance of the capitulation the subject of an article of treaty, and to give it the character of synallagmatic contract.

In what relation, then, does the question of the Holy Places stand to the Protectorate?

The question of the Holy Shrines is the question of a protectorate over the religious Greek Christian communities settled at Jerusalem, and over the buildings possessed by them on the holy ground, and especially over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. It is to be understood that possession here does not mean proprietorship, which is denied to the Christians by the Koran, but only the right of *usufruct*. This right of *usufruct* excludes by no means the other communities from worshipping in the same place; the possessors having no other privilege besides that of keeping the keys, of repairing and entering the edifices, of kindling the holy lamp, of cleaning the rooms with the broom, and of spreading the carpets, which is an Oriental symbol of possession. In the same manner now in which Christianity culminates at the Holy Place, the question of the Protectorate is there found to have its highest ascension.

Parts of the Holy Places and of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre are possessed by the Latins, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Abyssinians, the Syrians, and the Copts. Between all these diverse pretendants there originated a conflict. The sovereigns of Europe, who saw in this religious quarrel a question of their respective influences in the Orient, addressed themselves in the first instance to the masters of the soil, to fanatic and greedy pashas, who abused their position. The Ottoman Porte and its agents adopting a most troublesome *système de bascule*, gave judgment in turn favourable to the Latins, Greeks, and Armenians, asking and receiving gold from all hands, and laughing at each of them. Hardly had the Turks granted a firman, acknowledging the right of the Latins to the possession of a contested place, than the Armenians pre-

sented themselves with a heavier purse, and instantly obtained a contradictory firman. The same tactics with respect to the Greeks, who knew, besides, as officially recorded in different firmans of the Porte and "*hudgets*" (judgments) of its agents, how to procure false and apocryphal titles. On other occasions the decisions of the Sultan's Government were frustrated by the cupidity and ill-will of the pashas and subaltern agents in Syria. Then it became necessary to resume negotiations, to appoint fresh commissaries, and to make new sacrifices of money. What the Porte formerly did from pecuniary considerations, in our days it has done from fear, with a view to obtain protection and favour. Having done justice to the reclamations of France and the Latins, it hastened to grant the same conditions to Russia and the Greeks, thus attempting to escape from a storm which it felt powerless to encounter. There is no sanctuary, no chapel, no stone of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, that has been left unturned for the purpose of constituting a quarrel between the different Christian communities.

Around the Holy Sepulchre we find an assemblage of all the various sects of Christianity, behind the religious pretensions of whom are concealed as many political and national rivalries.

Jerusalem and the Holy Places are inhabited by nations professing different religions: the Latins, the Greeks, the Armenians, Copts, Abyssinians, and Syrians. There are 2,000 Greeks, 1,000 Latins, 350 Armenians, 100 Copts, 20 Syrians, and 20 Armenians—3,490. In the Ottoman Empire we find 13,730,000 Greeks, 2,400,000 Armenians, and 900,000 Latins. Each of these is again sub-divided. The Greek Church, of which I treated above, the one acknowledging the Patriarch of Constantinople, essentially differs from the Greco-Russian, whose chief spiritual authority is the Czar, and from the Hellenes, of whom the King and the Synod of Athens are the chief authorities. Similarly, the Latins are sub-divided into the Roman Catholics, United Greeks, and Maronites; and the Armen-

ians into Gregorian and Latin Armenians—the same distinction holding good with the Copts and Abyssinians. The three prevailing religious nationalities at the Holy Places are the Greeks, the Latins, and the Armenians. The Latin Church may be said to represent principally Latin races; the Greek Church, Slav, Turko-Slav, and Hellenic races; and the other Churches, Asiatic and African races.

Imagine all these conflicting peoples beleaguering the Holy Sepulchre, the battle conducted by the monks, and the ostensible object of their rivalry being a star from the grotto of Bethlehem, a tapestry, a key of a sanctuary, an altar, a shrine, a chair, a cushion—any ridiculous precedence!

In order to understand such a monastical crusade, it is indispensable to consider, firstly, the manner of their living, and, secondly, the mode of their habitation. Says a recent traveller:

[They live separated from each other. They are nomads. Jerusalem is a place where every one arrives, no one stays. Everybody in it gets his livelihood from his religion.]

Besides their monasteries and sanctuaries, the Christian nations possess at Jerusalem small habitations or cells, annexed to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and occupied by the monks who have to watch day and night that holy abode. At certain periods these monks are relieved in their duty by their brethren. These cells have but one door, opening into the interior of the Temple, while the monk guardians receive their food from without, through some wicket. The doors of the church are closed, and guarded by Turks, who do not open them except for money, and close them according to their caprice or cupidity.

The quarrels between Churchmen are the most venomous, said Mazarin. Now fancy these Churchmen, who not only have to live upon, but live in, these sanctuaries together!

To finish the picture, be it remembered that the fathers of the Latin Church, almost exclusively composed of Romans, Sardinians, Neapolitans, Spaniards, and Austrians, are all of them jealous of the French Protectorate, and would like to substitute that of Austria, Sardinia, or Naples, the kings of the two latter countries both assuming the title of King of Jerusalem, and that the sedentary population of Jerusalem numbers about 15,500 souls, of whom 4,000 are Mussulmans and 8,000 Jews. The Mussulmans, forming about a fourth part of the whole, and consisting of Turks, Arabs, and Moors, are, of course, the masters in every respect, as they are in no way affected by the weakness of their Government at Constantinople. Nothing equals the misery and the sufferings of the Jews at Jerusalem, inhabiting the most filthy quarter of the town, called *hareth-el-yahoud*, in the quarter of dirt between the Zion and the Moriah, where their synagogues are situated—the constant objects of Mussulman oppression and intolerance, insulted by the Greeks, persecuted by the Latins, and living only upon the scanty alms transmitted by their European brethren. The Jews, however, are not natives, but from different and distant countries, and are only attracted to Jerusalem by the desire of inhabiting the valley of Jehoshaphat, and dying on the very place where the redemption is to be expected.

To make these Jews more miserable, England and Prussia appointed, in 1840, an Anglican bishop at Jerusalem, whose avowed object is their conversion. He was dreadfully thrashed in 1845, and sneered at alike by Jews, Christians, and Turks. He may, in fact, be stated to have been the first and only cause of a union between all the religions at Jerusalem.

It will now be understood that the common worship of the Christians at the Holy Places resolves itself into a continuance of desperate Irish rows between the diverse sections of the faithful; that, on the other hand, these sacred rows merely conceal a profane battle, not only of nations but of races; and that the protectorate of the Holy Places,

which appears ridiculous to the Occident, but all important to the Orientals, is one of the phases of the Oriental question incessantly reproduced, constantly stifled, but never solved.

LVIII

War with Russia

LONDON, *April 4, 1854*

N. Y. T., April 17, 1854

A SINGULARITY of English tragedy, so repulsive to French feelings that Voltaire used to call Shakspeare a drunken savage, is its peculiar mixture of the sublime and the base, the terrible and the ridiculous, the heroic and the burlesque. But nowhere does Shakspeare devolve upon the clown the task of speaking the prologue of a heroic drama. This invention was reserved for the Coalition Ministry. My Lord Aberdeen has performed, if not the English clown, at least the Italian pantaloon. All great historical movements appear, to the superficial observer, finally to subside into the farce, or at least the commonplace. But to commence with this, is a feature peculiar alone to the tragedy entitled *War with Russia*, the prologue of which was recited on Friday evening in both Houses of Parliament, where the Ministry's address in answer to the Ministry's message was simultaneously discussed and unanimously adopted, to be handed over yesterday afternoon to the Queen sitting upon her throne in Buckingham Palace. The proceedings in the House of Lords may be very briefly delineated. Lord Clarendon made the Ministerial, and Lord Derby the Opposition, statement of the case. The one spoke as the man in office, and the other like the man out of it. Lord Aberdeen, the noble Earl at the head of the Government, the "acrimonious" confidant of the Czar, the "dear, good,

and excellent" Aberdeen of Louis Philippe, the "estimable gentleman" of Pio IX., although concluding his sermon with his usual whinings for peace, caused, during the principal part of his performance, their lordships to be convulsed with laughter, by declaring war, not to Russia, but on *The Press*, a London weekly periodical. Lord Malmesbury retorted on the noble Earl. Lord Brougham, that "old, foolish woman," as he was styled by William Cobbett, discovered that the contest on which they were engaged was no "easy" one. Earl Grey, who, in his Christian spirit, has contrived to make the British colonies the most miserable abodes in the world, reminded the British people that the tone and temper in which the war was referred to, the feeling of animosity evinced against the Czar and his Cossacks, were not the spirit in which a Christian nation ought to enter upon war. The Earl of Hardwicke was of opinion that England was weak in the means she possessed for dealing with the Russian navy; that they ought not to have a less force in the Baltic than twenty sail of the line, well armed and well manned, with disciplined crews, and not begin, as they had done, with a mob of newly raised men—a mob in a line-of-battle-ship during an action being the worst of all mobs. The Marquis of Lansdowne vindicated the Government, and expressed a hope as to the shortness and ultimate success of the war, because (and this is a characteristic mark of the noble Lord's power of conception) "it was no dynastic war, such a war involving the largest consequences, and which it was the most difficult to put an end to."

After this agreeable *conversazione*, in which everybody had given his sentiment, the address was agreed to, *nemine contradicente*.

All the new information to be gathered from this *conversazione* is limited to some official declarations on the part of Lord Clarendon, and the history of the secret memorandum of 1844.

Lord Clarendon stated that "at present the *agreement with France* consists simply of an *exchange of notes* contain-

ing arrangements with respect to military operations. Consequently there exists at this moment *no treaty* between England and France. In reference to Austria and Prussia, he stated that the former would maintain an armed, and the latter a neutral neutrality; but that "with such a war as is now about to be waged upon the frontiers of both countries, it would be impossible for either Power to preserve a neutrality." Finally, he declared that the peace to be brought about by the impending war would only be a glorious peace "if they did secure equal rights and immunities for the Christian subjects of Turkey."

Now we know that the Sheik-ul-Islam has already been deposed for having refused to sanction by a *fetva* the treaty granting this equalization of rights; that the greatest excitement exists on the part of the old Turkish population at Constantinople; and by a telegraphic despatch received to-day we learn that the Czar has declared to Prussia that he is willing to withdraw his troops from the Principalities if the Western Powers should succeed in imposing such a treaty upon the Porte. All he wants is to break the Osman rule. If the Western Powers propose to do it in his stead, he, of course, is not the madman to wage war with them.

Now to the history of the secret memorandum, which I collect from the speeches of Derby, Aberdeen, Malmesbury, and Granville. The memorandum was "intended to be a provisional, conditional, and secret arrangement between Russia, Austria, and England, to make certain arrangements with respect to Turkey, which France, without any consent on her part, was to be obliged to concur in." This memorandum, thus described in the words of Lord Malmesbury, was the result of private conferences between the Czar, the Earl of Aberdeen, the Duke of Wellington, and Sir Robert Peel. It was by the advice of Aberdeen that the Czar addressed himself to the Duke and Sir Robert Peel. It remains a matter of controversy between Lord Aberdeen and his opponents whether the memorandum was drawn up by Count Nesselrode on the return of the Czar.

to St. Petersburg subsequently to his visit to England in 1844, or whether it was drawn up by the English Ministers themselves as a record of the communications made by the Emperor.

The connection of the Earl of Aberdeen with this document was distinguished from that of a mere Minister with an official document as proved, according to the statement of Malmesbury, by *another paper not laid before the House*. The document was considered of the greatest importance, and such as might not be communicated to the other Powers, notwithstanding Aberdeen's assurance that he had communicated the "substance" to France. The Czar, at all events, was not aware of such a communication having been made. The document was sanctioned and approved by the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. It was not brought under the cognizance and consideration of the Peel Cabinet, of which Lord Derby was at that time a member. It remained, not with the ordinary papers of the Foreign Office, but in the private custody of each successive Secretary of State, with no copy of it whatever in the Foreign Office. When Lord Derby succeeded to office, he knew nothing of it, although himself a member of the Peel Cabinet in 1844. When the Earl of Aberdeen left office, he handed it over in a box to Lord Palmerston, who handed the box of Pandora over to his successor, Earl Granville, who, as he states himself, at the request of Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, handed it over to the Earl of Malmesbury on his accession to the Foreign Office. But, in the meantime, there appears to have been an alteration, or rather a falsification in the original endorsement of the document, since the Earl of Granville sent it to the Earl of Malmesbury with a note stating that it was a memorandum drawn up by Baron Brunnow, as the result of the conferences between the Emperor of Russia, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, the name of the Duke of Wellington not being mentioned at all. No other motive can be supposed for this false allegation but the anxiety to conceal the importance of the memorandum by describing it as a

mere annotation of the Ambassador, instead of an official document issued from the Chancellery at St. Petersburg.

Such was the importance Russia attached to this document that forty-eight hours after Lord Malmesbury had been in office, Baron Brunnow came and asked him whether he had read it; but Malmesbury had not done so then, it not being forwarded to him till a few days after. Baron Brunnow urged on him the necessity of reading this document, which he stated *constituted the key to all conferences with Russia*. From that moment, however, he never mentioned the document again to the Derbyites, apparently judging the Tory Administration too powerless or too transitory for carrying out the Russian policy. In December, 1852, the Derby Government went out, and shortly after the intelligence of the formation of the Coalition reaching St. Petersburg, on January 11, the Czar again opened this question—a sufficient evidence this that he thought the Cabinet of all the Talents ready to act on the basis of this memorandum.

Here, then, we have the most compromising revelations made in the House of Lords by the most unanswerable witnesses, all of them having been Prime or Foreign Ministers of Great Britain. An “eventual engagement”—the expression used in the memorandum—is secretly entered into with Russia by an English Foreign Minister, not only without the sanction of Parliament, but behind the backs of his own colleagues, two of them only having been initiated into the mystery. The paper is for ten years withheld from the Foreign Office, and kept in clandestine custody by each successive Foreign Minister. Whenever a Ministry disappears from the scene, the Russian Ambassador appears in Downing Street, and intimates to the new-comer that he has to look closely to the bond, the secret bond, entered into, not between the nation as legally represented, but between some Cabinet Minister and the Czar, and to act according to the line of conduct prescribed in a Russian memorandum drawn up in the Chancellery of St. Petersburg.

If this be not an open infraction of the Constitution, if not a conspiracy and high treason, if not collusion with Russia, we are at a loss to understand the meaning of these terms.

At the same time we understand from these revelations why the criminals, perfectly secure, are allowed to remain at the helm of the State at the very epoch of an ostensible war with Russia, with whom they are convicted of having permanently conspired, and why the Parliamentary Opposition is a mere sham, intended to annoy but not to impeach them. All Foreign Ministers, and consequently all the successive Administrations since 1844, are accomplices, each of them becoming so from the moment he neglected to accuse his predecessor, and quietly accepted the mysterious box. By the mere affectation of secrecy each of them became guilty. Each of them became a party to the conspiracy by concealing it from Parliament. By law the concealer of stolen goods is as criminal as the thief. Any legal proceeding, therefore, would ruin not only the Coalition, but their rivals also, and not only these Ministers, but the Parliamentary parties they represent, and not only these parties, but the governing classes of England.

I may remark, *en passant*, that the only speech delivered in the House of Lords worth mentioning is that of the Earl of Derby; but his criticism of the memorandum and the secret correspondence—and I may say the same with respect to the debate in the Commons—contains nothing that I have not stated before in the full analysis I gave you of that fatal memorandum and that extraordinary correspondence.

"The power of declaring war is a prerogative of the Crown, a real prerogative, and if Her Majesty summons her Parliament and informs them that she has found it necessary to engage herself in war, it is not an occasion when the Commons enter on the policy or impolicy of the war. It is their duty under such circumstances to rally round the throne, and to take a proper, subsequent, and constitutional occasion of commenting upon the policy which may have led to the war."

So said Mr. Disraeli in the sitting of the Commons, and

so said all the Commoners, and yet *The Times* fills seventeen columns with their comments on that policy. Why was this? Even because it was not the "occasion," because their talk would remain resultless. But we must except Mr. Layard, who stated plainly :

" If it should be the feeling of the House, after what he should state to them, that the conduct of the Ministers should form the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry, he should not shrink from the duty thus imposed upon him, and would be ready to ask the Ministers to fix an early day on which the matter might be brought forward."

You will comprehend now the reason why *The Times* begins to doubt the justice of the Assyrian discoveries of Mr. Layard.

Lord J. Russell, who introduced the address in the House of Commons, distinguished himself from Lord Clarendon only by his intonation of the words integrity, liberty, independence, civilization, whereby he secured the cheers of his more common audience.

Mr. Layard, who rose to reply to him, committed two great blunders, which disfigured his otherwise remarkable speech. In the first place, he sought to establish the existence of opposite elements in the Coalition—the Russian element and the English element, the Aberdeen fraction and the Palmerston fraction, these two fractions possessing no other distinction than their language and their modes of subserviency to Russia. The one is a partisan of Russia because he does not understand her, and the other although he understands her. The former is, therefore, an open partisan, and the other a secret agent. The former, therefore, serves gratuitously, and the latter is paid. The former is less dangerous because placed in open antagonism to the feelings of the English people; the latter is fatal, because he makes himself pass for the incarnation of the national animosity against Russia. With Mr. Layard we must presume that it is ignorance of the man whom he places in opposition to Aberdeen. For Mr. Disraeli, who employed the same contrast, there is no excuse. No man knows Lord Palmerston better than that chief of the

Opposition, who declared already, in 1844, that no foreign policy of any Minister had ever been so fatal to British interests as that of the noble Lord. The second blunder committed by Mr. Layard was his argument that *The Times* was the direct organ of the Aberdeen party, because the secret and confidential correspondence, two or three days after arrival, furnished materials for its leading articles, which endeavoured to bring the country to consent to the nefarious transaction intended at St. Petersburg, especially its articles during February and March of last year. Layard would have done better to conclude, with Lord Palmerston, that those materials were furnished by the Russian Embassy in London, when he would have been able to charge both *The Times* and the Foreign Office with being the organs of the St. Petersburg Cabinet.

Holding the opinion that *The Times* is, in fact, a greater power than the Coalition, not as to its opinions, but as to the data which constitute the treasonable character of this secret correspondence, I subjoin the whole statement of Mr. Layard against that paper:

[*Showing (1) that first of the secret despatches arrived Jan. 23; first article of "Times" dealing with its subject matter appeared Jan. 26; (2) that second despatch arrived Feb. 6; "Times" article, Feb. 11; (3) first intimation of Mentschikoff's mission to Constantinople, in Seymour's despatches, which arrived Feb. 14 and 21; "Times" article foretelling the mission, Feb. 23; (4) Czar's plan for partition of Turkey arrived Mar. 6; "Times" article on it, Mar. 7, although no Cabinet Council until Mar. 13; (5) "Times," Mar. 10, has a phrase paraphrased from Seymour's despatch (Feb. 21); (6) "Times," Mar. 23, has phrases from Clarendon's despatch sent Mar. 23.]*

Mr. Bright supported the character of Mr. Cobden, in order to afford another opportunity for Lord Palmerston to gather popularity by abuse of Russia and sham-energetic defence of the war policy. Among other things, Palmerston stated:

[*Standing, persistent policy of Russia to get hold of Turkey.]*

Now compare this declaration of Lord Palmerston with those he made in 1829, '30, '31, '33, '36, '40, '41, '42, '43, '46, '48, '49, and you will find that the above is less a reply to Mr. Bright than to his own former policy. But while this cunning foe, by such onslaughts upon Russia, conciliates the sympathies of the public, he, on the other hand, secures favour with the Czar by the following observation:

‘Do I blame the Russian Government for entertaining such a policy? A policy of aggrandizement pursued by legitimate means is not a reproach to the Government which pursues it, provided it be pursued by open means. The course which the Russian Government has pursued has not been open and straightforward.’

But the only reproach to be made against the Russian Government was just, as Mr. Disraeli termed it, her *fatal frankness*. Palmerston accordingly, by disapproving only of what Russia did not do, justifies entirely that which she really has done.

Mr. Disraeli's criticism of the secret papers was clever, as usual, but missed its effect by his declaration that it was out of place, and that his only intention in addressing the House was to support the address. It is painful to see a man of his genius cajoling a Palmerston, not only in the House, but also in his reputed organ, *The Press*, from so sordid a motive as the politics of place and party.

In yesterday's sitting of the House, Sir J. Graham stated that he had received intelligence that the fleet had entered the Black Sea, and was in the neighbourhood of Varna.

LIX

Russia and the German Powers

LONDON, *April 7, 1854*
N. Y. T., April 21, 1854

LORD CLARENDON declared last night in the House of Lords that "he had reason to believe" that the news of the landing of 4,000 Russians in the Dobrudscha by means of transports from Odessa was untrue. He was not aware that the Russian fleet had left Sebastopol, which point had been watched, now and then, by English and French steamers. With regard to the alleged inactivity of the fleets, he begged to say that a blockade of Sebastopol and Odessa could only be undertaken by the whole of the combined squadron, which would have been a dangerous undertaking during the bad season. He believed, therefore, that it had been politic to retain them at Beicos. The Vienna correspondent of *The Times* concurs in this view of Lord Clarendon, and moreover states the true motives of his policy. The apprehension of riots at Constantinople has never been more justified than since the negotiations for "Christian emancipation" have become known, and it would have been highly "impolitic" to move the fleets from the Bosphorus before the arrival of a sufficient land force, *i.e.* sufficient to put down the Turks.

In the House of Commons, Lord John Russell said the responsibility for the Greek insurrections rested with the

Court of Athens, which had favoured them, at first secretly and now openly.

The Daily News of to-day publishes the treaty between France, England, and Turkey, which, however, merely contains the arrangements for military action. The Western Powers are careful not to bring the real conditions of their "assistance to the Sultan" into the form of a treaty. These are imposed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and his minatory apparatus *in loco*, and made to appear as the voluntary act of the Turkish Government.

The peace mission of the Prince of Mecklenburg to Berlin had no other object but to furnish the King of Prussia with a new pretext for keeping aloof from the Western Alliance. I am informed from Berlin that Russia would only acknowledge the Swedish declaration of neutrality after the King had bound himself to re-issue to the commandants of the Swedish harbours the old regulations, according to which no more than four foreign men-of-war are allowed to anchor within the range of the guns of any port. As this order considerably departs from the stipulations of neutrality agreed upon between Sweden and Denmark, new negotiations between the Scandinavian Powers on the one hand, and the Western Powers on the other hand, are to be anticipated. It is generally believed at Stockholm that the Russians will abandon their occupation of Oland, and raze their fortifications on that island, carrying away the guns and other material of war. A telegraphic despatch received to-day states that this step has already been carried out.

The Austrian *corps d'observation* in the south-eastern portions of Hungary is now on a complete war footing, and drawn up in the different positions allotted to it. The concentration required from ten to twelve days. The German papers generally assume that this army would be destined to take the Turkish army in the flank, in case of Austria joining actively with Russia, and there would be no difficulty in doing so. But the Austrians can only enter Turkey either by Mehadia, when they would

have the Turkish army in their front, or by Belgrade, when they would find themselves in a line with the extended left flank of the Turks. It is much more probable, therefore, that, if the Austrians enter Turkey with hostile intentions, they will march from Belgrade upon Sophia by Kruchovitza and Nish; but even in that case the Turks would have a shorter way to Sophia, by marching from Widdin in a direct line southward.

The report of the Prussian Loan Committee in the Second Chamber contains an account of the policy pursued by Prussia in the Eastern Question, and publishes several diplomatic documents which have not yet found their way into the English press. I propose, therefore, to give you some important extracts from that report.

At the end of January the Russian Ambassador at Berlin handed a proposition to the Prussian Government, simultaneously with the propositions made by Count Orloff to the Austrian Court, according to which the three Courts of Prussia, Austria, and Russia were to sign a joint protocol. In the preamble to the draft of this protocol, it is stated that the motive of this common engagement was the desire to draw closer the alliance of the three Powers, in view of the dangers threatening the peace of Europe, and to regulate the relations both between them and with the Western Powers in the impending juncture. This draft contained the following three points :

1. The two German Powers bind themselves formally, in the case of an active participation of France and England in the Russo-Turkish war, to observe the strictest neutrality; and declare, if they should be again pressed or menaced by the Western Powers, that they are resolved to defend their neutrality, in case of need, with arms.

2. The three Powers will consider any attack by France or England on the respective territories of Austria, Prussia, or any other German State, as a violation of their own territory, and will defend each other as circumstances may require, and in accordance with a common military understanding (now arranged between General Hess and the Prussian Minister of War at Berlin).

3. The Emperor of Russia repeats his assurance that he intends to bring the war to a close *as soon as compatible with his dignity and the well-understood interests of his Empire*. Considering, however, that the ulterior development of events is likely to alter the existing state in Turkey, his Majesty binds himself, if he should come to any understanding on that point with the naval Powers, to take no definite resolution without previous concert with *his German allies*.

This draft was accompanied by a despatch from Count Nesselrode, in which the Chancellor reminds Prussia and Austria of the importance of that triple alliance which had so long been the shield of Europe. In sight of the impending war his Imperial master considered himself obliged to earnestly appeal to his friends and allies. Their common interests made it necessary to define the position which they had now to occupy under these grave eventualities. Pointing out the one-sided advance of the Western Powers, he called attention to their want of consideration for the interests of the German Powers. Russia acted differently. She was prepared to submit alone to the burdens of war, and would ask neither sacrifice nor aid from her friends or allies. The welfare of both Powers and of Germany depended on their union. In this way they would succeed in preventing the crisis from extending, and perhaps shorten it. The Russian despatch next proceeds to examine the three alternative positions open to the German Powers: common action with Russia against the naval Powers; alliance with the latter against Russia; or lastly, a strict neutrality. As to an alliance with Russia, the Czar did not require it; and as to an action against him, it was impossible, if the German Powers would not submit to the menace of the Western Powers. This would be the acknowledgment of a disgraceful necessity to the end of bringing about a deplorable future. Russia, unattackable in her own territory, apprehended neither military invasions nor the more pernicious invasions of the revolutionary spirit. If her allies deserted her, she knew how to

restrict herself to her own resources, and would arrange herself so as to dispense with them in future. (M. de Nesselrode writes his despatches in German, taking care that translation into another language becomes a matter of downright despair. As a specimen of his German exercises, I give you the last sentence in the original words: *Wenn seine Alliirten es verliessen, so würde es sich gesagt sein lassen sich auf sich selbst zurückzuziehen und sich so einrichten, ihrer in Zukunft entbehren zu können.*) But the Czar had full confidence in the known sentiments of his friends and allies, and in their gallant armies, which had been connected long since with those of Russia by the baptism of blood (Bluttaufe), and by an identity of principles not to be denied. The third alternative only the Russian Cabinet thinks worthy of the German Courts, as corresponding with their interests, and appropriate, by continuing their parts as mediators, to realize the particular desires of Russia. It must, however, be understood that this neutrality could not be an indefinite one, or merely provisional, or an expectant one, because such an attitude would be construed as hostile by either belligerent, especially by Russia. This neutrality should rather be founded on the principles (of the Holy Alliance), which, during many trials, had secured the general tranquillity and peace of the world. It was the duty of the German Powers to give effect to this basis of their policy, if need be, by arms. If the one (France) of the two maritime Powers should meditate or venture upon an attack on Germany, the other one (England) would instantly change her position. At all instances, if such an event should occur, Russia was ready to come forth and support Germany with all the forces at her command.

This proposition was declined at Berlin, and some days later at Vienna too. Manteuffel then still played the independent statesman, and declared in a despatch to St. Petersburg, that, by the desire of a new triple alliance, Russia, which pretended not to require the aid of Prussia, yet asked for it, though in an indirect form. "With regard to the revolutionary spirit, "which Russia did not

fear, he would observe that Prussia, too, had subjected it without foreign aid."

The independent Minister who "saved" Prussia by putting himself at the head of the counter-revolution, cannot suppress his irritation at seeing Prussia, which had no Hungary, placed in a line with Austria.

While Prussia thus boasts of her security, the other documents alluded to in the report prove that in the last days of February, Austria submitted to Prussia the draft of a Convention to be concluded between the four Powers. Prussia declined it in a despatch dated the 5th of March. But it is characteristic of this Power that it declares at the same time that the Government of Frederick William IV. still considered the concert of the four Powers as the best means to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the complication. Austria, consequently, was forced also to drop the Convention, which would have put an end to the equivocal position of both German Powers.

A Prussian despatch of March 16 contains the following important passage :

"The Russian Cabinet had noticed the measures taken by Austria with a view to maintain her interests on the south-eastern frontiers. It was true that Prussia, like all other German States, had to protect its own particular interests ; but this should not exclude an understanding with Austria. On the contrary, Prussia was ready to enter into a concert, as far as the maintenance of German interests required. From this motive she looked forward to communications on the following points :

"1. Whether Austria was prepared, in order to secure the tranquillity of her own frontier provinces, to occupy the contiguous Turkish provinces ?

"2. Whether she would take possession of the latter, and hold them as a pledge, till the restoration of peace ?

"3. Whether she intended to participate actively in the war ? "

It would wholly depend on the answer to these several questions whether Prussia could come to a conclusion as to what the maintenance of German interests would require, and whether she could do anything to mitigate the pres-

sure applied to Austria by the *Western Powers* (not by Russia!).

On March 14, the Prussian Government addressed a Circular Note to the German Courts in the one sense, and the Austrian Government in the opposite sense. The Prussian *circulaire* says the impending war will be of a purely local character. Austria, on the contrary, maintains that the struggle is likely to take a turn which would intimately affect her own relations. As long as circumstances should permit, she would not participate in the war; but she had to consider also the eventuality of a participation in it. The interests involved in this question were likewise those of the German States. The Imperial Cabinet, therefore, trusted that in such a contingency Prussia and the other German Courts would join their forces with those of Austria. The German Confederation would then be called upon to show that beyond its present defensive attitude, it knew also how to fill an active part in this question. Austria would make a further declaration as soon as the war between the Western Powers and Russia should have been actually declared. If there were yet any means to prevent the increase of those dangers which now threatened Europe, it would be found in the common action of Austria and Prussia, joined by their German confederates.

The last but not least remarkable information contained in the report is the melancholy answer given by Manteuffel to a question of the Committee members, viz.: That Russia had made no communication whatever of her partition schemes to the Prussian Government.

In conclusion, we learn from this document that the juggle of the Vienna Conferences has not at all come to an end. On the contrary, it states, on the authority of the Prussian Premier, that a new protocol was about to be drawn up, which would establish the *continued understanding between the four Powers*.

LX

Turkey and Greece—Italy

LONDON, *April* 18, 1854

N. Y. T., *May* 2, 1854

THE Governments of England and France are said to have at last exchanged copies of an offensive and defensive Treaty, comprising Five Articles. The contents are not yet known.

The Treaty between Austria and Prussia is not yet concluded, the point of dissension being the occupation of the frontiers touching on Russian Poland, which the Prussian Court partly declines.

On the 6th of April a *Te Deum* was celebrated at Athens in honour of the anniversary of Greek Independence. It was not attended by the Ambassadors of the Western Powers. On the same day the *Observer* at Athens registered sixteen royal *ordonnances* accepting the resignation of twenty-one, generals, colonels, and other officers, all of whom were about to join the insurgents. On the day following, the news reached Athens that the insurgents had been fearfully beaten near Arta. The very place where the battle was fought denotes that the insurrection had made not the slightest progress, and that its only victims until now have been the Greek peasants themselves, who inhabit the frontier districts of the kingdom of Greece.

You will remember that in 1827 the Ambassadors of Russia, England, and France demanded that the Sublime Porte should recall every Turk from Greece, whether settled

there or not. The Turks refusing to acquiesce, obedience was enforced by the battle of Navarino. A similar order has now been issued against the Greeks, on the part of the Sublime Porte; and as neither the letter of Reschid Pasha to Metaxas, the Greek Ambassador, nor the circular of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the British Consuls, has yet been published in the London papers, I give you a translation of each from the *Journal de Constantinople* of April 5 :

Reschid to Metaxas.

[Returns passports. All Greek Consuls in Turkey to withdraw. Other Greek subjects to do the same within fifteen days. It is by the connivance of the Greek Government that Turkey's frontier provinces have been invaded. Turkey has the right, but will not exercise it, to confiscate Greek vessels, reserving the right to bring before the Greek Government the question of the expenses due to the insurrection. The authorities are instructed to facilitate the departure of the destitute and sick Greeks. (The most Christian and civilized Government of Austria manages these things in a different style—witness the expulsion of the Ticinese.)]

According to this order 3,000 Greeks embarked at Constantinople on the 5th of April, and we hear that the Pasha of Smyrna has already published the order for the Greeks inhabiting that city to leave.

The circular addressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the British Consuls in Turkey and Greece runs as follows :

Constantinople, April 1, 1854.

[The Greek invaders of Turkey declare that France and England will support them, and protect the Greeks who are to be expelled. This is false. England and France are with Turkey.]

The populations most immediately interested in the issue of the Eastern complications are, besides the Germans, the Hungarians and Italians. It is of some consequence, therefore, to know the intentions of the diverse parties of these nations with regard to their relations towards one another. The following article from the Turin *Unione*, which I translate for this purpose, will show you the views of the consti-

tutional party in Italy, which seems to be quite prepared to sacrifice Hungary in order to recover Italian independence. The secret of the duration of the Austrian Empire is no other than the provincial egotism which blinds each people with the illusion that they can conquer their liberty at the sacrifice of their fellow-peoples' independence.

[England has only in view her commercial interests. French press only an echo of the Government. Germany afraid of Russia. But Italy wants her independence, which is impossible with the European status quo. Russia desires to get rid of this. Then England, France, and Germany will want a bulwark against Russia. This bulwark must be Austria, who will then give up Italy.]

LXI

Austria and Servia—Greece and Turkey— Turkey and the Western Powers

LONDON, *April 21, 1854*

N. Y. T., May 6, 1854

ACCORDING to a report from Meroni, Consul at Belgrade, the Austrians must be prepared to meet the armed resistance of the Servians, in case they should march their armies into Servia.

On the 3rd inst., Metaxas left Constantinople, to be followed, within a delay of less than fourteen days, by 40,000 to 50,000 of his compatriots. No Embassy was willing to act as his temporary substitute for carrying on the current business. The Austrian Ambassador declined, because England and France being the protecting Powers of Greece, it was the duty of their Chancelleries to represent Greece in the interim. Prussia would not accept, because Austria had declined. The Ambassadors of England and France declared the time rather unreasonable for constituting themselves the representatives of Metaxas. The *Chargés d’Affaires* of the smaller Powers thought fit anxiously to avoid making any manifestations either of sympathy or antipathy. Thus Metaxas was obliged to leave behind an *attaché* of his own. But it was soon discovered that his substitute, abusing the power granted by the Porte, busily engaged himself in distributing passports among the Greek *rayahs*, in order to enable them to join the insurgents in Albania. Consequently the functions of the Greek

Chancellery have been altogether suspended, the issuing of passports being now devolved upon a commission consisting of two Turks and two rayahs.

Simultaneously, a notice was posted up that any subject of the kingdom of Greece who wished to become a subject of the Sultan, might be allowed to do so on finding two respectable persons to guarantee his good conduct. As the Hellenic inhabitants of Constantinople had uttered loud threats of setting Constantinople on fire, and pillaging it before their marching off, extraordinary measures have been taken by the Government. The Turks patrol by day and night, and on the promenade of Pera fifty cannons are mounted. From sunset to midnight, every one walking or riding through the streets or the fields must be provided with a lantern; after midnight all circulation is forbidden. Another edict prohibits the export of grain. Greeks confessing the Latin religion have been allowed to remain on the responsibility of the Latin Bishops of Pera. For the greater part, these natives from Thion, Andros, and Syria belong to the servant class. The inhabitants of the Isle of Hydra have addressed a petition to the Porte, sharply censuring the Greek insurrection, and entreating the Government to except them from the general measure. There has also arrived a deputation of the Greek subjects of the Porte from Trikala, in Thessaly, requesting it to protect them energetically against the Hellenic robbers, as whole villages have been laid in ashes by them, and their inhabitants, without distinction of sex or age, dragged to the frontiers, there to be tormented in the most cruel manner.

A feeling of doubt, mistrust, and hostility against their Western allies is gaining possession of the Turks. They begin to look on France and England as more dangerous enemies than the Czar himself, and the general cry is: "They are going to dethrone the Sultan, and divide the land—they are going to make us slaves to the Christian population." Landing south of Constantinople instead of north of Varna, the allies are fortifying Gallipoli against

the Turks themselves. The tract of land on which the village is situated is a long peninsula joined by a narrow isthmus to the continent, and admirably adapted for a stronghold for invaders. It was there the Genoese of old defied the Greek Emperors of Constantinople. Besides, the appointment of the new Sheik-ul-Islam fills the orthodox Moslems with indignation, since they regard him as little better than a tool of the Greek priesthood, and a strong feeling begins to pervade the Turks that it was better to yield the one demand of Nicholas than be made the plaything of a knot of greedy Powers.

The opposition of the Coalition Ministry and the popular indignation at their manner of carrying on the war has grown so strong that even *The Times* is obliged to choose between damaging its own circulation and its subserviency to the Cabinet of all the Talents, and has thought fit to make a furious onslaught on them in its Wednesday's number.

LXII

The Greek Insurrection—Alliance between Prussia and Austria—Russian Armaments

LONDON, *April* 28, 1854

N. Y. T., *May* 15, 1854

THE last authentic news from Turkey confirms the views of THE TRIBUNE, with respect to the retreat of the Russians from Kalafat, the occupation by the Russians of the Dobrudscha, and the character of the Greek insurrection.

The *Lloyd* confirms that the Russians have raised the investment of Kalafat, and that the evacuation of Lesser Wallachia is now complete. The latest news received to-day at Constantinople states that the Russians do not advance, but, on the contrary, are fortifying the Dobrudscha.

With regard to the Greek insurrection, the following letter from Vienna, of the 25th April, appeared in yesterday's *Moniteur* :

[*Greek insurrection making no progress in Epirus. Quarrels between the two chiefs, Grivas and Xavellas. Grivas robbing and ravishing Christian rayahs. Notably at Metsovo.*]

Reschid Pasha has declared, on the unfounded rumour that Kossuth and Mazzini proposed to come to Constantinople, that he will not permit them to enter the Turkish territory.

The formation of a Polish Legion is said to have found no opposition from the Ambassadors of France and England, but to have met with obstacles of a different nature.

General Wysocki submitted to the Porte and Lord Redcliffe a document covered with several thousands of signatures, authorizing him to act in the name of a large portion of the Polish emigration. On the other hand, Colonel Count Zamoycki, nephew of Prince Czartoryski, presented a similar document also covered with many signatures, by which another fraction of the same emigration authorizes him to act on its behalf. In consideration of their divisions, in order to conciliate the alternative pretensions and rivalries, and in order to combine the services of both Wysocki and Zamoycki, the Ambassador of England advised the formation of two Polish Legions instead of one.

Marshal Paskevitch arrived on the 17th of April at Jassy, and proceeded on the same day on his journey to Bucharest.

According to the *Hannoversche Zeitung*, the following are the main stipulations of the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance concluded between Austria and Prussia :

- [1. *Attack on either is an attack on the other.* 2. *They will not only defend each other, but proceed to a common aggression, whenever either thinks German interests are compromised.*
3. *Members of the German Bund invited to accede to and support this offensive and defensive alliance.]*

On comparison, you will find that these stipulations closely resemble the terms in which Count Nesselrode made his proposition of neutrality to the Prussian Court. It is to be observed also that, practically, the Convention is only adapted to the exigencies of a defensive policy, while, with regard to the eventuality of an offensive policy, everything is reserved to the several Courts.

The First Chamber of Prussia passed, on the 25th inst., a vote of credit for six million pounds, in conformity with the recommendations of its Committee. The ministerial explanations given on this occasion by Herr von Manteuffel are so characteristic of that Prussian diplomacy which affects to conceal its intrinsic impotency under patriotic flourishes and nonsensical sublimity, that I will give you the document *in extenso*. Manteuffel says :

[Attempts of Prussia to arrange Russo-Turkish difficulties abortive. War broke out. Aim of the Vienna Conference was peace. Prussia, as a great and disinterested Power, could speak to Russia and Turkey frankly and strongly. She has upheld her own independence and made a Convention with Austria. At the same time, the concert of Prussia and Austria with the Western Powers continues. The respective positions of Prussia, Austria, Russia, Turkey, remain unchanged, and peace negotiations will go on, although Russia and Turkey are at war. But when the decisive moment arrives for Prussia, THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACT. Prussia must prepare for that moment. Prussia's interest in Oriental questions more remote than Austria's. Austria has asked Prussia to co-operate. Prussia the mediating link between Eastern and Western Powers. New Vienna protocol gives new means for a general peace, and keeps war away from Germany. Prussia could not consent to Austria's proposal of strict neutrality. What may occur between Russia and the Western Powers forces Prussia to take measures in defence of her own interests.]

The Committee, it is needless to say, found these explanations exceedingly gratifying.

The following new documents have been published by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*:

1. Order of Commissioner of Police calling out retired soldiers and sailors.
2. Ukase to the Senate to form a reserve fleet of volunteers for the Gulf of Finland; measures to be carried out by a committee of princes and ministers.
3. Regulation concerning the maritime armament. (a) Its object. (b) Method of enlistment: among other things, serfs must have a special authorisation to enlist from their proprietors; the police are to help the volunteers in every way. (c) Conditions of service: among other things, 8 roubles a month; ammunition and provisions of volunteers the same as those of the regulars; a peasant's suit of clothes; volunteers may wear their beards and hair à la paysanne.]

It would have been impossible to give a better bird's-eye view of Russia than is offered by the preceding documents: the Emperor, the bureaucracy, the serfs, the beards à la paysanne, the police, the volunteers, the corporations, the lands and the seas—"all the Russias."

LXIII

Bombardment of Odessa—Austria and Russia—The Greek Insurrection— Montenegro—Manteuffel

LONDON, *May* 2, 1854

N. Y. T., *May* 16, 1854

THE bombardment of Odessa, so many times performed by a boastful imagination, has at length been realized. But the telegraphic despatches hitherto received are too meagre and deficient in detail to deserve a commentary. According to the most trustworthy news, the bombardment began on the 22nd, was suspended on the 23rd (a summons to surrender being sent to the governor of the place), and recommenced on the 24th of April. On one side it is affirmed that a great portion of the town was laid in ruins; on the other, that only the forts were destroyed by rockets and shells. In some quarters it is even asserted that the bombardment had no effect whatever. Several despatches announce the destruction of eight Russian vessels—merchant vessels, of course, as there were no men-of-war at Odessa. The latest despatch—dated Odessa, 26th April—states that the whole of the combined fleet had taken its departure on that morning.

In order to prepare the public mind for this event, the French Government has just published in the *Moniteur* an extract from Admiral Hamelin's latest report to the Minister of Marine, in which he states :

[English ship "*Furious*," April 6, going with flag of truce to Odessa to take off French and English before hostilities, fired on. Admirals deliberating on retributive measures.]

The Russians give a different version of the affair. They allege that the sending of a flag of truce was only a pretext for examining their works of defence. The fact of the ship *Retribution* having entered the port of Sebastopol, some time ago, under the pretext of remitting despatches, but with the real object of making drawings of the interior batteries, had highly irritated the Czar—the more so, as the noise made about this achievement by the English press had confirmed this supposition. Orders had consequently been given to the effect that in future all vessels presenting themselves before a Russian port should be received with cannon-shots. The *Independence Belge* publishes a letter illustrating these circumstances, ostensibly by a Russian officer at Odessa, but probably having no other author than Kisseleff himself.

["*Furious*" approaches Odessa without a flag of truce. Sends her boat in with a flag of truce. Odessa captain sends aide-de-camp. "*Furious*" officer says they have come to fetch English and French consuls. But as these have long gone, the "*Furious*" is asked to withdraw. Her officers begin to sketch the Odessa batteries. The "*Furious*" is fired upon and withdraws.]

It is certainly ridiculous that the English and French fleets had to wait to be furnished with "reasons" by the Russians before entering upon the hostilities now directed against a Russian port, and not then even to take it, but merely to launch a few broadsides into it.

About the same time when the *Furious* was despatched on her mission, the letters received from Odessa at Constantinople affirmed that the Russian Government had seized all grain in bond, without any respect for the private property of foreign merchants. The quantity confiscated amounted to 80,000 chetwers. Besides, the Russian Government had enjoined the foreign merchants to supply 150,000 sacks, and 15,000 wagons for transporting to the interior

the confiscated grain. All reclamations were met by the governor with the declaration that the policy of the Western Powers reduced the Russian Government to such extremities, and that in seizing their property they only saved it from the plunder of an exasperated population. On the reclamations of the neutral Consuls remaining at Odessa, the governor at last consented—not to pay for the seized goods, but to issue simple receipts to the owners.

The following is an extract from a Stockholm paper :

[*Stockholm full of Finland and Oland fugitives, fleeing from the Russian press-gangs.*]

The *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 23rd ult. contains a proclamation from the Czar to his subjects, representing the war against the Occidental Powers as a war of the orthodox Church against the heretics, and aiming at the liberation of its oppressed brethren in the Ottoman Empire. The *Paris Presse* of to-day has the following article :

[*Russian plot in Constantinople. Baron Oelsner in the pay of the Turkish police, but really a Russian agent, is recruiting an army of 60,000 Greeks and Slavs in Turkey. One of his despatches to Gortschakoff intercepted by the Turkish police. Oelsner in communication with Greek captains of merchant vessels, who on a given day were to bring arms and ammunition to the Greeks in Constantinople.*]

There has appeared in the *Augsburger Zeitung* a series of articles extremely hostile towards Russia, which have created a great sensation in Germany, as that journal was, until now, the most ardent partisan of Russian interests, and is known at the same time to receive its inspirations from the Austrian Cabinet. Austria is represented in these articles as released from her obligations toward Russia, in consequence of the revelations contained in the confidential correspondence of Sir H. Seymour. In one of these articles it is said :

[*Vienna Cabinet treated uncereemoniously by Russia. Mensdorff, therefore, wishes to be relieved from his post as Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*]

Consequently he was replaced by Count Esterhazy. In another article there occurs this passage :

[*Czar at Olmütz rude to Buol. Sir H. Seymour's letters strengthen the resolution of the Austrian Emperor to resist Russia's encroachments on Austria. Orloff at Vienna refused to pledge Russia to the integrity of the Turkish Empire.*]

The Constantinople correspondent of *The Times* lays a special stress upon the statement that the Greek insurrection would infallibly lead to a revolution in Greece, that is a struggle between the national party and the partisans of Russia. On the other hand, it appears that the cruelties of the Pasha's bayonets in Bulgaria are disposing the population in favour of Russia. Let me illustrate by a few facts the position of Greece towards the Occidental Powers. We read in the *Nouvelliste de Marseilles*, dated Constantinople, April 17 :

[*European residents insulted and beaten. French and English Representatives send to the Greek Government an ultimatum calling on it to redress the wrongs done to the French, and to declare against the insurrection. In the event of a negative answer, the Ambassadors will break off relations with Greece and constitute themselves the ADMINISTRATORS OF GREECE.*]

The Greek Government has addressed circulars to its foreign agents, in apology for its conduct during its recent quarrel with the Porte, the latest measures of which against Greek subjects, says Mr. Paikes, arise from the resentment of Turkey at having no longer the privilege of considering Greece as a Turkish province, and which form merely the keystone of twenty years' intrigues against Greece, with the insurrections in Thessaly and Epirus as pretexts.

The *Wiener Presse* of 28th April publishes the following proclamation of Prince Daniel to the Montenegrin chiefs

[*calling them to war against Turkey*].

We read in the *Agram Zeitung* that, in consequence of this appeal to the pious freebooters of Montenegro, the chiefs called together, in each of the Montenegrin clans,

the young warriors, and communicated this proclamation, when 4,000 men swore at the altar to conquer or die under the flag "For Faith and Fatherland." It is impossible not to recognise the interesting affinity of this movement with the phrases and hopes of the Prussian war of independence, whose memory is so faithfully kept up by General Dohna at Königsberg, and the Prussian Irenbund generally. The attack of the Montenegrins upon Herzegovina by way of Niksiki will be commanded by Prince Daniel himself. The attack in the south (toward Albania) by way of Chabliak will be led by the Voivode George Petrovitch. "The mountaineers," says the *Agram Zeitung*, "are well provided with ammunition, and each of the two corps will have twelve three-and-a-half-pounders at their disposal." The signal for opening the hostilities will be given by Colonel Kovalevsky, who receives his instructions direct from St. Petersburg.

Herr von Manteuffel having got his £6,000,000 has sent the Chambers home with a speech, from which I extract the following eminently characteristic passage:

[By granting this credit you have given the Prussian Government the means to act in union with all Germany, and in concert with the other Great Powers, and to maintain her own position.]

Let me observe that in the telegraphic report of this speech given by the English papers, the "concert with all the other Great Powers" was falsely translated into a "concert with the Occidental Powers." Prussia has chosen a higher aim. She wants, in concert with both parties apparently at war, to arrange measures of peace—with whom?

Herr von Manteuffel, on the same day on which he dismissed the Chambers, had the good fortune to deliver a second speech in a *réunion* of his party, a speech far more precise and eloquent than the above official slang. That speech is the most eminently Prussian production of modern times. It is as it were Prussian statesmanship *in nuce*.

[*The word "liberty" has been much abused. My motto is
SERVICE. SERVICE TO THE KING is my standard.*]

Manteuffel is right: there is no other Prussia than that which lives upon the service of the King.

LXIV

Prussian Policy

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, May 19, 1854

THE policy of Prussia in the pending *mêlée* of Europe has evoked many unfriendly and violent comments from the English and French newspapers. In this the journals go hand in hand with Western diplomacy, whose main object now is to draw Prussia actively into the crusade against Russia, by persuasion, by threats of war, revolution, or whatever else is inconvenient and alarming to a timid Government. But let the final decision which this Power may take under the pressure of events and unavoidable necessities be what it may, the facts of the case deserve to be considered strictly as they stand at present, and this is what we now propose to do.

Great stress is laid on the near family connection existing between the Royal house of Berlin and the Czar, but we do not accord to this tie the preponderating influence generally attributed to it. For more than thirty years no friendly feeling has existed between the present king and Nicholas, who was a great favourite with the king's deceased father. Even when he was only Prince Royal, Frederick William absented himself from Berlin when his Imperial brother-in-law visited there. Since he mounted the throne, various events—too long a catalogue, in fact, to be enumerated here—have contributed on both sides to strengthen rather than to remove this alienation. Besides, the truth is that royal alliances of family have never stood and never can stand against the current of events and the demands of policy.

Without going far back for illustrations, we may recall the separation of Belgium from Holland, which took place notwithstanding the House of Orange was united with that of Prussia and Russia by several intermarriages and other family ties—too weak all of them to secure the possession of the Belgian crown.

Monarchies never or seldom go to war for principles, or even to avert distant or contingent dangers; but they do it for immediate interests and for immediate advantages. Monarchies are influenced likewise by traditions, especially by such as are deeply rooted in the minds of the dominant party of the nation. Such in Prussia is the military class, and the country delights to call itself a Military State. Whatever may be said to the contrary, three-fourths of this party, as represented by generals, colonels, majors, and other officers, still preserve vivid recollections of the national struggle of 1813–1815. All the superior officers fought at that time side by side with the Russians against the French, for whom they have still no liking; and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to bring them to change their prepossessions. Indeed, distrust, if not hatred, of the French is still active in the Prussian army. These feelings were recently publicly uttered by Count Dohna, the military patriarch of Prussia, with the applause of a numerous corps of officers, of whom the majority is far from being anti-Russian. Thus General von Hess, the Austrian Envoy sent to Berlin to conclude the recent Military Convention, said—if reports are true—"that he found Russia in Berlin." So, too, the people at large still recount the feats of the French campaigns, and sing songs drawn from that epoch; and from time to time the theatres amuse the public with plays recalling the French oppression and inflaming anew the national hostility. The generation of mature men and women who to-day count about fifty years of age, and who were educated during and in the years following the Napoleonic struggle, do not generally know French, as at that time its study was almost excluded from the public schools and from private teaching. Besides, Prussia proper

—that is, the Prussia extending from the right bank of the Rhine to the Russian boundaries—lives in constant dread of the loss of the Rhenish provinces, whose possession, as forming a national frontier, is the daily aspiration of every Frenchman from the peasant up to the Emperor. In case such a danger should become urgent, only the succour of Russia could give to Prussia a substantial guarantee against the unsated appetite of France.

In the ensuing struggle Prussia has nothing to win, but everything to lose, by war, especially if she should engage in it while, as now, its issues are still vague and indistinct. The Western Powers cannot proffer her any positive advantage to be gained by embracing their cause; and if France or her ruler shall eventually be foiled, the event will be hailed joyfully at Berlin, where the Bonapartes are most cordially hated. The bait of Poland, thrown to Russia recently by Napoleon, did not take. She can hardly manage the part of the Polish territory and people she already possesses. The Prussians hate and despise the Poles, and the general feeling is averse from any new acquisition in that quarter. On the other hand, Prussia incurs no danger, while she can anticipate no benefit, from any dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Austria, to be sure, would not object to acquire Bosnia and Herzegovina and Servia; but where on the map of Europe is there any compensation for Prussia?

Stretched out as she is across Germany like a long sausage tied in the middle, Prussia might covet Hanover or Saxony, if in a general conflagration those two countries side with an opposite camp. Hanover she has already once, almost thankfully, accepted from Napoleon, and her longing for Saxony was disappointed at Vienna in 1815, by the interposition of France and England, and the under-hand dealings of Austria. This Power will always oppose any aggrandizement of Prussia in Germany under any conditions whatever. They know this well at Berlin, and are not over-eager to bind together the destinies of the two Governments.

For all these reasons the Cabinet of Berlin is not in a hurry to plunge into a war which offers no compensation. The kingdom is not rich by nature, but made so by industry, activity, and economy. These beneficent results of peace and peace alone, may and must be destroyed by an untimely war. Already the export trade of Russia, and, indeed, nearly all the import trade, is forced into the Prussian channels; and if the war should be protracted, the poorest part of Prussia, that bordering on Lithuania, will at once reap the fruits of neutrality, and by this new commercial opening acquire an undreamed-of degree of prosperity.

It is difficult to make out—among the various contradictory and partial reports—the state of the national feeling in Prussia in regard to the present emergency. No inference can be safely drawn from the debates of the Prussian Chambers. The party so much applauded by the English newspapers, the so-called Bethman-Hollweg party (Bethman-Hollweg being its leader), is composed principally of wealthy citizens and *parvenus*. They form a nerveless *juste-milieu*, and are in some degree a pale imitation of the celebrated French doctrinaires. Many of them hate the ancient nobility, who now control the Government; they are greedy for power, but should they get it, they will bend under the influence of the Court and of the military aristocrats as they did in 1848–49. In their recent opposition to the loan proposed by the Government, this *juste-milieu* had not the energy to support the clear anti-Russian motion of Vincke, the leader of some one-and-twenty members of the Left, but prudently sheltered themselves behind a quantity of commonplace phrases.

Bethman-Hollweg and his partizans have their strength in the Rhenish provinces, which he represents. No doubt the interests of the left bank of the Rhine gravitate towards union with France. This bank is rich in coal-beds and iron; French capital already works them to a considerable extent, and they would become more valuable if merged in the French Empire. But Prussia has spent

millions and millions in making Düsseldorf and Coblenz fortresses of the first order, and will not so easily part with these provinces. The great cotton, woollen, linen, and silk manufactories are situated principally on the right side of the Rhine; they compete successfully with the French and English, and occasionally crowd them out from foreign markets. They have nothing to win, but everything to lose, by any close connection with their rivals in trade.

Such are the conflicting interests, the various incentives and feelings which really influence the decision of the Cabinet of Berlin. Time will show in what manner it will disentangle itself, or whether it will succumb to the equally dangerous embraces of the west, the south, or the north-east of Europe.

LXV

The Exploits in the Baltic and Black Seas—Anglo-French System of Operations

LONDON, *May* 23, 1854

N. Y. T., *June* 9, 1854

At last, then, we have to report an exploit of the "British Tar."

The fleet of Admiral Napier has destroyed, after eight hours' bombardment, the fort of Gustafsvärn (which, translated from the Swedish, means "Gustaf's defence, or stronghold,"—"Gustavs-Wehr"), and taken the garrison prisoners of war, to the number of 1,500. This is the first serious attack upon Imperial Russian property, and, compared with the drowsy, tame affair at Odessa, shows, at least, that Charles Napier is not going to sacrifice his own renown and that of his family, if he can help it. The fort of Gustafsvärn is situated at the extremity of the peninsula forming the south-west corner of Finland, close to the light-house of Hangöudd, known as a landmark to all skippers going up the Gulf of Finland. Its military importance is not very great; it defends a very small area either of land or water, and might have been left in the rear by the attacking fleet without any risk whatever. The fort itself cannot have been large, as is evident from the number of its garrison. But in the present blessed ignorance existing, even in the British Admiralty and War Office, as to the

real strength and importance of the Baltic coast defences of Russia, we may be excused if we delay any comments upon the tactical merits of the affair until fuller particulars have arrived.

We can for the present only say this much. The eight hours' duration of the cannonade proves a brave, if not over-skilful, defence on the part of the Russians, and forebodes a greater obstinacy than may have been expected in the defence of the first-class fortress in that same gulf. On the other hand, the fifteen hundred prisoners of war are no appreciable loss to Russia (they make up about two average days' loss by sickness on the Danube), while they must prove a serious embarrassment to Napier. What in the world will he do with them? He cannot release them on parole or without parole, and there is no place to bring them to nearer than England. For a safe transport of these fifteen hundred men he would require at least three ships of the line, or twice that number of steam frigates. The very effects of his victory cripple him for a fortnight or three weeks. Lastly, as he has no landing troops, can he hold the ground he has conquered? I do not see how he could without again crippling his thinly-manned fleet by a further weakening of each ship's contingent of sailors and marines. This circumstance brings us to a subject which is now discussed with great vehemence in the British press, although far too late, as usual.

The British press has all at once found out that a fleet, however powerful, is of very little avail unless it has troops on board strong enough to go on shore and complete the victory which ships' guns, in the best case, can obtain only very incompletely against land defences. It appears there was not a man in the British official world directing the war, nor in the official world directing British public opinion, who was ever struck by this idea up to the end of last month. Now all available troops and means of transport are engaged for the Black Sea; and the whole land force under orders for the Baltic, of which not a man has been sent off, the very staff of which has not yet been

organized, consists of one brigade of 2,500 men. As to the French, they are woefully lingering behind. Their Baltic fleet—you recollect the pompous report of Secretary Ducas : “ Your Majesty ordered the equipment of a third fleet ; the orders of your Majesty are executed ”—this splendid armament, which was to be ready for sea by the middle of March, to the tune of ten ships of the line, has never consisted of more than five ships of the line, which, with a frigate and smaller vessels, are at present creeping slowly along the Great Belt, to reach which, from Brest, it has taken them fully three weeks, westerly winds prevailing all the time. The Grand Camp of Saint Omer, to contain 150,000, in case of need 200,000, troops, intended for a Baltic expedition, has been formed, on paper, three or four weeks ago, and not a brigade as yet concentrated. The French, however, might easily spare some 10,000 to 15,000 infantry and field artillery from their coast garrisons without the fuss and pomp of large theatrical camp demonstrations, but where are the means of transport ? British merchantmen would have to be chartered ; they would, according to the rate of sailing of the French fleet, require from four to six weeks to arrive, one by one, on the scene of action ; and where could the troops be landed, the brigades and divisions concentrated, the staff and commissariats organized ? That is the vicious circle in which the Allies move. In order to have a landing in the Baltic, they must first conquer an island or peninsula where to concentrate and organize it for attack ; and in order to conquer this desideratum, they must first have a landing force on the spot. There is no difficulty in getting out of this scrape, as soon as they have a good admiral who knows as much of land warfare as is necessary to enable him to command a land force ; and there is no doubt Charles Napier is quite up to that, as he has fought a great deal on shore. But with an Aberdeen and Palmerston reigning supreme, with four different Ministries meddling with the fighting force, with the eternal antagonism of army and navy, and with French and English forces combined and jealous of each other’s glory and comforts, how

can you expect anything like unity of action? Then there cannot now be brought up any effective land force to the Baltic before the end of June; and unless the war is decided and peace concluded in four months, the whole of the conquests will have to be given up—troops, guns, ships, provisions, all will have to be withdrawn or abandoned, and for seven winter months the Russians will be again in possession of all their Baltic territory. This shows clearly enough that all serious and decisive attacks upon Baltic Russia are out of the question for the present year. It is too late. Only when Sweden joins the Western Powers have they a base of operations in the Baltic which will admit of their carrying on a winter campaign in Finland. But here again we have a vicious circle, though vicious only, as the former one, to the pusillanimous. How can you expect the Swedes to join you unless you show them, by taking a land force and taking part of Finland, that you are in earnest? And, on the other hand, how can you send that force thither without having made sure of Sweden as a base of operations?

Verily, Napoleon the Great, the "butcher" of so many millions of men, was a model of humanity, in his bold, decisive, home-striking way of warfare, compared with the hesitating, "statesmanlike" directors of this Russian war, who cannot but eventually sacrifice human life and hard cash to a far greater amount if they go on as they do.

Turning to the Black Sea, we find the combined fleets before Sebastopol amusing themselves with a little harmless long-range exercise against some paltry outworks of that fortress. This innocent game, we are informed, has been carried on for four days by the majority of the ships, and during all this time the Russians having only twelve ships of the line ready for sea, did not show their faces outside the harbour, to the great astonishment of Admiral Hamelin (*vide* his report, May 1-5). That heroic sailor is, however, old enough to recollect the time when French squadrons were not only blocked up, but even attacked in harbours by English squadrons of far inferior strength; and

certainly it is expecting a little too much that the inferior Russian squadron should come out of Sebastopol to be shattered and sunk by twice their number of ships, thus offering themselves up in expiation for the "hideous crime of Sinope."

In the meantime, two ships of the line (screws) and seven steam frigates are on their road to Circassia. They were to explore the coasts of the Crimea, and then to destroy the forts of the Circassian coast. But in this latter attack only three steam frigates were to participate, the remaining four being instructed to return to the fleet as soon as the Crimea was duly reconnoitred. Now the three forts the Russians still occupy on the Circassian coast—viz., Anapa, Sukum Kaleh, and Redut Kaleh—are, as far as we know, of considerable strength, built upon heights which entirely command the offing (except Redut Kaleh), and it may be doubted whether the force sent will be sufficient to effect its purposes, especially as it is not accompanied by landing troops. The squadron, which is commanded by Rear-Admiral Lyons, is at the same time to communicate with the Circassians, especially with their chief Schamyl. What Rear-Admiral Lyons is to communicate to him, the report telleth not; but there is this certain, that he cannot bring him what he wants most, viz., arms and ammunition, for men-of-war in active service have no room to spare for goods shipped to order. Two paltry merchant brigs or schooners, freighted with these valuable articles, would be far more acceptable than all the moral, but perfectly useless, support of five men-of-war. At the same time, we learn that the Turkish fleet has sailed for the same destination, this time carrying along with it the articles required for arming the Circassians. Thus two allied fleets are going on the same errand—the one not knowing of the other. This is unity of plan and of action with a vengeance. Maybe, each may take the other for Russians, and a famous sight it will be for the Circassians—these two squadrons firing one into the other!

The allied land forces in the meantime fraternize at

Gallipoli and Scutari in their own way, annihilating enormous quantities of the strong and sweet wine of the country. Those who happen to be sober are employed upon the construction of field-works, so situated and so constructed that they will be either never attacked or never defended. If a proof was wanted that neither the British nor the French Government had any intention of doing friend Nicholas any serious harm, it is given to the very blindest in their way of spending the time of the troops. In order to have a pretext to keep their troops away from the field of action, the allied commanders set them to dig a continuous line of field works across the neck of the Thracian Chersonesus. Everybody, and particularly every French engineer, knows that continuous lines of defence are, under almost all circumstances, to be rejected in field fortifications; but it was reserved for the Anglo-French army of Gallipoli to employ continuous lines upon a ground, two-thirds of which are commanded by heights situated on the side where the enemy is expected from. However, as the slow-coach system cannot be carried on without making at least a snail-like sort of progress, we are informed that 15,000 French are to go to Varna,—there to form what? To die of fever and ague.

Now, if there is any sense in this warfare, the chiefs must know that what the Turks are deficient in is the art of manœuvring in the open field, in which the Anglo-French troops are masters; and that, on the other hand, the Turks are fit for the defence of walls, ramparts, and even breaches, against stormers in a degree which neither the British nor the French can lay claim to. *Therefore and because* Varna, with a Turkish garrison, did that which no fortress before it had ever done,—that is, held out for twenty-nine days after *three practicable breaches had been made in the ramparts,—therefore*, the half-disciplined Turks are taken out of Varna, and sent to meet the Russians in the open field, while the well-drilled French, brilliant in attack but unsteady in lengthy defence, are sent to guard the ramparts of Varna.

Other reports inform us that all these reports are mere

gammon. They say that great things are in preparation. The combined troops are not intended to act in the Baltic Sea, but they are to execute, with the help of the fleets, tremendous exploits on the rear of the Russians. They are to land at Odessa, to cut off the retreat of the enemy, and to combine on his rear with the Austrians in Transylvania. They are, besides, to send detachments to Circassia. They are, finally, to furnish 15,000 to 20,000 men for the attack of Sebastopol on the land side, while the fleets are to force the harbour. If you cast a glance at the whole past history of the war and the diplomatic transactions preceding it, you will no doubt very soon dispose of these rumours. They came from Constantinople shortly after the arrival of Marshal Leroy, commonly called Saint Arnaud. Whoever knows the past history of this worthy (I shall send it you one of these days) recognises in these bravadoes the man who blustered himself up to the rank he occupies, although three times cashiered as an officer of the army.

The long and the short of the war is this: England, and particularly France, are being dragged, "unavoidably though reluctantly," into engaging the greater part of their forces in the East and the Baltic, that is upon two advanced wings of a military position which has no centre nearer than France. Russia sacrifices her coasts, her fleets, part of her troops, to induce the Western Powers to engage themselves completely in this anti-strategical move. As soon as this is done, as soon as the necessary number of French troops are sent off to countries far from their own, Austria and Prussia will declare in favour of Russia, and march with superior numbers upon Paris. If this plan succeeds, there is no force at the disposal of Louis Napoleon to resist that shock. { But there is a force which can "mobilize" itself upon any emergency, and which can also "mobilize" Louis Bonaparte and his minions as it has mobilized many a ruler before this. That force is able to resist all these invasions; it has shown this once before to combined Europe; and that force, the Revolution, be assured, will not be wanting on the day its action is required. }

LXVI

Delay on the Danube

LONDON, *June 2*, 1854
N. Y. T., *June 14*, 1854

THE formation of a special Ministry of War having now been determined upon, the great question of the moment is to know who may be selected to fill that office. The Duke of Newcastle, who has hitherto combined both the functions of Colonial and War Secretary, has long shown a great disinclination to relinquish either of his two posts, and seems disposed, if we may judge from the tone of *The Morning Chronicle*, to stick at all events to the administration of the War Department. *The Times* of to-day recommends for the third time the appointment of Lord Palmerston. "Lord Palmerston would certainly seem more in his place as Minister of War, directing the forces of this country *against what we may call his old enemy, Russia*, than engaged in a series of squabbles with parochial vestries and sewers' commissions." *The Daily News* likewise recommends Lord Palmerston. Yesterday's *Morning Herald* publishes a denunciation of this intrigue from the pen of Mr. Urquhart. In any case, these movements in Downing Street are of greater importance for the "war" than all the military demonstrations at Gallipoli or Scutari.

Perhaps you will remember that great expectations were held out to the public of immediate and energetic measures as soon as the commanders of the expeditionary forces arrived at Constantinople. On the 18th May, Marshal St.

Arnaud, Lord Raglan, and the Turkish Seraskier proceeded to Varna, where a council of war was to take place with Omer Pasha and the Admirals on the 20th. Yesterday, a telegraphic despatch arrived in London stating that "at the military council held at Varna, it was decided that the allied troops should proceed from Gallipoli to Adrianople." Simultaneously, *The Times* published a leading article in which the whole plan of the campaign as settled on at the Varna Conference, was revealed. "This Conference," says *The Times*, "must have taken place at the very time when the Russians, under Prince Paskevitch, were directing their fiercest attacks against the fortress of Silistria, and consequently the principal officers of the allied army were in the best position to decide on the measures which might be taken for the relief of that place." And consequently they ordered their forces to come up from Gallipoli to Adrianople—for the relief of Silistria; and consequently they arrived at the following heroic determination:

[Inexpedient to use the Turkish army on the right bank of the Danube, or the allied armies on the coast.]

In other words, the allied generals have resolved not to oppose anything to the exertions of the Russians to carry the fortresses on the right bank of the Danube. *The Times* confesses that this plan of operations "may disappoint the natural impatience of the public"; but, on the other hand, it discovers that "these fortified places are in reality the outworks of the Turkish position, and do not constitute its principal strength." Formerly, we were told that Moldavia and Wallachia were the *outworks* of Turkey, and that the latter could not be a great loser by surrendering them to Russian occupation. Now we learn that Turkey may, with the same tranquillity, abandon Bulgaria to the Russians. *The Times* goes on:

[The Balkans are the real bulwark of Turkey. The further the Russians advance north of the Balkans the worse their position, while the defending force is FRESH and unbroken.]

There is no doubt that if the beef-eating allies can only avoid encountering an enemy, their forces will remain very fresh. But how will it be if the Russians will not further advance within the region north of the Balkans, contenting themselves with the possession of the fortresses, the keys of Bulgaria, and with the Principalities? How will their evacuation be effected? "Behind the lines of the Balkans the European army is preparing to *advance* at the proper time, with irresistible force, and the concluding months of the campaign OUGHT to effect the annihilation of the enemy." This irresistible advance will, of course, be greatly facilitated by the Russian possession of the Danube fortresses; and what may not be achieved by the allied armies, the *season* will have no difficulty in finishing.

The *Moniteur*, it is true, announces that Omer Pasha was preparing to come to the relief of Silistria; and *The Morning Chronicle* finds fault with the above article of *The Times*, observing:

[*The writer hopes for Austria to induce Russia to withdraw, or if she advances on the Balkans the Austro-Prussian treaty may come into effect.*]

The news of the *Moniteur*, however, is notoriously so arranged as to keep the Parisians in good humour; and the manner in which *The Chronicle* comments on the plan of *The Times* only increases the probability that it is the plan of the Coalition. Other sources of information further confirm this assumption. The Constantinople correspondent of *The Chronicle*, under date of 18th May, observes: "A campaign will scarcely be undertaken on the Danube in midsummer, as more men would be lost by fever and disease than otherwise." Besides, the Ministerial *Globe* of last evening publishes an article conceived entirely in the same spirit as that of *The Times*. It tells us, firstly, that there are at this moment "*only*" 45,000 allied troops in Turkey—29,000 French and 16,000 English; the same *Globe* stating, in another column, that the Russians have only 90,000 men before and around Silistria, and that the regular Turkish

army in the field amounts to 104,000 men. But this aggregate of nearly 150,000 Turkish, French, and English troops is not deemed sufficient by *The Globe* to prevent 90,000 Russians from taking the Bulgarian fortresses, not to mention the co-operation which might be given by three powerful fleets. *The Globe* thinks it sheer superfluity that either Turks or Allies should fight against the Russians, as "time is fighting against them." In revealing the plan of campaign concocted by the allied commanders, *The Globe* even goes a step further than *The Times*, for it says: "Whatever becomes of the fortresses on the Danube, adequate force must be brought up to render hopeless the invader's *further* progress, and punish his audacious advance." Here we have the clear proof that the Austro-Prussian treaty has been acceded to in the last Vienna Protocol by England and France.

The fortresses on the Danube and Bulgaria are to be given up to Russia, and a case of war will only be constituted by her *further* advance.

When the 15,000 Russians who first invaded Moldavia crossed the Pruth, Turkey was advised not to stir, as she would be unable to prevent such a formidable force of 15,000 men from occupying Wallachia also. The Russians then occupied Wallachia. When war had been declared by the Porte, no operations could be taken against the Russians because it was winter. On the arrival of spring, Omer Pasha received orders to abstain from any offensive movement, because the allied forces had not arrived. When they arrived, nothing could be done because it was now summer, and summer is an unwholesome season. Let autumn arrive, and it will be "too late to open a campaign." This proceeding *The Times* calls a combination in strategy with tactics, the essence of tactics, in its opinion, being the sacrifice of the army in order to keep "fresh" the reserves. Observe also that all the time this juggle is going on under the very noses and eyes of the Opposition journals and the British public at large, *The Morning Advertiser* vies with *The Times* in expressions of angry

denunciation against Prussia, against Denmark and Sweden, for not "joining" the Western Powers! That the motives which determine the tendencies of all the smaller Courts to side with Russia are not without a very good foundation, is seen from the tone, for instance, of the Danish Government journals. Thus, the Copenhagen correspondent of *The Morning Chronicle* writes:

[*Danish ministers keep the National party quiet by saying that if Denmark joins the Western Powers, Germany will raid her.*]

It might be expected, and certainly was expected by the Coalition, that the delicate service—diplomatic, military, and otherwise—rendered by them to the "good cause" of Russia, would at least meet with a certain delicate gratitude from the Autocrat. Far from this, they receive a great deal of abuse from him beyond the understanding, and in excess of the exigencies, of the case. In illustration of the manner of expressing this sovereign contempt of the Russian Court for their sham adversaries, I will give you a translation of a fable lately published by the *Nordische Biene*, by some anonymous Tyrtæus of Russia. Its child-like simplicity of language and structure must be accounted for as an exigency of the semi-barbarian understanding to which the poet addresses himself, exactly as the ironical urbanity of criticism to which the late Odessa report of Admiral Hamelin has been subjected by the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, is to be explained by the circumstance of its being addressed to the diplomatists of Europe. The fable is headed: "The Eagle, the Bull-dog, the Cock, and the Hare."

[*A mock-heroic parable showing England and France outwitted by Russia.*]

LXVII

Speeches—St. Arnaud

LONDON, *June 9, 1854*
N. Y. T., June 24, 1854

THE speech delivered by Kossuth at Sheffield is the most substantial ever heard from him during his stay in England. Nevertheless, we cannot help finding fault with it. Its historical expositions are partly incorrect. To date the decline of Turkey from the support given by Sobieski to the Austrian capital is a proposition for which no grounds whatever exist. The researches of Hammer prove beyond dispute that the organization of the Turkish Empire was at that period already in a state of dissolution, and that the epoch of Ottoman grandeur and strength had been rapidly disappearing for some time before. Similarly incorrect was the proposition that Napoleon discarded the idea of attacking Russia by sea for other reasons than those suggested by his having no fleet, and his being excluded from the command of the ocean by the British. The menace that if England entered into alliance with Austria, Hungary might ally herself with Russia, was an act of imprudence. In the first place it furnished a weapon to Ministerial journals, of which *The Times* has not failed to make ample use by "convicting" all revolutionists as agents of Russia. Secondly, it came with a singular propriety from the lips of the man whose Ministry already, in 1849, had offered the Hungarian crown to a Czsarevitch. Lastly, how could he deny that if ever his threat should be carried into execution, either at his own or others' instigation, the national existence of the

Magyar race would be doomed to annihilation, the major part of the population of Hungary being Slavonians? It was equally a mistake to describe the war against Russia as a war between liberty and despotism. Apart from the fact that if such be the case, liberty would be for the nonce represented by a Bonaparte, the whole avowed object of the war is the maintenance of the balance of power and of the Vienna Treaties—those very treaties which annul the liberty and independence of nations.

A more than usually vigorous speech has also been delivered by Mr. Urquhart at Birmingham, where he developed again his charge of treachery against the Coalition. However, as Mr. Urquhart is strictly opposed to the only party prepared to overthrow the rotten Parliamentary basis on which the Coalition Government of the oligarchy rests, all his speeches are as much to the purpose as if they were addressed to the clouds.

In the House of Commons last night Lord John Russell announced the formation of a special Ministry of War, which Ministry, however, is not to absorb the various departments at present constituting the administrations of war, but only to have a nominal superintendence over all. The only merit of the change is the erection of a new ministerial place. With regard to the appointment, *The Morning Post* of yesterday stated that the Peelite section of the Cabinet had been victorious, and that the Duke of Newcastle would become the new Secretary of War, while the Colonies would be offered to Lord John Russell. *The Globe* of last evening confirmed this statement, adding that, as Lord John was not likely to accept, Sir George Grey would be nominated Colonial Secretary. Although the Peelite journals affect still to be ignorant of any decision, the Palmerstonian journal of to-day announces in positive terms that the Duke of Newcastle and Sir George Grey have been appointed.

The Morning Post has the following in reference to the Austrian "peremptory summons":

[Russia is likely to accept Austria's proposal for the evacuation

of Turkey if Austria will arrange for an armistice and negotiations.]

The Morning Chronicle of to-day likewise grants that "the communication may be of the greatest importance." It adds, nevertheless, that it must not be considered as an ultimatum, that it is couched in the usual courteous language, and that the possibility of a rupture was only held out in case Russia ignored the communication altogether. If Russia gave an evasive answer, or made a partial concession, new suggestions and negotiations might follow.

Let us suppose for a moment that the assumption of *The Post* was just, and about to be realized ; it will be seen that the service rendered by Austria would be only to procure another armistice in favour of Russia. It is highly probable that something like this may have been contemplated, founded on the supposition that Silistria in the meantime would fall and the "character and honour of the Czar" be guaranteed. The whole scheme, however, must fall to the ground if Silistria holds out, and the valour of the Turks should at last force the allied troops to enter into the campaign, much as it may be against the inclination of their commanders and Governments.

If there be anything fit to render the frequent gaps and omissions in this great war less unendurable, it is the amusing uncertainty of the English press and public about the value and the reality of the alliance between the Western and the German Powers. Scarcely is the "peremptory summons" of Austria started to the satisfaction of all the world, when all the world is distressed by the news of a meeting between the Austrian and Prussian monarchs—a meeting, which, in the words of *The Times*, "forebodes no good to the Western Powers."

You cannot at present pass through the streets of London without being stopped by crowds assembled before patriotic pictures exhibiting the interesting group of the Sultan, Bonaparte, and Victoria—"the three saviours of civilization." To help you to a full appreciation of the characters of the personages who are now charged with saving civilization,

after having "saved society," I resume my sketch of their generalissimo, Marshal St. Arnaud.

The famous days of July rescued Jacques Leroy (old style), or Jacques Achille Leroy de St. Arnaud (new style), from the grasp of his creditors. The grave question to him then arose how to improve the circumstance of French society having been thrown into general confusion by the sudden fall of the old régime. Achille had not participated in the battle of the three days, nor could he pretend to have done so, the fact being too notorious that at that memorable epoch he found himself carefully locked up in a cell at St. Pélagie. He was, therefore, unable to claim, like many other adventurers of the day, any remuneration under the false pretence of having been a "*combattant*" of July. On the other hand, the success of the *bourgeois régime* appeared by no means favourable for this notorious outcast of the Parisian Bohemia, who had always professed an implicit faith in Legitimacy, and never belonged to the Society of the "Aide-Toi" (a want of foresight which he has mended by becoming one of the first members of the Society of the "Dix-mille"), nor played any part whatever in the great "comedy of fifteen years." Achille, however, had learnt something from his ancient master, M. E. de P., in the art of extemporisation. He boldly presented himself at the War Office, pretending to be a non-commissioned officer who, from political motives, had tendered his resignation at the time of the Restoration.

His banishment from the *gardes du corps*, his expulsion from the Corsican Legion, his absence from the ranks of the 51st Regiment setting out for the colonies, were easily turned into as many proofs of his eccentric patriotism, and of the persecution he had suffered at the hands of the Bourbons.

The conduct-list gave his assertions the lie, but the War Office feigned to believe in their truth. The withdrawal of numerous officers refusing to take the oath under Louis Philippe had caused a great void which must be filled up, and every public apostasy from Legitimacy, whatever

might have been the motive of the conversion, was accepted as a valuable support to the usurper's government. Achille, consequently, was commissioned in the 64th Regiment of the line, but not without undergoing the humiliation of being simply rehabilitated in his post of non-commissioned officer, instead of being promoted to a higher grade, like the others who had resigned under the Restoration.

Time and his brevet advanced him at last to the rank of lieutenant. At the same time he was given an opportunity to make valid his special talents of servile apostasy. In 1832 his regiment was quartered at Parthenay, in the midst of the Legitimist insurrection of the Vendée. His former connection with some former *gardes du corps*, rallied around the Duchess of Berri, enabled him to combine the offices of soldier and of police-spy—a combination singularly agreeing with the genius matured in the gaming-houses of London and the *cafés borgnes* of Paris. The Duchess of Berri having been sold by the Jew Deutz to Mons. Thiers was arrested at Nantes, and Achille became entrusted with the mission of accompanying her to Blaye, where he was to act as one of her jailers under the orders of General Bugeaud. Anxious not to let slip the occasion of exhibiting a conspicuous zeal for the dynastic interest, he overshot the mark, and contrived to scandalize even Bugeaud himself by the abject services he allowed the police to impose upon him, and the brutal treatment to which he subjected the Duchess. Bugeaud, however, had not the power to dismiss an *aide-de-camp* whom the police had selected for the special duty of guarding the Duchess, who was under the particular superintendence of M. Joly, the Commissary of Police, and who, after all, depended more on the Ministry of the Interior than on that of War. The future generalissimo of the Anglo-French troops played the part of the midwife, it being his special mission to state and prove by witnesses the pregnancy of the Duchess, the discovery of which dealt the death-blow to the partisans of the old régime. It was in this same quality that the name of M. de St. Arnaud

figured for the first time in the *Moniteur*, in whose columns of May, 1833, we read that "M. Achille de St. Arnaud, thirty-four years old, habitually residing at Paris, Officer of Ordnance to General Bugeaud, was summoned to sign, in his official capacity, the act of birth of the child of which the Duchess was delivered in her prison on May 10, 1833." The gallant St. Arnaud continuing to play his part of a jailer, accompanied the Duchess on board the corvette which disembarked her at Palermo.

Having returned to France, Achille became the laughing-stock and the scapegoat of his regiment. Disliked by the other officers, excluded from their *réunions*, harassed by undisguised proofs of their utter contempt, put as it were in quarantine by the whole regiment, he was forced to take refuge in the Foreign Legion at Algiers, which was then organizing at Paris under the care of Colonel Bedeau. This Foreign Legion may be fairly characterized as the Society of the Tenth December of the European armies. Notorious desperadoes, adventurers of broken fortune, deserters from all countries, the general offal of the European armies, constituted the nucleus of this *corps d'élite*, which was properly called the *refugium peccatorum*. There was no situation that could have better suited the genius of Achille than the fellowship of such a corps, the official mission of which reserved it from the fangs of the police, while the character of its constituting members removed all the checks weighing on the officers of the regular army. Notwithstanding Achille's habitual prodigality, he gave such slender proofs of military courage and capacity that he continued to vegetate during four years in the subaltern place of lieutenant in the 1st battalion of the Foreign Legion, until on the 15th August, 1837, when a new brevet conferred upon him the rank of captain. It is an unhappy circumstance that the company's chest is placed under the control of the captains in the French army, who are accountable for the pay of the men and their provisions.

Chests were exactly the spot in which the modern Achille

was most vulnerable, and thus it happened that some months after his promotion a terrible deficit was discovered in his. The Inspector-General, M. de Rulhières, having detected this embezzlement, insisted on the punishment of the captain. The report to the Ministry was ready, it was on the point of being committed to the post, and M. de St. Arnaud would have been lost for ever, if M. Bedeau, his lieutenant-colonel, affected by the despair of his inferior, had not interfered and appeased the wrath of General Rulhières.

St. Arnaud has quite a manner of his own of showing his gratitude for past obligations. Appointed to the Ministry of War, on the eve of the *coup d'état*, he caused General Bedeau to be arrested, and struck the name of General Rulhières from the lists. Rulhières addressed to him the following letter, which he circulated among his friends at Paris, and published in the Belgian journals:

"In 1837 the General Rulhières refused to break the sword of the Captain Leroy de St. Arnaud, unwilling to dishonour him. In 1857 the Minister of War, Leroy de St. Arnaud, unable to dishonour the General Rulhières, has broken his sword."

LXVIII

State of the Russian War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, July 8, 1854

BESIDES the curious coincidence of the Russians evacuating and of the Austrians occupying Wallachia, the very manner in which the siege of Silistria was undertaken, carried on, and finally abandoned, indicates that agencies were at work altogether distinct from mere military considerations. From the official Russian report, which comes down to the night of May 28, and which differs from the Turkish bulletins only with regard to the respective numbers of killed and wounded, it appears that the operations were of a strangely precipitate character, that the rudest efforts to dismount the outworks were not made until the impossibility of taking the place by storm was practically ascertained, and that the attack was more wild and unscientific than any known even in the annals of Russian sieges. As to the operations between the 28th of May and the 15th of June, the reports which we have received are yet too fragmentary to allow of a detailed description; the fact, however, that during the repeated desperate assaults nearly all the commanding officers were wounded and disabled—Paskevitch, Schilders, whose leg has since been amputated, Gortschakoff, Lüders and Orloff, who was shot through the eye—clearly proves that the Russians were under orders, not merely to take the place at any cost, but to take it within a certain fixed time. Indeed, the whole affair was conducted on their part in a manner which reminds us more of the barbarian method of

carrying the cities of Kurdistan by Timour Tamerlane than of the proceedings of regular modern warfare. On the other hand, it is evident that the heroic and able defence of Silistria caused equal surprise to the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Divan. Our readers may remember that about six weeks ago the allied commanders met at Varna, that they discovered that the Balkan line formed the natural defence of Turkey, and that now many of the British journals not only confess, but glory in the avowal, that Silistria was not relieved by a single French or English soldier. Lastly, it cannot be denied that Silistria was a point of great military importance, that the fate of this fortress decides the fate of the campaign, and that with the abandonment of its siege and the sudden retreat of the Russians upon the Sereth, the whole of the Russian conquests of territory made this year as well as last are lost.

Still it must be said that our English contemporaries many of them greatly exaggerate the extent of the present Muscovite reverses. It certainly requires a high degree of credulity to believe that the sortie made by the garrison of Silistria on June 13, and the succour of 2,000 men they are said to have received from Omer Pasha, resulted in the total defeat of the Russians, and forced 90,000 to 100,000 men to fly before 15,000. The sudden retreat of the Russians is, so far as we can judge, quite as mysterious as their sudden attack. It is only to be explained by a previous understanding with Austria, involving the occupation of Wallachia by Austrian troops. Under these circumstances the following passage, which we find in a letter of *The Morning Chronicle's* Constantinople correspondent, revealing this plot on June 10, so early as four days before the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish treaty, is of a peculiarly interesting character:

"The Turks think that diplomacy is playing with them, and that it is their (the Allies) intention to allow Silistria to fall into the hands of Russia.

"These suspicions receive confirmation from the news that has been received here of the *preparation of a new Protocol at Vienna*, in which

the fall of Silistria is, I learn, spoken of *as if it were accomplished*; and the *military honour of Russia being satisfied*, Austria would consider the time to have arrived for her intervention to bring about an arrangement by the means of her co-operation—*occupying the Danubian Principalities, which would be evacuated by the armies of Russia.*”

According to this, if the Russians had taken Silistria in due time, all would have been right. But though they did not succeed in satisfying the military honour of the Czar, they must, according to the compromise with Austria, beat back in a somewhat inglorious manner. The Russians receding behind the Sereth, the Austrians advance to the Sereth and Danube, and thus place themselves between the Muscovites and the Turks and their allies. In this position they are arbiters of the quarrel, preventing both parties from moving forward. The Russians remain in Moldavia, while the Vienna Conference will now more than ever busy itself with protocols, and thus the winter will be gained. If the Conference end in nothing—a result which is sure, since the Emperor of Russia has got the money on his new loan of £7,400,000 from Hope and Co. of Amsterdam—the position of the Russian army behind the Danube and the Sereth will be twice as strong as was its line between Bucharest and Kustendji. Besides, if we look at the relative strength of the Russians before Silistria and in Bulgaria, and now on their retreat behind the Sereth, and of the allied armies as far as they can, thanks to their ingenious arrangements, be thrown at all into the balance, it is plainly seen that, with even the best intentions, the latter would not be capable of baffling this combination of Austria with Russia.

The Russian forces employed against Turkey and the Allies on the European shores of the Black Sea amount to thirteen divisions of infantry, three of the third, three of the fourth, one of the fifth, three of the sixth, army corps, and three reserve divisions. Besides these, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions of light cavalry, and the third, fourth, and fifth divisions of artillery. These troops, making

up nearly one-half of the grand army of operations, should amount, according to the official statements, to 16,000 men per division of infantry, 5,000 per division of cavalry, and 160 guns per division of artillery; altogether something like 250,000 to 260,000 men, inclusive of train and camp followers. But if we measure the strength of a Russian army by what it actually was in the Hungarian war, we cannot estimate a division of Russian infantry at more than 13,000 to 14,000 men, and the cavalry and artillery must be reduced in proportion. The actual forces, then, which the Russians have successively marched into the Principalities would be reduced to about 210,000 men, and even from this number must be deducted, on account of loss in battles and by sickness, at least 20,000 to 25,000 more. Recollecting the ravages made by the March fever in the ranks of the Russian army during 1828-29, and comparing the letters of a Russian surgeon in the *Vienna Medical Journal*, we cannot consider a loss of from eight to ten per cent. upon the total of the army as exaggerated. Thus, about 180,000 Russians are left as the disposable number of their army.

It is interesting to learn what portion of this force can have been employed in the operation against Silistria. A large body of troops was required to guard the communications and magazines established in the rear of the line of battle. Bucharest and the line of the Dobrudscha had to be occupied. Detachments were indispensable to cover the flanks and partly the front of the army; and if we deduct 60,000 men for these various duties, we obtain a net result of 130,000 men available for the siege of Silistria and the covering of that operation. This is rather above than below the mark. Now the position of Silistria on a large river made it unavoidable that the besieging army should divide itself, with a view to enclose the fortress from all sides. It further necessitated the establishment of strong reserves on the northern bank, in order to rescue the troops pushed forward from the southern bank in case of a defeat. Finally, these troops occupying the southern or right bank had to divide themselves again into a double army, the one

to carry on the siege and to repel any sallies of the besieged, the other to cover the siege and defeat any army marching to the relief of the fortress. About 35,000 to 40,000 men were required to occupy the right bank and carry on the siege on the left. Thus an army of 80,000 Russians would have remained available for active field operations against a relieving army, and this was the utmost the Russians could bring to battle on Bulgarian ground within from ten to twenty miles of Silistria.

Now let us see what force the Allies have to oppose to the 180,000 Russians all told at this moment. The Turkish army of Schumla was stated, some time ago, to be about 80,000 strong, but short of everything required for action in the open field, and is, according to the latest report of Lord Raglan and the French staff officers, badly officered; altogether in a condition which peremptorily forbids offensive operations. It is neither our purpose nor within our present means to determine the accuracy of this report. Suffice it to say that such is the character of the Turkish main army in the official opinion of its allies. Since then the troops from Kalafat have been drawn to Rustchuk, where a camp of 40,000 men is said to be establishing. It would be difficult to conceive the policy of thus rendering idle a corps of such strength, which, if it had marched upon Bucharest instead of Rustchuk, might have compelled the Russians to raise immediately the investment of Silistria, but for the conduct of the war being entirely in the hands of diplomacy. Setting apart the present garrison at Rustchuk, and the garrison and reserve at Schumla, it may well be doubted whether the Turks can muster 50,000 men in the open field in a condition fit for the work before them. An Anglo-French soldier being equal, in the estimation of Western military authorities, to at least two Russians, there would still be required a force of 65,000 Allies to balance the strength of the Russian army of occupation. Unless, therefore, they can muster that force at Varna, they would hardly go to battle, the case of extreme necessity excepted.

They have, however, been most careful not to drop at

once into the field in such force as would leave no further pretext for abstaining from active operations. The whole Anglo-French force now in Turkey does not amount to more than 80,000 men, besides from 15,000 to 20,000 more now on their way thither, including almost the entire cavalry and artillery. The amount of transports at hand in the Bosphorus is, whether intentionally or not, very limited, so that it would take many a journey there and back, if they were to be transported to Varna by sea alone. But, "according to the latest and most accurate accounts," says the correspondent we have already quoted, "there are at present but 12,000 British and foreign troops who have been transported by sea, while the bulk of the French army is slowly advancing from Gallipoli toward Constantinople and Adrianople." The roads being notoriously bad, and the difficulty of victualling extreme, this is an arrangement which allows their famous general, St. Arnaud, to be permanently under steam between Varna and Constantinople, where we may be sure he does not lose an opportunity of turning every intrigue in the Divan to a solid advantage for his unfathomable purse. As to the two British divisions still at Scutari, we are informed by the same correspondent that "they do not seem ready to start yet, though there is a whole fleet of transports and steamers at anchor, waiting to embark them."

From all these facts it is sufficiently clear to everybody that the allied Powers have taken full care not to be in a state to frustrate directly the present arrangement between Russia and Austria. For, if it were intended to pursue that object, a very simple alternative for doing so offers itself either by an Anglo-Swedish alliance in the Baltic, which would give a basis of operations for auxiliary troops by facilitating an invasion of Finland and a turning on the land-side of the fortresses of Svendborg and Cronstadt, or by a combined attack by sea and land on the Crimea and Sebastopol. With regard to the first supposition, it is amusing to see how the *London Times*, which not three weeks before preached the necessity of sending

the Black Sea squadron to the Baltic, now recommends a simple blockade of the harbours of the Baltic, and an immediate return of the greater portion of the Baltic fleet to the Black Sea, where it suddenly advocates the occupation of the Crimea. This is the same journal which affected to regret that nothing could be undertaken by Napier before the French fleet should have joined him. Now that it has done so, it is supposed that nothing *will* be done, after all, and that both the French and English fleet had better take another excursion through the Cattegat, the Channel, and the Straits of Gibraltar round to the Euxine. Reflecting on the time which the juncture of these fleets has required, and again on the time which their junction with the forces under Admiral Dundas would require, it becomes plain that to do nothing either in the Baltic or in the Black Sea is the great object of these propositions.

The only point on which the Russians—apart from their unforeseen and unexpected defeat at Silistria—have undergone substantial losses and are surrounded with dangers is the Caucasus, though this is not altogether certain. They had abandoned nearly all their fortresses on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, not from any fear of the allied fleets, but in order to strengthen their Georgian army. On their retreat across the Dariel Pass, they are stated to have been suddenly attacked by a large force of mountaineers in the van and rear, to have had their advanced guard cut to pieces, while their centre and rear were compelled to retire with severe loss. At the same time the army of Selim Pasha advanced from St. Nicholas upon Ozurgeti, whence the Russians had frequently molested and menaced the Turks, and now forced the Russians to evacuate that fortress, a result by which the communications between Selim Pasha and the main Turkish army at Kars has been secured. When it is recollected that even this army was throughout the winter and spring in the most deplorable state of inefficiency, the manœuvre of the Russians indicates at least that they felt their position in Georgia to be no less precarious, and that they were sadly in want of reinforcements.

from the coast. If now this reported defeat at Dariel be true, or even partially so, the consequence is that the army of Woronzow is cut off, and must try either to procure a tenable basis at Tiflis, with a view to hold out till next winter—a matter of no slight difficulty—or it must attempt to make its way, at any loss, through the pass. This operation would, at all events, be preferable to a retreat upon the Caspian Sea, the pass leading thither being of infinitely greater danger than that of Dariel. On this point, however, we shall be better able to speak positively on the receipt of more complete and authentic information from that quarter. So far we may set down Russia as having certainly gained two victories by the recent operations—one in the loan from Hope and Co., and one in the Austrian treaty with the Porte; and as having suffered one defeat—that of Silistria. Whether the former will have permanent advantages enough to compensate for the disgrace of the latter, the future only can decide.

LXIX

The War—Debate in Parliament

LONDON, *June 27, 1854*
N. Y. T., July 10, 1854

THE Russian *Moniteur* of Bucharest officially declares that, in obedience to orders sent from St. Petersburg, the siege of Silistria is raised, Giurgevo evacuated, and the whole Russian army about to recross the Pruth. *The Times*, in a third edition of yesterday, published a telegraphic despatch from its Vienna correspondent to a similar effect, viz.: "that the Emperor of Russia accepts the Austrian summons out of high consideration for his ancient ally, and has ordered his troops to recross the Pruth." Lord John Russell, in last night's House of Commons, confirmed the statement with regard to the abandonment of the siege of Silistria, but had received no official information about the answer given by Russia to the Austrian summons.

The result of the Austrian intervention will be to interpose a barrier between the Turks and the Russians, to secure the retreat of the latter from all molestation, to enable them to reinforce the garrison of Sebastopol and the Crimea, and perhaps to re-establish their communications with the army of Woronzow. Besides, the reconstruction of the Holy Alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia must be looked upon as certain the moment the Allied Powers refuse to acquiesce in the simple restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*, with perhaps some slight concessions made by the Czar in favour of Austria.

The whole fabric of this fine "solution," devised, it is

said, by Metternich, is now, however, shattered to pieces by the indiscretion of old Aberdeen and the intrigues of Palmerston,

It will be remembered that in the late Ministerial reconstruction the endeavour to place Lord Palmerston in the War Office, the cry for the establishment of which was mainly raised by the Palmerstonian press, failed, and the Peelite Duke of Newcastle supplanted the noble Lord in his contemplated new office. This failure seems to have reminded Lord Palmerston that it was high time to break up the whole Cabinet, and accordingly he has raised a perfect storm against its chief, the occasion for which was afforded by Lord Aberdeen's inconsiderate speech in reply to Lord Lyndhurst. The whole English press immediately laid hold of that speech. It is, however, important to add that *The Morning Herald* denounced the existence of a conspiracy against Lord Aberdeen before the speech was delivered. Mr. Layard rose in the House of Commons on Friday last, and gave notice that on Thursday next he should move a resolution that "the language held by the first Minister of the Crown was calculated to raise grave doubts in the public mind as to the objects and ends of the war, and to lessen the prospects of an honourable and durable peace." There are two weak points in this resolution: firstly, its being unconstitutional and apt to be set aside for being in contradiction to the Parliamentary rule, which forbids the criticism by a member of the Commons of a speech delivered in the Lords; and secondly, because it pretends to distinguish between the occasional language of the Premier and the whole acts of the Coalition Cabinet. Nevertheless, its result was to give such serious apprehensions to Lord Aberdeen that, two hours after the announcement of the above resolution, he rose in his place and gave notice, in an unusually excited tone, that

[On Monday he should move for a copy of his despatch to Russia after the Treaty of Adrianople, and allude to misconstructions of his speech.]

So strong was the belief that Mr. Layard's motion would

result in the expulsion of Lord Aberdeen from the Cabinet, that *The Morning Advertiser*, for instance, has published already the list of the Ministry which is to succeed him—a list including the names of Lord John Russell as Premier, and of Lord Palmerston as Minister of War. It may be imagined then that the sitting of the Lords of last night attracted an unusual number of the curious and excited *intrigants* of the aristocracy, anxious to witness in what manner Lord Aberdeen would clear himself from his somewhat difficult and intricate position.

Before giving a *résumé* of the speech of Lord Aberdeen, and of the attack made upon him by the Marquis of Clanricarde. I must recur to the epoch and the circumstances, to which both speakers particularly referred, in the year 1829, when Lord Aberdeen found himself at the head of the British Foreign Office. At that time a Russian fleet, under the command of Admiral Hyde, was blockading the Dardanelles, the Gulfs of Laros and Enos, as well as those of Adramyti and Smyrna, notwithstanding an agreement concluded between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London in 1815 that Russia should not exercise any belligerent rights in the Mediterranean. These blockades, threatening to injure British commerce in the Levant, aroused the otherwise dull opinion of the English of that time into vehement declarations against Russia and against the Ministry. Interviews accordingly took place between the Russian Ambassadors, Prince Lieven and Count Matuszevitch on the one side, and Wellington and Aberdeen on the other side. In a despatch under date London, June 1 (13), 1829, Prince Lieven reports as follows on the character of these interviews:

[Lieven saw Wellington first, Aberdeen after. Aberdeen laboured to TONE DOWN the disagreeable impression made by Wellington, by assurances that England did not seek a quarrel with Russia. Russia will have to congratulate herself more than she imagines on the benefits she will receive from England's concurrence with her. The English Ministry's position is not understood in Russia. The Ministry could not always brave, although it struggled against, English public opinion,

which was against Russia. The British Ministry wished Russia success, prompt and decisive, in the war.]

It is strange that none of the opponents of Lord Aberdeen have thought proper to recur to this despatch so conclusive against his conduct at the time before the Treaty of Adrianople, that it would have been impossible to attach any importance to anything contained in a secret despatch of his Lordship's, written *after* the conclusion of that Treaty. The production of the above despatch would have demolished at one stroke the only argument of defence which Lord Aberdeen could bring forward in his speech of yesterday. His true defence would have been an open recrimination against Lord Palmerston, since the whole "row" was exclusively between these two old rival servants of Russia.

Lord Aberdeen began by saying he had nothing either to retract or to contradict, but only to "explain." He had been falsely accused of having claimed the honour of having framed the Treaty of Adrianople. Instead of having framed it, he had protested against it, as their Lordships would see from the despatch for the production of which he now made a motion. Such had been the alarm produced on his mind, and on his colleagues' mind, by that treaty, that the whole policy of the Government had been changed in a most material point in consequence of its existence. What was this change of policy? Before the Treaty of Adrianople was signed, he, Lord Aberdeen, and the Duke of Wellington, therein following the policy of Canning, had never contemplated constituting Greece an independent kingdom, but only as a vassal state under the suzerainty of the Porte, somewhat similar to Wallachia and Moldavia. After the Treaty of Adrianople had been signed, the condition of the Turkish Empire appeared to them so perilous, and its existence so precarious, that they proposed to convert Greece from a vassal state into an independent kingdom. In other words, it was resolved, since the Treaty of Adrianople did so much to weaken Turkey, to counteract its perilous consequences by *dismembering* whole provinces from her. This was the "change."

Although their alarm for the consequences of that Treaty had been exaggerated, Lord Aberdeen was far from considering it as in the highest degree disastrous and prejudicial. He had said that "Russia had not acquired great territorial acquisitions by that Treaty," and even now he contended that the Russian Empire had not greatly increased in Europe within the last fifty years, as Lord Lyndhurst had asserted. (Bessarabia, Finland, and the kingdom of Poland appear not to be any significant acquisitions in the view of the noble Lord.) But, as he had stated in his despatch of December, 1829, if the territorial acquisitions of Russia had been small, they had been important in their character—the one giving Russia "exclusive authority over the navigation of the Danube and the other ports in Asia which, though small in extent, yet had the character of high political importance." (The vast territory acquired in the Caucasus is again not present to Lord Aberdeen's mind.) Starting from this point of view, he asserts that the Treaty of Adrianople was the commencement of a change of policy on the part of Russia, who, since the time of that Treaty, had looked to an extension of political influence rather than the acquisition of territory. This change of policy had not been a change of intention. "Satan had only grown wiser than in days of yore." The fact that Russia concerted a plan with Charles X. for the acquisition of Turkey—not through alarming conquests, but through a series of treaties—is passed over in silence. Nor did Lord Aberdeen think fit to mention that even before the Treaty of Adrianople and the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which he quotes in proof of the change in Russian policy, Russia had bound herself to France and England, already in 1827, not to seek to derive any further territory from the war against Turkey; and that, but for the permission of England, she would never have been able to advance an army upon Constantinople in 1833. Lord Aberdeen next stated that his expression that "if we could obtain a peace which should last twenty-five years, as had been the case by the Treaty of Adrianople, we should not have done amiss," had been

falsely construed into the meaning that he would return to a treaty similar to that of Adrianople. He had only meant to say that

[Peace for twenty-five years would be desirable. He had never recommended a return to the status quo. Before the war, the status quo was all the Ministry desired, and Turkey had promised to give it. But, war having broken out, the question was changed entirely. Still, the independence and integrity of Turkey must be secured.]

How it is to be secured Lord Aberdeen could not say, as this again depended on the events of the war.

He had been understood to express some doubt or disbelief as to the danger of Russian aggression, but, in fact, he had the greatest alarm at Russian aggression on Turkey, although he did not feel great alarm with respect to the danger of Russian aggression on Europe, and "he was inclined to feel less every day." He considered France more powerful than Russia and Austria put together. The noble Lord then complained of the "extraordinary absurdity and malignity of the personal imputations to which he had been exposed." It was true that there was no greater peacemonger in the country than himself, but his very love of peace peculiarly fitted him to carry on the war in the most vigorous manner.

His colleagues would admit that he personally had been more urgent than perhaps any other man in exhorting a speedy advance and concentration of the allied forces beyond the Balkans in order to support the gallant army of Omer Pasha and to extend a hand to Austria, in order to enable her to take a more active part in the operations of the war. This was the course he invariably urged. On the interpellation of Lord Beaumont he declared that

[For eighteen months he had not communicated with Metternich.]

Aberdeen's speech was on the whole favourably received by the House, but it is a curious fact that the acrimonious answer that he met with from the Marquis of Clanricarde—a disappointed place-hunter and Lord Palmerston's old

Ambassador at St. Petersburg—was not replied to by any member of the Cabinet, and that none of them came forward to certify to Aberdeen's having been the foremost in urging a vigorous war.

The Marquis of Clanricarde principally dwelt upon Aberdeen's participation in the Treaty of Adrianople, on the general character of his political past, and on the shortcomings of his present administration. He said that Lord Aberdeen had produced now, for his own personal convenience and from a merely personal motive, a despatch which he had some months ago refused to other members of either House. It was, however, quite different from what the noble Lord had written to St. Petersburg in December, 1829, when the Treaty of Adrianople had been signed in September. The real question was, what instructions he had given to their Ambassador at that time, and what steps he had taken to *prevent* the signing of the Treaty. The Russian general commanding at Adrianople had not had above 15,000 men, and that amount had to be diminished by some 5,000 or 6,000, who, either from disease or wounds, were literally *hors de combat*. The Turkish general, on the other hand, was within a short distance with 25,000 Albanians. The Russian general gave a very short respite to Turkey to sign or not to sign, for he knew that his real position might be discovered if he gave a long one. Consequently, he did not give beyond five or eight days. At Constantinople the Minister of Turkey summoned to his Council the Austrian and English Ambassadors and the Russian Minister, and asked for their advice. The English Ambassador, under instructions from Lord Aberdeen, tendered the advice to sign as soon as possible that Treaty, which the noble Lord now told them was disastrous.

The noble Marquis did not like to allude to the circumstance, that it was exactly the vehement denunciation which his friend Palmerston, then in opposition, directed against Lord Aberdeen, when he charged him with being too anti-Russian, which induced the latter to give the order for the signing of the Treaty.

The Marquis proceeded to reproach the Premier with having been always the most zealous, the most constant, and the most powerful supporter of the arbitrary Governments of Europe, in proof of which he reviewed the history of Portugal, Belgium, and Spain, alluding to Aberdeen's opposition to the famous Quadruple alliance of 1834. It certainly wanted all the cool impudence of an old Whig Lord to exult at this moment in the glory of Belgium, the constitutionalism in Portugal and Spain, and the general blessings Europe derives from the Quadruple alliance, which Palmerston, in his defence, falsely stated to have been devised, not by himself, but by Talleyrand.

As to the operations of the present war, Clanricarde said that the plan of the campaign had been drawn up by the highest military authorities in Russia, in December last, and that the British Government had been informed of the plan, aiming not at the mere occupation of the Principalities, but at crossing the Danube, seizing Silistria, masking Schumla, and marching on the Balkans. The noble Lord, with such information in his possession, had come down to this House talking of peace, and neglecting to give those orders which were at the time given by the Cabinet to the Ministry of War until the end of February or the beginning of March.

If Lord Clanricarde had chosen to remember the answers given by Lord Palmerston to Mr. Disraeli in the Commons and by Lord Clarendon to himself in the Lords, he would have abstained from the folly of charging with those neglects of duty only Lord Aberdeen, and exempting his Whig friends from a blame equally attaching to the whole Cabinet. "If," exclaimed the Marquis—"if a proper, he would almost say an honest, course had been taken by the Government fifteen months ago, there never would have been a war." Now, these are the very same words which Mr. Disraeli addressed to Lord John Russell.

Finally the Marquis had the absurdity to charge also Lord Aberdeen, individually and exclusively, with all the failures of the Coalition, and their continuous defeat in

Parliament on all important questions. It did not occur to his memory that at the very formation of the Cabinet it was declared by every judicious man that it could not hold together for six weeks, unless it left all legislation an open question, and abstained from politics.

After a silly speech from Lord Brougham, who expressed himself very much contented with Lord Aberdeen's first speech, but still more so with his second, the subject dropped.

The serious result of this whole incident is the baffling of the secret Protocol drawn up at Vienna, and consequently the continuance of hostilities and of a war, the speedy cessation of which was so confidently anticipated that Consols rose three per cent., notwithstanding heavy loans in the market, and that many bets were taken at the military clubs against the prolongation of war beyond four weeks.

The Russian Failure

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, July 11, 1854

A CERTAIN class of writers have been wont to attribute to the Emperor of Russia the possession of extraordinary powers of mind, and especially of that far-reaching, comprehensive judgment which marks the really great statesman. It is difficult to see how such illusions could be derived from any truthful view of his character, or from any part of his history; but the most obstinate of his admirers must, we think, now question the justice of their conclusions. Russia is now in a difficult and most humiliating position. Her armies are defeated in Turkey, and, after immense losses of men and means, are retreating within her own frontiers; her possessions in Asia, the fruit of many years' effort and vast expenditure, are partly lost and wholly imperilled; her foreign commerce is destroyed, and her home industry injured by turning the national attention and the people's energies to a useless and disastrous war; her navy is imprisoned, and her fortresses menaced; and she must even regard as an advantage an intervention which, whatever its other benefits, interposes an effectual barrier to the realization of her ambitious dreams, and renders impossible a renewal of her attack on Turkey, because that would involve a direct collision with Germany, as well as with the Western Powers. And all this is the work of this great statesman and wise ruler Nicholas I. Praise of this headstrong imperial blunderer's mental gifts must hereafter be considerably qualified, if indulged in at all.

The defeat at Silistria is not enough to destroy the reputation of the Czar, or of his army, any more than the defeat at Oltenitza, Tchetalea, or Karakul, for a defeat is something that the wisest foresight and the most complete preparations cannot always prevent. But apart from this there is a fact which stands out with greater prominence than any other in the whole course of the late remarkable siege and the Russian retreat which followed it. It is this—that the Russian army, with its enormous numbers and its whole swarms of officers, cannot afford leaders to take the place of Paskevitch, Gortschakoff, Schilders and Lüders, who were killed or disabled in the desperate and confused operations against Silistria. Indeed, old as these men are—Paskevitch and Gortschakoff being each over seventy, and Lüders, the youngest, being over sixty—and likely as they were to die a natural death any day, such is the narrowness and imbecility of the system on which the Czar has managed his vast military establishment that we can affirm it as a positive and undeniable fact, that there is hardly a single officer who could step into the vacated place of either of these generals, and carry with him the confidence of the army and the nation. For years the Emperor, with an unaccountable blindness which seemed, indeed, to fall little short of stupidity, has directed his efforts to the real injury and depression of the service for whose improvement and perfection he fancied he was doing the utmost. Thus he has limited promotion to mere parade martinets, whose principal merit consists in stolid obedience and ready servility, added to accuracy of eyesight in detecting a fault in the buttons and button-holes of the uniform—constantly preferring such sticks to men of real military ability and intellectual superiority. Years of the dullest service, such as garrison duty and daily parade, and not youth, activity, and the study and acquirement of military science, have been the exclusive titles to the Czar's favour and to advancement. Thus the army is commanded on the average by old valetudinarians, or by ignorant corporals, who might manage a platoon, but have not brains and knowledge enough to

direct the extensive and complicated movements of a campaign.

The same narrowmindedness and presumption appear throughout the Czar's whole management of this Eastern Question. Every one can now see that he began the war in an unwise and inadequate manner. Indeed, his very first military demonstration was totally absurd and unequal to the purpose in hand. He ought to have known that Europe would not allow the destruction of Turkey, and should, therefore, either have kept quiet, biding his time, or have crossed the Pruth, not with between forty and fifty thousand men, as he did last year, when during the whole winter he had only one army corps in the Principalities, but should have pounced at once with his most powerful masses upon Turkey, reaching across the Balkans before the Turks could have gathered together their scattered forces, and before the Western Powers could have combined in their opposition and sent fleets or troops. To strike by surprise, and terror ought to have been his aim, instead of engaging in such an imbecile manner his nation in a gigantic struggle. But Nicholas is growing old, and has all the faults of decrepit age. One of the reasons which prevented him from putting all his resources into action at once was that he feared the cost of such an effort. Now he will lose a hundred times as much money, and without results. Penny-wisdom in such an affair is no wisdom at all.

When the Russian forces first crossed the Pruth, the Czar had no doubt—as we happened to know and took occasion to state at the time—that he could bully all Europe, and reap laurels at small expense. His diplomatic agents, too, encouraged him in this foolish opinion. The most mischievous of these accessories to the great Russian blunder has proved to be the Russian Minister at Paris, Kisseleff, whose despatches were full of the most satisfactory accounts concerning the friendly and pacific intentions of Louis Napoleon. Kisseleff having resided for more than twenty-eight years in the French capital, very naturally dreaded the idea of being recalled from the position where he led an

epicurean life. The Czar, accordingly, who delights to read adulatory and flattering reports from his agents, caught at the first bait, and any despatch smelling of a disagreeable truth from any quarter was discredited, treated with contempt, and did nothing but injury with the Autocrat to the faithful and able diplomatist sending it. Thus nearly all the Russian diplomatic reports were full of encomiums on the Imperial sagacity, to which Europe bowed, as they assured his Majesty, with respect and admiration. In one word we are able to affirm that, since 1851, Nicholas has never had laid before him a truthful account of the state of Europe, and of the feelings of the other Governments towards him and Russia ; and if his numerous agents misled him in such a manner, the reason was that this was the most, nay the only, palatable dish for his political appetite. He craved universal adulation ; now he tastes its bitter and poisonous fruits.

We do not put any faith in the rumour of his abdication, a thing totally impossible and unwarranted ; but, on the other hand, only a miracle can extricate him from the difficulties now heaped on him and Russia by his pride, shallowness, and imbecility.

LXXI

Russia, Austria, Turkey, Wallachia, and Redcliffe

LONDON, *July 4*, 1854
N. Y. T., *July 19*, 1854

It appears now that the new Russian loan has not been positively contracted for by the Messrs. Hope of Amsterdam, as I was led to believe from announcements made on the London and Manchester Exchanges, and that these bankers have not advanced any portion of the money to the Russian treasury. They merely undertook to bring it out at the different European Exchanges, but at no risk of their own. The success of the loan is reported to be very doubtful, and we have news that at Berlin and Frankfort it has met with very little favour. The Hamburg Senate has prohibited its official quotation, and the English diplomatic agents and consuls, according to *The Morning Chronicle*, have issued warnings to British subjects not to become subscribers to a loan "intended for carrying on war against the Queen."

The intelligence of the movements of the Russian troops since the abandonment of the siege of Silistria is contradictory. The *Moniteur* having announced the retreat of the Russians behind the Pruth, the *Vienna Presse* states that there was not the slightest reason to believe in the fact of such a move. It appears, on the contrary, that not even Wallachia is intended to be evacuated, General Liprandi having taken up a position at Ploiesti and

Kimpina, with his outposts stationed at the entrance of the Rothenthurm Pass, while the main army, retiring by Slobodzie, and along the left bank of the Danube, is stated to have halted at Braila. On the other hand, the corps of Lüders occupying the Dobrudscha, has not yet abandoned the line of Trajan's Wall, and it is not likely that, even in case of further retreat, they will surrender Matschin and Isaktshi. Fresh troops are said to be pouring into Moldavia, where it seems to be the plan of the Russians to concentrate a large force. The corps of General Parniltin has entered from Podolia, and additional resources are being drawn in from Bessarabia. The entire force of the Russians in Upper Moldavia, between Jassy, Roman and Botuchani is said to amount to 60,000, and a division of 20,000 is encamped near Kaminietz. "Paskevitch," says the *Ost Deutsche Post*, "has declared that in no case will he abandon the mouths of the Danube." The retreat is explained by the Russians to be only a consequence of the plague having broken out on the Higher Danube.

The movements of the Austrians are still quite undefined. The corps of Coronini is stated to have orders to embark on steamers at Orsova, and to go down the river to Giurgevo, thence to march upon Bucharest. The *Corriere Italiano*, an Austrian Government organ, announces that the object of this move is only to take up a neutral position in Wallachia, and yet at the same time we hear that the Austrian "ultimatum" has been declined by Russia. "The Russian Emperor," says the despatch published in *The Morning Chronicle*, "in his answer to the Austrian summons, expresses his readiness to negotiate with the four Powers on all points, except on the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. On this subject he will only treat directly with the Porte, and he refuses to admit the interference of the four Powers. He also refuses to give any guarantees for the evacuation of the Principalities."

Now, it is quite possible that, in consequence of this refusal, a sham war between Austria and Russia may occur, to end in some such famous *rencontre* as the remarkable

affair at Bronzell, which ended the sham war between Austria and Prussia in 1850, while the newspapers were yet lost in conjectures on the terrible eventualities of that "middle European crisis." In lieu of similar speculations on the possible meaning of Austria's present policy, we shall betake ourselves to the fact of the Austro-Turkish Treaty of June 14, which is now fully and officially made known.

There are two points to be considered—the relations between Austria and Turkey, and the relations of the Moldo-Wallachian people to Turkey and Austria or other foreign Powers, the latter point being, strange to say, entirely neglected by the diplomacy-ridden opinion of Europe.

By the first article of the Treaty,

[Austria by negotiation or by force will clear Russia out of the Principalities.]

The Emperor of Austria is thereby entitled to march any number of troops into Wallachia, without a previous declaration of war on his part against Russia. Thus a Turkish dependency is subjected to an operation converting it into a neutral possession under Austria against Turkey. By the second article it is agreed that

[The Austrian commander has the exclusive right of directing his army, but should keep the Turkish commander informed as to what he is doing.]

By this agreement the Austrians escape, not only from all control on the part of Turkey over any movement they may think fit, but obtain a perfect control of all the operations possibly intended on Wallachian ground by the Turkish commander, whom they have only to inform that they want to occupy such and such a point, when the Turks will be prevented from marching there. Considering now, that the Principalities, besides the narrow territory of the Dobrudscha, are the only possible battle-field between the Turks and the Russians, the Austrian intervention

simply forbids Turkey to follow up her victories and punish the invader.

By virtue of Article 3,

[Austria will re-establish the legal STATUS QUO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Local authorities thus reconstituted are not to interfere with the Austrian army.]

Thus the Emperor of Austria reserves to himself full liberty of restoring the legal state when he shall think it *possible*; and, even then, he may reconstitute the local authorities only in order to place them under Austrian martial law, quite after the fashion of the Russian general Budberg.

According to Article 4,

[Austria will enter into no plan with Russia that has not as basis the integrity of Turkey.]

Article 5 adds :

[After peace is declared between Russia and Turkey, Austria will withdraw her troops AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.]

By the former of these articles Austria reserves to herself the right to an arrangement with Russia, based simply on the *status quo* as embodied in the Vienna Note. By the latter, Austria promises not to withdraw her troops after an arrangement between herself and Russia, but only after the conclusion of a treaty between Russia and Turkey. The "material guarantee," no longer safe in the direct keeping of Russia, is transferred to Austria, and Austria empowered to hold it for her—with the consent of the Porte—until Turkey shall have adhered to the "accommodation between the two Imperial Courts."

Article 6 entitles the Austrians to feed, without even a semblance of payment, upon the remainder left by the Russians in the Principalities. The advantages of this arrangement can only be appreciated in Germany, where the people are wont to receive Austrian garrisons for the punishment of their revolutionary sins, and where the Austrians grazed off whole districts in 1849-50.

The treaty is a virtual surrender of the Principalities to

Austria, and an abandonment of the Turkish suzerainty over them. The Turks have committed thereby as flagrant a violation of the rights of the Moldo-Wallachian people as any previously committed by the Russians. The Turks have as little right to surrender the Principalities to Austrian occupation as they have to declare them Russian provinces.

The claims of the Porte to the suzerainty of Moldo-Wallachia are founded on the Treaties of 1393, 1460, and 1513. The Treaty concluded in 1393 between Wallachia and Turkey contains the following articles :

[Autonomy of Wallachia. Christian princes to be elected by the Metropolitans and Boyards. Wallachia to pay Turkey 500 piastres a year.]

The Treaty concluded in 1460 between Vlad V., Prince of Wallachia, and Mahomed II. stipulates :

[Autonomy of Wallachia under suzerainty of Turkey. 10,000 ducats tribute. Princes elected by bishops and Boyards. Princes to have right of life and death over their subjects, and of peace or war irresponsibly of Turkey.]

The third Treaty is that of 1513, in which Moldavia acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, obtaining even better conditions in exchange than Wallachia had obtained.

The Treaties which intervened between Russia and Turkey could not, of course, invalidate the Treaties concluded by the Moldo-Wallachians themselves with the Porte, since this people never treated with the Russians, nor gave the Porte power to treat for them. It may be stated, besides, that Russia herself recognised the above-mentioned capitulations in the Treaty of Adrianople.

It follows, then, from the above-cited capitulations, which, not having been superseded by any subsequent Treaty, still remain in force, that the Principalities form two sovereign States, under the suzerainty of the Porte, to which they pay a tribute on the condition that the Porte shall defend them against every and any external enemy, and not interfere at all in their internal administration.

So far from being entitled to surrender Wallachia to foreign occupation, the Turks themselves are forbidden from entering Wallachia without an ostensible motive. Nay, more; since the Turks have thus violated their capitulations with the Wallachians, and forfeited the claims of suzerainty, the Russians might even, when appealed to by the Wallachians, found their right of driving the Austrians out of the Principalities on the show of broken Treaties. And this would be by no means surprising, as it has been the constant policy of Russia to encourage and even oblige the Turks to violate the rights of the Wallachians, so as to produce hostilities between them, and create for herself a pretext for intervention. What happened, for instance, in 1848? Some Boyards in the spring of that year had presented a petition to the Prince of Moldavia demanding certain reforms, which request was, by the influence of the Russian Consul, not only refused, but caused its authors to be thrown into prison. The commotion produced by this act furnished the Russians with a pretext to cross the frontier on June 25, and to march upon Jassy. Simultaneously the Hospodar of Wallachia, like the other Continental Governments, granted a number of reforms demanded by the Liberal party of the Wallachian Boyards. This was on June 23. It is scarcely necessary to remark that these reforms infringed in no way the suzerainty of the Porte. But they happened to destroy all the influence Russia had obtained through the fundamental law, decreed during her occupation of 1829, which the reforms abolished. The Constitution replacing it suppressed serfdom, and a portion of the land occupied by the peasant was ceded to him as property, while the landlord was to be indemnified by the State for the land given up, and for the loss of his peasant's labour. The reigning Prince was then induced by the Russians to remove, and a Provisional Government took up the management of public affairs. The Porte, which, as we have shown, had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities, and had omitted to protest against the Russian entrance into Moldavia,

despatched Solyman Pasha with a Turkish army into Wallachia, and published a very threatening address of the Sultan to the inhabitants, the measures of the Divan being taken, of course, under the influence of Russia. The Wallachians went out to meet the Pasha and the Turks, and fraternised with them. An agreement was made that the Provisional Government should be replaced by a *Lieutenance Princière*, composed at first of six, and afterwards of three members. This Government was then recognised by the Pasha, and at the Pasha's desire by the foreign Consuls. A modification was introduced into the new Constitution, after which that was also confirmed by the Sultan.

Meanwhile the Russian Government fulminated against the Wallachian people in manifestoes addressed to Europe, wherein they were charged with having established a republic and proclaimed communism. On the 1st August, 1848, a large Russian force crossed the Pruth on its march to Bucharest. Suddenly Solyman Pasha was recalled by the Porte; the Sultan refused to receive the Wallachian deputies who had gone to Constantinople in answer to his own invitation; and on September 25, Fuad Effendi, at the head of a Turkish army, presented himself before Bucharest, declaring that he had only come to deprive Russia of all pretext for entering the Principality. Confiding in the word of the Turks, more than 100,000 inhabitants went out from Bucharest and the surrounding country, unarmed, in festive garments, and with the clergy at their head, to welcome them. Fuad Effendi then invited them to send a deputation to his camp, so that he might communicate to them his instructions. M. Bratiano, in his account of these events, says:

[The deputation were made prisoners. The Turkish army marched on Bucharest and sacked the town.]

It was here that General Duhamel, the Russian Commissioner, accompanied, and in fact commanded, the Turkish army. He was followed by the Russian army, and the

result was the Treaty of Balta-Liman, *i.e.*, among other things, the restoration of the Russian fundamental law, or *statuto*, which is nothing else than the *status quo* to which Austria engages to reduce Wallachia.

It is clear that if Omer Pasha should now enter Wallachia with his victorious army, the Turks with all their late experience and at war with Russia, would re-establish the Constitution of 1848, with the "republic, communism," and the revival of all the creations of 1848 following in its wake. Nobody will believe that Austria would have been less displeased with that contingency than Russia. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Porte must have been subject to extraordinary pressure to allow itself to be dragged into violation of its treaties with the Wallachians, the consequences of which it knows by experience. That pressure can have proceeded from no quarter but the English Ambassador. It is, therefore, interesting to record how the same Lord Redcliffe and his superiors in Downing Street behaved in 1848 and 1849 with regard to the violations of the rights of Moldo-Wallachia by both Russians and Turks.

When the Russian army first crossed the Moldavian frontier, in June, 1848, Lord Palmerston declared in the House of Commons, in answer to the inevitable Dudley Stuart:

[Russian army entered Moldavia without orders from St. Petersburg, on the authority of the Hospodar, to restore order, not to acquire territory.]

In August, 1848, when the Russian army again crossed the Pruth, on their march to Buchares and when the Moldo-Wallachians sent a deputation to Constantinople, the Divan applied to the Ambassadors of England and France for advice, and was recommended by Lord Redcliffe to adopt the line of policy enjoined by Russia.

In October, when the Turks and Russians in common occupied Wallachia, a Wallachian officer was pursued by the Russians into the dwelling of the commander of the Turkish troops at Bucharest, Omer Pasha, who in com-

mon with Fuad Effendi protested. The Porte, informed of this insult, declared it would have no more to do with the Russians, and would order its troops to recross the Danube, in order to cease to be the accomplice of the Russians in the Principalities, and threatened to address to the Great Powers a solemn protest, accompanied by a detailed memorandum of all that had occurred in the Principalities. The same Ambassador interfered again, and baffled these intentions of the Porte.

Lastly, at the time when the combined Russo-Turkish occupation in 1849 had assumed the character of a reign of terror, and when Maghiero, the commander of the Wallachian irregulars, alone resisted, he was induced to withdraw beyond the Carpathian mountains, "by the persuasion of the British Consul-General, who represented to him that the presence of his army would paralyse the action of diplomacy, but that his country would soon be righted."

LXXII

A u s t r i a

LONDON, *July 7, 1854*
N. Y. T., July 21, 1854

AUSTRIA holds at this moment the balance of war. If she has not yet marched her troops into Wallachia, it is only because she awaits the reply of the Emperor of Russia. The electric telegraph reports that Gortschakoff has now arrived at Vienna, the bearer of a disagreeable answer. For the first time, the Austro-Prussian summons, despatched on June 3, has been published in the *Kölnische Zeitung*. The principal passages in the Austrian summons are the following:

[Austria politely asks Russia to evacuate the Principalities with a scarcely veiled threat of military action if Russia refuses.]

The Prussian note destined to support the Austrian "summons" terminates as follows:

[A hope for abridgment and circumscription of the general action of both parties, and that Russia's reply will be such that Prussia will be able to withdraw from the painful necessities imposed on her.]

Hess, the generalissimo of the Oriental army, will establish his headquarters at Czernowitz. The *Soldatenfreund* of Vienna gives the following biography of General Hess:

[Born, Vienna, 1788; ensign, 1805; lieutenant, 1815; lieutenant-colonel, 1822; colonel, 1829; quartermaster of the mobile corps in Upper Italy, 1831; lieutenant-marshal, 1842; chief

of staff of Radetzky's army, 1848 ; planner of the campaigns of 1848 and 1849.]

With regard to the avowed intentions of Austria in the occupation of Wallachia, I will quote from Austrian journals.

The *Oberpostamts-Zeitung* of Frankfort, organ of the Austrian Embassy at the Bundestag, remarks :

[Austria, by its geographical position, can effect peace by separating the belligerents. Russia retires behind the Pruth ; Turkey does not cross the Danube. The actual situation makes peace almost inevitable.]

The *Lloyd*, in its turn, observes :

[An armed mediator will stand between Russia and the Western Powers, and prevent a collision in the Principalities. Hence, an armistice on the theatre of war. Austria's occupation of the Principalities is with a view to peace.]

The last and most curious article in this line occurs in the *Spenerische Zeitung*, published at Berlin :

[New Conference at Vienna of the four Great Powers to discuss the Convention between Austria and Turkey, to declare it in harmony with the earlier Protocols of the Conference, to come to an understanding how Vienna Protocol, April 9, may be modified to serve as a basis, not of war but peace.]

In the meantime, Austria has profited by these contingencies to project a new loan, of which the following are the terms of its official announcement :

[Provisional amount, 350-500 million florins. Payment in three, four, or five years ; rate of emission, 95 in bank paper ; interest, 5 per cent. in cash ; subscription not a forced one, but a PATRIOTIC one ; with the loan the State debt to the Bank (80 millions) will be paid, to restore the value of the Bank paper ; the surplus (four-fifths of the whole) will go to meet future budgets.]

The *Lloyd*, of course, assures that this grand financial operation now contemplated (and almost for the first time !) must and will do away with the existing depreciation of the Austrian currency. Your readers will not have forgotten that it was this pretext which introduced almost

every Austrian loan in this century. There are some points, however, in this grand operation which they might not hit upon, as they are carefully omitted from the above announcement. On this score *The Globe* of last evening remarks:

[*Taxpayers will have to subscribe in proportion to their taxes. Moral compulsion first, physical after. Really it is a raising of more taxes, with a promise that this particular sum will be repaid.*]

It is curious what resemblance this grand operation bears, in point of its pretexts as well as in point of execution, to the late Spanish decrees that now prelude a revolution.

In my last letter I called your attention to the rights and position of the Wallachian people, in opposition to the diplomatic quarrels pretending to originate in their violation. A report has just appeared in the *Paris Siècle*, of M. Barbo Bibesco, Prefect of Mehedinzi, in Little Wallachia, addressed to the Foreign Minister of the Porte, in which at length we hear a voice raised for the people of the Principalities treated with such shameful indifference by the "defenders of civilization." It commences by stating

[*Abominable Russian cruelties on their retreat from Little Wallachia; thefts of public cash, seals, and archives, and sacred vessels of the churches; slaughter of cattle.*]

M. Bibesco remarks, with respect to the then rumoured entrance of the Austrians into Wallachia, that "even a benevolent foreign army is always burdensome for the country it occupies." He says that Wallachia does not want the Austrians; that it is able to furnish a contingent of 50,000 men, drilled in arms and disciplined. In each of the seventeen departments of Wallachia, there are at this moment 3,000 *gendarmes*, wood-keepers, game-keepers, and ancient soldiers, who require only arms and to hear the drums beat, when they would burst upon the Russians. He concludes in the following words:

[*All we want is arms; then in three months there will not be one of our implacable enemies, the Russians, in the Principalities.*]

The poor Prefect of Mehedintzi does not understand that it is precisely to prevent them having arms, and along with the Osmanlis pursuing and punishing the Russians, that Austria subjects the Wallachians to her occupation.

Sir Charles Napier, say the Cockney papers, is trying to make the Czar's Admirals come out from Cronstadt, and leave the protection of the granite walls behind which they "tremble" before the Anglo-French fleet. But why don't the English sailors come out from their wooden walls and fight the Russians on their element, the land? Be it observed, that in spite of the English bravadoes, the Russians came out from Sebastopol, and "damaged" the *Fury*.

Baraguay d'Hilliers has been appointed commander of a division of troops to be embarked for the Baltic, the departure of which is fixed for the 14th inst. England is to furnish the transports for 6,000 men. An equal number of troops with one field battery will be embarked on board the French ships. If we add to these numbers that of the marine soldiers, commanded by Colonel Fieron, the effective of the whole Baltic division will amount to from 13,000 to 14,000 men, while at the same time the embarkation of troops for the Black Sea from Marseilles has not yet ceased, the process of disarming France having apparently not yet reached the desired point of "safety."

LXXIII

The Siege of Silistria

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, July 25, 1854

ABOUT eighty years ago, when the victorious armies of Catherine II. were severing from Turkey province after province, prior to their transformation into what is now called South Russia, the poet Derzhavin, in one of the bursts of lyrical enthusiasm in which he was wont to celebrate the glories, if not the virtues, of that Empress, and destined grandeur of her Empire, uttered a memorable couplet in which we may still find condensed the scornful boldness and self-reliance of the Czarian policy.

“ And what to thee, O Russ, is any ally ?
Advance and the whole universe is thine ! ”

This may be true enough even now, if the Russ only could advance ; but on that process a pretty decided check has been put. Consequently he is constrained, for the present moment at least, to postpone the possession of the universe. But what is very bitter to his pride is that, in retracing his steps, he not only fails to carry with him the pledge of universal dominion, but is even obliged to leave behind the keys of the simple fortress of Silistria, on the Danube, which he had sworn to have. And still more painful, he leaves behind him, also, the remains of some fifty thousand of his brethren, who have perished by disease and battle in this single campaign.

There is no doubt that in a military point of view the

siege of Silistria is the most important among all the military events since the beginning of the war. It is the failure to take that fortress which renders the campaign a failure for the Russians, and adds disgrace and the Czar's disfavour to the retreat behind the Sereth, in which they are now engaged. Of the earlier stages of the siege, we have already laid before our readers a careful and, we hope, a clear analysis; and now, at last, having received the official Russian reports, we are able to follow the whole affair to its conclusion without doing any injustice to either party. Besides the Russian reports, which are distinct, clear, and business-like in what they state, but abound in faults of omission, we now have Lieutenant Nasmyth's (Bengal Artillery) report to the *London Times*: a complete journal of the siege, giving some interesting particulars, but made up in rather a slovenly way, and sometimes incorrect in the dates. It is only proper to say that the views and conclusions we have previously expressed concerning the siege are altogether confirmed by these later and more detailed narratives, except in the particular that the Turks did not abandon the defence of the fort, Arab Tabiassi, as in the latter part of the siege we supposed they would be constrained to do. It appears, too, that the Russians were still more extravagant in their operations than we suspected. First, they made a regular attack on the fortress on its eastern side, on the lowlands of the Danube, hoping to be able to turn the detached forts altogether, and to make a breach in the main wall of Silistria at once. If this attempt had the merit of originality, it certainly had no other. It affords, perhaps, the first instance of trenches and approaches being thrown up against a fortress, on ground which was not only flanked, but actually commanded in the rear by heights fortified by the enemy. But then a second or irregular attack was directed against these very heights, and so cleverly combined that after the loss of a fortnight in reconnoitring and storming, in which thousands of Russians were killed or disabled, a regular siege against them had also to be employed. So much for the skill displayed by

the Russians. Let us now pass to the details during the period of the siege.

On the 1st of June the Russians got a fresh train of siege-artillery brought over from the left bank of the Danube, which they arranged in battery against Arab Tabiassi. The Turks sunk shafts and pushed mines under the counterscarps and glacis of this fort. On June 2, Mussa Pasha, commander of Silistria, was killed by a shell. Towards evening the Russians exploded a mine under one of the bastions of Arab Tabiassi. As at that time they could not yet have arrived at the crest of the glacis, this mine could not have been very accurately laid. The distances, as well as the line of shortest resistance, must have been wrongly calculated; and, accordingly, when the mine was sprung, so far from injuring the Turkish defences, it exploded backwards and overwhelmed the Russian trenches with a hail of stones and earth. But here the storming columns were assembled ready for an assault, and the effect of this hail of stones among them may be readily imagined. How far the Russians succeeded in effectually blockading the fortress is shown by the fact that on this day 5,000 Turkish irregulars from Rasgrad, south-west of Silistria, made their way into the besieged town.

From the 4th to the 8th of June the trenches against the Arab Tabiassi were continued. The Russians arrived at the glacis, pushed a sap boldly forward toward its crest, which was very poorly supported, however, by the fire of their artillery. They commenced sinking a mine below the ditch and pushed it under the scarp of the bastion. While this was going on, Marshal Paskevitch on the 9th again made one of his inexplicable displays of armed force in a grand reconnaissance against the fortress, consisting of 31 battalions, 40 squadrons, and 144 field pieces. What he expected to gain by this expedition nobody can tell. It looks like one of those displays volunteered only in the hope of some chance offering itself for doing something serious, or, at least, to impress your enemy with the notion that you are irresistible. But no such effect was produced

upon the Turks. On the contrary, they sent forth 4,000 cavalry, who, according to the Russian *bulletin*, were dreadfully beaten. Nasmyth, however, asserts that they brought in sixty Russian horses taken in the affray. At the same time, Paskevitch, instead of reconnoitring something to his advantage, was, according to the report, himself reconnoitred by a Turkish cannon-ball, which put him *hors de combat*, and necessitated his being transported to Jassy.

On the 10th, the siege was at its crisis. The grand mine, Schilders' last hope, was sprung. It produced, indeed, a practicable breach in the front bastion of Arab Tabiassi. The Russian columns advanced to the assault; but, as they might have expected, the Turks had long since made a *coupure* or second parapet with a ditch, a little to the rear of the main wall, and the Russians on coming up found themselves arrested and exposed to a murderous fire. Now, when the advance of an assaulting column is once brought to a stand, that column is beaten; for the fire of the enemy, covered behind ramparts and supported by artillery, at a distance where every shot tells, forces it to retreat in a very few minutes. The Russians, therefore, had to make the best of their way back across the breach, and were followed by the Turks, who pursued them as far as the Russian trenches and destroyed part of the siege works. This assault was the last serious enterprise of the Russians against Silistria. If the siege was apparently and nominally continued until orders for the raising of it arrived, it was merely to save appearances. On the 12th, the blockade was so little sustained that European officers from Schumla had no difficulty in entering the fortress.

The Russians had opened their trenches in the low ground on the 19th of May. Their batteries against Arab Tabiassi, seven in number, commenced work on the 22nd. Fifteen more guns were brought up against that fort on the following day. Still the regular attack against the Arab Tabiassi did not take place, according to the Russian account, until the 31st of May. This appears to indicate that the batteries erected on the 21st and 22nd merely did the

office of a first parallel, and were armed with heavy field pieces, for the purpose of enfilading the fort. From May 31 to June 10 the Russian batteries advanced within one hundred yards of the fort, that is, from the first to the third parallel at the foot of the glacis. Neither was the glacis crowned, nor were trenching batteries erected; but, as before stated, a sap was pushed up the slope of the glacis in order to sink the shaft of the mine at its top. As we learn from all reports that Arab Tabiassi was hardly more than a field fortification, of large proportions but of little permanent strength, the conduct of its defenders, composed of four battalions and 500 irregulars under Hussan Pasha, certainly deserves the highest praise. Nine days of distant cannonading, eleven days of open trenches, two mines and four or five assaults, all ending in the discomfiture of the enemy—we remember no other instance in the history of war where a mere outwork of such construction as Arab Tabiassi has stood so much. The instances coming nearest to it are the defence of Colberg by the Prussians in 1807, and of Danzig by the French in 1813.

It has seemed very surprising that during the whole siege nothing was done by Omer Pasha to support or relieve so important a place. From his letter addressed to Sami Pasha, the Governor of Widdin, we learn, however, that he was actually prepared to succour Silistria when the Russians withdrew to the left side of the Danube. Says this letter:

[I was preparing to march to the relief of Silistria. Then the Russians withdrew. During the forty days of investing Silistria, they lost 25,000 men killed.]

What the Russians are now about to do it is impossible to decide. According to some Vienna papers, they propose to take up a position behind the Buseo, but the same papers pretend that it is the fear of Austria which drives them back, and Buseo is equally outflanked by Austria. If the Russians try to hold Moldavia, they would be outflanked by Austria from Galicia and the Bukovina. But a timely

junction of the Russian troops in Poland with the late Danubian army in Podolia and Volhynia would again out-flank Austria and expose the north-eastern part of Galicia as far as the San and the Dniester.

Abstaining for a moment from political considerations, and supposing Austria to be ready to join with the allied forces in an attack upon Russia, matters would stand thus: Austria could bring into the field from 200,000 to 250,000 men to join the Allies, who themselves dispose of about 160,000—100,000 to 120,000 Turks, and 60,000 Anglo-French troops. To these forces Russia could oppose the four corps of the Danubian army, with their reserves, amounting, after due deduction on account of losses, to about 200,000 men. The second corps commanded by Panintin, and the three cavalry reserve corps, with some further infantry reserves and reinforcements by fresh levies, might together amount to 180,000 men, so that the entire military strength of Russia would be composed of 350,000 men, from which the garrisons necessary for guarding the Crimea and parts of Southern Russia would have to be deducted. This would still leave the guards, the grenadiers, and the first army corps disposable for the defence of Poland and the Baltic provinces, not to speak of the Finnish corps of about 15,000 men. Everything considered, the discrepancy between the relative belligerent forces would not be so great as to forbid Russia from calculating on moderate success, if she would restrict herself to a proper defence.

If Austria, as the latest diplomatic news and her total inactivity on the Moldavian frontier appear to indicate, has no other intention but to interfere between the belligerents, then we may safely assume that there is no chance of anything occurring in the course of the year in either Moldavia or Bessarabia.

The Theatre of War—The Russian Note to the German Powers—Servia and Austria

LONDON, *July 14, 1854*
N. Y. T., July 28, 1854

SIR CHARLEY has quietly returned from Cronstadt, with no other killed and wounded than some of his gallant tars carried off by the cholera. To keep the public in good humour, the same farce is now to be repeated before Sebastopol, fifty sail of the combined fleets having been seen at Odessa, "making direct" for that place.

The embarkation of the French troops from Calais, fixed for this day, has been adjourned until the 20th inst., in order, it is said, to await the development of events in Spain.

General Budberg has forced upon the inhabitants of the Principalities an address expressing their thanks to the Emperor Nicholas for the occupation of their country, and for its defence against the "cruel and barbarous Turk." The *Euphrates*, which left Constantinople on the 5th, and arrived at Marseilles on the 13th inst., brings the important news that the Dobrudscha has not at all been evacuated by the Russians, and that the "illustrious" Reschid (wretched) Pasha has resumed the office of Foreign Minister.

It is stated from Cracow, July 8, that Prince Paskevitch has arrived at Castle Homel, on his estates in Lithuania, and that he is not to take any more part in the present campaign. It is added that not only himself, but also his

plan of campaign, have been given up, and this is the more probable as the Russian troops already in retreat to Moldavia have been ordered forward again by Prince Gortschakoff, who is said to be collecting a strong force in front of Bucharest. The present position of the Russian troops is, therefore, as follows: their right wing on the Upper Jalomnitztza, leaning with its extreme on the Transylvanian Alps, where they occupy the Temesher Pass, with twenty-four pieces of heavy artillery, their centre extending from Fokchany to Bucharest; their left, under Lüders, at Braila; and their extreme left under Uschakoff, in the Dobrudscha.

The latest news from the theatre of war states that the Turks have crossed the Danube in force (40,000, including 12,000 Allies), and that they have occupied Giurgevo. French journals report that the Russian establishment at the Sulina mouth has been bombarded and destroyed by the steamers detached from the combined fleet; but this news is probably to be classed with the hoax about the second bombardment and destruction of Bomarsund in the Baltic. The operations of Marshal St. Arnaud in the East seem to have inspired the Tuileries with some dread, lest they might be on too grand a scale. At least, it is said that the French Government has despatched a special superintendent—of course a *financial one*—to control his excess of zeal (*son excès de zèle*).

The *Indépendance Belge* gives quite a new version of the Russian note addressed to Austria and Prussia. According to this paper, which may be regarded as the private *Moniteur* of the retired Russian diplomatists at Brussels, the Russian note was not addressed directly to the Austrian Cabinet, but to Prince Gortschakoff, who left a copy with De Buol, expressing the belief that Austria, while demanding the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians, only meant to propose an armistice, since it could not be her wish to expose the retreating Russian armies to an attack of the allied forces. The Austrian meaning accordingly must have been a suspension of arms. Turks, English, and French would then have to abstain from all forward movements

and from every act of fresh hostility to Russia. As to the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops, the note dwells on the absolute necessity for Russia of maintaining certain strategical points in those provinces while awaiting the conclusion of peace, as she would otherwise be placed in too disadvantageous a position with regard to the armies of the Allies. On the other hand, the note protests against any supposed intention of threatening Austria by the said strategical occupation. Proceeding from these premises, the note expresses the disposition of Russia to enter upon new negotiations of peace, to be on the following basis: integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which the Russian Government never intended to injure; equality between the Christians and Mussulman subjects of the Porte, such as it is understood in the Protocol of April 9; finally, revision of the Conventions referring to the Straits. The note admits a common Protectorate of the Powers over the Christians of Turkey; but with regard to the Russian Protectorate of the Greek Christians, the article in the *Indépendance* confesses that some vague phrases are attached to it which would give sufficient latitude for divergent interpretations. Prince Gortschakoff, it is said, speaks even in a more subdued tone than the note itself. His despatch does not contain the *last word* of Russia; he may be authorized to go further, with a view to enabling Austria to enter into fresh negotiations. On the 9th inst., however, the Vienna Cabinet had not yet come to a decision. "Now," says the *Indépendance*, or rather Baron Brunnow,

[whatever the disposition of Russia, any single incident, e.g. an attack on Sebastopol, must modify that disposition and give more power to the country opposed to any concession.]

At all events this Russian note has satisfied Prussia, which considers it as a sort of escape into new negotiations, and as a means of preventing the Austrians from entering Wallachia. The *Moniteur* itself admits that the objections raised by Prussia against this Austrian entrance have produced the fresh hesitation evinced by the Court of Vienna.

On the other hand, we are told in the sanctimonious *Morning Chronicle* that "it was urged from Berlin, that the contingent duty with which the Court of Berlin charged itself of protecting the Austrian territory from invasion entitled it to protest against any fresh provocation of Russia." It is known besides that the treaty between Austria and Prussia was arranged in precisely such a manner as to allow either of these Powers to stop its military operations, as long as it should not be convinced of the necessity of the warlike steps contemplated by the other. Thus Austria may appear anxious to act with the Western Powers, while it finds itself stopped by the remonstrances of Prussia. I, for my part, am sure that all these eventualities were arranged for long ago by the three Northern Powers in common, and that even the new difficulties raised against Austria are only intended to give her occupation of Wallachia the appearance of a heroic opposition to Russia. A little sham war, after the fashion of the Austro-Prussian war of 1850, may not be excluded from that arrangement, as it would only contribute to give Austria a more decisive vote at the conclusion of peace. Be it observed that the *Austrian Correspondence* expressly announces that Austria consents in every point to the policy of the Western Powers, *except* as to any eventual infringement on the present territories of Russia.

In judging the position of Austria; it is important to notice the "Protest of the Servian Government against Austrian occupation," dated June 22, which has now been laid before the House of Commons. This protest is addressed by the Servian Government to the Sublime Porte. It begins with stating that

[the language of Austria to Servia was friendly or otherwise according as Servia appeared well disposed or otherwise to Russia.]

Then took place a very considerable concentration of troops on the frontiers of Servia. The Government of Servia asked for information "directly from the Cabinet of Vienna, and indirectly from the Sublime Porte, as to the object and

meaning of this military movement of Austria." Austria gave evasive declarations, while the Porte and the representatives of the Western Powers at Constantinople professed to know nothing about the object of the Austrian demonstrations, and appeared even to participate in the anxieties and doubts of the Servian Government.

[The Pasha of Belgrade had still only his old instructions, to consider any military intervention of Austria in Servia hostility to Turkey, and to repel it.]

Austria appearing to lean more and more toward the Western Powers, their agent at Belgrade began to give satisfactory assurances as to the disposition of Austria. Simultaneously the Cabinet of Vienna informed the Servian Government that the military measures in question had nothing in them hostile to Servia; that Austria only intended to protect her own frontiers, and would not interpose in Servia, unless the Russian troops entered it, or revolts against legitimate authority should break out there; that, consequently, even in that case, she would interpose as a friend, and with a view to lending assistance to the Government and legitimate authority. The Servian Government was not tranquillized by these assurances of Austria. It saw, on the one side, Austria claiming arbitrary intervention, and on the other, her isolated action under pretence of co-operating with the Western Powers in support of the Ottoman Empire. In conclusion, it suspected her intention to provoke those very disorders which she professed to be so anxious to prevent. As the military preparations of Austria assumed, day by day, a more threatening aspect, the Servian Government, in concert with Izzet Pasha, took active steps at Vienna and Constantinople for the prevention of any combination which would make Austria the arbiter of the present destinies of Servia. It is for this object that Azzir Pasha was first sent to Vienna, and is now at Constantinople. At the same time every measure for the defence of the country was taken in concert with the Turkish representative. Austria holds out two reasons

which might occasion her intervention in Servia: (1) the entrance of the Russians; (2) the breaking out of an insurrection in Servia. The first is absurd, as the theatre of war is too distant from Servia; and should the Russians attempt to enter Servia, the Servian and Turkish troops would perfectly suffice to repel them. If auxiliary troops were required, others would be preferable to Austrian.

[Servia mistrusts and hates Austria. If Austria enters Servia, the Servians would at once attack her. Austria has always tried to exercise in Servia a selfish influence.]

As to internal insurrections, they are only to be apprehended in consequence of Austrian intervention. Servia will always be loyal to the Porte.

[If Turkey is loyal to her, Servia answers for the maintenance of order in Servia.]

This protest of the Servians is at the same time a fair indication with what enthusiasm the Austrian entrance into Wallachia is looked forward to by the Wallachian people.

The neutral, or rather hostile, attitude of the minor Powers towards England can surprise no one who has followed her present acts of war against Russia, who considers the marauding expeditions of the English fleet in the Baltic, and the measures that have been taken to disable the troops at Varna from doing anything in the field, so that even the medical ambulances of the British troops in Turkey have but just now been sent out by the *Himalaya* from Southampton. Sweden, accordingly, has definitely declared her resolution to remain neutral, and to abstain from any steps in common with the Western Powers, while Denmark and Holland, as members of the German Confederation, have only assented to the Austrian communication of May 24, on the express understanding that nothing but neutrality and endeavours to restore peace are meant by it.

LXXV

The Private Conference at Vienna— Ministerial Crisis

LONDON, *July 18, 1854*
N. Y. T., August 3, 1854

THERE was a Congress at Vienna on July 13, composed of rather different elements from those of the late famous Conferences. Count Buol, the Austrian Premier, gave a dinner on that day, in honour of Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Envoy, whose task it is to cover the position of Prince Gortschakoff, the General commanding in the Principalities. Besides the *personnel* of the Russian Legation, there were present Count Hemming, the representative of Prussia during the absence of Count Arnim; General Mansback, Ambassador of Sweden; Count Bille-Brahe, Ambassador of Denmark; De Heckeren, Ambassador of Holland; De Wendland, the expelled Secretary of the King of Greece; lastly, Count O'Sullivan de Grass, Minister of Belgium and the senior of the *corps diplomatique*. Here you have the complete list of the persons openly sailing under the Russian flag. Bamberg, of course, was strongly represented, but the names of its great men have not been given.

The official English press cannot suppress the uneasiness felt at the Austrian order for the suspension of Count Coronini's advance into Wallachia, and about the despatches forwarded to Paris and London, according to which Russia proposes to accede to the terms of the Protocol of

9th April, as a basis for negotiations of peace, but subject to conditions. The semi-official *Austrian Correspondence* thinks that, although the Russian propositions are not quite satisfactory, there is really something in them which deserves to be taken into consideration by the Western Powers. *The Times*, *Morning Chronicle*, and *Observer*, suggest, as a sort of consolation, that it is all the fault of Prussia. If anything were still wanting to reinforce the impression produced by the dinner, the altered position of the Russian troops would be sufficient to prove how much Russia relies on the intentions of Austria. We read in the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, the Russian *Moniteur* at Berlin, with respect to the latest movements of the Russian troops in the Principalities :

[*Gortschakoff* has countermanded the orders for the evacuation of Bucharest. The line Oltenitza, Bucharest, Buseo, Fokchany to be maintained.]

From other sources we learn that the Russian cavalry are again pushing forward on Slatina, to the left of the Aluta. How serious was the intention of evacuating Bucharest is evident from the severe measures taken for the carrying off the archives in that town, which are said to contain some documents extremely compromising for the Court of Peterhoff.

All these apparently whimsical and contradictory movements of the Russians receive their explanation from the inopportune interference of the Turkish army with the diplomatic arrangements. As the successive settlements of the diplomatists at Vienna were blown up by the Turkish exploits at Oltenitza, Tchetalea, and Silistria, so also have their last shams been dispersed by the general advance of Omer Pasha's army.

"The policy of those crafty, swearing rascals, that stale old mouse-eaten dry cheese, Nestor—and that same old dog-fox, Ulysses—is proved not worth a blackberry; . . . whereupon the Greeks begin to proclaim barbarism, and policy grows into an ill opinion." ¹

¹ *Troilus and Cressida*, Act v., Sc. 4.

If you had passed through the streets of London on Saturday, you would have heard all the newsvendors shouting their "great Anglo-Turko-Gallo victory over the Russians at Giurgevo, and capture of Bucharest by the allied troops." The reason of these pompous announcements you will learn by-and-by when I come to speak of the new Ministerial crisis. As to the co-operation of the Anglo-French forces in the battle of Giurgevo, we know by the regular post from Varna, with dates down to the 4th inst., that "no move" had taken place in the camps. According to the latest Vienna advices, on July 13, the auxiliary troops were in full march upon Rustchuk, by way of Schumla, and on the 8th a division of French troops had arrived at Rustchuk, and on the 9th only a division of English troops arrived there. Now the battle of Giurgevo ended at 4 a.m. on the 8th, having commenced at an early hour on the 7th, and after an interruption of some hours at noon, being resumed and continued until the morning of the 8th. Thus it is impossible that any French or English troops can have participated in it. The Turks found eight Russian guns spiked, and immediately threw entrenchments around Giurgevo. The town did not suffer, notwithstanding the shells thrown by the Turks from Rustchuk and the islands. After the retreat of the Russians, Omer Pasha issued a proclamation calling upon the inhabitants to remain tranquil, as no further danger menaced their towns. Giurgevo was only occupied by a feeble detachment of regulars, the principal force of the Turks being encamped around the town and on the three islands of the Danube. Omer Pasha remains at Giurgevo, Said Pasha at Rustchuk. The Turks are masters of the road communicating between Giurgevo and Oltenitza on the left bank of the Danube.

With regard to a second battle, which is asserted to have been followed by the capture of Bucharest, the French *Moniteur* itself limits it to a small defeat inflicted by the Turks on the Russian rear at Frateschti, on the road from Giurgevo to Bucharest. The *Moniteur* adds, that an Anglo-French corps of 25,000 men has joined the Turks, that the

allied forces concentrated amount to about 60,000 men, that Prince Gortschakoff is at the head of a force nearly equal in numbers, and that a great battle might be expected, decisive of the fate of Bucharest. Frateschti is a small fortified place, about twelve miles from Giurgevo, and thirty miles from Bucharest. According to the *Moniteur*, the battle at this place was fought on the 11th, but according to the *Journal des Débats*, on the 14th inst. The Russians are said to have had 700 wounded in this affair, including two generals.

The last Marseilles steamer from Constantinople reports the capture of the Sulina mouth of the Danube by the English steamer *Terrible*. It is said to have entered the Roads, to have destroyed the Russian fortifications, dispersed the garrison and captured its commander. The news appears to me to require more positive confirmation.

A rumour circulated by English journals, which is, however, not repeated by any French paper, pretends that Admiral Lyons is cruising before Anapa with a view to support an expedition of Admiral Bruat, who is said to have on board 7,000 men for landing.

Letters from Constantinople state that the Porte shows a disposition, on the representations of the English and French Ministers, to resume immediately commercial relations with Greece on the following conditions: 1. That Greece engage herself to pay on convenient terms the expenses of the war, and an indemnity for the pillage organised by the late insurrectionists; 2. That she sign, within two months, the commercial Treaty hitherto declined. This Treaty acknowledges the actual limits of the Turkish and Greek territories.

No news from the Baltic. The *Hamburger Correspondent* describes the result of the English marauding expedition on the Finnish coast, in its effects on the mind of the Finlanders, as follows:

[Russia distributing arms in Finland to prevent English landing. Two battalions of Finnish riflemen formed. More to be formed.]

The Austrian loan turns out to be a forced contribution, as I predicted. The whole is now to be distributed on the different crown lands of the Empire; for instance, Upper Austria has to take 115,000,000 of florins, Lower Austria 15,000,000, Vienna 2,500,000, Hungary 70,000,000, etc., in proportion. If the Emperor of Russia has not obtained anything for himself, he has at least contrived to plunge all the other Governments into a serious quarrel with their subjects about the question of cash. The Prussians will have to pay an increased income tax on the 1st of August. Bonaparte, too, is said to be projecting another loan of 500,000,000 francs, the effect of which on France will not be diminished by the present prospects of the wine and corn harvest, and the stagnation of trade, especially at Lyons, since the outbreak in Spain. An appeal to the English pockets is also contemplated by the Coalition Ministry, and expected for next week.

“Aimes-tu le front sévère
Du sa(i)ge Napoléon ?
Aimes-tu que l'Angleterre,
T'oppose Lord Palmerston ?”

With this apostrophic song, the embarkation of the French troops at Calais has been celebrated. In order to really oppose Lord Palmerston to the Czar, immense movements have shaken the town from Saturday to Monday, with a view to put him in the place of the Duke of Newcastle. Great agitation has prevailed once more in the Ministerial as well as in the Opposition camp. It was known that the estimates for the new Ministry of War were to be laid before the House on Monday night, and this occasion was to be seized to make a murderous onslaught on the Coalition, and to place the invincible Palmerston in the War Ministry.

[On Saturday a Cabinet Council met, with the exception of Clarendon, Foreign Secretary, who was with the Queen, but joined his colleagues later. The Council sat three and a half hours, and on its rising Aberdeen went to the Queen.]

You may see from this excited narrative of the *Morning Herald* how greatly the hopes of the Tories were raised by these "important" moves. Lord John Russell summoned his adherents to Whitehall for Monday, and Mr. Disraeli in his turn assembled the Opposition members. One hundred and seventy-nine gentlemen presented themselves at Whitehall, almost in hysterics with the anticipation of the great revelations intended for them by Russell. They were most deplorably deceived by the Parliamentary Squeers, who drily told them that the vote of the war estimate being a matter of course, he expected them to be quiet and behave.

[More money would be wanted for the war, and on the money vote next week, a vote of confidence or no confidence in the Ministry would probably be taken.]

Not being initiated into the secrets of Lord Clarendon, he could not give them any information on the state of foreign affairs. Well, the result was that Russell saved the whole Coalition for the present session; for if the vote of confidence had been taken on the estimates of the War Ministry, a defeat would have been a victory of Palmerston over Newcastle, while on the general war estimates a vote of non-confidence would be a victory of the Tories over the combined Whig Peelites—an eventuality, of course, out of the question.

Accordingly, the votes for the War Ministry were taken last night in a very quiet House, nothing occurring but a delivery by Russell and Pakington of all the stale common-places on the present military administration.

It is to be regretted that the obstinate resistance of the Queen keeps Lord Palmerston out of office, as by his installation in that office, the last false pretence under which the Radicals yet defend the foreign policy of England would fall to the ground.

Another War Debate

LONDON, *July 25, 1854**N. Y. T., August 7, 1854*

AT last Friday's evening sitting of the House of Commons, in reply to an inquiry of Mr. Disraeli, Lord J. Russell stated that Her Majesty had been pleased to order that a message should be sent to the House, in pursuance of which he proposed to move on Monday a vote of credit for £3,000,000. There would be no necessity for a Committee of Ways and Means. To Mr. Disraeli's question whether there would be an autumnal session this year, Lord John gave no reply. Accordingly, the vote of credit was accomplished without a division, in the sitting of both Houses which took place yesterday.

In the House of Lords, Lord Aberdeen, in moving the vote, delivered the shortest, driest, and most commonplace speech that ever he has favoured us with since his accession to the Premiership.

[He had to ask for three millions, and he was sure their lordships would have no objection. All of them must be unanimous as to the necessity of adopting measures calculated to lead to an early termination of the war. This result was mainly to be produced by the efforts of England and France, with the concurrence of the other Powers. (He did not say whether he meant the efforts to be made by war, or negotiation; nor even exclude Russia from "the other Powers" with whom England and France are to concur.) Parliament being about to be prorogued, there was so much more reason to provide the Government with money.]

The Earl of Ellenborough, who has the particular gift of never speaking to the question,

[recommended economy in all those civil departments not connected with the war].

The Earl of Hardwicke saw

[forces in the Baltic and Black Seas, and the greatest army sent out that ever left this country. He did not know what the Government intended to do with them, and, therefore, he appealed to every noble Lord to grant the credit demanded from them.]

Earl Fitz-William, an out-of-place Whig, protested against

[England being called the most highly taxed country; the taxes fell more lightly on the people than elsewhere in Europe. (If the noble Lord had spoken of the Lords instead of the people, he would have been right.) Aberdeen's speech conveyed scarcely a single idea to the House (and the noble Lord ought to know better what the wants of the House are in respect to ideas). Who were the other Powers whose concurrence he was anxious to have? Austria? He feared they might be induced by that Power to consider the evacuation of the Principalities and the free navigation of the Danube, as justifying them in concluding peace. (Ridiculous fear, since Lord Aberdeen will certainly not be induced by any one to demand so much.) What was to be understood by the integrity of Turkey—that circumscribed by the Treaty of Adrianople, or something else? They found themselves in a very singular position, Parliament having no information whatever of the intentions of the Government. Accordingly he would vote for the credit.]

The Marquis of Clanricarde, whose temper is getting sourer each day that separates him further from office,

[claimed explanation respecting the progress made and the course pursued since the former supplies were asked for, the conditions and prospects of the war, the state of the country with respect to its allies. The Turks had been successful, but not the British Government or the British arms. As to the relations with their allies he would move later for the production of the recent treaty between Turkey and Austria, as well as other documents. It is rumoured that under pressure

from England Turkey has made a Convention with Austria by which Austria is to enter the Principalities. How was it that, in the hour of danger, Austria commenced fresh negotiations? Are the Vienna Conferences going on, and what are they consulting about? On the whole they depended too much on the German Powers.]

In order to prove that Austria "ought" to be the best possible ally, Lord Clarendon showed

[Austria circumscribed and threatened by Russia in all parts of her dominions. No ratified copy of the Austro-Turkish Treaty received as yet. The time was probably not far distant when they would have Austria co-operating with them; he "answered, however, for nothing."]

Having twice been convicted of the most unblushing falsehoods, Lord Clarendon naturally expects implicit belief in his assurance "that there is no intention of returning to the *status quo*, and that there is no intention of listening to a patched-up peace, which could only be a hollow truce, and which would render a return to war inevitable."

After this brilliant display of their own highly educated minds, the Lords naturally turned to the subject of national education, and we will leave them there.

During the discussion in the Lords, the Commons were occupied upon several indifferent subjects, until the speech of Lord Aberdeen was communicated to them, which produced a "disagreeable sensation." Lord John Russell perceived at once that it was necessary to produce a counter-sensation.

When the first extraordinary grant was about to be asked, the Government despatched the "magnificent" Baltic fleet; on the occasion of the second one, the famous bombardment of Odessa had to serve as a catcher; now the watchword selected was Sebastopol.

Lord John began by certifying to the "patriotic" spirit of the House in having given the first grant, and judiciously abstained from putting any embarrassing questions to the Government. A very great number of ships and men had been procured. Of first, second, and third-rate steamers

they had now 17, against only one on the 1st of January, 1853; sailing line-of-battle-ships, 17 against 11; a marine force of 57,200, against 33,910. On the Turkish shores they had a force of about 30,000 soldiers, "a great part of which was lately at Varna." As to the operations of war they had "but just commenced."

[Valour of the Turkish army. Nobody could now say that a fillip from Russia would overthrow Turkey. Perfect union between English and French armies. He could not tell them what the money was exactly required for. He asked the money not on the ground of detailed estimates, but for the use of the Government, "as it might have occasion for it." Austria had a greater interest in protecting Turkey than even France or England. The Czar would have the complete command of the Government of Austria as soon as he domineered over the Principalities. Austria beset with difficulties. On more than one side Russian armies could approach near Vienna, and some of the kingdoms submitted to Austria were greatly disturbed. Her policy, therefore, was negotiation. But recently she had despatched a message to the Czar, whose answer could not be termed evasive.]

1. Russia will not fix a time for the evacuation of the Principalities.
2. The Western Powers being stronger than Russia by sea, she can only restore the balance in the Principalities and on the Danube.
3. She declines, therefore, to evacuate the Principalities.

Russia ready to adopt the principles contained in the Protocol of the 9th of April, except the admission of Turkey into the European Concert. Austria is mistaken in her present policy, but she will hardly forfeit her engagements with the Western Powers and Turkey, by which she was bound to take part in the attempt to drive back Russia. They had no control over the councils of Austria, and Austria had no control over the King of Prussia. All the Powers were, accordingly, in the most favourable position for jointly counteracting Russia. Then came an exposition of what France proposed to do. The integrity of Turkey was not compatible with a return to the status quo in the Principalities. Nor with such a fortress in position and strength as Sebastopol, which is not, of course, named, but clearly indicated. There can be no treaty that leaves Russia in such a position of menace. In this France agrees with England.]

With respect to Mr. Disraeli's proposition of an autumnal

session, Lord John "declined to accept at the hand of members of this House restrictions on the freedom of Ministers."

It would be as tedious as it is superfluous to report the sayings of the Humes, Bankes', Knights, Alcoxes, and *tutti quanti* on this occasion.

Mr. Cobden laboured to show why Sebastopol and the Crimea should on no account be taken. A point of more interest was

[whether this country was in alliance with the sovereignties and not, as deluded people thought, with the nationalities. The war had been conducted with a view of riveting still closer the chains by which Hungary and Italy were bound in the grasp of Austria.]

There were honourable and deluded gentlemen in the House who had been

[calling for Palmerston as Premier, in the interests of Hungary and Italy. But Kossuth and Mazzini had told him, Cobden, that Palmerston would never stir a finger for Hungary or Italy].

Mr. Layard and Lord Dudley Stuart did nothing but repeat their old speeches, with this variation, that Lord Dudley's opinion of the magic force of the name "Palmerston" was "more exalted than ever."

It was reserved for Mr. Disraeli to blow up by one single breath the whole bubble speech of Lord John. Having briefly justified his proposition of an autumnal session by an allusion to Sinope and other exploits that occurred during the last autumnal vacation, he confessed himself to be surprised, bewildered, alarmed, at the announcement of the impending destruction of Sebastopol and the conquest of the Crimea. Lord John here expressed dissent, but did not rise. Mr. Disraeli, however, sitting down on his part, forced Lord John to an explanation. In a voice of humility and confusion he came forward at last: "I may as well state that what I said was, that I thought Russia could not be allowed to maintain the menacing attitude she has done by keeping so large a fleet at Sebastopol." Having elicited

his confession from Lord John, Mr. Disraeli delivered one of his most savage and sarcastic speeches on record, which would well repay a perusal *in extenso*.

[It is copied at length in another part of the N. Y. T. of this date, among the news from Great Britain.]

The speech ended with the following words:

[After what we have heard, the painful distinction often made between the policy of Aberdeen and that of his Cabinet is unfair. Russell's and Aberdeen's policy is substantially the same. Ministers are in unison. The Coalition Government is unanimous in carrying on the war with small purposes, and getting from great objects of policy insignificant results.]

Lord Palmerston's jokes were of no use. After the speech of Mr. Disraeli, and a number of other members having risen to protest that they had been entirely deluded by Lord John's first speech, the motion for the supply was indeed voted, but only on the condition that the debates should be resumed to-night, Lord Dudley Stuart announcing at the same time his intention to move an address to the Queen,

[not to prorogue Parliament until the House had more full information with respect to the relations with foreign Powers, and the prospects of the war.]

LXXVII

The Austro-Turkish Treaty—More Parliamentary Talk

LONDON, *July* 28, 1854
N. Y. T., *August* 9, 1854

IN one of my former letters I gave you an analysis of the Austro-Turkish Treaty of the 14th of June, and stated as the purposes aimed at by that curious diplomatic transaction: (1st) To give the allied armies a pretext for not crossing the Danube, and for not confronting the Russians; (2nd) To prevent the Turks from reoccupying the whole of Wallachia, and forcing them out of that part which they had already conquered; (3rd) To restore in the Principalities the old reactionary Government, forced upon the Roumanians by Russia in 1848. We are now actually informed from Constantinople that Austria had protested against Omer Pasha's presumption in crossing the Danube; that she claims an exclusive occupation of the Principalities for herself, and the right of shutting them not only against the Anglo-French troops, but equally against the Turks. Upon this remonstrance the Porte is said to have forwarded orders to Omer Pasha not to cross the Danube for the present, while refusing to admit in principle the exclusive occupation of the Principalities by Austria. Wretched Pasha, who has learned something from his master and contriver, Lord Palmerston, has, of course, little objection to admitting in fact what he refuses in principle. You may, perhaps, think that Austria has already violated, as well as practically

cancelled, the treaty of the 14th June, by not entering Wallachia at the moment when the Russian army was disorderly retreating in three different directions, and was exposed in the flank and the rear to an Austrian attack, if it had failed to retire at once behind the Sereth. Only remember, that by the very words of this famous Treaty Austria is bound neither to enter the Principalities at once, nor to leave them at any exact epoch, nor even to force the Russians to evacuate them within any definite term. It is now stated that the Austrians are really entering Little Wallachia, and that the Russians are recalling their troops from the Carpathian passes and concentrating them at Fokchany. This, however, means nothing but that the Austrians, instead of expelling the Russians from Great Wallachia, have resolved to eject the Turks from Little Wallachia, thus preventing their operations on the banks of the Aluta. It is evident that no better contrivance could have been imagined to work up a military insurrection in Turkey than their exclusion from the territory conquered by the Turkish army, and by an occupation of Bulgaria by Anglo-French troops, who are carefully avoiding the Russians, and keep the Turks under a sort of state of siege, as you may see from the common proclamation of the Anglo-French commanders to the inhabitants of Bulgaria—a proclamation almost literally copied from a Budberg, a Gortschakoff, and *tutti quanti*. I have told you long before this that the Western Powers would render one service to progress—the service of revolutionizing Turkey, that keystone of the antiquated European system.

Besides the protest against the Turkish presumption in occupying Turkish territories, Austria demands the reinstallation of the two Hospodars now residing at Vienna, whose return to Wallachia and Moldavia along with the first Austrian troops, von Bruck has announced to the Porte. Reschid Pasha replies that the Porte will take the propriety of their restoration into consideration—Herr von Bruck on his part insisting, however, on the fulfilment of Article III. of the Convention, which stipulates for the

re-establishment of the late Government. It will be remembered that I called attention to the ambiguous construction liable to be put on this Article. Reschid Pasha retorts that this re-establishment could not take place before the Porte had made sure that the Hospodars had not failed in their duty as loyal subjects. The Porte had no serious complaints against Prince Ghika of Moldavia, but the conduct of Stirbey, the Hospodar of Wallachia, had been very compromising, he having proved himself a partisan of Russia in the most scandalous manner, so that his expulsion had been imposed upon the Porte. Herr von Bruck then appealed to the Sultan, who assembled an extraordinary Council, in which the compromise was made that both Hospodars should be recalled to their posts *provisionally*, while the Porte would appoint a High Commissioner to inquire into their conduct, and then come to a definite resolution. Now it will be at once understood that Prince Ghika, against whom Reschid pretends to have no serious objections, is only nominally recalled, Moldavia remaining in the hands of the Russians. The recall of Prince Stirbey, expelled by the Porte itself and stigmatized as a Russian agent, is, on the contrary, a real restoration, as a portion of Wallachia is already evacuated by the Russians, and the other likely to become so at no distant time.

But the action of Austrian diplomacy does not stop there. We read in yesterday's *Morning Post*, a paragraph dated Belgrade, July 19:

[*Order from Turkey to Servia to suspend all armaments. An order for disarmament is expected.*]

This, then, is the answer of the Porte to the Servian protest against an Austrian occupation. Thus the miserable Turkish Government is simultaneously prevented from thwarting its avowed enemy, and driven into hostile and usurpatory acts against its own loyal dependencies. By the treaty of June 14, Turkey broke her Conventions with the Principalities, and by the order for disarmament she breaks the fundamental laws of Servia. By the same stroke

of policy the Turkish army is worked into a state of insurrection, and Servia and the Principalities are thrown into the arms of Russia. The Austrian summons for the evacuation of the Principalities turns out to be a prohibition to the Turks to enter them, and the boasted armaments of Austria to be the disarmament of Servia.

With all that, stupid Austria, a mere tool in the hands of the Czar and his English confederates, is only preparing the elements of a general revolution, the first victim of which she herself will be, and of which nobody can complain except Utopian reactionaries like David Urquhart.

At Monday's sitting of the Commons, for the first time in the annals of Parliament, the Lord President of the Ministry and Leader of the House rose on the pretext of giving a deliberate exposition of the intentions of the Cabinet, which he completely recanted six hours later in the same place. At 7 p.m., Sebastopol was bombarded, dismantled, destroyed, and dismembered from Russia. At 1.15 a.m. the Russian fleet at Sebastopol was to be reduced by one or two sail of the line, and "Russia by no means to be disturbed in her present rank and position." During six hours little Johnny brawled, swaggered, bullied, hectorcd, rhodomontaded, cheered, congratulated, amplified to his Commoners; during six hours he caused Parliament to revel in "a fool's paradise," when, by no more than one sting of Mr. Disraeli's tongue, this bubble speech suddenly shrunk together, and the false lion was forced to hang his usual calf-skin round his shoulders. This was a "day of humiliation" for the Ministry, but they carried their three millions of pounds.

At Tuesday's sitting the debate on Lord Stuart's motion for the non-adjournalment of Parliament took place. They had voted away the money of the country; they could not but vote their confidence in the Ministry. This being generally understood by the honourable members, the House was but thinly attended, the debate dull, the Ministry more provoking than ever, and the motion of Dudley negatived without a division. The Ministry contrived to turn their very disgrace into a victory over the Commoners. This

was the "day of humiliation" for Parliament. Nevertheless, the sitting became important from the defence of the warfare furnished by Mr. Herbert, the British Secretary at War, and Woronzow's brother-in-law; from Berkeley, the Lord of the Admiralty's indiscretions; and from little Johnny's magisterial declarations on the internal state of the English Ministry.

In answer to the complaints about the deficient organization of the commissariat, Mr. Herbert, a thin-headed, ex-young Tory, entered into an elaborate eulogy of Commissary-General Fielder, who was certainly the fittest man for the place, because some fifty years ago he had enjoyed the confidence of the Iron Duke, and held high offices under him. To the disagreeable letters of the newspaper correspondents he opposed the highly coloured reports of "the very best paymasters in the service," and the obligatory compliments of some French officers. He uttered not a word about the army being destitute of any means of transport, being supplied neither with mules nor horses to carry the baggage and the water necessary for an army marching from Varna and Devna towards the Danube, and the other necessities required on a march. He uttered not a word about the deficient means of the army for supplying itself with food. He did not refute the fact that no commissariat was appointed until several divisions of troops had been sent out, and the fleets were at Constantinople. He dared not contradict the assertion that Lord Raglan himself had stated that his troops had been stationed at one place nearly two months but could not advance, from the deficiency of the commissariat, although they were almost within cannon-shot of the half-starved enemy.

In a similar way the ingenious brother-in-law of Prince Woronzow got rid of the complaints about the ordnance. He spent much breath upon an answer to a reproach made by himself, viz., that there were only six-pounders out with the army in Turkey; while he passed in obstinate silence over the facts that there was no battering train with the army; that the infantry was almost unsupported by

cavalry, the most essential arm for operations in the plains of Wallachia; and that the 40,000 men at Varna had not 40 pieces of artillery to oppose to the Russians, with whom every corps of 40,000 men deploys 120 pieces.

To the attacks on the negligence of the Government in supplying the army with the necessary implements, the brother-in-law of Woronzow answered by an indignant defence of the military commanders, who were not at all to blame.

As to the fatal accidents and the British monopoly of fatal accidents, none of which happened to the French expedition, the Hon. Mr. Herbert replied, first that it was true that a ship which carried out a portion of the 6th Dragoons was lost by fire, but that the commander [*perished at his post, although he could have escaped.*] The imbecile Commoners cheered this nonsensical answer. As to the loss of the *Tiger*, he declared it to belong to the chapter of accidents. As to the "grievous casualty in the Baltic—why, it proved the foolhardiness of our seamen."

The small-headed man then proceeded to answer the question whether "any practical results had been brought about by our fleets and armies?"—and he gloried in the "complete, effective, and irresistible blockade of the Russian ports." This blockade was so effective that, for instance, eight Russian war-steamers have reached Odessa from Sebastopol, notwithstanding bombardments, fights, and obstruction. It was so effective that the Baltic trade is carried on through Russia to such an extent that Russian produce is selling in London at a price very little higher than that at which it sold before the war; that at Odessa commerce is carried on exactly as last year, and that even the nominal blockades of the Black and White Seas were only some days ago forced upon the English by Bonaparte.

But the English Government did more, exclaims the noble young man called Herbert. Had they not wrested from Russia the ability of communicating supplies by the Black Sea, and cut them off from all access by sea? He forgot that for four months they left the Russians in

command of the Danube, that they allowed them to appropriate, with only 15,000 men, the European corn-houses of Moldavia and Wallachia, that they abandoned to them the rich flocks of the Dobrudscha almost under their eyes, and that they prevented the Turkish fleet from annihilating the Russian squadrons at Sinope.

They had an ample share in the military success of the Turks, because, by forming their reserve, they enabled them to use every man and every gun against the invading army. Need I repeat to your readers that, as long as the Russians were unable to concentrate a superior force in the Principalities, the British Government interdicted Omer Pasha the use of his own commercial superiority and the fruits of his first victories?

Had their forces done anything else?

[All but one of the Russian forts along the Circassian coast are taken.]

Woronzow! Woronzow! Do you not remember that, when advised at the beginning of the session to take those forts, you refused to do so, thus allowing the Russians to withdraw their garrisons to Sebastopol. You have only taken the forts which the Russians chose to abandon, and that single "exception," which you neither destroyed, nor captured, nor attacked, is the only one worth taking, the only one thought worth holding by the Russians, and the only one by which you could communicate with the Circassians—Anapa.

Mr. Herbert reached the climax of his insipid diatribe when he pretended that, in the glorious defence of Silistria, which she neither relieved nor allowed Omer Pasha to relieve, England had a share because of one dead young man, called Captain Butler. Lieutenant Nasmyth, as a living man, is, of course, not mentioned. Captain Butler, let me tell you, went to Silistria, only after the Government had refused to send him there, and there is no ground for Marshal Herbert to claim credit for his conduct. As to Lieutenant Nasmyth, he belongs to the class who were

shortly to be expelled from the British camp, and went to Silistria in the capacity of a newspaper correspondent.

Lord Dudley Stuart having assailed the Government for not procuring steamers drawing only three feet of water, and carrying one or two heavy guns, Admiral Berkeley—who spoke after General Herbert—begged the noble Lord “to teach the Surveyor of the Navy how to build such steamboats.” This was the answer given by the gallant Whig Admiral to the question how the Admiralty could fit out a fleet for the Baltic without providing a large number of gun-boats. Brave Berkeley and his scientific Surveyor of the Navy would do better to apply for instruction to the Swedish and Russian Admiralties than to poor deluded Dudley Stuart.

We have now done with the defence of British warfare as put forward by elegant Herbert and gallant Berkeley, and we come to the indiscreet revelations of that same Berkeley. On the previous evening the Sebastopol bubble was blown up by little Johnny; on this evening the Cronstadt bubble exploded through the means of Berkeley. As the Austrians alone will fight out the case in the Principalities, there remains no field of action “for the most formidable armies and navies, with screw-propellers, Paixhams, and other monster powers of destruction, ever fitted and sent out by any country.” From a letter written by the gallant commander of the Baltic fleet, the following quotation was made by gallant Berkeley: “It has not been in my power to do anything with this powerful fleet; for attacking either Cronstadt or Sveaborg would have been certain destruction.” This was not all. Brave Berkeley, exulting at what the most powerful fleet could not do, went on babbling:

[Admiral Chads writes: “The forts are too substantial for the fire of our ships, and we cannot attack their ships.”]

As to Napier, brave Berkeley concludes with the words:

[He had carte blanche. The Government did not tie his hands, but encouraged him to proceed]

—from Bomarsund to Cronstadt, and from Cronstadt to Bomarsund.

On the remarks of Mr. Kildyard, a Tory, that “in the whole course of his life he never heard such indiscretion,” that Berkeley had spoken as a plain agent of Russia, and that all the rhodomontades about Cronstadt had, notwithstanding, experienced his silent approval, brave Berkeley recanted his indiscretions so far as to say that Napier had only spoken of his present position, with ships alone, and without being backed by any land forces. That nothing could be done in the Baltic without land troops and without an alliance with Sweden, I have repeated to you all the time since Napier left the English shores, and my opinion was participated in by every scientific military man.

I come now to the last point of this memorable debate, the magisterial declarations of Lord John Russell. After having got his note for £3,000,000, he was as barefaced as he was shamefaced, twenty hours before, when quailing under the sarcasms of Disraeli.

[Unnecessary to further explain his former statements.]

As to the “painful distinctions,” which certain parties had attempted to draw between Aberdeen and his colleagues, he would tell them that

[the war measures had been considered, step by step, by the Cabinet, and all the Cabinet were responsible for the decisions taken].

In fact, he dared—but at no risk—to tell the House :

[If we are fit Ministers we have the discretion to call or not to call Parliament together.]

Being present at the sittings of the English Parliament on Monday and Tuesday, I confess to my error in having stigmatized, in 1848, in the *New Rhenish Gazette*, the Berlin and Frankfort assemblies as the lowest possible expressions of Parliamentary life.

It will be assuring for your readers to see opposed to the declarations of Woronzow’s British brother-in-law, the

fades bravadoes of a Russell, and the roaring leaders of *The Times*, the following extracts from the latest letters of *The Times* correspondent, at the British camp near Varna, dated July 13.

[*General talk of peace. Austrian Envoy dines with General Brown, and is on his way to Omer Pasha and to Raglan and St. Arnaud. The allied armies are not at war with Russia. Parades, drills, etc., as innocent as those at Satory or Cobham. All military operations thus far have been a reconnoitre, the sending some engineers and French pontonniers to Silistria and Rustchuk, the building a bridge at Rustchuk.*]

Another little Parliamentary comedy was performed on the same Wednesday evening. At the sitting of last Friday, Mr. Butt had moved the resolution that British subjects should be forbidden, under certain penalties, to trade in Russian Government securities, this Bill relating only to loans contracted by the Russian Government during the present war. The British Government had not proposed the Bill, but it could hardly dare to oppose it, as Bonaparte had already falsely announced in the *Moniteur* that the British Government concurred with him in considering subscriptions to the Russian loan as illegal. Palmerston, therefore, supported Mr. Butt's motion, but found himself opposed in no very courteous manner by Mr. Wilson, the sage editor of *The Economist*, and Secretary of the Treasury. Now, on Wednesday, the same Palmerston having defended the Coalition Cabinet on Monday, having abstained from speaking on Tuesday, and thus secured the real success of the Coalition, could not but seize upon this opportunity to resume his position as the "unprotected female" of the Cabinet. He spoke with the aspect and in the tone of a male sybil, as if overpowered by the spontaneous explosion of his patriotic feelings, which he, poor man, was forced to suppress on the two preceding evenings, fettered as he was by the cold necessity of an official position. He elicited the inevitable cheers of the honourable and deluded gentlemen when he declared :

[*The Bill simply affirms the principle that British subjects*

*should not supply Russia with funds to carry on war.
Wilson's arguments nonsense.]*

Note, that this is the same man who during twenty-four years imposed the Russo-Dutch Loan upon England, and is at this very moment the most influential member of a Cabinet which continues to pay the capital and interest of that loan, thus supplying Russia with "funds to carry on the war."

LXXVIII

That Bore of a War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, August 17, 1854

It is now very nearly a twelvemonth since a small Turkish corps, two battalions, succeeded in crossing the Danube near Turtukai, opposite Oltenitza, threw up entrenchments there, and being attacked by the Russians, repulsed them in a very spirited little affair, which, being the first engagement in the war, took the style and title of the Battle of Oltenitza. There the Turks alone were opposed to the Russians; they had no British or French troops behind them as a reserve, and could not even expect any support from the allied fleets. And yet they held their ground on the Wallachian side of the river, for a fortnight at Oltenitza, and for the whole winter at Kalafat.

Since then, England and France have declared war against Russia; sundry exploits, of a doubtful nature it is true, have been achieved. Black Sea fleets, Baltic fleets, and an army of now nearly a hundred thousand English and French soldiers are there to assist the Turks or to make diversions in their favour. And the upshot of all this is nothing but a repetition of the Oltenitza business on a larger scale, but rather less successfully than last year.

The Russians laid siege to Silistria. They went about it stupidly but bravely. They were defeated day after day, night after night; not by superior science, not by Captain Butler or Lieutenant Nasmyth, the two British officers present, who, according to *The Times*, saved Silistria. They were defeated by the ignorance of the Turks, an ignorance

extending so far as not to know when a fort or rampart ceases to be tenable, and to sticking doggedly to every inch of ground, every mole-hill which the enemy appears to covet. They were defeated besides by the stupidity of their own generals, by fever and cholera; finally, by the moral effect of an allied army menacing their left, and an Austrian army menacing their right wing. When the war began, we stated that the Russian army had never been able to lay a regular siege, and the ill-managed operations before Silistria show that they have not improved since. Well, they were defeated; they had to decamp in the most discreditable way imaginable; they had to raise the siege of an incomplete fortress in the midst of a fine season, and without any troops coming to relieve the garrison. Such an event occurs not more than once in a century; and whatever the Russians may try to do in the autumn, the campaign is lost, disgracefully lost, for them.

But now for the reverse of the medal. Silistria is free. The Russians retreat to the left bank of the Danube. They even prepare for, and gradually execute, the evacuation of the Dobrudscha. Hirsova and Matschin are dismantled. The Sereth seems to be the line to which the Russians trust for the defence, not of their conquests, but of their own territory. Omer Pasha, the wily old Croat, who can hold his tongue or tell a lie as well as anybody, "in the execution of his duty," at once sends a corps to the Dobrudscha, and another to Rustchuk, thus engaging the two wings of the Russians at once. There were far better manœuvres possible at the time, but poor old Omer appears to know the Turks and the Allies better than we do. The correct military move to be made would have been to march through the Dobrudscha or by Kalarash upon the communications of the enemy; but, after what we have seen, we cannot even accuse Omer of having missed a good opportunity. We know that his army is very badly cared for—provided with almost nothing—and cannot therefore execute rapid movements which would remove it to a distance from its base, or open up fresh lines of operation. These movements, de-

cisive as they are in their effect when undertaken by a sufficient force, are not within the reach of an army which lives from hand to mouth, and has to pass through a barren country. We know that Omer Pasha went to Varna, imploring the aid of the allied generals, who at that time had 75,000 capital soldiers there, within four days' march of the Danube, but neither St. Arnaud nor Raglan thought proper to come up to where they could meet the enemy. Thus Omer could do no more than he has done. He sent 25,000 men toward the Dobrudscha, and marched with the rest of his army to Rustchuk. Here his troops passed from island to island until the Danube was crossed, and then by a sudden march to the left took Giurgevo in the rear, and forced the Russians to quit it. On the next day the Russians were drawn up on some heights to the north of Giurgevo, where the Turks attacked them. A sanguinary battle ensued, remarkable for the number of English officers who, with rare success, competed for the honour of being shot first. They all got their bullets, but with no benefit to anybody, for it would be preposterous to think that the sight of a British officer being shot could inflame a Turkish soldier to invincibility. However, the Russians having a mere advanced guard on the spot—a brigade, the two regiments of Kolyvan and Tomsk—got beaten, and the Turks made good their footing on the Wallachian bank of the Danube. They at once set about fortifying the place, and as they had British sappers, and, as at Kalafat, they did very well for themselves, there is no doubt that they were making a formidable position of it. But thus far they were allowed to go and no farther. That Emperor of Austria who now for eight months has been trying hard to act the part of an independent man, steps in at once. The Principalities have been promised to his troops as a feeding ground, and he intends to have them. What business have the Turks there? Let them go back to Bulgaria. So down comes the order from Constantinople to withdraw the Turkish troops from the left bank, and to leave "all that plot of land" to the tender mercies of the Austrian soldiers.

Diplomacy is above strategy. Whatever may come of it, the Austrians will save their own frontiers by occupying a few yards of ground beyond; and to this important end even the necessities of the war must give way. Besides, is not Omer Pasha an Austrian deserter? And Austria never forgets. In Montenegro she interrupted his victorious career; and she repeats the process again, to make the renegade feel that he is not yet out of the allegiance to his lawful sovereign.

It is entirely useless to enter into the military details of this present stage of the campaign. The actions possess little tactical interest, being plain, straightforward front attacks; the movements of troops on either side are ruled more by diplomatic than strategical motives. Most likely we shall see the campaign closing without any great enterprise, for on the Danube there is nothing prepared for a grand offensive, and as to the taking of Sebastopol, of which we hear so much, the beginning will probably be delayed until the season is so far advanced that it must be postponed till next year.

It would seem that whoever may have had any conservative leanings in Europe must lose them when he looks at this everlasting Eastern Question. There is all Europe, incapable, convicted for the last sixty years of incapability, to settle this puny little strife. There they are, France, England, Russia, going actually to war. They carry on their war for six months, and unless by mistake, or on a very shabby scale, they have not even come to blows. There they are, eighty or ninety thousand English and French soldiers, at Varna, commanded by old Wellington's late military secretary and by a Marshal of France (whose greatest exploits, it is true, were performed in London pawnshops)—there they are, the French doing nothing and the British helping them as fast as they can; and as they may think this sort of business not exactly honourable, the fleets are come up to Baltchik Roads to have a look at them and to see which of the two armies can enjoy the *dolce far niente* with the greater decorum. And, although the Allies

have hitherto only been eating up the provisions upon which the Turkish army had calculated, idling away day after day at Varna for the last two months, they are not yet fit for duty. They would have relieved Silistria if required by about the middle of May next year. The troops that have conquered Algeria and learned the theory and practice of war on one of the most difficult theatres in existence, the soldiers who fought the Sikhs on the sands of the Indus, and the Kaffirs in the thorny bush of South Africa, in countries far more savage than Bulgaria—there they are, helpless and useless, fit for nothing in a country which even exports corn!

But if the Allies are miserable in their performances, so are the Russians. They have had plenty of time to prepare. They have done whatever they could, for they knew from the beginning what resistance they would find. And yet, what have they been able to do? Nothing. They could not take a yard of contested ground from the Turks; they could not take Kalafat; they could not beat the Turks in one single engagement. And yet they are the same Russians who, under Münnich and Suvaroff, conquered the Black Sea coast from the Don to the Dniester. But Schilders is not Münnich, Paskevitch is not Suvaroff, and though the Russian soldier can bear flogging with the cane beyond all others, yet when it comes to habitual retreating he loses his steadiness as well as anybody else.

The fact is, that conservative Europe—the Europe of “order, property, family, religion”—the Europe of monarchs, feudal lords, moneyed men, however they may be differently assorted in different countries—is once more exhibiting its extreme impotency. Europe may be rotten, but a war should have roused the sound elements, a war should have brought forth some latent energies; and assuredly there should be that much pluck among two hundred and fifty millions of men, that at least one decent struggle might be got up wherein both parties could reap some honour, such as force and spirit can carry off even from the field of battle. But no, not only is the England of the middle

classes, the France of the Bonapartes, incapable of a decent, hearty, hard-fought war ; but even Russia, the country of Europe least infected by infidel and unnerving civilization, cannot bring about anything of the kind. The Turks are fit for sudden starts of offensive action, and stubborn resistance on the defensive, but seem not to be fit for large combined manœuvres with great armies. Thus everything is reduced to a degree of impuissance and a reciprocal confession of weakness, which appears to be as reciprocally expected by all parties. With Governments such as they are at present, this Eastern war may be carried on for thirty years, and yet come to no conclusion.

LXXIX

The Russian Retreat—Denmark

LONDON, August 8, 1854
N. Y. T., August 21, 1854

ON the 28th ult., Prince Gortschakoff passed with the centre of his army through Shlawa, a village about six miles from Kalugereni; leaving it again on the 29th *en route* for Fokchany. The vanguard, commanded by General Soimonoff, consists of eight battalions of the 10th division of infantry, of the regiments of *chasseurs* of Tomsk and Kolyvan, and of the regiment of hussars of the Grand Duke, heir of the Empire. This vanguard was to pass the Jalomnitza on the 1st inst. at Ureshti and Herescyani, where bridges had been constructed. It would be expected to arrive at Fokchany about the middle of the month.

The Turkish army advances in three columns. The centre was, on July 29, at Kalugereni; on the 30th skirmishers of its vanguard were seen at Glina, two miles from Bucharest, where Omer Pasha's headquarters were expected to be established on the 1st. The right wing marched along the Arjish, in the direction from Oltenitza to Bucharest. The left, which on the 28th was at Mogina, is to take the road from Slatina to Bucharest.

"The retrograde movement of the Russian army," says the *Moniteur de l'Armée*, is

[strategic rather than political. Troops can concentrate in a good and formidable position and recuperate. They are nearer their basis of supplies and occupy an important part of the territory invaded last year.]

On the 26th of July Baron Budberg addressed the following proclamation to the Wallachians:

[The troops are withdrawn for reasons of health. The attacking enemy have been routed. When the season is more favourable the Russian army will return and deliver Wallachia for ever from Turkey.]

It is curious that in 1853, in the very same month of July, the Russians found the season not at all unfavourable to the occupation of Wallachia.

[Emigration of Bulgarian families from the Dobrudscha, according to a letter from Galatz.]

This "voluntary emigration," to which the inhabitants were invited by the Russians, on the plea of the dangers from Turkish vengeance, is very similar in character to the "voluntary" Austrian loan. The Vienna correspondent of *The Morning Chronicle* relates that the same families,

[finding they were to be employed on the fortifications in Moldavia, wanted to return, but were forced on to Fokchany to work in the trenches].

The Danish Ministry obstinately persists in refusing to accord to the Western Powers the harbours and landing-places which would enable them to keep their forces in the Baltic during the winter. This is, however, not the only manner in which that Government manifests its contempt for the Powers arrayed against its patron, the Emperor of Russia. It has not hesitated to make its long meditated *coup d'état*, one entirely in the interest of Russia, in the very face of the fleets and armies of the Occidental Powers. On July 26, a State paper was published in Copenhagen, headed—"Constitution of the Danish Monarchy for its common affairs." Strange to say, the English press has scarcely taken any notice at all of this measure. I give you, therefore, the more important points of this new Danish Constitution.

Common affairs of the monarchy are all those which are not expressly stated to refer to any particular part of it. The common affairs of the monarchy are to be in charge of

a Rigsrad. The present Rigsrad will be composed only of members nominated by the king. Future Rigsrads are to be *partly* elected. The Rigsrad will then be composed of fifty members, the king nominating twenty. The Rigsrad is to be convoked at least once within every two years, for a term as shall be decreed by the king. Its sittings are to be at Copenhagen; but the king may remove them to any other place. Its deliberations will be guided by a President, nominated by the king. The deliberations of the Rigsrad are secret.

A decree of the same date convokes the Rigsrad for September 1, 1854, and another decree publishes the nominations of the king, the nominees being all courtiers, high functionaries, and knights of the Danebrog.

The principal points gained by this new *coup d'état* are the suppression of the fundamental law, and the representative institutions of Denmark, and the creation of an easy machine for the supply of as much money as the Court and the Government may want.

LXXX

The Evacuation

LONDON, *August 11, 1854*

N. Y. T., August 25, 1854

YESTERDAY'S *Moniteur* states that

[Austria, France, England must exact from Russia guarantees against a return of recent complications. Austria will not, unless general peace is established or these guarantees obtained, enter into any treaty with Russia].

Of what sort these guarantees are to be may be seen from *The Times* of this morning. Firstly, the evacuation of the Principalities; secondly, the substitution of a common European Protectorate in lieu of the Russian Protectorate; thirdly, the revision of the Convention of the Straits [*and the reduction of Russian navy.*]

The statement of the *Moniteur* is, on the whole, confirmed by the declarations of Lord Clarendon in yesterday's sitting of the House of Lords. We know, also, from other sources, that the Russian headquarters are removed to Buseo; that four Russian regiments have crossed the Pruth, and that the Austrian Government, on its part, has countermanded the order given to several corps of troops to reinforce the armies drawn up *en échelon* on the frontiers of Galicia and Transylvania.

There was scarcely ever a more curious operation in the history of war than this evacuation of the Principalities by the armies of Russia. The fact is that it cannot be accounted for from any strategical, but only from a diplomatic point

of view. As has been explained in THE TRIBUNE, a plan has been arranged between Austria and Russia, according to which the Austrians were to occupy the Principalities as soon as the honour of the Czar should be satisfied by the capture of Silistria, the chance of a Russian defeat being provided for by a clause, according to which the Austrian occupation was to take place in that case too. Accordingly, one day before the Russians raised the siege of Silistria, a Treaty was concluded between Turkey and Austria, giving the latter Power the right to enter Wallachia. The Treaty aimed at three purposes: to withhold the Principalities from Turkey; to "raise a cordon against the plague of revolution around the Austrian frontiers"; lastly, to secure the safe retreat of the Russian army. This Treaty, as we may safely infer from the confessions of Lord Clarendon, was forced upon the Porte by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the English Ambassador at Constantinople—the Divan simultaneously issuing an order for allowing the Russians to retire without being molested by pursuit. The precipitate withdrawal of the Russians from the Danube is therefore without an explanation, unless it entered into Russia's agreements with Austria. The Austrians had fixed the 3rd of July for the entrance of their troops into Wallachia. Whence their procrastination? They were securing concession upon concession from the Porte: firstly, in respect to the form of government to be established in Wallachia; secondly, in respect to the exclusion of the Turks from their own province. Subsequently, they made known that their occupation of Wallachia would not include a declaration of war. Says Lord Clarendon:

[When Russia was about to evacuate Wallachia, Austria notified the Allies that she would occupy part of Wallachia for Turkey and to restore Turkey's authority there; but not as a belligerent, BECAUSE Austria was not at war with Russia.]

This imbecile sincerity of Austria caused embarrassment, and a new delay was necessitated. Then came the protest of Prussia, jealous of the aggrandisement of Austrian power on the Danube. The fact of both these Powers being the

tools of Russia does not exclude their remaining jealous of each other, as was sufficiently exemplified by the "potato war" of 1850. If Mr. Urquhart had perused the Warsaw Protocol of that year, he would not have tumbled into the Quixotic idea of suddenly propping up Prussia as the European bulwark against Russia.

Seeing Austria losing her opportunity, the Russians, already in retreat, turned round and advanced once more to the Danube; for, if the evacuation of Wallachia was complete before Austria had moved, their subsequent entrance into that Principality would have been deprived of any pretext. Meanwhile, however, the Turkish general at Rustchuk—to use the phraseology of *The Times*—"imagining" the Russians in full retreat, went over to Giurgevo, and beat them so soundly as to render impossible any attempt at retaking possession of the line of the Danube. In consequence of this defeat, the Russians were obliged to think seriously of retreat, a resolution to which they were prompted by the discovery that the ostensible allies of Turkey would no longer be able to remain inactive, and that the English Government would be forced, in deference to their army as well as to the public, to undertake something against them. By retiring from the Principalities, they increased their defensive force in Bessarabia and the Crimea. Thus we learn by a telegraphic despatch that the Russian regiments in Bessarabia and Kherson are to move in all possible haste to the Crimea, while those in Moldavia march to occupy their places.

It was to be presumed that the Turks would not be slow in improving their opportunity. Their vanguard, under Skander Bey, entered Bucharest on the 6th inst., and their general received a deputation from the Wallachian capital on the anniversary of the day on which, in 1853, their enemies had entered it.

Thus the Austrians have again lost their opportunity, and are deprived of their false pretences for entering Wallachia. An occupation at this moment would bring them infallibly into collision with the Turks. While,

therefore, the Austrian papers denounce the advance of the Turks upon Bucharest as a breach of contract, the Austrians themselves are denounced by the English Ministerial press for their slowness and stupidity in having set at nought the fine-spun plot. In *The Times* of Thursday we read, for instance :

[Austria, by procrastination, has lost the position she might have assumed in the Principalities. Wallachia, in the main, and the Danube from Orsova to Galatz in Turkey's hands. Turkey not likely to recede now at the instance of a foreign Power.]

All that is left for the Austrians to do now is to occupy Moldavia.

The despatches from Constantinople, dated July 30, almost exclusively allude to the projected expedition against the Crimea. The division of twenty ships, which started from Balchik on July 21, accompanied by General Brown and Canrobert, and commanded by Admiral Bruat, in order to *reconnoitre* the coast from Anapa to Sebastopol, returned on the 27th. After their return Canrobert and Brown immediately proceeded to Varna to communicate the results of their mission to St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan. The Anglo-French troops were drawn up from Varna to Kustendji, in order to facilitate their embarkation at the different ports. This embarkation must have taken place on the 29th or 30th of July. The Turkish fleet had entered the Black Sea, and all the Anglo-French naval forces must have been assembled in the latitude of Varna, as on the 1st inst. numerous transports were accumulated there. On the destination of these forces the *Gazette du Midi* has the following :

[It may be Anapa, which being taken, the Circassians could help in an attack on the Crimea; or Odessa, which being taken, the Allies threaten the Crimea and Bessarabia; or Nikolaiev, where the Russian arsenals are.]

The Dobrudscha has been entirely abandoned by the Russians, and is now occupied by 36,000 Turks and French.

The Turks are at Baba Dagħ, and are said to be under orders to attack Tultcha, while the French are to attack Galatz.

On July 16, the little town established by the Russians at the Sulina mouth, which was already partly dismantled, is said to have been completely destroyed by the English steamers '*Spitfire* and '*Vesuvius*, no buildings having been spared, except the lighthouse and the church.

In the White Sea the English have effected a landing on some point on the coast of Onega and destroyed a village.

The Vladimir affair in the Black Sea has called forth a violent attack from *The Times* against Admiral Dundas, to which *The Herald* answers as follows :

[*Napier allowed the Sveaborg fleet to pass unmolested, Hangöudd to be fortified, buoys to be moved, ships to run aground in consequence, and "The Times" said nothing. But with Dundas, the case is different.*]

By letters from Paris of the 9th inst., we learn that 50,000 French troops are to be added to the Oriental army. If the war produce no other good, it has at least the merit of ridding France of her Decembrist army.

LXXXI

Servia—England, France, and Constantinople

LONDON, *August 15, 1854*
N. Y. T., *September 1, 1854*

ON the 1st of August the Servian Government sent a courier to Brestovac, where Prince Alexander is taking the waters, with the answer proposed to be made to the injunctions of the Sublime Porte. The answer was signed by the Prince, and immediately forwarded to Constantinople. It alleges the impossibility of a disarmament, on account of the many dangers that would surround it, but states that in deference to the wishes of Austria and the orders of the Porte the military exercises had been suspended. Izzet Pasha, the Governor of Belgrade, has been recalled, at his own request. His successor is not yet known.

Ten thousand Turks are said to occupy Bucharest; but at the same time we read in to-day's *Moniteur*, that Austria is only waiting for the reply of Omer Pasha to the last communication of Colonel Kalik, in order to command the entrance of an Austrian corps into the Principalities. When Count Buol received the notification from Prince Gortschakoff, announcing the departure of the Russians from the Principalities, he answered that "the Austrian troops would occupy the Principalities, but that such occupation had nothing hostile to Russia."

By the prorogation of Parliament in 1854, the Eastern

Question is brought back to the stage it occupied at the prorogation of Parliament in 1853. The Vienna Conference is once more to set to work, to paralyze active operations, to bewilder public opinion, and to offer a new occasion to Sir James Graham, at the reopening of Parliament, to say that a noble mind is slow to suspect. It is worthy of observation that the dodge originates this time not with Austria, but with England itself, as you will see from *The Times* Vienna correspondence :

[*England and France PROPOSE the Vienna Conference. Nothing could be more agreeable, says Austria.*]

The basis of the new deliberations of the Conference is a sort of revived Vienna note, furnished by the answer of M. Drouyn de l'Huys to the last communication of M. de Nesselrode, the cardinal points of which differ very little from what I expected they would be, after the analysis I gave you in my last letter of the terms named by *The Times*. There is not a word about an indemnity to the Turks, nor even to the Allies. The usurped Russian Protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, is to be transformed into European usurpation ; the same is to be done with the "Protectorate" over the Christians in Turkey ; the fruits of the Turkish victories to be restricted to a free navigation of the Danube for Austria, and a change of the Treaty of 1841, in favour, not of the Porte, but of the Powers.

The speech of Lord Clarendon on Thursday, the main points of which I have already reported, contained a most important revelation on the policy observed by the English Ministry in the Oriental question. He stated in plain words :

[*When war broke out, everybody believed Russia meant a war of further aggression, and intended a march southward of the Danube. Nobody thought Turkey could hold her at bay. So England and France sent engineers to Constantinople to devise means of defence for Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Raglan and St. Arnaud waited to meet those engineers, and then went to Gallipoli and threw up works.*]

The whole plan, then, of the Allied Powers was that Russia should advance into and occupy the provinces, and the allied forces the capital of the Ottoman Empire and the Dardanelles. Hence the delays and all the misunderstood movements of the Anglo-French forces. The bravery of the Turkish troops which baffled this Russo-Anglo-French trick was, of course, "unexpected."

The Capture of Bomarsund

LONDON, *August 21, 1854*
N. Y. T., September 4, 1854

You will see from the English press the first exploits of the British army at Bomarsund. These poor journals, which had never anything brilliant to report, are in great enthusiasm about the successes of 10,000 French troops over 2,000 Russians. I shall pass over these glories and occupy myself with the consideration of the result of this capture of an island—the *faubourg* of Stockholm and not of St. Petersburg. The French *Siècle* had announced, and its announcement was echoed by many journals, that Sweden would presently join the Western Powers against Russia in active measures. The probabilities of this announcement may be measured by the fact that Sweden concluded a treaty of armed neutrality at the very time it might have operated with success against the swamps and woods of Finland. Will it alter its policy now that the time for operations has gone by? England and France have refused King Oscar the required pecuniary and territorial guarantees for his adhesion. Moreover, how are we to explain the order of the Swedish Government for the disarmament of a whole squadron, on the supposition that Sweden is about to take the field? This disarmament extends to the ships of the line *Charles XII.* and *Prince Oscar*, the frigate *Desirée*, and the corvettes *Gefle* and *Thor*.

The capture of Bomarsund, now that the waters in those

latitudes will soon be covered with ice, can have no importance. At Hamburg, an opinion prevails that it is to be followed by the capture of Riga—an opinion based upon a letter of Captain Heathcote, commander of the *Archer*, to the English consul, Mr. Hertolet, at Memel, to the effect that all foreign vessels must have cleared from the harbour of Riga by the 10th inst.

Prussia is said to be greatly encouraging smuggling articles contraband of war on its Russian frontier, and at the same time preparing for a rupture with the Occidental Powers. The commanders of the harbours of Königsberg, Dantzic, Colberg, and Swinemünde, have received orders to arm these places.

The most influential papers of Norway and Sweden declare that: "it would be worse than madness to join the Allies, and make enormous sacrifices, unless on the fixed and well understood condition that Russia shall be broken up and Poland restored. Otherwise even the transfer of Finland to Sweden would be a delusion and a snare."

It ought to be remembered that all these northern Governments are in conflict with their own people. At Copenhagen, for instance, matters stand thus: the Schleswig-Holsteiners have determined to abstain from all elections for the Rigsdag; while at the same time the electors of Copenhagen have sent an address to Dr. Madrig, deputy of the Landthing, calling upon him not to accept a place in the Rigsdag, since the decree of the King was an infringement of the Danish Constitution and the rights of the Danish people.

LXXXIII

The Condition of Wallachia—Revolution in Turkey

LONDON, *September 12, 1854*

N. Y. T., September 30, 1854

TRAVELLERS who have recently arrived from Wallachia give a very distressing account of the state of that Principality. It is known that Russia saddled the Principalities with a debt of 14,000,000 francs, on account of the occupation in 1848-49. This sum has been raised by the Russian generals during the late occupation. The Russians retreated after having emptied all the chests—the vestry chests, the central chests of the monasteries, the municipal chests—and it is with the contents of these that they have paid the supplies contracted for with the Wallachian proprietors and peasants. But the transports, which make a very important item in an agricultural country, wood, coals, straw, etc., were not paid at all, but simply foraged. The Treasury of the Principalities accordingly is so much exhausted that the vestries are expected to become bankrupt. All this without taking into account the use of the houses transformed into hospitals, and the thousands of pounds of property entrusted to Russian hands from the Boyards' fear of Turkish robbery.

We read in a letter from Athens, dated 29th August :

“The king continues to refuse any indemnity to Turkey. The hatred against the Occidental troops increases, and already several French soldiers have been ill-treated by the people.”

It would be a curious history to expose to your readers how the Greek communities have been dissolved by British influence—how Capo d'Istria was imposed upon them, and how the whole of this people has been demoralized by the agency of Lord Palmerston. The honest intentions of the British Government even at this moment of their intervention in Greece are sufficiently betrayed by the support they give to General Kalergi, a man, like Capo d'Istria, born, bred, and domiciled in Russia.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the British Government have at length obtained what they have laboured to bring about—a revolution in Turkey, if not in Europe, at least in Anatolia. We knew already by reports from Rhodes that on the coast opposite this island, the Zeybeks, a war-like Ottoman mountain tribe, had revolted. The *Journal de Constantinople* of 20th August now announces that anarchy in those parts is daily increasing. The rebels, in the absence of the regular army, constantly descend from the mountains, invade the villages, raise the tithes, plunder the inhabitants and caravans, violate the women, and murder every one that resists. Their excesses are gravest in the province of Mestescak. From Aidin the Governor has been obliged to flee to Tireh. Denizli is in their hands, and the mufti Sahib Effendi, who went to inform the Governor-General, has been seized and beheaded with his followers. Their strength amounts to thousands. The source of these disturbances are the Bashi-Bazouks returning from Kars and Bayazid, who denounce the Porte for its oppression towards the Turks, and its submission towards Russia.

If we cast a look at Europe, we meet with symptoms of revolution in Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Danubian Principalities, Greece, Asiatic Turkey; and even in the ranks of the French army at Varna the cry has resounded, "A bas les singes!"

LXXXIV

The Fleet off at Last—Revolt of the Moldavians

LONDON, *September 15, 1854*

N. Y. T., October 2, 1854

WE read in yesterday's *Moniteur* the following telegraphic despatch:

"Therapia, September 7.—The French and the Turks left Varna on the 5th. The English fleet was to join them at the Island of the Serpents. The weather is beautiful."

The delay in the departure of this first portion of the expeditionary army was caused by the violent storms which visited the Bosphorus up to the 27th of August. The wind having come round from the north-east on the 27th, the fleet of transports was enabled to leave Constantinople for the Black Sea. The Isle of the Serpents (Ilade Adessi) is a little rocky islet at some distance from the Bessarabian coast, and nearly opposite the mouth of the Danube. Its circumference is not more than three English miles. The departure not having been effected until the 5th, the disembarkation of the troops cannot have taken place before the 9th of September.

A curious passage occurs in an article published by the *Moniteur*, in which the chances of the expedition are discussed.

[If Russian troops are more than we expect, or Sebastopol offers a PROTRACTED DEFENCE, or the SEASON offers obstacles,

or a large Russian army comes to the Crimea, the attack on Sebastopol must be resumed in spring.]

In one word, if any serious difficulties should be encountered by that "powerful armada, with its thousand of agencies of destruction," it will quickly return to the Bosphorus. At all events it will not be their fault if such difficulties should not be met with, due notice of the expedition having been given to the Czar months ago, and it having been delayed up to the very last days of the season. The confidence felt by the French mariners in their commander may be judged of by the following extract from a letter from Constantinople published by the *Augsburger Zeitung*:

[Sailors call St. Arnaud "Florival," his NOM DE THÉÂTRE at the Ambigu.]

According to the latest despatches from Hamburg and Copenhagen, part of the French fleet, transports and soldiers, have passed through the Belt on their return to France. A Bonapartist paper, the *Constitutionnel*, makes a revelation on the Bomarsund affair:

[Napoleon III. wished to recompense his sailors for their long Baltic cruise.]

Bomarsund, then, was only bombarded for the amusement of the fleet, and as a concession to the impatience and ennui of the officers. Those two laconic allusions of the *Moniteur* and *Constitutionnel* contain more in qualification of the character of the war than all the swaggering leading articles of the Ministerial English press.

The Czar has ordered the arrest of all the engineers who were engaged in the construction of the forts of Bomarsund. They are to be put on their trial. One of the charges raised against them is that the fortifications should have been constructed entirely of blocks of pure granite, while it has been proved since their fall that the interior of the walls was simply filled with sand and rough stones. All the commanders of the different fortresses along the Gulf of Finland have received orders from St. Petersburg to

inquire into the most minute details of their construction, and to report on this subject without delay. It is now ascertained that Fort Gustafsvärn at Hangöudd was blown up by the Russians themselves, at the moment when Baraguay d'Hilliers and General Jones appeared before it on their reconnoitring expedition. The Russians feared an attack on Abo, and in order to make the troops of Fort Gustafsvärn disposable for the defence of that town the fort was destroyed.

Some of the London papers to-day give telegraphic news of a victory gained by Schamyl somewhere in the neighbourhood of Tiflis. The French and German papers contain no mention of this fact. On September 4, the Turks crossed the Danube near Matschin, and occupied the island situated between that fortress and Braila. A great portion of the Turkish flotilla of the Danube has also cast anchor off Matschin. The occupation of Braila by the Turks was to take place on the 5th inst. You will notice the proclamation of General Krusenstern, posted upon the walls of Odessa on the 30th August, in which the inhabitants are warned, under heavy penalties, not to oppose the setting fire to the city should this act be deemed necessary by the troops for the defence of the country. The Russians have also given orders in all the districts of Bessarabia, to burn towns and villages at the approach of the enemy. The order is the more ludicrous as the Russians are well aware that the Roumanians of Bessarabia would no more regret their withdrawal than the Roumanians of Wallachia and Moldavia.

I have described the circumstances accompanying the enrolment in the Russian service of the Wallachian and Moldavian militia. From the English papers of to-day you will learn the details of the scenes which took place on the 28th August, between M. de Budberg and the officers of the Roumanian militia, scenes which ended in Captain Phillippesco telling the Russian general to his face that the Wallachians considered the Sultan as their only suzerain. He was, of course, placed under arrest, in company with

two brother officers who had indulged in similar remonstrances. The following account of the events which occurred on the 29th, the day on which the Russian campaign in the Principalities was brought to such a glorious conclusion, is from the *Paris Presse* of to-day.

[Irritation in the Moldavian militia; reluctance to serve in the Russian army. The cavalry and artillerymen decamp. Sixty are caught and surrounded by 12,000 Russians. The Russian soldiers load and take aim at them. Osten-Sacken, with Budberg, orders them to follow the Russian army or be shot. The Moldavians refuse. They are dismounted and made prisoners. So are thirty artillerymen that have not escaped. In the Moldavian infantry camp, the Russians find only 150 men. The population of Jassy utter execrations against their Russian "protectors."]

In a former letter I mentioned the order given by Omer Pasha to suppress the publication of the Austrian manifesto of General Hess. We are now informed on what grounds this order was given, viz., because the said proclamation called upon the Wallachian authorities to apply exclusively to the Austrian commander in all affairs. Omer Pasha sent word to General Hess that he had better abstain from intermeddling with the civil administration of Wallachia, which belonged to his (Omer Pasha's) province. Having only intended his proclamation as a feeler how far he might go, General Hess apologised for the objectionable passage, and in order to convince Omer Pasha that it was all a mistake, he communicated to him the original German text, where the Wallachian authorities are only invited to apply to his aides-de-camp in such matters as are connected with the Austrian troops. The Austrian general, Popovitch, who had entered Bucharest with the Austrian vanguard on the 3rd September, and immediately commenced to play the part of Haynau, was likewise checked by Omer Pasha. How welcome the Austrian occupation is to the Wallachians in general may be understood from an extract from to-day's *Daily News*:

[Villages on Austrian line of march deserted by inhabitants, carrying with them all their goods.]

It is certainly with respect to the infamies committed in the Principalities—the *consequences of English diplomacy*—that the sober *Economist*, alluding to some comparatively very slight faults of American diplomacy in Europe, draws the following line of distinction between English and American diplomacy :

[*No doubt men of gentlemanly feeling abound in America as in England. But they do not elect the Government, give the tone to the nation or GUIDE THE PRESS. In England the UPPER CLASSES have the power in their hands. In America the masses govern.*]

Thus speaks the servant of the English stock-jobbers, as if English diplomacy were not an identical term with infamy, and as if the “gentlemen” appointed by Mr. Wilson, the editor of *The Economist*, and Mr. Gladstone, his superior, had not been convicted before Parliament of swindling, gambling, and larceny.

LXXXV

The Attack on Sebastopol

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, October 14, 1854

At last it seems possible that the French and English may strike a serious blow at the power and prestige of Russia, and we in this country are accordingly looking with renewed interest to the movement against Sebastopol, the latest intelligence from which is detailed in another column. As a matter of course, the British and French journals make a great parade about this undertaking, and if we can believe them, nothing grander was ever heard of in military history; but those who look at the facts in the case—at the inexplicable delays and senseless apologies attending the setting out of the expedition, and all the circumstances preceding and attending it—will refuse to be imposed upon. The termination of the enterprise may be glorious, but its origin would rather seem to be disgraceful.

Look at the past history of the allied armies in Turkey. At first these very heroic, but also exceedingly cautious, warriors intended to land at Enos, on this side of the Dardanelles, and to approach that peninsula only after everything should have turned out to be quite safe. Before this daring feat, however, was accomplished, they stretched their courage to an unexpected extent, and risked a landing on the Thracian Chersonesus at Gallipoli. But this was merely done in order to have the defensive works across the peninsula completed in less time, thus securing to themselves that most essential of all requisites, a base of opera-

tions. All the while the Turks on the Danube were facing those formidable opponents whose presence in Wallachia was the pretext for these learned manœuvres of the Allies; and they were facing them, too, with considerable success. But as more ships and more troops arrived, it was found out that the Dardanelles and the Peninsula cannot harbour them all. Thus another hole is made in the scientific arrangements agreed upon between Paris and London. A portion of the troops had actually to endure the dangers and risks of a landing at that very exposed spot, Constantinople! To remedy this, the fortification of this town was at once taken in hand. Fortunately a good deal of time was spent in all these operations, and thus the main object was secured—not to gain time, but to lose it. Then it was ascertained that a division might, with little risk, be sent to Varna, to garrison that important place; for surely the Turks who so gloriously defended it in 1828, had since then made such progress in European discipline that the defence of such a post could no longer be entrusted to them. The division was sent accordingly, and one or two divisions more. When finally every pretext for keeping the troops in the Bosphorus was fairly worn out, the grand combined army was very leisurely concentrated at Varna. This was done at the same time when an Austrian army appeared like a menacing thunder-cloud on the flank and rear of the Russians, and when thus, by political combinations, the base of the allied operations was at once transferred for the moment from Constantinople to Transylvania and Galicia. Without this, there is every reason to believe there would never have been an allied army in Bulgaria. The proof of it is in their behaviour during the siege of Silistria. Everybody knows that there was the turning-point of the campaign, and that on such an emergency, when both parties have been straining their powers to the utmost, the smallest extra weight added on one side will, in nine cases out of ten, turn the balance in its favour. Yet, during this decisive siege there were 20,000 English and 30,000 French soldiers, “the flower of the two armies,” smoking their

pipes and very quietly getting themselves in trim for the cholera at a very few days' march from the fortress. And, but for the havoc made by disease among the Russians, and for the unaccountable bravery of a handful of Arnauts ensconced in a ditch ploughed by shells in every direction, Silistria would have fallen into the hands of the enemy. There is no instance in the history of war of an army within easy reach, thus cowardly leaving its allies to shift for themselves. No expedition to the Crimea, and no victory will ever clear away that stain from the honour of the French and English commanders. Where would the British have been at Waterloo if old Blucher, after his defeat at Ligny, two days before, had thus conscientiously acted in the manner of Raglan and St. Arnaud?

The handful of Arnauts in the skirmishing ditch of Arab Tabiassi proved a match for the skill, intellect, and military strength of Russia. No relieving army drove the Russians across the Danube; their own foolishness, the valour of the defenders, the marsh fever, the passive weight of the Austrians on the Dniester and of the Allies on the Devna (for who could think they would act as they did?) made them finally abandon the siege, and give up both the campaign, the Principalities, and the Dobrudscha. After this great success, the allied generals of course thought of following it up—always according to the rules of that strategic system which they had hitherto applied with so much effect. Consequently, Lord Cardigan led the British cavalry to the Danube, on a reconnoitring expedition, in which they saw no Russians, lost many horses, and earned nothing but sickness and ridicule; while General L'Espinasse, mainly known by his betrayal of the National Assembly on December 2, 1851, led his division into the Dobrudscha for no other purpose than having a couple of fine regiments half destroyed by cholera, and bringing the germ of that epidemic into the allied camp. The great invasion of cholera which ensued among the Allies at Varna was thus the well-earned result of their fine strategic combinations. The soldiers fell off by thousands before they

had even seen an enemy; they died like flies in a camp where, unattacked and undisturbed, they were enabled to live in comparative luxury. Discouragement, distrust in their commanders, disorganization, ensued, not so much among the English, who suffered less and who have more power of endurance, as among the French, whose national character is more apt to give way to such influences, especially while their commanders hold them in a state of inactivity. But there was visible in the riots that actually broke out among the French troops the natural effect of the abnormal state in which they have existed since 1849. The French soldier has been taught by the bourgeoisie he rescued from the terrors of the Revolution, to look upon himself as the saviour of his country and of society at large. He has been petted by Louis Bonaparte as the instrument that restored the Empire. He was treated all the while in a way which taught him to command and made him forget to obey. Superior as he was instructed to consider himself to civilians, he very soon got a notion that he was at least equal to his commanders. Every effort was used to make him a Pretorian, and all history shows that Pretorians are but degenerate soldiers. They begin by commanding the civilians, they next proceed to dictating to their generals, and they end by being thoroughly thrashed.

Now look at what occurred at Varna. When whole battalions dropped down on the burning sands, writhing in the agonies of cholera, the old soldiers began to compare the adventurers who now are at their head, with the old commanders that led them successfully through those very African campaigns which the heroes of the modern Lower Empire affect so much to disdain. Africa was a hotter country than Bulgaria, and the Sahara is a good deal less pleasant than even the Dobrudscha; but no such mortalities ever marked the paths of African conquest as attended the repose of Devna, and the easy reconnoitring marches around Kustendji. Cavaignac, Bedeau, Changarnier, Lamoricière led them through greater dangers with far less loss, at a time when Espinasse and Leroy St. Arnaud were

still buried in the obscurity from which political infamies alone could raise them. Accordingly the Zouaves, the men who had done most work and smelt most powder, the best representatives of the African army rose in a body and shouted, "A bas les singes! Il nous faut Lamoricière!" (Down with the apes! Give us Lamoricière!) His Imperial Majesty, Napoleon III., the head and soul of this actual official apery of a great past, must have felt when this came to his knowledge that the cry of the Zouaves was for him "the beginning of the end." At Varna, it had a magic effect. We may say that it was the chief cause of the expedition to the Crimea.

After the experience of this summer's campaigning, or rather promenading, from Gallipoli to Scutari, from Scutari to Varna, from Varna to Devna, Aladyn and back again, nobody will expect us to treat seriously the pretexts put forth by the allied commanders why the expedition, after being so long delayed, was finally so hurriedly undertaken. One instance will sufficiently show what their arguments are worth. The delay was owing, it was said, to the French siege artillery not having arrived. Well, when the cholera riots occurred, and Leroy St. Arnaud saw that he must now play his best card and that without delay, he sent to Constantinople for Turkish siege artillery and ammunition, and it was got ready and embarked in a very short time; and if the French siege train had not arrived in the meantime, they would have sailed without it. But the Turkish siege artillery was ready many a month before, and thus all the delays that had occurred are proved to have been needless.

Thus we see that this grandiloquent expedition to the Crimea, with six hundred ships and sixty thousand soldiers, with three siege trains and nobody knows how many field-pieces, instead of being the deliberate result of skilful movements, prepared scientifically long beforehand, is nothing but a hurried *coup de tête* undertaken to save Leroy Saint Arnaud from being massacred by his own soldiers; poor old soft Lord Raglan not being the man to resist, especially as

any longer delay would bring his army down to the same state of discipline and despondency which has already seized the French troops. The *irony of events*, as a German writer has it, is still at work in contemporary as much as in past history, and poor Lord Raglan is its present victim. As to Leroy Saint Arnaud, nobody ever treated him as a commander. He is a member of the swell mob of too long standing—this notorious old companion of female thieves and swindlers—this worthy acolyte of the man whom “Debt, not Destiny,” hurried on to the expedition of Boulogne. In spite of this censorship, his character and antecedents are known well enough in gossiping Paris. The twice-cashiered lieutenant, the captain who robbed the regimental cash-box when paymaster in Africa, is known well enough, and whatever he may accomplish in the Crimea, his successful expedition to a London pawnshop with his landlady’s blankets, followed up by his well-executed retreat to Paris, will still form his chief title to military glory. But poor Raglan, the Duke of Wellington’s Adjutant-General, a man grown hoary among the theoretical labours and minute details of a staff command, no doubt actually believes in the motives he gives for his actions. And upon him falls the full weight of the curious fact that the whole of the campaign has been so scientifically planned, so skilfully executed, that ten thousand men, or about one in seven, died before they saw an enemy, and that the whole of these elaborate proceedings have served only to bring about a helter-skelter expedition into the Crimea at the close of the season. There is nothing so pungent as this very “irony of events.”

For all that, the expedition may be successful. The Allies almost deserve it, for nothing would hold up to greater contempt the way in which they have previously carried on the campaign. So much fuss, such an expenditure of caution, such a profusion of science, against an enemy who succumbs to an undertaking which has for its end, not his destruction, but the preservation of their own army; this would be the greatest condemnation the Allies could pass upon themselves.

But then, they are not yet in Sebastopol. They have landed at Eupatoria and at Staroye Kreplienic. Thence they have respectively fifty and twenty miles' march to Sebastopol. Their heavy artillery is to be landed close to the latter place, to save the trouble of land-carriage; the landing then is far from completed. The force of the Russians is not exactly known, but there is no doubt it is large enough to allow them to be stronger than the Allies on most points in the immediate vicinity of Sebastopol. The hilly ground and the bay cutting into the land some ten miles deep, will force the Allies to expand on a very long line as soon as they attempt to invest the fortress. To break their line cannot, with a determined commander, be a matter of great difficulty. We do not of course know what the land defences of the place are; but what we know of old Mentschikoff leads us to presume that he will not have lost his time.

The first attack, we are led to believe from statements in the British journals, and by the line of operations chosen by the Allies, will be the fort commanding the town from a hill on the north side. This is called by the Russians Syevernaya Kryepost, the Northern Fort. If this fort is anything like solidly constructed, it is capable of lengthy resistance. It is a large square redoubt, constructed upon Montalembert's polygonal, or *caponnière* system, the flanking defence being formed by a low casemated work lying at the bottom of the ditch in the middle of each side of the square, and sweeping the ditch both right and left. These works have the advantage of not being exposed to the direct fire of the enemy until he has come with his works to the very brink of the ditch. The proximity of this work to the main fortress allows it to be made use of offensively as a support and base for strong sorties, and altogether its presence must force the Allies to confine their main operations to the northern shore of the bay.

But the experience of Bomarsund has taught us that nothing certain can be said about Russian fortifications until they are actually put to the test. The chances of success for the Crimea expedition cannot, therefore, now be

ascertained with any probability. But this much is pretty certain, that if the operations should be of a protracted character, if the setting in of winter should cause a fresh irruption of sickness, if the troops should be wasted in hurried and unprepared attacks, like those of the Russians against Silistria, the French army, and most likely the Turkish army, will relapse into that state of dissolution which the former underwent at Varna, and the latter has more than once exhibited in Asia. The English are sure to hold together longer; but there is a point at which even the best disciplined troops give way. This is the real danger for the Allies, and if the Russian resistance brings this state of things about, it must make a re-embarkation before a victorious enemy a very hazardous thing. The expedition may very likely prove successful; but, on the other hand, it may turn out a second Walcheren.

LXXXVI

The Decay of Religious Authority

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, October 24, 1854

THE days in which religious considerations were a governing element in the wars of Western Europe are, it seems, long gone by. The Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, which wound up the Thirty Years' War in Germany, marks the epoch when such questions lost their force and disappeared as a moving cause of international strife. The attitude of the two great Powers of Western Europe in the present war against Russia is a striking illustration of this truth. We there see England, professedly Protestant, allied with France, professedly Catholic ("damnable heretical" as they naturally are in each other's eyes, according to the orthodox phraseology of both), for the purpose of defending Turkey, a Mohammedan Power, whose destruction they ought most religiously to desire, against the aggressions of "holy" Russia, a Power Christian like themselves; and though the position of Austria and Prussia is more equivocal than that of England and France, the maintenance of the Mussulman Empire in its integrity against the assaults of its Christian neighbour of the North is an object that has been avowed and guaranteed equally with France and England, by the two great Powers of Christian Germany. Religious considerations are certainly not the influences which restrain these from action against Russia.

To perfectly appreciate this state of things we must call to mind the period of the Crusades, when Western Europe, so

late as the thirteenth century, undertook a "holy war" against the "infidel" Turks for the possession of the Holy Sepulchre. Western Europe now not only acquiesces in the Mussulman jurisdiction over the Sepulchre, but goes so far as to laugh at the contests and rivalries of the Greek and Latin monks to obtain undivided possession of a shrine once so much coveted by all Christendom; and when Christian Russia steps forward to "protect" the Christian subjects of the Porte, Western Europe of to-day arrays itself in arms against the Czar to thwart a design which it would once have deemed highly laudable and righteous. To drive the Moslems out of Europe would once have roused the zeal of England and France; to prevent the Turks from being driven out of Europe is now the most cherished resolve of those nations. So broad a gulf stands between Europe of the nineteenth and Europe of the thirteenth century! So fallen away since the latter epoch is the political influence of religious dogma.

We have carefully watched for any expression of the purely ecclesiastical view of the European crisis, and have only found one pamphlet by a Cambridge D.D., and one North British Reviewer for England, and the Paris *Univers* for France, which have dogmatically represented the defence of a Mohammedan Power by Christendom as absolutely sinful; and these pronunciamientos have remained without an echo in either country. Whence is this?

From the period of the Protestant Reformation, the upper classes in every European nation, whether it remained Catholic or adopted Protestantism, and especially the statesmen, legists, and diplomatists, began to unfasten themselves individually from all religious relief, and become freethinkers so-called. This intellectual movement in the higher circles manifested itself without reserve in France from the time of Louis XIV., resulting in the universal predilection for what was denominated Philosophy during the eighteenth century. But when Voltaire found residence in France no longer safe, not because of his opinions, nor because he had given oral expression to them, but because he had communi-

cated them by his writings to the whole reading public, he betook himself to England and testified that he found the *salons* of high life in London still "freer" than those of Paris. Indeed, the men and women of the court of Charles II., Bolingbroke, the Walpoles, Hume, Gibbon, and Charles Fox, are names which all suggest a prevalent unbelief in religious dogmas, and a general adhesion to the philosophy of that age on the part of the upper classes, statesmen and politicians of England. This may be called, by way of distinction, the era of aristocratic revolt against ecclesiastical authority. Comte, in one short sentence, has characterized this situation :

"From the opening of the revolutionary period in the 16th century this system of hypocrisy has been more and more elaborated in practice, *permitting the emancipation of all minds of a certain bearing*, on the tacit condition that they should aid in protracting the submission of the masses. This was eminently the policy of the Jesuits."

This brings us down to the period of the French Revolution, when the masses, firstly of France, and afterwards of all Western Europe, along with a desire for political and social freedom, began to entertain an ever-growing aversion from religious dogma. The total abolition of Christianity, as a recognised institution of State by the French Republican Convention of 1793, and since then the gradual repeal in Western Europe, wherever the popular voice has had power, of religious tests and political and civil disabilities of the same character, together with the Italian movement of 1848, sufficiently announce the well-known direction of the popular mind in Europe. We are still witnesses of this epoch, which may be characterized as the era of democratic revolt against ecclesiastical authority.

But this very movement among the masses since the French Revolution, bound up as it was with the movement for social equality, brought about a violent reaction in favour of church authority in high quarters. Nobility and clergy, lords temporal and lords spiritual, found themselves equally threatened by the popular movement, and

it naturally came to pass that the upper classes of Europe threw aside their scepticism in public life and made an *outward* alliance with the State churches and their systems. This reaction was most apparent in France, first under Bonaparte, and during the Restoration under the elder branch of the Bourbons, but it was not less the case with the rest of Western Europe. In our own day we have seen renewed on a smaller scale this patching up of an alliance offensive and defensive between the upper classes and the ecclesiastical interest. Since the epoch of 1830 the statesmen had begun to manifest anew a spirit of independence towards ecclesiastical control, but the events of 1848 threw them back into the arms of Mother Church. Again France gave the clearest exemplification of this phenomenon. In 1849, when the terror of the Democratic deluge was at its height, Messrs. Thiers, De Hauranne, and the Universitarians (who had passed for Atheists with the clergy), together with the so-called Liberal Opposition, were unanimous in supporting that admirably qualified "saviour of religion," M. Bonaparte, in his project for the violent restoration of the Pope of Rome, while the Whig Ministry of Protestant England, at whose head was a member of the ultra-Protestant family of Russell, were warm in their approval of the same expedition. This religious restoration by such processes was indeed only redeemed from universal ridicule by the extremely critical posture of affairs which, for the moment, in the interest of "order" did not allow the public men of Europe to indulge in the sense of the ludicrous.

But the submission of the classes of leading social influence to ecclesiastical control, which was hollow and hypocritical at the beginning of this century after the Revolution of 1792, has been far more precarious and superficial since 1848, and is only acknowledged by those classes so far as it suits their immediate political interest. The humiliating position of utter dependence which the ecclesiastical power sustains toward the temporal arm of Government has been made fully manifest since 1848. The Pope

indebted to the French Government for his present tenure of the chair of St. Peter; the French clergy, for the sake of their salaries, blessing trees of liberty and proclaiming the sovereignty of the people, and afterwards canonizing the present Emperor of France as the chosen instrument of God and the saviour of religion, their old proper doctrines of legitimacy, and the divine right of kings being in each case laid aside with the downfall of the corresponding political *régime*; the Anglican clergy, whose *ex officio* head is a temporal Queen, dependent for promotion on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, now generally a Liberal, and looking for favours and support against popular encroachment to Parliament in which the 'Liberal element is ever on the increase—constitute an *ensemble* from which it would be absurd to expect acts of pure ecclesiastical independence, except in the normally impossible case of an overwhelming popular support to fall back upon.

Such was the position of affairs in 1853, when the governing classes of England and France deemed it necessary and politic to espouse the cause of the Ottoman Porte against the Christian Czar; and that policy was not only sanctioned, but in a measure forced upon them by the popular sentiment of the two nations. Then the Governments of France and England entered upon a policy totally inconsistent with religious considerations, and threw off unhesitatingly their feigned ecclesiastical alliances. Then at length the upper-class current of revolt (which had been so long dissembled) formed a juncture with the broad popular current, and the two together, like the Missouri and the Mississippi, rolled onward a tide of opinion which the ecclesiastical power saw it would be madness to encounter. Beneath this twofold assault the pure ecclesiastical point of view has not dared to manifest itself; while, on the contrary, the state clergy of England, on the appointed day of the national fast and humiliation, had to pray and preach patriotic sermons on behalf of the success of the Crescent and its allies. These considerations seem to afford a rational explanation of two apparent anomalies with which we started; namely,

the defence of the Crescent by allied Catholic and Protestant Europe against the assaults of the Cross, as represented by Christian Russia, and the fact that no voice of any influence has been lifted up to denounce to Christendom the novel position in which it is placed.

This coalition between the politicians of Western Europe and the popular opinion in behalf of a purely secular policy, is likely to generate ulterior consequences and to subject ecclesiastical influence to further shocks from its old accomplices, the politicians. It is doubtless owing to the ripeness of the public mind in this respect, that Lord Palmerston ventured to refuse the request of the Edinburgh Presbytery for a day of public fast and humiliation to avert the divine scourge of cholera, the Home Secretary audaciously averring that prayers would be of no consequence unless they cleansed their streets and habitations, and that cholera was generated by natural causes, such as deleterious gases from decomposed vegetable matter. The vain and unscrupulous Palmerston knew that buffeting the clergy would be a cheap and easy way of acquiring popularity, otherwise he would not have ventured on the experiment.

A further evidence of the extreme incompetence of ecclesiastical policy to answer the exigencies of the European situation is found in the consideration that the ecclesiastical view, if logically carried out, would condemn Catholic Europe to entire indifference in the present European crisis; for though it might be permissible for Anglican orthodoxy to side with the Greek Cross against the Turkish Crescent, Catholic Europe could not unite with so impious a denier of the authority of the successor of St. Peter, and so unhallowed a pretender to the highest spiritual functions, as the Czar of Russia, and would apparently have no other opinion to utter than that both the belligerent parties were inspired by Satan!

To complete the disparagement which ecclesiastical authority has undergone in the present European crisis, it is patent to the world that while the advanced communi-

ties of Western Europe are in a forward stage of ecclesiastical decay, in barbarian Russia, on the other hand, the State Church retains a powerful and undiminished vigour. While Western Europe, discarding religious biases, has advanced in defence of "right against might" and "for the independence of Europe," "holy" Russia has claimed for its war of might against right a religious sanction as a war of the vicegerent of God against the infidel Turks. It is true that Nesselrode, in his State papers, has never had the assurance in the face of Europe to appeal to the ecclesiastical aspect of the question, and this is in itself a remarkable symptom of the decline of the ecclesiastical sentiment; this method of treatment is reserved by the Russian Court for internal use among the ignorant and credulous Muscovites, and the miracle-pictures, the relics, the crusading proclamations of the Russian generals show how much stress is there laid upon the religious phase of the struggle for inflaming the zeal of the Russian people and army. Even the St. Petersburg journals do not omit to cast in the teeth of France and England the reproach that they are fighting on behalf of the abhorred Crescent, against the religion of the Cross. Such a contrast between religious Russia and secular France and England is worthy of a profound and thorough examination, which we cannot undertake to give it, our object being simply to call to these large, impressive, and novel facts a degree of attention they have not hitherto received. They are facts which perhaps the philosophic and religious historians of the future will alone be able to appreciate at their exact value. They appear, however, to constitute an important step in the great movement of the world towards abrogating absolute authority and establishing the independence of the individual judgment and conscience in the religious as well as the political sphere of life. To defend or attack that movement is not our purpose; our duty is discharged in the simple attestation of its progress.

LXXXVII

The Military Power of Russia

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, October 31, 1854

WE may safely leave John Bull and Jacques Bonhomme, for a while, to their rejoicings at the "glorious victory" of the Alma and their anticipations of the fall of Sebastopol. The war on the Danube and in the Crimea, whatever importance it may have in the eyes of the Allies and of the United Middle Class Liberalism of Europe, has very little weight as far as Russia is concerned. The centre of gravity of that country is in no wise affected by its possible results; while a defeat in the Crimea and forced retreat of the Allies would cripple their land operations for a considerable time, and give them a moral check to recover from which would require their utmost exertions.

Some authentic reports of the distribution and late movements of the Russian forces have lately come to hand, and it may be well to sum them up in order to show how little, comparatively speaking, of the Russian force is as yet engaged, and what the remainder is expected to perform. [*Here follows a detailed analysis of Russia's troops, which we omit.*]

There is no doubt that Nicholas cares comparatively little what happens to the south of his Empire, so long as he can concentrate above 300,000 men in the splendid strategical position of Poland. And a splendid position it is. Driven in like a wedge between Prussia and Austria, it outflanks both, while it is protected by the strongest means

of resistance which art and nature combined can produce. Napoleon knew the military importance of the country enclosed by the Vistula and its affluents. He made it his base of operations for the campaign of 1807, until he took Danzig. But he neglected permanently to fortify it, and paid dearly for this after the retreat of 1812. The Russians, especially since 1831, have done what their predecessors in power omitted to do. Modlin, (Novo-Georgevitch,) Warsaw, Ivangorod Brzesc, Litewski, form a system of fortifications stronger in its strategical combination than any other in the world. This system offers a position in which a beaten army may defy double its numbers as long as it has plenty to eat; and to cut off a whole country from all communications is a thing that has not yet been attempted. This whole complex system of fortresses, says a German military writer who knows the country, indicates even more an aggressive than a defensive spirit. It is planned not so much to maintain the ground on which it stands, as to serve as a base for offensive attacks towards the West.

And there are people who believe that Nicholas will sue for peace if Sebastopol be taken! Why Russia has not played one-third of her trumps yet, and the momentary loss of Sebastopol and of the fleet is hardly felt at all by the giant to whom Sebastopol and the fleet were but a plaything. Russia knows full well that her decisive action does not lie along the sea shores or within reach of disembarking troops; but, on the contrary, on the broad interior of the continent, where massive armies can be brought to act concentrated on one spot, without frittering away their forces in a fruitless coast defence against evanescent enemies. Russia may lose the Crimea, the Caucasus, Finland, St. Petersburg, and all such appendages; but as long as her body, with Moscow for its heart, and fortified Poland for its sword-arm, is untouched, she need not give in an iota.

The grand actions of 1854 are, we dare say, but the petty preludes of the battles of nations which will mark the

annals of 1855. It is not until the great Russian army of the West, and the Austrian army come into play, no matter whether against each other or with each other, that we shall see real war on a large scale, something like the grand wars of Napoleon. And, perhaps, these battles may be the preludes merely of other battles far more fierce, far more decisive—the battles of the European peoples against the now victorious and secure European despots.

LXXXVIII

The Siege of Sebastopol

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, November 15, 1854

NEXT to the battle of the Alma, the principal achievement of the Allies in the Crimea has been Lord Raglan's famous flank march from the Alma to Balaklava, by which he changed the apparent object of the campaign from the capture and occupation of Sebastopol to a *coup de main* against a portion—and the weaker portion, too—of the fortifications, including, of course, the destruction of the Russian fleets, dockyards, and arsenals, but involving the withdrawal of the allied forces as soon as this object should be attained. That such must be the case was plain, from the entire movement in question. It was an abandonment of the idea of attacking the northern front of the fortress, which is the commanding front, where alone an attack could really be decisive; and thus it was a patent confession of incompetence on the part of the expedition to accomplish what was laid down in its programme—the complete capture and occupation of the place. Nevertheless, as we said, this very march has been glorified as a most brilliant stroke of generalship through columns on columns of high-sounding phrases and rhetorical gibberish; and even the great journals of London, with their correspondents on the spot, did not discover the truth till a month afterwards, when the Government seems to have given them a hint of it. Thus, the London *Times* of October 28, for the first time opening its eyes to the true state of the case, gently

indicates that the minor object of the campaign may be the only one accomplished, and that the forts on the north side of the bay, if they do not voluntarily surrender, can hardly be taken. But *The Times* hopes they will behave respectably, and surrender, inasmuch as all dependent fortifications ought to give in when once the main body of the place is taken. But the truth is, that it is not the North Fort which depends upon the town of Sebastopol, but the town of Sebastopol which depends upon the North Fort, and we fear the argument of our contemporary will hardly suffice to take so strong a fortress.

It is true that since the "glorious march" in question, nothing has been done by the Allies of which anybody could boast much, and, therefore, our transatlantic contemporaries are not to blame for making the most of it. As for the siege itself so far as it has proceeded, it is one of those things of which they may well think that the less said the better. But as we are bound to nothing but impartiality in the premisses, we shall not be so delicate. The truth is that the war in general being an exceedingly curious war, this siege is one of its most curious points. The great feature of the war appears to be a belief that fieldworks are impregnable. First at Oltenitza, the old-fashioned way of cannonading was employed for a couple of hours, and then the works were stormed, but without success. At Kalafat the Russians did not even dare to make an attack. At Silistria a mere earth-work bore the brunt of the battle, and held out, even when almost levelled, against the frantic onslaught of the enemy. Now, at Sebastopol a simple line of fieldworks is honoured with more extensive breaching batteries, and with far heavier artillery than were ever brought to bear against the most regular fortress. This siege is a striking proof of the fact that in the same proportion as the *materiel* of warfare has, by industrial progress, advanced during the long peace, in the same proportion has the *art* of war degenerated. A Napoleon, on seeing the batteries before Sebastopol, bristling with eight and ten-inch guns, would burst out in a fit of

irresistible laughter. But this is not the whole story by a great deal.

About the 1st of October, the Allies were in position, but it was not till the 8th or 9th that the first ground was broken, and fire was not opened till the 17th. The reason of this delay was, that the guns could not be brought up sooner. There were only four or five miles of ground to go over—all good, hard soil, with little undulation, and part of it a passable road. But they had no draught cattle. No draught cattle in the Crimea,—the richest country for cattle in the whole world! Why, there were more bullocks in the valley of Baidar, within sight from the heights of the Chernaya, than would have been required to drag all the united fleet across the hills. But the valley of Baidar was open to the Cossacks, and the allied cavalry, in protecting a *razzia*, might be exposed to these formidable opponents. Besides, the Allies must keep on good terms with the inhabitants, and not seize their property. With such excuses our English contemporaries seek to hide the truth that Raglan and Canrobert, while blockading Sebastopol on the south, are themselves blockaded by Mentschikoff's outposts on the Chernaya. And yet, that they are so is proved by the simple fact that the allied soldiers, up to the latest report, were compelled to live upon salt meat, no fresh meat being at hand.

On the 3rd of October five Russian battalions crossed the Chernaya near Inkerman, and were allowed to enter the fortress from the south, as "this could but be favourable to the Allies." An original mode of making war! The enemy, represented as beaten, demoralized, dejected, sends 3,000 men into Sebastopol, under the very nose of the Allies. He must have had a reason for doing so. But if he has reasons for sending them, Raglan has his reasons for bowing them in. He supposes the place to be overcrowded, though upon what grounds is not clear. At all events, besides the four square miles enclosed within the Russian lines, there is the whole of the north shore and all the country lying behind it, to which any excess of troops may be sent in ten

minutes. To represent a place as overcrowded, which is blockaded on one side only, is certainly the height of absurdity.

When the landing was first reported, we said that disease would be the worst enemy of the Allies, if the campaign should be lengthened. Disease is there in its worst forms, coupled, at least as far as the British are concerned, with the very worst sort of attendance. Indeed, to such an extent have the sick been neglected from this cause, that Lord Raglan has been obliged to issue a very peremptory reprimand to the medical staff. But this is not all. The doctors are at Constantinople, the medical stores at Varna, and the sick at Balaklava. Is not this a splendid illustration of the new military doctrine lately held forth by Louis Bonaparte at Boulogne, that every army, to have a good position, must be placed in a triangle? The sickness increases with the roughness of the season, the regiments dwindle down—a British regiment sent out 1,000 strong now cannot count more than 600 men under arms—and the slowness of operations goes on in its even course. The routine of the Horse Guards, the fruit of forty years' peaceful schooling, is not to be upset by trifles of that sort. Perish the army, but let Sebastopol be taken according to her Majesty's regulations!

In common sieges the besiegers usually try to place their first batteries as near as possible to the enemy's works, and six or seven hundred yards is considered a great distance. But in a grand siege like this, particularly against mere fieldworks, just the reverse should be done, according to Raglan. The enemy allows us to come within seven hundred yards, but we must never do what the enemy wants us to do. So says Raglan, and opens his batteries at 2,500 and 3,000 yards distance—a fact we could not believe did the reports leave it possible to doubt. Next he comes down to 1,500 and 1,200 yards, and then states, as a reason for not opening fire, that breaching batteries, to be effective, must be within three or four hundred yards from the works to be breached! The distant batteries are to have Lancaster and long range ten-inch guns, since it seems the British artiller-

ists are of opinion that these guns are like telescopes, only good at a great distance. Indeed, this long-range question, which is perfectly in its place for naval armaments, has caused more confusion and humbug than real good when applied to land artillery ; we have an example of it in these ridiculous batteries.

The landward fortifications of Sebastopol, which have provoked all these outbursts of genius and perspicacity, are as follows : On the western side (attacked by the French) one or two faces of the Quarantine Fort are exposed. Behind this is a loop-holed wall running up toward the head of the Quarantine Bay, and ending on a hill in a round tower which forms a redoubt for an earthwork constructed around it. Thence a wall of three feet average thickness is continued to the upper end of the harbour, thus enclosing Sebastopol on the south-west. This wall is said to be incapable of any defence, although it might easily have been made so ; it is, therefore, protected by small earthworks lying in front of it. From the end of the harbour eastward to the Careening Bay (the British front of attack) there are no regular defences whatever, except two towers surrounded and sheltered by lunettes, in a similar manner to the one described above. There are, besides, some earthworks of irregular form, the whole forming an entrenched camp of no great pretensions, if we are to believe the published plans of Captain Biddulph sketched on the spot. At all events, they show only one line of defences, consisting of works open in the rear ; there are no closed redoubts, of which as a general thing the Russians are so exceedingly fond. But we cannot believe that this is the case ; if this was the only line to take, the British ought long since to have taken it with the bayonet. There must be a second line of redoubts behind it.

The whole of the Russian works have been armed with heavy guns from the fleet—the best use the Russians could make of them. Yet their practice with them is despicable. They fire away whole days and nights at the enemy, and make one hit for a hundred rounds. Perhaps it was this very bad practice which induced Lord Raglan to open his

trenches at the safe distance of 3,000 yards. After three days' bombardment by the allied fleets and armies, it is stated that the British, on their side, had made one breach, while the French had not yet completed theirs. As soon as this was completed, the assault was to take place. That it should take 200 guns of immense calibre three or four days to breach such defences would be incredible, had we not very good authority for the respectful distance at which the allied batteries had been constructed. So much for the results already achieved; but whatever event may crown the operations, it is certain that the siege of Sebastopol will stand unparalleled in military history.

LXXXIX

Progress of the War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, January 1, 1855

THE sun of Austerlitz has melted in water. A great battle, as was confidently announced and believed in Paris, was to be fought before Sebastopol in celebration of the second of December, but from a despatch of General Canrobert, of the third of December, it appears that "rain was falling in torrents, the roads were cut up, the trenches filled with water, and the siege operations—as well as all the works—put in a state of suspense."

The Russians hitherto had the offensive, the Allies the defensive, superiority on the Chernaya; at the walls of Sebastopol it was the reverse. In other words the Russians were strong enough on the Chernaya to hold the field, but the Allies were not, though able to keep their position; while at Sebastopol the Allies, strong enough to carry on the siege, were so nearly equally matched by the garrison that the operations, though not stopped from without, yet proceeded with hardly any visible effect. The proportions of force seem about to change, and the Allies appear on the point of becoming strong enough to repulse the Russians from the Chernaya. In that case, the Russians can act in two ways, after having lost their position above Inkerman. Either they can go round and take up the entrenched camp about the North Fort, or they can with their main body retreat into the interior, where the Allies cannot follow them far. The Allies can hardly be strong enough before

February either to invest the northern camp or follow a retreating army much further than Baktchiserai. They could scarcely fight a second battle against an army entrenched somewhere about Simpheropol. In either case they would have to fall back on the Chernaya, and thus this game of alternate advance and retreat is likely to be played all the winter over, unless, indeed, Sebastopol, on the south side, succumbs to an assault. But as the news which we receive respecting the siege is very meagre, we cannot say any more on this point than that it is not at all likely. We are, indeed, aware that, according to a despatch of December 7, published in the Paris *Moniteur*, and reprinted in the London papers, the allied armies had all of a sudden got the upper hand, and only two days after the deluge "almost completed the investment of the town." This spurious despatch was evidently concocted with a view to make amends for the baffled second of December prophecy.

A short time ago we gave a statement of the sum total of the Russian army, together with its disposal. We then showed that of these nearly three-quarters of a million soldiers, up to the present time hardly one-third had been engaged in active operations, and that the far greater portion of the remaining two-thirds were employed to menace Austria. In spite of the reinforcements sent to the Crimea, matters have not been much altered since then; for Dannenberg's corps, the 4th, which marched to the relief of Sebastopol, was withdrawn from the army of the Danube, where it had been previously reinforced. The only essential change in the position of the great western army of Russia, as we may call the corps of some 300,000 men concentrated on the Austrian frontier, is a slight extension of its left wing towards Bessarabia, and the middle Dniester, in which position it is enabled, in case of need, to receive the remnants of the army of the Danube in case of their retreat from Bessarabia. The great western army may, besides, have detached a couple of divisions to the Crimea, and a few reinforcements to the Danube, but, on the whole,

its strength is unimpaired, and the march of the 3rd division of the Guards from Revel, and of some more reserves, will have made up for these detachments.

The Danubian army, however, may be considered as entirely broken up, and reduced to a mere corps of demonstration, placed in Bessarabia to keep up the appearance of a Russian occupation as long as possible. By Liprandi's and afterwards Dannenberg's departure, that army was deprived of the whole of the 4th corps (10th, 11th, and 12th divisions), deducting from the remaining five divisions (the 7th, 8th, 9th, 14th, and 15th) the troops necessary for the occupation of the coast, and the garrisons of the fortresses from Bender and Ismail, to Kherson and Nikolaiev, and, considering the enormous losses of the two Danubian campaigns, these five divisions could not muster for field operations more than 15,000 men. They are placed near the coast, and wherever there is coast, the Russian defensive, so efficient in the heart of the Continent, is lame in the extreme. It has to guard numerous fortresses and depots against the attacks of the hostile fleet, and thus it is explained that of the 30,000 or 35,000 men composing these five divisions, not one-half are disposable for the field.

The dissolution of the army of the Danube, like most of the great strategical measures taken by Russia (for the blunders generally commence with *execution* of them), is a very well chosen step. Since the Anglo-French have engaged themselves over head and ears in the Crimea, no enemy opposes the Russians on the Danube. Omer Pasha's army, hardly amounting to some 40,000 men after the wear and tear of two campaigns, never made up for, has, by the aid of Western diplomacy, been so broken up as to leave it scarcely sufficient to invest Ismail, much less to detach a corps to cover the siege, or to repel the Russians in the field. Besides, an attack upon Bessarabia, which would have afforded a powerful diversion some months ago, would now lack a definite military object, and, consequently, Omer Pasha's army is now sent to the Crimea. The only force, then, purporting to menace the Russians on the south-west

is the Austrian army, which, in a force of some 270,000, occupies Galicia, Transylvania, and Moldavia. This force must, above all things, be held in check; for should it declare itself hostile to Russia, Bessarabia and even the country up to the Bug, would have to be abandoned, and operations have to be conducted either from the offensive basis of the Polish fortresses, or from the defensive basis of Kiev and the Dnieper. In both cases a Danubian army would be cut off, and have to find a base of its own somewhere in the steppes of the South, which is no easy matter in a country which feeds many horses and sheep, but very few men. On the other hand, should Austria declare for Russia, or turn the points of her neutral bayonets towards the Alps and the Rhine, then the Polish army might either march into Germany as a reserve to the Austrians, after sending a strong corps towards the Danube, or the Austrians pour in a mass upon the Danube, and risk a march to Constantinople. In either case, a separate army on the Danube, stronger than a demonstration corps, was superfluous.

As to the co-operation of Austria in this war, we can, of course, only speak in an altogether hypothetical way. The noisily trumpeted Treaty of Alliance said to have been concluded by her with France and England on the 2nd of December, turns out to be but a snare laid for Parliament, as we warned our readers immediately on the announcement of the Treaty.

In the Queen's speech the Treaty is alluded to in these words: "It is with satisfaction I inform you that, together with the Emperor of the French, I have concluded a treaty with the Emperor of Austria, from which I anticipate important advantages to the common cause;" but, being hardly pressed by Lord Derby, Aberdeen went the length of declaring: "We propose only that the House should learn with satisfaction that Her Majesty has made a Treaty from which she (viz., old Aberdeen) anticipates important advantages."

This is all the satisfaction he gave. Lord John Russell, in the Lower House, was forced by Mr. Disraeli to advance

a step further, and plainly to confess that the boasted Treaty of Alliance means neither a treaty nor an alliance. He avows that it binds Austria to nothing at all, while it forces the Western Powers into an alliance offensive and defensive with Austria, if she should choose to declare war on Russia, and obliges them besides to propose to Russia, before the end of the year, conditions of peace on the basis of the famous four points. After all, Austria might then "without a breach of faith" release herself from the alliance by saying, "at the last moment," she did not concur in the interpretation put on the four points by the Western Powers. The result of Lord John Russell's explanation of the glorious Treaty of December 2 was an immediate fall of the funds, both in London and in Paris.

A year ago the Coalition pretended to have allowed the massacre of Sinope to take place in order to obtain the alliance of the German Powers. Now, a sham treaty with one of these Powers is held out as the equivalent for the loss, not of a Turkish fleet, but of a British army. We are even assured by the latest German papers that the opening of the British Parliament has given the signal for the reappearance of the spectre of the Vienna Conference, which was about once more to set its cumbrous machinery at work.

However, as Austria, according to Lord John Russell, declares it possible that she may be driven to war with Russia, and as the position taken by the Russian army on the Austrian frontier indicates the same thing, we may suppose for a moment that Austria and the rest of Germany, even including Prussia, are to join the Western Powers. How far would Russia be prepared to meet such an eventuality?

If, in 1812, the Continental force launched against Russia was far weaker than that which she may perhaps see on her frontiers in April or May—if then England was her ally instead of her foe, Russia may console herself with the reflection that the more numerous the armies are which penetrate into her interior, the more chance is there of their speedy destruction, and that, on the other hand, she

has now three times the troops under arms which she had then.

Not that we think "Holy Russia" unassailable. On the contrary, Austria alone we consider fully her equal as to military resources, while Austria and Prussia united are quite able, if merely military chances are taken into account, to force her to an ignominious peace. Any forty millions of men, concentrated upon a country of the size of Germany proper, will be able to cope successfully with the scattered sixty millions of Russian subjects. The strategy of an attack upon Russia from the west has been clearly enough defined by Napoleon, and had he not been forced by circumstances of a non-strategic nature to deviate from his plan, Russia's integrity would have been seriously menaced in 1812. That plan was to advance to the Dvina and the Dnieper, to organize a defensive position, both as to fortifications, depots, and communications, to take her fortresses on the Dvina, and to delay the march to Moscow until the spring of 1813. He was induced to abandon this plan, late in the season, from political reasons, from the outcry of his officers against winter quarters in Lithuania, and from a blind faith in his invincibility. He marched to Moscow, and the result is known. The disaster was immensely aggravated by the mal-administration of the French Commissariat, and by the want of warm clothing for the soldiers. Had these things been better attended to, Napoleon, on his retreat, might have found himself at Vilna at the head of an army twice in numbers that which Russia could oppose to him. His errors are before us; they are none of them of a nature irremediable; the fact of his penetrating to Moscow, the march of Charles XII. to Poltava, prove that the country is accessible, though difficult of access; and as to maintaining a victorious army in its heart, that all depends upon the length of the line of operations, or the distance and the security of the bases. Napoleon's line of operations from the Rhine to Eylau and Friedland, if we consider long lines of operations in their capacity of drawbacks upon the active force of an army,

will be about equal to a line of operations from Brest-Sitovsk (supposing the Polish fortresses to be taken in the first year) to Moscow. And in this supposition no account is taken of the circumstance that the immediate base of operations would have been advanced to Vitebsk, Moghilev, and Smolensk, without which preparatory act a march on Moscow would certainly be hazardous.

Russia is certainly thinly populated; but we must not forget that the central provinces—the very heart of Russian nationality and strength—have a population equal to that of Central Europe. In Poland—that is, the five Governments constituting the Russian kingdom of Poland—the average is about the same. The most populous district of Russia—Moscow, Tula, Riazan, Nijni-Novgorod, Kaluga, Yaroslavl, Smolensk, etc.—are the very heart of Great Russia, and form a compact body; they are continued, on the south, by the equally populous Little Russian provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Tchernigov, Voronezh, etc. There are, in all, twenty-nine provinces or governments, in which the population is quite half as dense as that of Germany. It is only the eastern and northern provinces, and the steppes of the south, where population is very thin; partly also the formerly Polish provinces of the west—Minsk, Mogilev, and Grodno—on account of extensive swamps between the (Polish) Bug and Dniester. But an advancing army, having in its rear the corn-producing plains of Poland, Volhynia, and Podolia, and in front, and for its theatre of operations, those of Central Russia, need not be afraid of its subsistence, if it manages the matter anything like well, and if it learns from the Russians themselves how to employ the means of transport of the country. As for a devastation of all resources by the retreating army, as in 1812, such a thing is only possible on one line of operations, and in its immediate vicinity; and if Napoleon had not, by his hurried advance from Smolensk, tied himself down to a very short time in which to complete his campaign, he would have found plenty of resources around him. But being in a hurry, he could not forage out the country at a short distance from

his line of march, and his foraging parties, at that time, appear actually to have been afraid of penetrating far into the immense pine forests which separate village from village. An army which can detach strong cavalry parties to hunt up provisions, and the numerous carts and wagons of the country, can easily provide itself with everything necessary in the shape of food ; and it is not likely that Moscow will burn down a second time. But even in that case, a retreat to Smolensk cannot be prevented, and there the army would find its well-prepared base of operation provided with every necessary.

But not only military questions are to be decided. Such a war must be brought to a close by political action too. It is possible that the declaration of Germany against Russia would be the signal for the restoration of Poland by Russia herself. Nicholas would certainly not part with the Lithuanian and other West Russian provinces ; but that the kingdom of Poland would be durable, who can tell ? One thing is certain : it would put an end to what is hollow in the enthusiasm for Poland, which for the last forty years has been affected by everybody and anybody calling himself liberal or progressive. A Russian appeal to Hungary would be sure to follow ; and, if the Magyars should demur, we must not forget that two-thirds of the population of Hungary consists of Slavs, who consider the Magyars as a ruling and intruding aristocracy. On the other hand Austria would, in such a case, not hesitate to restore the ancient Hungarian Constitution, thus aiming to blot Hungary out of the map of revolutionary Europe.

This suffices to show what a wide perspective of military and political interest would be opened by the accession of Austria to the Western Alliance, and a chance of a war of all Europe against Russia. On the contrary supposition, the spring is likely to see a million and a half of soldiers arrayed against the Western Powers, and an Austro-Prussian army marching on the French frontiers. And then the management of the war is sure to be taken out of the hands of its present leaders.

British Disaster in the Crimea—The British War System

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, January 22, 1855

THE entire British public, starting from the recent vehement leaders of the *London Times*, seems to be in a state of great anxiety and excitement respecting the condition of the forces in the Crimea. Indeed, it is impossible longer to deny or palliate the fact that, through unparalleled mismanagement in every branch of the service, the British army is rapidly approaching a state of dissolution. Exposed to the hardships of a winter campaign, suffering cold and wet, with the most harassing and uninterrupted field duty, without clothing, food, tents, or housing, the veterans who braved the burning sun of India and the furious charges of the Beloochee and Afghan die away by hundreds daily, and as fast as reinforcements arrive they are eaten up by the ravages of disease. To the question who is to blame for this state of things, the reply just now most popular in England is that it is Lord Raglan; but this is not just. We are no admirers of his Lordship's military conduct, and have criticised his blunders with freedom, but truth requires us to say that the terrible evils amid which the soldiers in the Crimea are perishing are not his fault, but that of the system on which the British war establishment is administered.

The British army has a Commander-in-Chief, a person

dispensed with in almost all other civilized armies. But it would be a mistake to suppose that this Commander-in-Chief really commands anything. If he has some control over the infantry and cavalry, the artillery, engineers, sappers and miners are entirely beyond his sphere. If he has any authority over trousers, coatees, and stocks, all great-coats are exempt from his influence. If he can make every foot-soldier carry two cartridge pouches, he cannot find him a single musket. If he can have all his men tried by court-martial and well flogged, he cannot make them stir a single inch. Marching is beyond his competence, and as to feeding his troops, that is a thing which does not concern him at all. Then there is the Master-General of the Ordnance. This person is a lamentable relic of the times when science was considered unsoldierlike, and when all scientific corps, artillery, and engineers were not soldiers, but a sort of nondescript body, half savants, half handicraftsmen, and united in a separate guild or corporation, under the command of such a Master-General. This Master-General of the Ordnance, besides artillery and engineers, has under him all the great-coats and small arms of the army. To any military operation, of whatever nature, he must, therefore, be a party. Next comes the Secretary at War. If the two preceding characters were already of comparative nullity, he is beyond nullity. The Secretary at War can give no order to any part of the army, but he can prevent any portion of the army from doing anything. As he is the chief of the military finances, and as every military act costs money, his refusal to grant funds is equivalent to an absolute veto upon all operations. But, willing as he may be to grant the funds, he is still a nullity, for he cannot feed the army; that is beyond his sphere. In addition to all this, the Commissariat, which really feeds the army, and, in case of any movement, is supposed to find it in means of transport, is placed under the control of the Treasury. Thus the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Treasury, has a direct hand in the getting up of every military operation, and can at his pleasure

either push it, retard it, or stop it. Everybody knows that the Commissariat is almost a more important portion of the army than the soldiers themselves; and for this very reason the collective wisdom of Great Britain has thought proper to make it quite independent of the army, and to place it under control of an essentially different department. Finally, the army, formerly put in motion by the Colonial Secretary, is now subject to the orders of the new War Minister. He dislocates the troops, from England to China, and from India to Canada. But, as we have seen, his authority, taken singly, is as ineffectual as that of any of the four preceding military powers, the co-operation of all the five being required in order to bring about the least movement.

It was under the auspices of this wonderful system that the present war began. The British troops, well fed and well cared for at home, in consequence of a forty years' peace, went out in high condition, persuaded that, whatever the enemy might do, England would not let her gallant lads want for anything. But scarcely had they landed at their first stage, at Gallipoli, when the comparison with the French army showed the ludicrous inferiority of all British arrangements, and the pitiable helplessness of every British official. Although it was here comparatively easy to provide for everything, although sufficient notice had been given, and a very small body of troops only was sent out, everything went wrong. Everybody made himself very busy, and yet nobody would perform duties that had not fallen to his lot at home in time of peace; so that not a man was to be found to do that business which was created by the very war itself. Thus shiploads of stuff were left to rot on the shore where they were first landed, and troops had to be sent on to Scutari for want of room. Chaotic disorder announced itself in unmistakable signs; but as it was the beginning of the war, an improvement was expected from growing experience.

The troops went to Varna. Their distance from home increased, their number increased, the disorder in the

administration increased. The independent working of the five departments composing the administration, each of them responsible to a different minister at home, here first resulted in open and unmistakable clashing. Want reigned in the camp, while the garrison of Varna had the best of comforts. The Commissariat, lazily indeed, got together some means of transport from the country; but as the General-in-Chief did not appoint any escort wagons, the Bulgarian drivers disappeared again as fast as they had been brought together. A central depot was formed at Constantinople—a sort of first base of operations; but it served no purpose, except to create a fresh centre of difficulties, delays, questions of competency, quarrels between the army, the Ordnance, the paying staff, the Commissariat, and the War Office. Wherever anything was to be done, everybody tried to shove it off his own shoulders upon those of somebody else. The avoiding of all responsibility was the general aim. The consequence was that everything went wrong, and that nothing whatever was done. Disgust at these proceedings, and the certainty of seeing his army rot in inactivity, may have had some influence in determining Lord Raglan to risk the expedition to the Crimea.

This expedition crowned the success of John Bull's military organization. There in the Crimea came the "palpable hit." So long as the army was, in point of fact, in a state of peace, as at Gallipoli, Scutari, and Varna, the magnitude of the disorder, the complicity of the confusion, could hardly be expected fully to develop itself. But now, in face of the enemy, during the course of an actual siege, the case was different. The resistance of the Russians gave full scope to the British officials for the exercise of their business-like habits. And it must be confessed never was the business of destroying an army done more effectually than by these gentlemen. Of more than 60,000 men sent to the East since February last, not more than 17,000 are now fit for duty; and of these some 60 or 80 die daily, and about 200 or 250 are every day disabled

by sickness, while of those that fall sick hardly any recover. And out of the 43,000 dead or sick, not 7,000 have been disabled by the direct action of the army.

When it first was reported in England that the army in the Crimea wanted food, clothing, housing, everything; that neither medical nor surgical stores were on the spot; that the sick and wounded had either to lie on the cold, wet ground, exposed to the weather, or to be crowded on board ships moored in an open roadstead, without attendance or the simplest requisites for medical treatment; when it was reported that hundreds were dying for want of the first necessities—everybody believed that the Government had neglected to send proper supplies to the scene of action. But soon enough it became known that, if this had been partially the case in the beginning, it was not so now. Everything had been sent there, even in profusion; but, unfortunately, nothing ever happened to be where it was wanted. The medical stores were at Varna, while the sick and wounded were either in the Crimea or at Scutari; the clothing and provisions arrived in sight of the Crimea, but there was nobody to land them. Whatever by chance got landed was left to rot on the beach. The necessary co-operation of the naval force brought a fresh element of dissension to bear upon the already distracted councils of the department whose conflicts were to insure triumph to the British army. Incapacity, sheltered by regulations made for peace, reigned supreme; in one of the richest countries of Europe, on the sheltered coast of which hundreds of transports laden with stores lay at anchor, the British army lived upon half rations; surrounded by numberless herds of cattle, they had to suffer from scurvy in consequence of being restricted to salt meat; with plenty of wood and coal on board ship, they had so little of it on shore that they had to eat their meat *raw*, and could never dry the clothes which the rain had drenched. Think of serving out the coffee not only unground but even unroasted. There were stores of food, of drink, of clothing, of tents, of ammunition by tons and

hundreds of tons, stowed away on board the ships, whose masts almost touched the tops of the cliffs where the camp was placed; and yet, Tantalus like, the British troops could not get at them. Everybody felt the evil, everybody ran about, cursing and blaming everybody else for neglect of duty, but nobody knew, to use the vernacular expression, "which was which," for everybody had his own set of regulations, carefully drawn up, sanctioned by the authorities, and showing that the very thing wanted was no part of *his* duty, and that *he*, for one, had no power to set the matter right.

Now, add to this state of things the increasing inclemency of the season, the heavy rains setting in and transforming the whole Heracleatic Chersonesus into one uninterrupted pool of mud and slush, knee-deep if not more; imagine the soldiers two nights at least out of four in the trenches, the other two sleeping, drenched and dirty in the slush, without boards under them, and with hardly any tents over them; the constant alarms completing the impossibility of anything like proper rest and adequate sleep; the cramps, diarrhœa, and other maladies arising from constant wet and cold; the dispersion of the medical staff, weak though it was from the beginning, over the camp; the hospital tents with 3,000 sick almost in the open air, and lying on the wet earth; and it will be easily believed that the British army in the Crimea is in a state of complete disorganization—reduced to "a mob of brave men," as the *London Times* says—and that the soldiers may well welcome the Russian bullet which frees them from all their miseries.

But what is to be done? Why, unless you prefer waiting until half a dozen Acts of Parliament are, after due consideration by the Crown lawyers, discussed, amended, voted on, and enacted; until by this means the whole business connected with the army is concentrated in the hands of a real War Minister; until this new Minister, supposing him to be the right man, has organized the service of his office, and issued fresh regulations; in other

words, unless you wait until the last vestige of the Crimean army has disappeared, there is only one remedy. This is the assumption by the General-in-Chief of the expedition, upon his own authority and his own responsibility, of that dictatorship over all the conflicting and contending departments of the military administration which every other General-in-Chief possesses, and without which he cannot bring the enterprise to any end but ruin. That would soon make matters smooth ; but where is the British general who would be prepared to act in this Roman manner, and on his trial defend himself, like the Roman, with the words, "Yes, I plead guilty to having saved my country" ?

Finally we must inquire who is the founder and preserver of this beautiful system of administration. Nobody but the old Duke of Wellington. He stuck to every detail of it as if he was personally interested in making it as difficult as possible for his successors to rival him in war-like glory. Wellington, a man of eminent common sense, but of no genius whatever, was the more sensible of his own deficiencies in this respect from being the contemporary and opponent of the eminent genius of Napoleon. Wellington, therefore, was full of envy of the success of others. His meanness in disparaging the merits of his auxiliaries and allies is well known ; he never forgave Blucher for saving him at Waterloo. Wellington knew full well that had not his brother been minister during the Spanish War he never could have brought it to a successful close. Was Wellington afraid that future exploits would place him in the shade ? And did he therefore preserve to its full extent this machinery so well adapted to fetter generals and to ruin armies ?

Russian Diplomats

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, March 10, 1855.

WHEN, on the declaration of war, the Russian diplomatists retired from London and Paris, their protracted sojourn, each with his respective staff, in Brussels and Darmstadt, occasioned much talk among European politicians and quidnuncs. It was surmised that Kisseleff took up his abode in Brussels to be within reach of Paris, in order to continue his diplomatic rummagings; while Baron Brunnow, at Darmstadt, was to inflame and direct the policy of the lesser German courts. The truth, however, is that the Czar was irritated to the utmost by the evidences of their incapacity, and in the first outburst of passion prohibited them from returning to Russia, while all that Count Nesselrode—generally very regardful of the welfare of his subalterns—could obtain was, that their salaries should be paid in full. Now, both these unlucky diplomatists, with their secretaries and *attachés*—excepting those who entered the army—are put on the shelf. They are brought down to the position of supernumeraries, with very reduced pay, and attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or, as it is said, placed at the disposition of the Minister. In all possibility Kisseleff, as well as Baron Brunnow, has exhausted his diplomatic career. Kisseleff will no longer enjoy a sybaritish life at Paris, nor Brunnow, with his runaway wife, count among the aristocratic leaders of the *haut ton* in London.

The next most prominent man still afloat, of all the wrecked Russian diplomats, is Titoff, at present connected with Prince Gortschakoff in carrying on the negotiations for peace at Vienna. Titoff was for more than twenty years at Constantinople, either as secretary or chief of the Russian Legation. After the Mentschikoff explosion, he was nominated to Stuttgart, Darmstadt, and Frankfort, to replace Prince Gortschakoff, who went to Vienna. He belongs to the new generation, and ranks among the ablest diplomatists of Russia. He is a student, and possesses very extensive general information. He shares in the opinions of the so-called Panslavistic and ultra-Russian party. As an aid of Gortschakoff he will be of great use, being acquainted with the deepest intricacies of the Eastern Question, and with many details unknown to Gortschakoff, who never was concerned with Turkish or Oriental diplomacy. After these two comes Fonton, Councillor of Legation, a special favourite of the Czar, a person of great shrewdness, skill, and daring. During the days of trial, in 1849, Fonton was a favourite friend and adviser of the Archduchess Sophia, the mother of Francis Joseph. At the same time, by way of novelty, Demidoff, with his large fortune, is also attached to the Vienna Legation, principally for the sake of display; dinners and balls will be his forte.

It is thus evident that the vaunted and feared old tribe of Russian diplomats are reduced to a corporal's guard in numbers, and the system must exhibit fresh power to regain its former celebrity and influence. As yet, however, it has brought forward only one new man of any prominence or promise, namely Prince Alexander Gortschakoff, above referred to as charged with the negotiations at Vienna. He is about fifty-six years old, and is nearly related to the other Prince Gortschakoff, who commanded on the Danube last summer, and of whom we sometime since gave an account. They both belong to one of the most eminent families of Russia, once independent rulers in the dukedom of Smolensk, and tracing their origin not to the Norman or Varangian, but to the native Slavic stock.

The father of Alexander, a Senator, left him a very reduced patrimony. He was educated at the Lyceum of Tsarskoe Selo, a celebrated country residence of the Czars. This school was a pet establishment of the Emperor Alexander, where the youth of the first nobility were instructed in the various literary and scientific branches, and trained to be accomplished gentlemen. It was a nursery for statesmen and diplomats, and most of the eminent men of Russia, of the age of Gortschakoff, have been educated there—among them Poushkin, the celebrated poet. This generation marked the transition from the absolute subserviency to French models as idolized by Catherine II. to a more natural and genuine breeding, and may date from 1820.

The young Gortschakoff, having finished his studies in the Lyceum, instantly entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and on the occasion of the celebrated Congress of Verona, was joined to the Secretaryship attached to Alexander, Nesselrode, and Capo d'Istria. At this congregation of crowned heads and refined diplomats, Gortschakoff was repeatedly intrusted with writing the protocols of the conferences, which were made in the French language. He acquitted himself of this rather difficult task with such consummate skill that Chateaubriand, who represented France, and superintended the Secretaryship, congratulated Alexander on possessing a young man of such remarkable talent, as an elegant, precise, and clear diplomatic writer. Gortschakoff, after this, became a favourite with Alexander, and was made the second Secretary of the Imperial Mission in London, then under the direction of Count Lieven, or rather that of his wife, still in so many ways celebrated as the Princess de Lieven. Of a very handsome and prepossessing personal appearance, the young and ambitious aspirant became a great favourite with the Princess, as well as with several other *grandes dames* of the most aristocratic and exclusive English society, and won the denomination of the *beau et élégant diplomate*.

In the course of his diplomatic service he was sent to Italy, where he was temporarily *Chargé d'Affaires* at

Florence. Soon after, he became the first Secretary of the Legation in Vienna, under the well-known Bailli Tatischtscheff, one of the best, but the most absolutist, of Russian diplomats, and was intrusted by him with the more difficult and secret work of the mission. As the Bailli was in very bad health, Gortschakoff acted often as *Chargé*, and thus was brought into close and intimate contact with Prince Metternich and other Austrian statesmen of that epoch, as well as with the Count and the Imperial family. In one word, he was at home in Vienna. Owing to a family misunderstanding between him and his chief, Gortschakoff resigned his post previously to the death of Tatischtscheff, and went to St. Petersburg. Being thus rather on the shelf, but eagerly looking for a new opening, he cultivated the great art of the courtier—that is, flattery to all influential and powerful persons.

When Baron Brunnow, previously his junior in service, was advanced from a Minister at the petty German Courts of Darmstadt and Stuttgart to London, Gortschakoff slipped into his place and established his residence at Stuttgart. In 1845 Nicholas, on his journey to Italy, with his wife and his daughter, the Grand Duchess Olga, so celebrated for her beauty, passed through Vienna, in the hope of realizing his dearest family scheme—that of arranging a marriage between Olga and the Archduke Stephen, subsequently the Palatine of Hungary. Foiled in this plan, and exasperated to the utmost, the Czar told a knot of diplomatists and courtiers about him at some stopping place in the Tyrol, that he would marry his daughter instantly to any small sovereign German prince. Gortschakoff, who had come from Stuttgart to meet his sovereign, at once suggested for a husband the Hereditary Prince of Würtemberg. This being agreed to, he returned to Stuttgart, soon after which the Prince of Würtemberg joined the Russian Imperial family, and the affiance took place. This marriage did not satisfy the ambitious hopes of Gortschakoff, as he still lingered as Minister to the Court of Stuttgart until after the events of 1849, when he became Minister to the German Diet.

The Turkish complication was more propitious to his expectations. Baron de Meyendorff, once a favourite of the Czar, and a luminary of Russian diplomacy, having fallen into disgrace, was recalled from Vienna, and, as we have above shown, most of the foremost Russian diplomats were overthrown by the pending events. Thus an opening was made for those of the second rank, and Gortschakoff, accordingly, was sent to Vienna, where he found himself upon old and tried ground. He is intensely ambitious, cool-headed, unprincipled, egotistical, and insinuating, and a consummate diplomat in craft, shrewdness and ability. Notwithstanding all this, he will have to strain every nerve to cope with his opponents. He has to deal with Count Buol, Lord John Russell, and a special French envoy not yet named, as well as with some lesser diplomats, all the while surrounded by a society unfriendly to the interests which he represents. If he succeeds in this mission, he will deserve a place along with Talleyrand, Metternich, and other fox-like celebrities.

XCII

Affairs in Russia

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, March 28, 1855

THE death of the Emperor Nicholas, with its immediate and prospective consequences, overtops all other news. As THE TRIBUNE informed its readers would be the case, contrary to the opinion of nearly all the journals, Alexander II. quietly assumed the inheritance of his father. European writers speculate upon the course which the new Emperor will pursue in the ominous conflict now pending. Until yet, however, the few public acts of Alexander show that he intends to pursue the same course as his predecessor. The manifesto to the nation, of which only the most interesting part is published in the European journals, declares that the new Czar will do all in his power to maintain Russia in the high position which she holds, and that he will continue the policy of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and his deceased father. Such a declaration is very natural in the mouth of a new sovereign, but it would be preposterous to draw conclusions therefrom as to his future acts. Such words are neither for war nor for peace, and other indications are required in order to judge of his intentions. One of these is that he has no liking for the English; and another is the nomination of Count Rudiger as War Minister, instead of Prince Dolgoroucki, who filled this post under the deceased Czar, and was his favourite. These are the only changes yet known to be made among the higher

dignitaries of the Empire, and they followed almost immediately on the death of Nicholas. We perceive in them a demonstration that the new Emperor is preparing for extremities, and for an energetic prosecution of the war, should the Conference of Vienna prove a failure.

As we long ago stated, it was the practice of Nicholas to direct personally all the movements of his armies and the destination and location of his troops. In a word, he was his own War Minister. Prince Dolgoroucki, a man of secondary capacity, without any military experience, was a good Secretary—laborious and exact in the execution of orders, but unable alone to conceive any plans, or combine or energetically organize new resources. The present Emperor himself, inexperienced in military matters, and never having really devoted to them much of his time, has, in appointing Count Rudiger Minister of War, compensated for his own deficiencies. This Minister is one of the oldest generals of Russia, having served with distinction in inferior grades during the French campaigns, as general against the Turks in 1828-29, as the commander of a corps in the Polish campaign of 1831, and having finally contributed chiefly to bring to an end the Hungarian invasion, Georgey surrendering to him. He is beyond seventy years, but active, very energetic, and a military man to the marrow, enjoying great consideration in the army as well as at St. Petersburg. He was highly esteemed by Nicholas, and was always a favourite with the present Emperor. Personally he is on rather unfriendly terms with Prince Paskevitch and Prince Gortschakoff, the late commander on the Danube, and now in the Crimea. Count Rudiger has represented the German party, but that must not be confounded with a peace party. The Germans in the military service of Russia are more warlike than the Russians themselves. War is for them the only way of acquiring distinction and rising to elevated positions. Rudiger is descended from an ancient family in the Baltic provinces, as are nearly all the Germans in the Russian service. These noble descendants of the ancient Teutonic knights have preserved

all the warlike traditions and the aristocratic character of their ancestors, and all of them prefer to enter the army, war being for them an object of ambition as well as an attraction. The elevation, therefore, of Rudiger, though a German, would give a new and powerful impulse to the preparations for war.

On the rest of the Continent all is in suspense, and the diplomatic entanglements are as great as ever. The separate negotiations between Prussia and the two Western Allies have not progressed. Up to the present moment Prussia does not proffer any concessions to the Allies, and still perseveres in maintaining the independence of her separate movements; and, on the other side, it appears that the originally peremptory tone used by the French Minister towards the Cabinet of Berlin is now lowered.

It seems that France and England would have no objection to Prussia remaining neutral, if she would not prevent the other German Powers from siding with Austria. In Frankfort, the seat of the German Diet, the antagonism between Prussia and Austria is as active as ever. The one opposes every project presented by the other for mobilizing the army. Bavaria interferes continually as a mediator; and in the great question of naming a Commander-in-Chief for the German Federal Army—a dignity which Austria wishes to be conferred on Francis Joseph, to which Prussia never will submit—Bavaria suggests that the respective forces of the two Powers remain under the command of their own generals, and only the remaining federal contingents be put under a federal commander. So much for German unity.

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XCIH

Fate of the Great Adventurer

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, April 2, 1855

WE published the other day some interesting extracts from the pamphlet lately issued by Prince Napoleon, which, we doubt not, were duly considered by our readers. That pamphlet reveals the striking and most important fact that the Crimean Expedition was an original invention of Louis Bonaparte himself; that he elaborated it in all its details, without communicating with anybody; that he sent it in his own handwriting to Constantinople in order to avoid the objections of Marshal Vaillant. Since all this is known, a great portion of the flagrant military blunders connected with this expedition are explained by the dynastic necessities of its author. In the council of war at Varna the expedition had to be forced upon the admirals and generals by St. Arnaud appealing in the most direct manner to the authority of the "Emperor," while that potentate in return publicly branded all opposing opinions as "timid counsels." Once in the Crimea, Raglan's really timid proposal to march to Balaklava was readily adopted by St. Arnaud, as it led directly, if not to, at least to somewhere near, the gates of Sebastopol. The frantic efforts to push the siege, though without sufficient means—the eagerness to open fire, which made the French neglect the solidity of their works to such a degree that their batteries were silenced by the enemy in a couple of hours—the consequent

overworking of the troops in the trenches, which is now proved to have done as much as anything else towards the destruction of the British army—the inconsiderate and useless cannonade from the 17th of October to the 5th of November—the neglect of all defensive works, and even of a sufficient occupation of the ridge towards the Chernaya which ended in the losses of Balaklava and Inkerman—all this is now as clearly explained as can be wished for. The Bonaparte dynasty was bound to take Sebastopol at any cost, and at the shortest notice; and the allied armies had to do it. Canrobert if successful would be made a Marshal of France, Count, Duke, Prince, whatever he liked, with unlimited powers to commit “irregularities” in financial matters; while if unlucky he would be a traitor to the Emperor, and would have to go and join his former comrades, Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Changarnier in their exile. And Raglan was just enough of an old woman to give way to his interested colleague.

All this, however, is but the least important feature of the consequences incumbent upon this Imperial plan of operations. Nine French divisions, equal to thirty-one battalions, have been engaged in this hopeless affair. The greatest efforts, the most lavish sacrifices have accomplished nothing; Sebastopol is stronger than ever; the French trenches are, as we now learn from authentic sources, still fully four hundred yards from the Russian works, while the British trenches are twice that distance. General Niel, sent by Bonaparte to look into the siege works, declares that an assault is not to be thought of; he has changed the principal point of attack from the French to the British side, thereby not only causing delay in the siege, but directing the main attack towards a suburb which, even if taken, is still separated from the town by the Inner Harbour Creek. In short, device after device, dodge after dodge is resorted to, to keep up, not the hope, but the mere appearance of a hope, of success. And when matters are come to this pitch, when a general war on the Continent is imminent, when a fresh expedition to the Baltic is preparing—an expedition

which must do something this season, and therefore must be far stronger in land troops than that of 1854—at this moment, obstinacy goads Louis Bonaparte to engage five move divisions of infantry in this Crimean slough, where men, and even whole regiments, vanish as by enchantment. And, as if that were not sufficient, he has made up his mind to go there himself, and to see the final assault carried out by his soldiers.

This is the situation to which the first strategic experiment of Louis Bonaparte has reduced France. The man who with some sort of reason thinks he is bound to be a great captain, approaching in some degree the founder of his dynasty, turns out at the very beginning a mere presumptuous piece of incapacity. With very limited information, he forms the plan of the expedition at some 3,000 miles from the spot, works it out in its details, and sends it off secretly and without consulting anybody to his general-in-chief, who, though but a few hundred miles from the point of attack, is yet equally ignorant as to the nature of the obstacles and the force of the resistance likely to be encountered. The expedition once commenced, disaster follows disaster; even victory is worse than sterile, and the only result obtained is the destruction of the expeditionary army itself. Napoleon in his best days would never have persisted in such an undertaking. In such a case he used to find some fresh device, to lead his troops on a sudden to a fresh point of attack, and by a brilliant manœuvre, crowned with success, make even temporary defeat appear as but contributive to final victory. What if he had resisted to the last at Aspern? It was only in the time of his decline, when the thunderstroke of 1812 had shaken his confidence in himself, that his energy of will turned into blind obstinacy, that, as at Leipsic, he clung to the last to positions which his military judgment must have told him were completely false. But here is just the difference between the two Emperors: what Napoleon ended with, Louis Napoleon begins with.

That Louis Bonaparte has the firm intention to go to the

Crimea, and to take Sebastopol, is very likely. He may delay his departure, but nothing short of peace will shake his resolution. Indeed, his personal fate is bound up with this expedition, which is his first military effort. But, from the day he actually sets out, the fourth and greatest French Revolution may be said to date its beginning. Everybody in Europe feels this; everybody dissuades him. A shudder runs through the ranks of the French middle class when this departure to the Crimea is mentioned. But the hero of Strasburg is inflexible. A gambler all his life, a gambler accustomed of late to the very heaviest stakes, he stakes his all upon the one card of his "star" against the most fearful odds. Besides, he knows well enough that the hopes of the *bourgeoisie* to escape the crisis by retaining him in Paris are entirely hollow. Whether he be there or not, it is the fate of the French Empire, the fate of the existing social order of things, which is still approaching its decision in the trenches before Sebastopol. If successful there against hope, by his presence he will overstep the barrier between a highwayman and a hero, at least in the opinion of Europe; unsuccessful, his Empire is gone under all circumstances. That he calculates upon the possibility of such an event is shown by his taking with him his rival and heir presumptive, the young Jerome Bonaparte, in the livery of a lieutenant-general.

For the moment this Crimean expedition serves nobody better than Austria. This slough, which drains off by army-corps after army-corps the strength of both France and Russia, must, if the struggle before Sebastopol lasts a few months longer, leave Austria the main arbiter of the Continent, where her 600,000 bayonets remain disposable in a compact mass to be cast as an overwhelming weight into the scale. But fortunately there is a counterpoise against this Austrian supremacy. The moment France is launched again into the revolutionary career, this Austrian force dissolves itself into its discordant elements. Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Italians, Croats, are loosened from the forced bond which ties them together, and instead of the

undetermined and haphazard alliances and antagonisms of to-day, Europe will again be divided into two great camps with distinct banners and new issues. Then the struggle will be only between the Democratic Revolution on the one side and the Monarchical Counter-Revolution on the other.

XCIV

Napoleon's Last Dodge

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, April 7, 1855

"IF Cræsus does pass the Halys, he will destroy a great Empire." This answer, given to the Lydian king by the oracle of Delphi, might with equal aptness now be sent to Louis Bonaparte on his Crimean excursion. It is not the Russian Empire which this journey is calculated to destroy, but his own.

An extraordinary anomalous position creates anomalous necessities. Every other man in his place would be considered a fool if he undertook this trip, whose unfavourable chances are to the favourable as ten to one. Louis Bonaparte must be quite aware of that fact, and nevertheless he must go. He is the originator of the whole expedition; he has got the allied armies into their present unenviable position, and is bound before all Europe to get them out of it again. It is his first military feat, and upon its issue will depend, for some time at least, his reputation as a general. He answers for its success with no less a pledge than his crown.

There are, besides, minor reasons, which equally contribute to make this hazardous journey a matter of State necessity. The soldiers in the East have shown, on more than one occasion, that their expectations of the military glories of the new Empire have been sadly disappointed. At Varna and Bazardjik, the paladins of the mock Charlemagne were saluted by their own troops with the title of

"apes." "*A bas les singes ! Vive Lamoricière !*" was the cry of the Zouaves when St. Arnaud and Espinasse sent them into the Bulgarian desert, to die of cholera and fever. Now it is no longer the banished generals alone whose fame and popularity are opposed to the commanders of doubtful reputation, now leading the French army. The singular conduct of Napoleon Jerome junior while in the East has recalled to the mind of the old Algerian soldiers the far different behaviour of the Orleans Princes in Africa, who, whatever else may be said against them, were always at the head of the troops and did their duty as soldiers. The contrast between young d'Aumale and young Napoleon was certainly strong enough to make the soldiers say: If the Orleans were still in power, the Princes would be with us in the trenches, sharing our dangers and fatigues; and yet, their name was not Napoleon! Thus the soldiers *do* speak, and what is to be done to stop them? The man who is permitted to wear the uniform of a general of division has managed to throw a stain upon the military traditions of the name of Napoleon; the remainder of the family are all very quiet civilians, naturalists, priests, or else unmitigated adventurers; old Jerome cannot go, on account of his age, and because his warlike feats of old throw no great halo of glory round his head; so Louis Napoleon cannot but go himself. Then the rumour of the Crimean journey has been made known in the remotest hamlets of France, and has been hailed with enthusiasm by the peasantry; and the peasantry it was that made Louis Napoleon Emperor. The peasantry are convinced that an Emperor of their own make, and who bears the name of Napoleon, must actually be a *Napoleon redivivus*; his place is, in their eyes, at the head of the troops, who, led by him, will rival the legions of the Grand Army. If Sebastopol is not taken, it is only because the Emperor has not yet gone there; let him but once be on the spot, and the ramparts of the Russian fortress will crumble into dust like the walls of Jericho. Thus, if ever he wished to retract his promise to go, he cannot now do so since the report has once gone forth.

Accordingly, everything is being prepared. The ten divisions now in the Crimea are to be followed by four new ones, two of which are to form, in the beginning of the campaign, an army of reserve at Constantinople. One of these divisions is to consist of the Imperial Guard, another of the combined *élite* companies, or the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the army of Paris; the two other divisions (11th and 12th) are already getting embarked or concentrated at Toulon and Algiers. This fresh reinforcement would bring the French troops in the Crimea to some 100,000 or 110,000 men, while, by the end of April, the 15,000 Piedmontese troops and numerous British reinforcements will be arriving. But yet, it can hardly be expected that the Allies can well be in a position to open the campaign in May, with an army of 150,000 men. The state of the Heracleatic Chersonese, which has been turned into one great and wretchedly managed burial-ground, is such that, with the return of hot and damp weather, the whole must form one hot-bed of pestilence of all kinds; and whatever portion of the troops will have to stop in it, will be exposed to losses by sickness and death far more terrific than those at any previous time. There is no chance for the Allies to break forth with an active army from their present position, before all their reinforcements are up; and that will be somewhere about the middle of May, when sickness must have already broken out.

In the best event the Allies must leave 40,000 men before the south side of Sebastopol, and will have from 90,000 to 100,000 men at liberty for an expedition against the Russian army in the field. Unless they manœuvre very well and the Russians commit great blunders, this army, on debouching from the Chersonesus, will have first to defeat the Russians, and drive them back from Simpheropol, before it can effect its junction with the Turks at Eupatoria. We will, however, suppose the junction to be effected without difficulty; the utmost reinforcement which the Turks will bring to this motley body of French, English, and Piedmontese will be 20,000 men not very well adapted for a battle

in the open field. Altogether, this would make an army of some 20,000 men. How such an army is expected to live in a country exhausted by the Russians themselves, poor in corn, and whose main resource, the cattle, the Russians will take very good care to drive off towards Perekop, it is not very easy to see. The least advance would necessitate extensive foraging and numerous detachments to secure the flanks and the communications with the sea. The Russian irregular cavalry, which has hitherto had no chance to act, will then commence its harassing operations. In the meantime, the Russians will also have received their reinforcements; the publicity with which the French armaments have been carried on for the last six weeks has enabled the Russians to take their measures in time. There can be no doubt that at this present moment two or three Russian divisions, either from the army of Volhynia and Bessarabia, or from the new-formed reserves, will be on the march so as to maintain the balance of power there.

The greatest detachment to be made from the allied army must, however, be the force which has to enclose Sebastopol on the north side. For this purpose, 20,000 men will have to be set aside, and whether the remainder of their forces will then be sufficient, fettered as they must be by difficulties of sustenance, embarrassed with trains of carriages for stores and provisions, to drive the Russian field army out of the Crimea, is very doubtful.

So much is certain, that the laurels by which Louis Bonaparte intends to earn the name of a Napoleon in the Crimea are hung up rather high, and will not be so very easily plucked. All the difficulties, however, which have been hitherto mentioned, are of a merely local character. The great objection to this mode of campaigning in the Crimea is, after all, that it transfers one-fourth of the disposable forces of France to a minor theatre of war, where even the greatest success decides nothing. It is this absurd obstinacy about Sebastopol degenerating into a sort of superstition, and giving to successes, and also to reverses, fictitious values, which forms the great fundamental mis-

take of the whole plan. And it is this fictitious value given to events in the Crimea which rebounds with redoubled force upon the unfortunate originator of the scheme. For Alexander, Sebastopol is not Russia, far from it; but for Louis Bonaparte, the impossibility of taking Sebastopol is the loss of France.

XCV

Prospects in France and England

LONDON, *April* 10, 1855

N. Y. T., *April* 27, 1855

YESTERDAY and to-day will most likely be the first two decisive days in the Vienna Conferences, as they were to open on the 9th in the presence of M. Drouyn de l'Huys, and as, at the same time, the Russian Ambassador was expected to have received his instructions relative to the third and fourth points. The journey of Drouyn de l'Huys was at first puffed up on every Stock Exchange as a certain symptom of peace; for such an eminent diplomatist, it was said, surely would not go to take personal part in these debates unless he were sure of success. As to the "eminence" of this diplomatist, it is of a very mythical cast, and exists principally in the paid newspaper articles, by which he magnifies himself into a second Talleyrand, as though his long career under Louis Philippe had not long since established his "eminent" mediocrity. But the real reason of his journey is this: Lord John Russell has managed within a few weeks, through his notorious ignorance of the French language, to embroil the Allies in concessions which he never intended to make, and which it will take extraordinary efforts to retrieve. Lord John's French is of the real John Bull species, such as "Milord" speaks in *Fra Diavolo*, and other theatrical pieces formerly popular in France. It begins with "Monsieur l'Aubergiste," and ends with "Très-bien"; and if he understands but one-half of

what is said to him, he is revenged in the consciousness that other people understand still less what he utters. It was for this very reason that his friend and rival, Lord Palmerston, sent him to Vienna, considering that a couple of blunders on that stage would be sufficient finally to demolish poor little John. And so it has turned out. Half the time he could not make out what was going on, and a quick and unexpected interpolation from Gortschakoff or Buol was sure to draw an embarrassed "Très-bien" from the unfortunate diplomatic *débutant*. In this way, Russia, and, to some degree, Austria, lay claim that several points are settled, at least so far as England is concerned, which poor Lord John never intended to concede. Palmerston, of course, would have no objection to this, as long as the blame falls exclusively upon his hapless colleague. But Louis Bonaparte cannot afford to be cheated into peace that way. To put a stop to this sort of diplomacy, the French Government at once resolved to bring matters to an issue. They fixed upon an ultimatum, with which Drouyn de l'Huys went to London, got the adhesion of the British Government, and then took it with him to Vienna. Thus, at present, he may be considered the joint representative of France and England, and there is no doubt that he will use his position in the best interests of his master. And as the only, the exclusive, interest of Louis Bonaparte is *not* to conclude peace until he has reaped fresh glory and fresh advantages for France, and until the war has served to the full its purpose as a *moyen de gouvernement*, Drouyn's mission, far from being a peaceful one, will turn out, on the contrary, to have for its object to secure a continuance of the war under the most decent pretext available.

With the middle classes both of France and England this war is decidedly unpopular. With the French *bourgeoisie* it was so from the beginning, because this class has been ever since the 2nd of December in full opposition against the Government of the "saviour of society." In England the middle class was divided. The great bulk had transferred their national hatred from the French to the

Russians, and although John Bull can do a little annexation business himself now and then in India, he has no idea of allowing other people to do the same in other neighbourhoods in an uncomfortable proximity to himself or his possessions. Russia was the country which in this respect had long since attracted his anxious notice. The enormously increasing British trade to the Levant, and through Trebizond to Inner Asia, makes the free navigation of the Dardanelles a point of the highest importance to England. The growing value of the Danubian countries as granaries forbids England to allow their gradual absorption into Russia, and the closing of the navigation of the Danube by the same Power. Russian grains form already a too important item in British consumption, and an annexation of the corn-producing frontier countries by Russia would make Great Britain entirely dependent upon her and the United States, while it would establish these two countries as the regulators of the corn-market of the world. Besides, there are always some vague and alarming rumours afloat about Russian progress in Central Asia, got up by interested Indian politicians or terrified visionaries, and credited by the general geographical ignorance of the British public. Thus, when Russia began her aggression upon Turkey, the national hatred broke forth in a blaze, and never, perhaps, was a war so popular as this. The peace party was for a moment interdicted from speaking; even the mass of its own members went along with the popular current. Whoever knew the character of the English must have felt certain that this warlike enthusiasm could be of but short duration, at least so far as the middle class was concerned; as soon as the effects of the war should become taxable upon their pockets, mercantile sense was sure to overcome national pride, and the loss of immediate individual profits was sure to outweigh the certainty of losing gradually great national advantages. The Peelites, adverse to the war, not so much out of real love of peace as from a narrowness and timidity of mind which holds in horror all great crises and all decisive action, did their best to hasten

the great moment when every British merchant and manufacturer could calculate to a farthing what the war would cost him, individually, *per annum*. Mr. Gladstone, scorning the vulgar idea of a loan, at once doubled the income tax, and stopped financial reform. The result came to light at once. The peace party raised their heads again. John Bright dared popular feeling with his own well-known spirit and tenacity until he succeeded in bringing the manufacturing districts round to him. In London the feeling is still more in favour of the war, but the progress of the peace party is visible even here; besides, it must be recollected that the peace society never at any time commanded any mentionable influence in the capital. Its agitation, however, is increasing in all parts of the country, and another year of doubled taxation, with a loan—for this is now considered to be unavoidable—will break down whatever is left of warlike spirit among the manufacturing and trading classes.

With the mass of the people in both countries, the case is entirely different. The peasantry in France have ever since 1789 been the great supporters of war and warlike glory. They are sure this time not to feel much of the pressure of the war; for the conscription, in a country where the land is infinitesimally subdivided among small proprietors, not only frees the agricultural districts from surplus labour, but also gives to some 20,000 young men every year the opportunity of earning a round sum of money by engaging to serve as substitutes. A protracted war only would be severely felt. As to war taxes, the Emperor cannot impose them upon the peasantry without risking his crown and his life. His only means of maintaining Bonapartism among them is to buy them up by freedom from war taxation, and thus for some years to come they may be exempted from this sort of pressure. In England the case is similar. Agricultural labour is generally over-supplied, and furnishes the mass of the soldiery, which only at a later period of the war receives a strong admixture of the rowdy class from the towns. Trade being tolerably good, and a

good many agricultural improvements being carried out when the war began, the quota of agricultural recruits was, in this instance, supplied more sparingly than before, and the town element is decidedly preponderant in the present militia. But even what has been withdrawn has kept wages up, and the sympathy of the villagers is always accompanying soldiers who come from among them, and who are now transformed into heroes. Taxation, in its direct shape, does not touch the small farmers and labourers, and until an increase of indirect imposts can reach them sensibly, several years of war must have passed. Among these people the war enthusiasm is as strong as ever, and there is not a village where is not to be found some new beer-shop with the sign of "The Heroes of the Alma," or some such motto, and where there are not in almost every house wonderful prints of Alma, Inkerman, the charge at Bala-klava, portraits of Lord Raglan and others, to adorn the walls. But if in France the great preponderance of the small farmers (four-fifths of the population), and their peculiar relation to Louis Napoleon, give to their opinions a great deal of importance, in England that one-third of the population forming the country people has scarcely any influence except as a tail and chorus to the aristocratic landed proprietors.

The industrial working population has in both countries almost the same peculiar position with regard to this war. Both British and French proletarians are filled with an honourable national spirit, though they are more or less free from the antiquated national prejudices common in both countries to the peasantry. They have little immediate interest in the war, save that if the victories of their countrymen flatter their national pride, the conduct of the war, foolhardy and presumptuous as regards France, timid and stupid as regards England, offers them a fair opportunity of agitating against the existing Governments and governing classes. But the main point with them is this: That this war, coinciding with a commercial crisis, only the first developments of which have, as yet, been seen, con-

ducted by hands and heads unequal to the task, gaining at the same time European dimensions, will and must bring about events which will enable the proletarian class to resume that position which they lost to France by the battle of June, 1848, and that not only as far as France is concerned, but for all Central Europe, England included.

In France, indeed, there can be no doubt that every fresh revolutionary storm must bring sooner or later the working class to power; in England things are fast approaching a similar state. There is an aristocracy willing to carry on the war, but unfit to do so, and completely put to the blush by last winter's mismanagement. There is a middle class unwilling to carry on that war which cannot be put a stop to, sacrificing everything to peace, and thereby proclaiming their own incapacity to govern England. If events turn out the one, with its different fractions, and do not admit the other, there remain but two classes upon which power can devolve—the petty *bourgeoisie*, the small trading class, whose want of energy and decision has shown itself on every occasion when it was called upon to come from words to deeds—and the working class which has been constantly reproached with showing far too much energy and decision when proceeding to action as a class.

Which of these classes will be the one to carry England through the present struggle, and the complications about to arise from it?

XCVI

Napoleon's Apology

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, April 30, 1855

NAPOLEON III., in his quality as chief editor of the *Moniteur*, has published a long leading article on the Crimean expedition, the important portions of which we have duly published. The purpose of this manifesto is evidently to console the French nation for the failure of the enterprise, to shift the responsibility of it from the Imperial shoulders, and at the same time to reply to the famous pamphlet lately issued by Prince Napoleon. In that half-familiar, half-dignified style, characteristic of the man who writes at the same time for French peasants and for European Cabinets, a sort of history of the campaign is given, with the alleged reasons for each step. Some of these reasons merit a special examination.

The Imperial adventurer informs us that the allied troops were brought up to Gallipoli, because otherwise the Russians might have crossed the Danube at Rustchuk, and turning the lines of Varna and Schumla, passed the Balkans and marched upon Constantinople! This reason is the worst ever given for the landing at Gallipoli. In the first place, Rustchuk is a *fortress*, and not an open town, as the illustrious editor of the *Moniteur* seems to fancy. As to the danger of such a flank march of the Russians, it is well to recollect that an army of 60,000 Turks, firmly established between four strong fortresses, could not safely be passed without leaving a strong corps to observe them; that such a flank

march would have exposed the Russians, in the ravines of the Balkans, to the fate of Dupont at Bailen, and of Vandamme at Culm; that in the most favourable case they could not bring more than 25,000 men to Adrianople; and that whoever thinks such an army dangerous to the Turkish metropolis, may have his opinion corrected by reading Major Moltke's well-known observations on the campaign of 1829 lately republished in English in London.

In case there should be no danger to Constantinople, the Allies were, as we learn from the *Moniteur*, to push some divisions to Varna, and to end any attempt at besieging Silistria. This done, two other operations would offer themselves—a landing near Odessa, or the seizure of the Crimea. Both were to be discussed by the allied generals on the spot. Such were the instructions to St. Arnaud, which wound up with some sound military advice in the form of maxims and apothegms:—Always know what your enemy is doing; keep your troops together, divide them on no account; or if you must divide them, manage so that you can reunite them on a given point in twenty-four hours—and so forth. Very valuable rules of conduct, no doubt, but so trite and commonplace that the reader must at once conclude St. Arnaud to have been, in the eyes of his master, the greatest dunce and ignoramus in the world. After this, the instructions wind up with: “You have my entire confidence, Marshal. Go, for I am certain that, under your experienced leadership, the French eagles will earn new glory!”

As to the main point, the Crimean expedition, Mr. Bonaparte confesses that it was certainly a favourite idea with him, and that at a later period he sent another batch of instructions to St. Arnaud respecting it. But he denies having elaborated the plan in its details, and sent it to headquarters; according to him, the generals still had the choice of landing near Odessa. As a proof of this, a passage from his fresh instruction is given. In it he proposes a landing at Theodosia (Kaffa), on account of its offering a safe and capacious anchorage to the fleets, which must form the base

of operations of the army. What a base of operations is he had explained to St. Arnaud in his first instructions, in terms which leave no doubt that the illustrious Marshal was supposed never to have read any standard work whatever upon his profession. From this point—Kaffa—the army was to march upon Simpheropol, drive the Russians into Sebastopol, before the walls of which a battle would probably be fought, and finally to besiege Sebastopol. “Unfortunately” this “plan was not followed up by the allied generals”—a circumstance very fortunate for the Emperor, as it allows of his shuffling off the responsibility of the whole affair, and leaving it on the shoulders of the generals.

The plan of landing 60,000 men at Kaffa, and marching thence upon Sebastopol, is indeed original. Taking as a general rule that the offensive strength of an army in an enemy's country decreases in the same ratio as its distance from its base of operations increases, how many men would the Allies have brought to Sebastopol after a march of more than 120 miles? How many men were to be left at Kaffa? How many to hold and fortify intermediate points? How many to protect convoys, and to scour the country? Not 20,000 men could have been collected under the walls of a fortress requiring three times that number barely to invest it. If Louis Napoleon ever goes to the war himself, and conducts it upon this principle, he may as well order quarters at Mivart's Hotel, London, at once, for he will never see Paris again.

As to the safety of the anchorage at Kaffa, every mariner in the Black Sea knows, and every chart shows, that it is an open roadstead, with shelter against northerly and westerly winds alone, while the most dangerous storms in the Black Sea are from the south and south-west. Of this the storm of the 14th of November is an instance. Had the fleets then been at Kaffa, they would have been driven upon a lee-shore. In this way our hero clears himself from the responsibility thrown upon him by his cousin; but it would never do to sacrifice Raglan and Canrobert. Accordingly, to show the cleverness of the said generals, a very decent

sketch is given of siege-operations according to Vauban—a sketch which from the total ignorance of the subject it supposes in the reader might have been written for the benefit of Marshal St. Arnaud. This sketch, however, but serves to show how Sebastopol was *not* to be taken, for it winds up with the assertion that all these rules are inapplicable to Sebastopol. For instance, “in a common siege where one front is attacked, the length of the last parallel would be about 300 yards, and the whole length of trenches would not exceed 4,000 yards; here the extent of parallel is 3,000 yards, and the whole linear length of all the trenches is 41,000 yards.” This is all true enough, but the question here is: Why has this enormous extent of attack been adopted, when every circumstance called for the greatest possible concentration of fire upon one or two determined points? The answer is: “Sebastopol is not like any other fortress. It has but a shallow ditch, no masonry scarps, and these defences are replaced by abattis and palisades; thus our fire could make but little impression on the earth breastwork.” If this was not written for St. Arnaud, it is surely written for the French peasantry alone. Every sub-lieutenant in the French army must laugh at such nonsense. Palisades, unless at the bottom of a ditch, or at least out of sight of the enemy, are very soon knocked over by shot and shell. Abattis may be set on fire, and must be at the foot of the glacis, about 60 or 80 yards from the breastwork, else they would obstruct the fire of the guns. Moreover, these abattis must be large trees laid on the ground, the pointed branches toward the enemy and the whole firmly connected together; but where such trees could have come from, in a woodless country like the Crimea, the *Moniteur* does not say. The absence of masonry scarps has nothing to do with the protracted siege, for according to the description in the *Moniteur* itself, they only come into play when the breaching batteries have been established on the top of the glacis—a position from which the Allies are yet far distant. That palisades are an improvement upon masonry scarps is certainly new; for these wooden ramparts can be very

easily destroyed by enfilading fire, even at the bottom of the ditch; and thus they allow of an assault as soon as the defending guns are silenced.

In conclusion, we are told by this new military authority that all the facts show that the allied generals have done what they could—have done more than, under the circumstances, could have been expected from them—and have, indeed, covered themselves with glory. If they could not properly invest Sebastopol—if they could not drive away the Russian army of observation—if they are not yet in the place—why, it is because they are not strong enough. This is also true: but who is responsible for this greatest of all faults? Who but Louis Bonaparte! Such is the final conclusion which the whole French public must inevitably draw from this wordy, round-about, shuffling, and ridiculous explanation of their Emperor,

XCVII

Panslavism

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, May 5, 1855

THE all-absorbing facts in the news brought by the *Atlantic* are the breaking off of the Vienna Conferences, and the partial if not total separation of Austria from the Allies. For both of these events we were not unprepared. The rejection by Russia of any plan of settlement which should not substantially admit all she claimed before the war, was, in the present state of that war, a matter of course. The return of Austria to her old expectant, wavering policy was also the result of certain circumstances of great importance, which we proceed to explain.

The French Government discovered some time since, and the fact could not be denied by the British Cabinet, that Lord John Russell had committed a great blunder at Vienna in allowing those of the points before the Conference in which Austria was directly interested to be first disposed of. These points were the freedom of the Danube and the question of the Principalities. From this moment Austria appeared satisfied. Expecting, as she does, to share sooner or later in the partition of Turkey—Servia, Bosnia, and Albania are provinces which she cannot allow to fall into any other hands than her own. It is her interest to keep the question respecting the Christians in Turkey an open one. And as she can never expect to cope with Russia's naval power in the Black Sea, she has but little interest in

humiliating her in that quarter. From this point of view, then, Austria has every reason to be satisfied with what she has obtained, and to turn the weight of her seemingly impartial arbitration against England and France. But this diplomatic success has very little to do with her present wavering. The cause of this is of a far more overpowering nature.

Some six months ago we alluded to the private and confidential despatch by which Nicholas informed both Austria and Prussia, that in case they allied themselves with the West against him he would reply to such a treaty of alliance by a proclamation of Hungarian independence and Polish restoration. At that time, and whenever we have considered the chances of a war in Poland and Volhynia, we have always taken into consideration the great military advantage which such a proclamation might give to Russia, if put forth after the conquest of Galicia and from the heights of the Carpathians, with Hungary open to her victorious armies. On that account, especially, we have always pointed out the fact that Austria could not undertake a war against Russia unless she was in a state at once to take the offensive and to parry, by successful battles and an advance upon Russia, the effects of such a proclamation. So long, therefore, as the Austrian army in Galicia and the Principalities was strong enough to march upon Warsaw or Kieff, there was little immediate danger from such a step.

This despatch of Nicholas has, however, as we now learn, lately been followed up by another from his successor, which contains quite different and far more serious menaces. The moment Austria shall irrevocably ally herself to the West, it says, or commit any overt act of hostility against Russia, Alexander II. *will place himself at the head of the Panславист movement*, and change his title of Emperor of all the Russians into that of *Emperor of all the Slavonians*.

At last! Let Alexander take such a step, and the struggle concerning the Christians in Turkey, the independence of the Porte, Sebastopol, the Principalities, and other such local trifles, may be considered at an end. This declaration of

Alexander's is the first plain-spoken word since the war began; it is the first step toward placing the war upon the Continental theatre, and giving it, frankly and openly, that European character which has hitherto been lurking behind all sorts of pretexts and pretences, protocols and treaties, Vatel phrases and Puffendorf quotations. Turkey—her independence and existence—is thrown into the background. Who is to rule in Constantinople—would then no longer be the question—but who is to command all Europe? The Slavonic race long divided by internal contests; repelled towards the East by Germans; subjugated, in part, by Turks, Germans, Hungarians; quickly reuniting its branches, after 1815, by the gradual rise of Panslavism, would then for the first time assert its unity, and, in doing so, declare war to the knife against the Romano-Celtic and Germanic races which have hitherto ruled the Continent. Panslavism is not a movement which merely strives after national independence; it is a movement which, thus acting upon Europe, would tend to undo what a thousand years of history have created; which could not realize itself without sweeping from the map Hungary, Turkey, and a large part of Germany. Moreover, it must subjugate Europe in order to secure the stability of these results, if they are ever obtained. Panslavism is now, from a creed, turned into a political programme, or rather a vast political menace, with 800,000 bayonets to support it.

Nor are these 800,000 soldiers all the forces it could command. A word from the Russian Emperor at the head of an army, marching upon the Carpathians, and nine or ten millions of Slavonians in Austria would be agitated as in 1848; a victory over the Austrians, and they would be in full insurrection; while Hungary and Italy would be hardly less ploughed by revolutionary agitation. Here is a danger which might well make Francis Joseph pause; for unless he could at once defeat the great Slavonian army on his frontiers and carry the war into the enemy's country, he might as well give up the contest before entering the lists.

XCVIII

Austria's Weakness

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, May 7, 1855

THE great points of weakness in Austria are usually supposed to be her bankrupt treasury and the revolutionary elements of Italy and Hungary. It is true that in a war with France and England those elements might be employed with great effect against her; but in a war with Russia her vulnerable point lies in another quarter. Though this point was always plainly to be seen, and, indeed, has been indicated by Austrian statesmen themselves, we had, during the life of the Emperor Nicholas, no menace to show that he had firmly resolved, in any contingency, to take advantage of it. His successor, however, appears to be less scrupulous, or at any rate less reserved. He has clearly announced to Austria that in the event of her finally joining the Allies he shall put himself officially at the head of the great Slavonic brotherhood, and call to his aid all the slumbering sympathies of race or religion which naturally impel the Slavonians of Austria and Turkey to Russia, as well as all the deep-seated animosities they cherish against the nations and Governments that now hold them in more or less complete subjugation.

Panslavism as a political theory has had its most lucid and philosophic expression in the writings of Count Gurowski. But that learned and distinguished publicist, while regarding Russia as the natural pivot around which the destinies of this numerous and vigorous branch of the

human family can alone find a large historical development, did not conceive of Pan Slavism as a league against Europe and European civilization. In his view the legitimate outlook for the expansive force of Slavonic energies was Asia. As compared with the stagnant desolation of that old continent, Russia is a civilizing power, and her contact could not be other than beneficial. This manly and imposing generalization has, however, not been accepted by all the inferior minds which have adopted its fundamental idea. Pan Slavism has assumed a variety of aspects; and now, at last, we find it employed in a new form, and with great apparent effect, as a warlike threat. As such, its use certainly does credit to the boldness and decision of the new Czar. And how just the fear with which the threat has inspired Austria, we now propose to show.

Of the seventy millions of Slavonians living east of the Bohemian forest and the Carnic Alps, about fifteen millions are subject to the Austrian Emperor, comprising representatives of almost every variety of Slavonic speech. The Bohemian or Tchech branch (six millions) falls exclusively within the Austrian dominions; the Polish branch is represented by about three millions of Galicians; the Russian by three millions of Malo-Russians (Red Russians, Ruthenes) in Galicia and the north-east of Hungary—the only Russian tribe outside the pale of the Russian Empire; the South Slavonic branch by about three millions of Slovenes (Carinthians and Croats) and Servians, including some stray Bulgarians. These Austrian Slavonians are of two different kinds. One part of them consists of the remnants of tribes whose history belongs to the past, and whose present historical development is attached to that of nations of different race and speech; and to complete their unfortunate position, these hapless relics of former greatness have not even a national organization within Austria, but are divided among different provinces. Thus the Slovenes, although scarcely 1,500,000 in number, are spread over the different provinces of Kraina, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, and South-western Hungary. The Bohemians (Tchechs), though the

most numerous tribe of Austrian Slavonians, reside partly in Bohemia, partly in Moravia, and partly (the Slovak branch) in North-western Hungary. These tribes, therefore, though living exclusively on Austrian soil, are far from being recognised as constituting separate nations. They are considered as appendages, either to the German or the Hungarian nations, and in reality they are nothing else.

The second portion of Austrian Slavonians is composed of fragments of different tribes, which in the course of history have become separated from the great body of their nation, and which, therefore, have their centre of gravity out of Austria. Thus the Poles have their natural centre of gravity in Russian Poland; the Ruthenes in the other Malo-Russian provinces united with Russia; the Servians in the Servian Principality. That these fragments, torn from their respective nationalities, will continue to gravitate, each toward its natural centre, is a matter of course, and becomes more and more evident as civilization, and with it the want of historical, national activity, is spread among them. In either case, the Austrian Slavonians are *dissecta membra*, seeking their reunion either among each other, or with the main body of their separate nationalities.

This is the cause which formerly rendered Panslavism so active in Austria. In order to secure the restoration of each Slavonian nationality, the different tribes of Slavonians in Austria long since began to work for a union of all the Slavonic tribes. The first appearance of Austrian Panslavism was merely literary. Dobrovsky, a Bohemian, the founder of the scientific philology of the Slavonic dialects, and Kolar, a Slovak poet from the Hungarian Carpathians, were its originators. With Dobrovsky it was the enthusiasm of a scientific discoverer; with Kolar, political ideas soon became predominant; but still he ventured to complain only; the greatness of the past, the disgrace, the misfortune, and foreign oppression of the present, were the themes of his poetry. The dream of the Panslavic Empire dictating laws to Europe was at that time hardly hinted at.

But the lamenting period soon passed away, and his-

torical research upon the political, literary and linguistic development of the Slavonic race made great progress. Schafarik, Kopitar, and Miklosich as linguists, Palacky as a historian, took the lead, followed by a host of lesser men like Hanka and Gaj. The glorious epochs of Bohemian and Servian history were glowingly depicted in contrast to the present degraded and broken state of those nations. While in Germany philosophy formed the pretext under the protection of which the most revolutionary doctrines in politics or theology were propounded, in Austria and under the very nose of Metternich, historical and philological science was used by the Panslavists as a cloak to teach the doctrine of Slavonic unity, and to create a political party with the unmistakable aim of upsetting Austria, and instituting a vast Slavonian empire in its place.

Austrian Panslavism was destitute of the most essential elements of success. It wanted both force and unity: force, because the Panslavic party consisted of a portion of the educated classes only, and had no hold upon the masses, and withal no strength capable of resisting both the Austrian Government and the German and Hungarian nationalities against which it entered the lists; unity, because its uniting principle was a mere ideal one, which, at the very first attempt at realization, was broken up by the fact of diversity of language. Of this diversity, a ludicrous illustration was afforded by the famous Slavonian Congress at Prague in 1848. There, after various attempts to make out a Slavonic language that should be intelligible to all the members, they were obliged to resort to the tongue most hated by them all—the German.

In fact, so long as the movement was limited to Austria it offered no great danger, but that very centre of unity and strength which it wanted was very soon found for it. The national uprising of the Turkish Servians, in the beginning of this century, had called the attention of the Russian Government to the fact that there were some seven millions of Slavonians in Turkey, whose speech, of all other Slavonic dialects, most resembled the Russian. Their re-

ligion too, and their ecclesiastic language—old Slavonic or Church Slavonic—were exactly the same as in Russia. It was among these Servians and Bulgarians that the Czar for the first time began an agitation supported by appeals to his position as the protector of the Eastern Church. It was, therefore, only natural that as soon as this Panslavist movement in Austria had gained consistency, Russia should extend thither the ramifications of her agencies. Where Roman Catholic Slavonians were met with, the religious side of the question was dropped ; Russia was merely held up as the proper head of the Slavonic race, and the strong and united people which was to realize the great Slavonic Empire from the Elbe to China, and from the Adriatic to the frozen ocean.

Metternich, in the latter years of his power, very well appreciated the danger and saw through the Russian intrigues. He opposed the movement with all the means in his power. But the only proper means—general freedom of expansion—did not belong to his system of policy. Accordingly, on Metternich's downfall in 1848, the Slavonic movement broke out stronger than ever, and embraced a large proportion of the population. But here its reactionary character at once came to light. While the German, Hungarian, and Italian movements were decidedly progressive and revolutionary, the Slavonic party turned to the conservative side. It was the Slavonians that saved Austria from destruction, and enabled Radetzky to advance on the Mincio, and Windischgrätz to conquer Vienna. And to complete the drama, in 1849 the Russian army had to descend into Hungary and settle the war for Austria there.

While thus driven by her own want of vitality to depend on Slavonic aid for her very existence, Austria seized the first moment of security to react against the Slavonians in her own territory. For this purpose she had to adopt a policy at least partially progressive. The special privileges of the Provinces were broken down ; a centralized Empire took the place of a federal one ; and, instead of all the

different nationalities, a fictitious Austrian nationality was created. Though these changes were in some degree against the German, Italian, and Hungarian nationalities, they yet fell with far greater weight on the less compact Slavonian tribes, and more especially gave the German element a considerable preponderance.

But the sentiment of race and of attachment to Russia has been strengthened rather than weakened by this process. Austrian Panslavism possesses, perhaps, at this moment a greater latent force than ever. It represents the only element in Austria which was not broken down in the late revolutionary struggle. The Italians, the Hungarians, the Germans even, all came debilitated and discouraged out of that vehement convulsion. The Slavonians alone felt themselves unconquered and unreduced. Is it surprising that Francis Joseph should hesitate before setting on foot a war in which Russia would find millions of devoted and fanatical allies within his own Empire?

The New Arbiter of Europe

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, June 6, 1855

WE have frequently had occasion to refer to the power which Russia possesses of fearfully deranging, if not of exploding, the Austrian Empire by an appeal to its Slavic elements; and it is not long since we noticed the intimation which the Emperor Alexander, bolder and more decided than his father, lately made to the Court of Vienna. Alexander distinctly gave that Court to understand that on the first distinctly hostile movement on its part he would let loose against Austria all these dangerous and long fermenting forces. The result is seen in the present position of the latter Power.

We have never attached any weight to the notion, current as it is, that Austria can be led by sheer sympathy to embrace the cause of Russia. There is no doubt an agreement between St. Petersburg and Vienna as respects the theory and objects of government, and as against the revolutionary democracy we might again expect to see them making common cause, as they have done hitherto. But this is not a sympathy to influence the policy of either under other circumstances. Austria and Russia are naturally enemies. Austria especially has every reason to hate her powerful neighbour and to desire her humiliation; and that in the Hungarian war the Russian armies would much more gladly have fought against the Austrians than for them is a notorious fact. In the present war Austria would no doubt prefer to see both sides weakened

and humiliated, while risking and losing nothing herself ; but of the two, she must necessarily desire that the party more dangerous to her own power should be especially a sufferer. That party is Russia, to whom she is not only hostile for having saved her own life, but because the great military strength of that Empire, her influence over the Slavonic tribes on both sides of the Danube, and her secret designs upon Turkey render her existence a constant menace to the integrity and greatness of Austria. If the latter does not join the Allies, it is not from friendship for their enemy, but because she cannot do it with safety to herself. The time may come when accord in abstract political opinions will determine the co-operation of Governments ; as yet, however, the policy of every Power is dictated not by sympathy, but by interest. If Austria dared, she would make war on Russia ; but as the Vienna Conference approached their crisis, Field-Marshal Kiss was instructed to report upon the chances of an immediate campaign against Russia. His report, as we learn from good authority, was to the effect that Russia, having about 250,000 men ready to act on the Austrian frontier, in positions of great natural strength, and defended by six of the strongest fortresses of Europe, it would require about twice their number to dislodge them, to lay siege to the fortresses, and to force the enemy to a decisive battle not too far from the frontier. Now as Austria could oppose to them no more than some 350,000 men, this result could not be obtained, and in fact the co-operation, or at least the moral aid of Prussia and the remainder of Germany was requisite. Unless, therefore, the Russo-Prussian frontier was occupied by an army of 100,000 troops allied to Austria, or unless at least 100,000 French troops were sent to the assistance of Austria, the campaign against Russia could not be undertaken with any chance of immediate success. Accordingly the idea was abandoned.

But while Alexander thus launches at the house of Hapsburg the menace of raising the Slavonic tribes, Napoleon on the other hand threatens to call upon the stage

the oppressed nationalities of Italy, Hungary, and Poland. "All those who suffer, look to the West," he exclaimed before the worshipful Aldermen of the City of London. Walewski, the connecting-link between the Bonapartes and Poland, is made Foreign Secretary. The Polish refugees, at least the shabbiest aristocratic refuse of them, offer up to him appeals which he duly parades in the *Moniteur*.

Thus Austria is placed between two fires. On the one hand Alexander II. girding his loins for the conquest of four-fifths of the Austrian Empire if she joins the West; on the other Louis Napoleon offering his assistance to those very "oppressed" whom Francis Joseph knows constitute the vast majority of his subjects. Whichever way Austria turns she finds revolution staring her boldly in the face, and with all her army of 600,000 bayonets, the finest in the world, commanded by generals tried on the battle-field, she is reduced to actual impotence. And what is most remarkable of all in this emergency, she falls back upon Prussia, against whom she has long been conspiring, and who, in spite of the sneers of British and French journals, is at this moment, if she chooses, what Austria has for months fancied herself to be, the arbiter of Europe.

Another Vienna Disclosure

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, July 23, 1855

ON the evening previous to our latest dates from Europe a scene of rather startling character was enacted in the British House of Commons, bringing out yet another shade in the ever-varying picture of the Vienna Conference, and presenting the British Plenipotentiary, Lord John Russell, in a new light, calculated not alone to reflect dishonour on his character as a man, but to awaken a thorough distrust in European statesmanship. One after another have the events of this Conference been dragged to light out of the darkness in which the Governments endeavoured to enshroud them, and it is only now that we have, more through that quarrel among the parties to it in which the world ever comes by its own, than from any sense of honour or truth, arrived at the real result. The story is a very simple one.

It appears that the only point which disturbed the smooth surface of the Conference was the Third, which proposed to effect the nominal object of the war, and secure the independence of Turkey by "putting an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea." A solution of this difficult knot was proposed by Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, in which it was stipulated that there should always exist a counterpoise of forces, whereby if Russia increased her naval power in the Black Sea beyond its then dimensions, England, France, Austria, and Turkey might augment theirs in proportion; and, further, that there

should be a treaty by which Austria, Great Britain, and France should guarantee the independence and integrity of Turkey, Russia being a party to that guarantee. This solution, which we adopt *ipssissimis verbis* from Lord John Russell's last reformed statement, was cordially adopted by him and by Drouyn de l'Huys, the French representative, both of whom undertook to submit it to their respective Governments, and to solicit for it the perfection of that approval which they had themselves individually extended to it. Austria undertook on her part to forward this solution, if approved by the French Emperor and the English Government, to Russia, and in case of that Power refusing to accede to the proposed provisions, to at once declare war and enter into active armed alliance with France and England.

Such was the position of the play when the curtain fell upon the Conference. Drouyn de l'Huys on his return presented the accepted solution to his master, who gave it his assent, subject to England's decision. Lord John Russell, it seems, was less fortunate. Those proposals which he deemed, and still declares he deems, sufficient to secure a just and honourable peace were rejected by Lord Palmerston and the majority of the English Cabinet, and Louis Napoleon yielded his opinion to that of his more bold and daring ally. Drouyn de l'Huys at once, with a sense of personal and political honour which must enhance the character he has hitherto held on the roll of European statesmen, refused to direct a war which he no longer deemed necessary and to which he saw an honourable termination, and resigned the Foreign Bureau. Not so, however, the English Plenipotentiary. Not content with quietly nestling in his seat beneath the shade of Palmerston, Lord John Russell, in speaking on Messrs. Gibson's, Layard's, and Disraeli's motions, not only argued explicitly that the terms proposed by Count Buol (which it now seems he had approved and accepted) were unsatisfactory, but even went so far, in his violent denunciations of Russia, and in asserting an imperative necessity of chaining down

its ambitious power, as to leave upon the House the impression that all hope of peace must be abandoned, and that England, like Rome of old, must gird up her loins and cry out resolutely, "*Carthago delenda est.*" Little did those who then cheered and voted dream that this very Minister had returned from Vienna with those very terms in his pocket, believing then, as he does still, that they would establish a just and honourable peace.

Whatever may be the opinion of the capacity of the solution to attain its proposed end, there can be, as Mr. Cobden, Mr. Disraeli, and Mr. Roebuck, representing different parties in the House, have powerfully expressed, but one as to the character of a statesman who in the support of party would so far forget what was due to his own honour and the sacred obligations of the office he undertook as to sanction by his presence in the Cabinet the continuance of a war in which myriads of men, and the product of men's sweat, must be wasted, while he held and concealed from that Assembly, to which he undertook to give a full and frank account of his mission, terms of peace which he considered and still considers honourable and just.

Lord John Russell alleges in excuse the old Whig precept, sanctioned and consecrated by the eloquent words of Fox, of sacrificing principle to party, and the happiness of many to the benefit of a few. "If he had left office on this decision he should not have acted consistently with the rule which had always guided his conduct; and whatever might be his sentiments on this great question, he thought it to be his duty to continue to give his support to the present head of the Cabinet, and not by quitting office to weaken its stability."

There is perhaps no statesman in England who possesses a broader knowledge of the philosophy of the British Constitution or a keener perception of the current of public opinion, and a more dashing daring in following its bent when absolutely determined. But these qualities are cramped and confined by a close cunning and party selfishness of rat-like ferocity. It was this spirit, more than any

principle, which incited him to betray the Aberdeen Government in a manner which would "make any man in England prefer," as the *London Times* so well observed, "to be the gallant generous Newcastle, covered with failure as he was, rather than the cool and crafty Russell." It is but a few months since Lord John shed, or feigned to shed, some tears over what might have been deemed the stain on his honour in yielding to the necessities of the hour, his promised Reform Bill. It had been well had he reserved his tears for this occasion. They might have flowed more effectually, and were certainly more needed.

Ministerial Crisis in England

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, July 26, 1855

FOR some days prior to our latest dates from England, the Ministerial vessel which under Palmerston had hitherto taken the flood with such gallant fortune has been in difficulty and exhibited every symptom of foundering. Our article of Monday, upon "the last Vienna disclosure," prepared our readers for this crisis and explained its cause. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that it was the creation of that calm little English statesman who with such coolness and unconsciousness of reproach has during his political career so often "upset the coach," but who has recently outdone even himself in the celerity and novelty of his exploits. Writhing and restless in the subordinate position in the Coalition Cabinet to which a previous rash insult to the religious feelings and invasion of the religious liberties of a large portion of the Queen's subjects had doomed him, Lord John Russell suddenly seized an occasion to break up the Aberdeen Ministry, and strove as the representative of the fierce war passion of the people to build upon its ruins a Government of his own. Failing in this, we next find him under his old subordinate of so many years, and recent rival, Palmerston, on his road to Vienna as the Plenipotentiary of a vigorous war Ministry, and with the character of the vigorous war man, to persuade Austria to accept the terms of England and press them upon Russia.

¹ Inserted by mistake. The article is not by Marx.

Resting for a moment on the road to telegraph his acceptance of the Seals of the Colonial Office, we next find him, after a few weeks of veiled communion with the other Powers, once more in England, informing an impatient nation that there could be no peace with the modern Macedon, and that an Empire "whose moderation was beyond the ambition of other kingdoms" must be brought down.

At the time certain mysterious whispers were abroad that Lord John Russell, the supposed champion of a vigorous war policy, had allowed much of his courage to cool down under the climate of Vienna; and the Peelites were not slow to rejoice in the rumoured adhesion to their peace predilections of so distinguished a convert. But the bold and defiant tone of his story of the Conference dispelled such doubts. Some weeks of silence passed, unbroken by a hint from Lord John Russell, when forth comes Count Buol's Circular disclosing the horrid truth that he who had gone to Vienna to press upon Austria the terms of England, returned to press upon England the terms of Austria, and all this time, while denouncing Russia to the eye and ear, inwardly believed that that Cabinet of which he continued a member was the obstacle which stood between Europe and a just and honourable peace. Both as the Minister of England in which capacity he went to Vienna, and as the Minister of Austria in which capacity he returned, he has failed. The result of his mission was simply to give Austria the opportunity she eagerly coveted of escaping from the obligations she had imposed on herself by the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and placing his own country, instead of Russia, in the position of an implacable belligerent. Our prediction that Lord John Russell would not gather laurels at Vienna has been fatally fulfilled.

The explanations offered by Lord John Russell of this huge knavery or folly were contradictory and weak. Those who have most keenly analysed his long career do not hesitate to attribute it to that close cunning which in our previous article we represented as the great vice of his

political character. He was his own representative—not that of England. Had Sebastopol fallen, he craftily considered that, in the silence which covers all Cabinet secrets and in the tumult of public joy, this peace exploit of his would not be dug up. On the other hand, had the Allies failed, as he evidently calculated, he could have come before the people as the overruled advocate of an honourable peace. Cunning has, however, found its foil. The circular of Count Buol came too soon. A burst of indignation rose from every side of the House, which found grave expression in a motion of censure placed on the books of the House of Commons by Sir Bulwer Lytton. Had Lord Palmerston adopted Lord John Russell's actions, and, as he threatened, faced this motion, he would undoubtedly have fallen. With more judicious wisdom, the telegraph which touched the *Atlantic* as she started tells us that he has thrown the dangerous member of the Administration overboard, and thus possibly saved his Government from shipwreck. The resignation of Lord John Russell may for a time defer a crisis. Upon Mr. Roebuck's motion of censure upon the Ministers at large we anticipate for Lord Palmerston a large majority should he escape Sir Bulwer Lytton's.

Thus has fallen, after a uniform and gradual descent, a minister who for more than twenty years has led the House of Commons, as constituted by that Reform Bill he himself proposed; who for six years held the post of Premier of England; who in his youth had crossed swords with Canning and in his maturity had divided glory with Peel, the successor of Fox and star of Whiggery. We know for him no more truthful epitaph than that in which we, a few days since, wrote him down "as one who possessed a broader knowledge of the philosophy of the British Constitution and keener perception of the current of public opinion, and more dashing daring in following out its bent when fully determined, than any statesman of England, but who found these qualities cramped and confined by a close cunning and party selfishness of rat-like ferocity." England's diplomatic has gone the way of her military fame.

The place vacated by Lord John Russell we have little doubt will be offered to Lord Elgin, and if refused by him, to Mr. Lowe. Lord Palmerston may find, however, considerable difficulty to fill it. Statesmen avoid a falling house.

CII

The Birmingham Conference

LONDON, *July 27, 1855*
N. Y. T., August 10, 1855

It is a great mistake to judge of the movement in England by the reports in the London press. Take, for instance, the late Birmingham Conference. The majority of the London newspapers did not even notice it, while the remainder contained only the meagre intelligence of its having taken place. Yet what was this Conference? It was a public Congress composed of delegates from Birmingham, London, Huddersfield, Newcastle, Halifax, Sheffield, Leeds, Derby, Bradford, Nottingham, and other places, convened to take the task of discussing the most important subject of the day—the foreign policy of England—out of the hands of an incapable and collapsing Parliament.

The movement, undoubtedly, had been instigated by the meetings addressed by Mr. Urquhart throughout the factory districts, and the distinguishing feature of the Conference just held at Birmingham was the harmonious working together of men from the middle and the labouring classes. The Conference divided itself into various Committees charged to report on the most prominent questions of British foreign policy. I have been favoured with a detailed account of the proceedings and the documents connected therewith, of which I proceed to place the most characteristic before the readers of *THE TRIBUNE*. The first is a correspondence between the Secretary of the Conference and Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign Minister of Lord Derby,

concerning the Treaty on the Danish succession of May 8, 1852. Lord Malmesbury writes:

[“ . . . *Your resolution respecting the Danish Treaty of 8th of May, 1852, is founded on a totally erroneous view of the cases and facts. It is not true that the succession to Denmark, the Sound and Schleswig-Holstein, is secured to Russia by that Treaty. Russia has obtained no right, present or prospective, that she did not possess before the Treaty. There are now four male heirs to the crown of Denmark alive. The Treaty prescribes that if their extinction should become universal, the high contracting parties—namely, Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, France, and Sweden—shall engage to take into consideration any further proposition made to them by the King of Denmark for securing the succession on the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy. Should this remote contingency occur, the contracting Powers would therefore meet again to settle the Danish succession, and I leave you to judge whether the Five Powers who signed the Treaty of 8th May with Russia are likely in such a case to determine that, as head of the house of Holstein-Gottorp, she should annex to her dominions the whole of the present Danish monarchy. . . .*”]

The following is the answer of the Secretary to Lord Malmesbury's letter:

[“ . . . *We gather that in the case of the expected failure of the four heirs to the United Monarchy of Denmark, England and Russia are pledged to interfere between the King of Denmark on the one hand, and the several States of Denmark, Schleswig and Holstein on the other. We are at a loss to know by what right such an interference can be justified, and we cannot but think the fact of war with Russia ought to be taken advantage of in order to enable us to abstain from so immoral and illegal an action. You think the character of the six Powers is a security against the admission of Russia to the whole succession in right, first, of Holstein-Gottorp, and secondly, of the principle of the integrity of the monarchy. Who will come in for the whole if Russia does not, and, if England did not mean Russia to come in for the whole, why did she not make Russia's renunciation of Holstein-Gottorp a condition of the Treaty? . . .*”]

The correspondence stops here—Lord Malmesbury not having felt inclined to go on. His Lordship's inability to answer those questions is, however, not without an excuse—

the noble Lord having found all points concerning the Danish Succession so well settled by Lord Palmerston's Protocol of July 8, 1850, that the Treaty required indeed his mere signature.

The second document is the report of the Committee appointed by the Conference on the famous *Four Points*. I quote as follows :

[“ *We find their SOURCE in the following proposition, laid down in the despatch of Count Nesselrode, of June 29, 1854, and headed, ‘Consolidation of the Rights of the Christians in Turkey :’ ‘The civil rights for all the Christian subjects of the Porte are inseparable from religious rights. If this were the case, the demands made by the Emperor on the Porte would be fulfilled, the cause of the dispute done away with, and his Majesty would be ready to give his concurrence to a EUROPEAN GUARANTEE FOR THIS PRIVILEGE.’ ”*

“ *This proposal for the perpetual interference, not of one, but of five Powers, in the internal affairs of Turkey, was accepted on the part of England and France, in the shape of what is now known as the Fourth Point, couched in the following terms by Drouyn de l’Huys, in his despatch of 22nd of July, 1854: ‘No Power shall claim the right to exercise any official Protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, but France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, shall lend their mutual co-operation in order to obtain from the initiative of the Ottoman Government the consecration and observance of the religious privileges of the various Christian communities, so that there shall not result therefrom any infringement of the dignity and independence of his crown.’*

“ *The effect of the Fourth Point is to destroy the independence of the Ottoman Empire, which it is the avowed object of the war to defend. This proposed surrender has been made by England and France without the consent of Turkey.*

“ *Had we been beaten in war by Russia and compelled to sue for peace, we could not legally have made such a proposal on the part of another Power. In order to remove this illegality it would be necessary first for England and France to go over openly to Russia and to declare war against Turkey. As the Fourth Point is the surrender of the independence of Turkey, so the First Point is the surrender of her integrity ; and, as in the Fourth Point, that surrender is made without the consent of the party concerned.*

“ *The separation of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia from*

Turkey is concealed under the statement that they are still to be subject to the Porte. The Five Powers are in the same condition with the Porte as Joint Suzerain. France and England have proposed that Wallachia and Moldavia should be united in a single State, under a hereditary Prince chosen from one of the reigning families of Europe. But the infamy of this surrender is enhanced by the fact that it was made at a time when the armies of Russia were compelled to evacuate the Turkish territory, without the smallest assistance from the forces of England and France.

"We cannot for a moment suppose that the English Cabinet was not aware that by substituting Austrian for Turkish soldiers in Wallachia and Moldavia they were setting free the Russian army to support Sebastopol, nor is the supposition that this was a concession to Austria, made for the purpose of obtaining her adherence to the Turkish cause, tenable.

"The Second Point was the free navigation of the Danube. The interruption of the navigation of the Danube dates from the cession by Turkey to Russia, at the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, of the delta of the Danube—contrary to the Treaty of London of July 6, 1827. The acquiescence of England in this violation of public law was defended by her desire for peace. The cession of the Danubian delta to Turkey was an indispensable demand in any real war of England against Russia. It has, on the contrary, been made a means of injury to Austria. The Austrian Plenipotentiary proposed that Russia should admit the neutrality of the Danubian delta. The Russian Plenipotentiaries said that they would not consent. Lord J. Russell did not support the proposal of Austria, and the question was settled in favour of the continued possession by Russia of the Danubian delta.

"The Third Point is that the Treaty of 1841 shall be revised by the high contracting Powers in the interest of the European equilibrium, and in the sense of a limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea.

"Russia has not a natural preponderance in the Black Sea: she is not able to descend from Sebastopol and take possession of Constantinople and of Turkey; had she possessed this power she would have used it. She has been withheld by the impracticability of the undertaking. As a preparation for such an undertaking, she has robbed Turkey by treaty, not of her fair share of power in the Black Sea, but of the exclusive control of the Straits which command her capital in the Bosphorus, and which secure it at the Dardanelles. For

the restoration of the Sultan's exclusive control of the Straits no stipulation was necessary ; it reverts to him on the abrogation by the fact of war of the treaties by which it has been temporarily placed in abeyance. This simple view of the case has, however, not even been suggested at the Conference of Vienna. In the despatch of Lord Clarendon to Austria we find the reason in the words : THE JUST CLAIMS OF RUSSIA. If the claims of Russia were just, and if England intended to support them, England should have declared war against Turkey.

"With regard to the limitation of the power of Russia, the Austrian Plenipotentiary, Count Buol, wrote : ' The joint efforts of the Allies should be directed to limiting the political power of Russia to such a point as to render the abuse of its material resources if not impossible, at least in the highest degree difficult. The diminution, nay, even the total destruction of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, would not of itself suffice to deprive Russia of the advantage which she derives from her geographical position with regard to Turkey.'

"Of all the delusions attempted by the English Government upon Parliament, the only one which has failed has been the proposal for limiting the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea. Had the war been intended as announced—to protect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire—the terms of peace offered to Russia would have been : 1. Cession to Turkey of the Danubian Delta, which de jure she still has ; 2. Indemnification by Russia of the expenses of the war."

The Committee wind up their report as follows :

"Your Committee find it impossible to reconcile these facts with the innocence of the British Cabinet. One cannot overlook the pre-eminence of the four Foreign Ministers, Clarendon, Aberdeen, Russell, and above all Palmerston, whose aid in securing the recognition of the Treaty of Adrianople, the payment to Russia, even in time of war, of the Russo-Dutch loan, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and the Dardanelles, and the Treaty of Balta-Liman, and whose perfidy towards Poland, Hungary, Sicily, and Italy, no less than his treachery towards France, Persia, Spain, and Denmark, point him out as the implacable enemy—not only of Turkey, but of every nation of Europe, and the willing tool of Russia."

CIII

Austria and England

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, September 13, 1855

WE communicate to our readers on another page an account by an Austrian officer of a tour of inspection of the Galician army recently made by the Emperor Francis Joseph.¹ The writer, in narrating the events of this tour, and in stating the dislocation of the Imperial forces, confirms the opinion we have on former occasions taken care to explain, that in the preparations she last year made for war, Austria was by no means engaged in a comedy for the delusion of the Western Powers. Certainly she would never have made such sacrifices merely to throw dust in the eyes of the world.

It is true that the utmost necessity alone induced her to arm against Russia; and, indeed, as long as it was possible to procrastinate, Austria clung to the cobweb thread of a prospective peace which Russian diplomacy held out for a bait. At last, however, her patience was exhausted, and St. Petersburg learned with surprise, not unmingled with terror, that the Austrian columns were drawn up along the Galician frontier. This was before the bare possibility of such an armament had been admitted; and to concentrate an army of equal strength on the Russian side, within an equally short time, was altogether out of the question. The arts of diplomacy had

¹ This letter, which we do not print, was evidently sent by and translated by Marx.

therefore again to be resorted to. In what manner and with what success this was done, need not be repeated. The whole of the immense army lately gathered on the Galician frontiers was dissolved at once, and the apprehensions of Russia in that quarter were partly allayed. We say partly, because two important elements have risen with that army which are not dissolved along with it. These are the fortifications and railways erected, renewed or completed, during the stay of the army in Galicia.

While in all other parts of the Empire the Government was guided by the principle of abandoning railway enterprise to private speculators; while the western railway, intended to connect Vienna with Munich, was even strikingly neglected, Baron Hess, the commander-in-chief in Galicia, was employing thousands of soldiers in the construction of a line of which, however great the strategic value, the commercial advantages are questionable, at least for the present—a line, too, which otherwise might have remained in the desks of private engineers for thirty years to come. To Russia nothing could have been more disagreeable than the construction of these railways, by which Austria is now able to reconcentrate the army just dissolved within less than a fifth part of the time required by Russia to bring up a similar army. Whoever will take the pains to inquire into the statistics of Austrian railway enterprise, and compare what has been done in the east to meet purely political views with the little attention paid to the interests of commerce in the west, cannot fail to disbelieve that these Galician railways were thus hurried into premature existence for the mere deception of the world. Indeed, it is plain that such a purpose would have been much better answered by the speedy completion of the western lines connecting Austria with Bavaria.

Our opinion is also confirmed in a still higher degree by the recent extensive improvements and additions in the fortifications of the eastern provinces of Austria. If railways may, or may not, be constructed from strategic considerations, the erection and completion of a system of

fortifications and the unproductive outlay occasioned by such works, certainly admit of no explanation beyond the immediate necessities of the case. What we have said about the comparative extent of railway works in the east and west of Austria applies with much greater force to these fortifications. Of the thirty-six fortresses of the Austrian Empire, seven belong directly, and nine indirectly, to the eastern line of defence, most of them having only recently been raised to a high perfection—as, for instance, Cracow, Przemyśl, and Czernowitz. The two former, together with Lemberg, which on account of its situation cannot be made of great strength, command the road to Warsaw; the latter is at the easternmost extremity of Galicia, opposite the important Russian fortress of Chotin. Cracow has been made a fortress of the first order, and all the works of this, as well as of the other Galician fortifications, have been put up in complete readiness for war. It was once the custom in the Austrian army to give the command of fortresses to old worn-out generals, as a sort of honourable retirement, and such places were looked upon as a sort of exile for officers in disgrace at the court; but we now find in the whole east and north-east really efficient men, generals of merit and distinguished staff officers, in command of fortresses. Cracow is commanded by Field-Marshal Wolter; Przemyśl by Major-General Ebner; Czernowitz by Major-General Gläser; Carlsburg, in Transylvania, by Field-Marshal Sedlmayer; and Olmütz, on the north-western flank, by General Von Böhm. At the same time the state of things in the west is the very reverse—men and things are but ruins tranquilly made over to further decay. How different would be the aspect there if the Western Powers could even pretend to call Austria's policy ambiguous! How the Austrian authorities would hasten to restore Linz with its forty Maximilian towers, now scarcely treated as a fortress—and Salzburg, once a stronghold of the first order? Instead of this, what do we behold?—dead quiet and perfect absence of all military preparations. The very soldiers returning from the east,

where they expected to reap their laurels, are invalidated as fast as they approach the Bavarian frontier.

These being facts which speak for themselves, there remains only one question to be settled; namely, through whose fault was the policy of Austria baffled and that country saddled with an enormous additional debt, without any immediate advantage either to herself or to her ostensible allies? We know it to be an opinion current at Vienna, and re-echoed throughout Germany, that Austria shrank back for fear of creating a second adversary in Prussia, and because a war undertaken without the aid of Germany offered no guarantee of as speedy a termination as the exceptional position of the Empire requires. We must, however, insist upon the contrary view. It is our judgment that if Austria had boldly attacked the Russian army, Prussia and the rest of Germany would have been compelled to follow, more or less slowly and reluctantly, in her track.

Who, then, is to be held responsible for the present Austrian policy? England, under the guidance of that brilliant boggler and loquacious humbug, Lord Palmerston. To prove this proposition, it is necessary to leave the military camp and to enter the diplomatic labyrinth. On the 23rd of July, Mr. Disraeli asked Lord John Russell the authority for his statement that "one of the principal causes of the expedition to the Crimea was the refusal of Austria to cross the river Pruth." Lord John could not recollect—that is, he said his "authority was his general recollection." Mr. Disraeli then put the question to Lord Palmerston, who

[would not answer questions like these, picked out piecemeal from a long course of negotiations. He had always thought the Crimea was the place where the most effective blow could be struck at the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea.]

Thus we learn from Lord Palmerston that the Crimean campaign originated not with Austria, not with Bonaparte, but with himself. On June 26, Lord Lyndhurst, making a fierce onslaught on Austria, stated that:

["She resolved on making a demand upon Russia to evacuate

the Principalities in very strong terms, with something like an intimation that if it were not complied with Austria would resort to forcible means to secure this object. Did Austria attempt to enter the Principalities? She abstained from doing anything till the siege of Silistria had been raised, the Russian army was in retreat, and Russia herself had served a notice that she would within a certain time leave the Principalities and retire behind the Pruth."]

Lord Lyndhurst thus reproaches Austria for saying one thing and doing another. He was followed in the debate by Lord Clarendon, and from him we may get some idea of the genius which transformed the Austria of May and June into the Austria of July and August. He says:

"When Austria entered into engagements with England and France she made preparations for war. I have no doubt she intended and expected war. But she also expected that long before the season for military operations began the allied armies would have obtained decisive victories in the Crimea, and would be able to undertake other operations in concert with her own forces. That was not the case; and if Austria had declared war, she would have had to wage that war single-handed."]

The explanation of Lord John Russell is thus in direct opposition to the statement of Lord Clarendon. Lord John stated that the Crimean expedition sailed because Austria refused to cross the Pruth—that is, to take part against Russia. Lord Clarendon tells us that Austria could not take part against Russia because of the expedition to the Crimea.

Next, we may consult with profit an uncontradicted statement of Lord Ellenborough:

"Before the expedition to the Crimea, Austria proposed to communicate with the allied Powers on the subject of future military operations. The Allies sent that expedition. Austria at once said that she could not meet the Russians single-handed, and that the expedition to the Crimea rendered it necessary for her to adopt a different course of action. At the commencement of the Conferences at Vienna, when it was of the greatest possible importance that Austria should act with us, 50,000 Turkish troops were withdrawn from the

immediate vicinity of Austria, thus depriving Austria of the only assistance on which she could rely in the event of a military expedition against Russia. Our expedition to the Crimea has paralyzed the policy of Austria."]

The advice of Lord Ellenborough against the Crimean expedition was not heeded. Palmerston sent off the Sebastopol expedition at the very moment when its sailing was best calculated to prevent and avert Austrian hostilities against Russia. It almost looks as if he had meant to render aid to the great enemy of England, and as if he had purposely entrapped Austria into her present ambiguous position in the Principalities, delivered her over to Russian diplomacy, and crowded her still nearer to the brink of that abyss into which she must ultimately sink. In this matter, as in so many others during his long and inglorious career, Palmerston has brilliantly succeeded, whatever may have been his real purpose, in serving the interest of Russia alone.

CIV

Napier and Graham

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, September 24, 1855

WITH the single exception of the posthumous papers of Sir A. Burnes, published by his father in order to clear his memory from the false imputation cast upon him by Lord Palmerston of having initiated the infamous and unfortunate Afghan war, and proving to evidence that the so-called despatches of Sir A. Burnes, as laid before Parliament by Lord Palmerston, were not only mutilated to the entire perversion of their original sense, but actually falsified and interpolated with passages forged for the express purpose of misleading public opinion—with this single exception, there has, perhaps, never appeared a series of documents more damaging to the reputation of the British Government and of the caste which enjoys a hereditary tenure of office in that country, than the correspondence between Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Napier, just published by the old Admiral with a view to vindicate his own character.

In this controversy Sir James Graham possesses one great advantage over his adversary—no revelation whatever is likely to lower his character in the world's judgment. The man who loudly boasted of having been an accomplice in the murder of the Bandieras; who stands convicted of having regularly opened and tampered with private letters at the London Post-Office for the mere benefit of the Holy Alliance; who spaniel-like licked the hands of the

Emperor Nicholas when he landed on the English shores ; who even exaggerated the atrocious cruelty of the new English Poor Laws by his peculiar method of administering them ; and who, but a few months ago, vainly attempted in a full House to throw upon Mr. Layard the odium of the injuries he had himself inflicted upon poor Captain Christie—such a man may be fairly considered character-proof. There is something mysterious in his public career. Possessed neither of the uncommon talents which allow Lord Palmerston to belong to no party, nor of the hereditary party influence which enables Lord John Russell to dispense with uncommon talents, he has nevertheless succeeded in acting a prominent part among British statesmen. The clue to this riddle is to be found, not in the annals of the history of the world, but in the annals of *Punch*. In that instructive periodical there occurs, year after year, a picture drawn from the life, and adorned with the laconic inscription: "Sir Robert Peel's Dirty Boy." Sir Robert Peel was an honest man, though no great man ; but above all, he was a British statesman, a party leader, forced by the very exigencies of his position to do much dirty work, which he was rather averse from doing. Thus, Sir James proved a true godsend to him, and thus Sir James happened to become an inevitable man, and a great man too.

Sir Charles Napier belongs to a family alike distinguished by their gifts and their eccentricities. The Napiers, amid the present tame race of men, impress one with the notion of some primitive tribe, enabled by their natural genius to acquire the arts of civilization, but not to bow before its conventionalities, to respect its etiquette, or to submit to its discipline. If the Napiers have always done good service to the English people, they have always quarrelled with and revolted against their Government. If they possess the value of Homeric heroes, they are also somewhat given to their swaggering mood. There was the late General Sir Charles Napier—undoubtedly the most ingenious soldier England has possessed since the times of

Marlborough, but not more noted for his conquest of Scinde than for his quarrels with the East India Company, which were prolonged beyond the grave on the part of his family. There is General Sir W. Napier, the first writer in the military literature of England, but not less famous for his eternal feuds with the British War Office—whose regard for the narrow prejudices of his countrymen is so small that, at first, his celebrated history of the Peninsular War was unanimously denounced by the British reviews as “the best French account ever given of that war.” There is also the antagonist of Sir James Graham, old Admiral Napier, who made his renown by unmaking the orders of his superiors. As for this last burly scion of the Napiers, Sir James fancied he had wrapped him in boa-constrictor folds, but they finally prove to be mere conventional cobwebs.

Sir James Graham, as First Lord of the Admiralty, deprived Sir Charles Napier, on his return to England, of his command; in the House of Commons he pointed to him as the responsible author of the Baltic failure, in proof of which he quoted some passages from his private letters; he accused him of having shrunk from the execution of the bold orders he had received from the Admiralty Board; he expressed a hope that no other Lord of the Admiralty would at any future time be inconsiderate enough to hoist Sir Charles Napier’s flag; and he ridiculed him in the papers at his disposal as “Fighting Charley,” who, like the mythological King of France, “marched up the hill with twenty thousand men, and then marched down again.” Sir Charles, to use his own words, “demanded inquiry on his conduct, which was refused; he appealed to the Cabinet, but received no reply, and finally to the House of Commons. The papers were refused, under the plea that it would be injurious to her Majesty’s service.” After the bombardment of Sveaborg that plea was of course at an end.

Sir James thought his game the more sure, as he had taken the precaution of marking all his letters “private” which were likely to expose himself and to vindicate his intended victim. As to the meaning of that sacramental

word "private," Sir James himself, when giving his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee, stated that a British First Lord of the Admiralty is wont to mark public instructions "private" whenever he has good reason to withhold them not only from the public, but even from Parliament.

With a man like Sir James, who thinks himself entitled to turn private letters into public ones, it is quite natural to convert public documents into private property. But this time he reckoned without his host. Sir Charles Napier, by boldly breaking through the shackles of "private instructions," is perhaps exposed to the chance of being struck off the British Navy list, and has probably disabled himself from ever again hoisting his flag; but, at the same time, he has not only barred the entrance of the Admiralty Board to Sir James, but also shown to the English people that their navy is as rotten as their army. When the Crimean campaign stripped from the British army its time-honoured reputation, the defenders of the ancient *régime* pleaded not guilty on the plausible ground that England had never pretended to be a first-rate military power. However, they will not dare to assert that Great Britain has laid no claim to be the first naval power of the world. Such is the redeeming feature of war; it puts a nation to the test. As exposure to the atmosphere reduces all mummies to instant dissolution, so war passes supreme judgment upon social organizations that have outlived their vitality.

This correspondence between Sir James Graham and Admiral Napier, extending from the 24th of February to the 6th of November, 1854, and denied a place in full in our columns only from its great length, may be summed up very briefly. Up to the end of August, when the Baltic season, as is generally known, has reached its close, all went very smoothly—although Sir Charles Napier, at the very outset of the expedition, had told Sir James his opinion that "the means which the Admiralty had provided for fitting out and manning the North Sea fleet were insufficient for

the occasion and unequal to an encounter with the Russians on fair terms." During all this time Sir James in his letters does nothing but smile upon his "Dear Sir Charles." On March 12 he "congratulates" him on the "order" in which the fleet had left the English shores; on April 5 he is "satisfied with his movements"; on April 10 he is "entirely satisfied with his proceedings"; on June 20 he calls him a "consummate Commander-in-Chief"; on July 4 he is "sure that whatever man can do will be done by Sir Charles"; on August 22 he congratulates him sincerely on the success of his operations before Bomarsund; and on August 25, seized with a sort of poetical rapture, he breaks forth: "I am more than satisfied with your proceedings; I am delighted with the prudence and sound judgment you have evinced." During the whole time Sir James feels only anxious lest Sir Charles, "in the eager desire to achieve a great exploit and to satisfy the wild wishes of an impatient multitude, should yield to some rash impulse, and fail in the discharge of one of the noblest of duties—which is the moral courage to do what you know to be right, at the risk of being accused of having done wrong." As early as May 1, 1854, he tells Sir Charles: "I believe both Sveaborg and Cronstadt to be all but impregnable from the sea—Sveaborg more especially—and none but a very large army could operate by land efficiently in the presence of such a force as Russia could readily concentrate for the immediate approaches to her capital." If Sir Charles tells him on June 12 that "the only successful manner of attacking Sveaborg that he could see after the most mature consideration, assisted by Admiral Chads, was by fitting out a great number of gun-boats"—Sir James answers him on July 11: "With 50,000 troops and 200 gun-boats you might still do something great and decisive before the end of September." But hardly had the winter set in, the French army and navy sailed away, and the heavy equinoctial gales began to furrow the Baltic waves—hardly had Sir Charles reported "that our ships have already been parting their cables; the *Dragon* was reduced to one anchor, and the *Impériouse* and

Basilisk lost one each the other night; and the *Magicienne* was obliged to anchor in a fog, and when she weighed in the night from off Nargen found herself obliged to anchor off Renskar Lighthouse, having drifted among the rocks; and that the *Euryalus* had been ashore on the rocks, and that it was a mercy she was not lost"—when Sir James all at once discovered that "war is not conducted without risks and dangers," and Sveaborg, therefore, must be taken without a single soldier or a single gun or mortar-boat! Indeed, we can only repeat with the old Admiral: "Had the Emperor of Russia been First Lord of the Admiralty he would have written just such letters."

At the Admiralty Board, as is clearly shown by this correspondence, anarchy reigned as supreme as at the War Office. Sir James approved of Napier's movement inside the Belt, while the Board disapproved of it. In August, Sir James writes him to prepare for an early retreat from the Baltic, while the Board sends despatches in a contrary sense. Sir James takes one view of General Niel's report, and the Board an opposite one. But the most interesting point presented by the correspondence is, perhaps, the new light it throws upon the Anglo-French Alliance. The French Admiral showed Sir Charles his orders of recall on the 13th of August. The French army sailed on the 4th of September, and the rest of the French fleet left on the 19th; while Sir James Graham informs Sir Charles that he only knew of their withdrawal on the 25th September. Sir James, therefore, erroneously supposed "the decisions to have been taken on the spot, with Napier's consent," but, as he emphatically adds, "without any reference to the English Government." On the other hand, it seems that Niel, the French General of Engineers, and Louis Bonaparte's intimate friend, gave the advice to "destroy Sveaborg in two hours, by sail-of-the-line." This would seem to show clearly that he intended goading the English fleet into a desperate attack, in which they would uselessly knock their heads on the forts and sunken rocks of the Russian defences.

The Great Event of the War

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, October 13, 1855

THE details of the successful general assault at Sebastopol, on the 8th ult., are now fully known to us, through the official reports of the allied commanders, and the correspondence of the European journals, the most important of which have already occupied a place in our paper. Of course these interesting statements have been read quite universally, and it is not necessary that we should recapitulate the facts they contain. What we desire to do is to give our readers a clear idea of the conditions under which the assault took place, and to explain why, on that occasion, the Allies met with such opposite results at different points of the attack.

According to General Niel, the French had pushed their trenches at all points quite close to the Russian works. Opposite the Little Redan of the Careening Bay (Bastion No. 1), and the Malakoff (Bastion No. 2), the head of the sap was no more than twenty-five yards distant from the Russian ditch. At the Flagstaff (Bastion No. 4) the distance was thirty; at the Central (Bastion No. 5) forty yards. On all these points, therefore, the storming columns were close to the works to be stormed. The English, on the other hand, had given up sapping as soon as they arrived at 240 yards from the Great Redan (Bastion No. 3). This was due to the spirit of routine still predominant in the English army. As soon as they had pushed their

trenches to that distance, they found that on going any further they would be enfiladed from the Flagstaff bastion, which projects a good deal beyond the other Russian works. Now, there is a general rule in the theory of sieges not to trace any portion of the trenches so that its prolongation will meet any point occupied by the enemy, as this would lay it open to enfilading fire.

This is, of course, right enough when one can do without such faulty tracing. But here, where this enfilading fire could not be avoided (the general plan of the siege and the nature of the ground precluding the idea of taking the Flagstaff bastion separately beforehand), it was evidently better to make faulty trenches than none at all. The theoretical rules in fact provide plenty of remedies for such an unavoidable evil. Traverses and the compound sorts of sap are prescribed in such a case. The French engineer officers, it seems, remonstrated with their English comrades, telling them that, although they might lose many men in pushing their trenches under such adverse circumstances, yet it was better to lose them now in completing a work which would all but secure the success of an assault, than to lose them during an assault, the result of which might be very doubtful from the want of covered approaches. But the British engineers knew better. The result shows them to have been grossly in the wrong.

The French General distributed his forces as follows:—Against the key of the whole position, the Malakoff, MacMahon's division; to its right, against the curtain connecting it with Bastion No. 1, the division of La Motte-rouge; on the extreme right, against Bastion No. 1 itself, Dulac's division. The Malakoff being the only point which, in case of serious resistance, it was necessary to force at all risks, MacMahon had for his reserve a division of Guards under Mellinet. So much for the French attack on the Karabelnaya side. On the town side, the Flagstaff bastion forming a sort of advanced citadel on very strong ground, and having interior works of considerable strength, was not to be immediately attacked in front; but the central

bastion was to be assaulted by Le Vaillant's division, which, in case of success, was to be followed up by d'Antemarre's division, ordered to turn the gorge of the Flagstaff bastion, to assail which in front, at that moment, Cialdini's Piedmontese brigade was concentrated in the trenches. The position between the Malakoff and the Flagstaff bastion was held by the English. They were to attack the Redan.

The Malakoff was to be assailed first, and, after its capture, the remaining columns were to advance on their respective objects of attack. The Malakoff was a large redoubt on the top of the commanding hill of that name, closed on all sides, but having wide apertures to the rear for admitting reinforcements. It was connected by a curtain with the Great and Little Redans to its right and left; they, too, were closed redoubts, containing smaller works, intended for redoubts; while the rear faces, the embrasures of which looked into the interior of the redoubts, formed a *coupure*. The gorges of these *coupures* were again connected with the Malakoff by a second or interior curtain, forming a second line of defence. The interior of the Great and Little Redans was pretty free from obstructions, and therefore completely commanded by the artillery of the *coupures* and redoubts. But the Malakoff redoubt, on which the fire of the enemy had been concentrated ever since the Mamelon was taken, was crammed alongside the ramparts with hollow traverses, affording bomb-proof shelter to the gunners and troops on duty, while the interior was filled with large blockhouses, roofed bomb-proof, serving as barracks, and completely unfit for defence. When first the news of the taking of the Malakoff arrived, we stated that undoubtedly the Russians had committed the same error as in the construction of the Kamtchatka redoubt on the Mamelon; viz., that in order to save themselves from the enemy's fire, they evidently had made the interior of the fort unfit for defence against an assault, by cutting it up into small compartments. Our opinion is now fully borne out. The labyrinth of the

Malakoff, like that of the Mamelon, proved quite indefensible; in ten minutes it was taken, never to be recaptured.

The arrangement of the French for this assault on the Malakoff were admirable. Everything was foreseen and provided for. A new sort of bridges, the description of which is not forthcoming, were used to cross the ditch; they were laid down in less than a minute. No sooner had the assault commenced than the sappers constructed a flying sap from the trenches to the ditch, cut large passages through the Russian breastworks, filled up the ditch opposite, and formed a practicable road into the interior of the Malakoff redoubt by which supports, reserves, and even field guns could move up. As soon as the whole of the redoubt was taken, the passages in the gorge were rapidly closed, embrasures cut, field-guns brought up, and in a couple of hours, before the Russians could seriously attempt to reconquer the work, it was completely turned against them, and they came too late. Gunners were ready to spike the guns if necessary, and the detachments of infantry carried short-handled trenching-tools in their waist belts.

This attack was under the immediate superintendence of Marshal Pelissier and General Niel. Whether the other attacks were equally well organized we are not told; but they were generally unsuccessful, and that of the Central Bastion especially. This assault seems to have been undertaken by General de Salles with quite insufficient forces, for as soon as the French arrived at the Russian parapet they were compelled to seek shelter behind it; the assault degenerated into a skirmishing fire and was necessarily repulsed. What this means General Simpson has taken good care to show us in his assault on the Redan. The attack on the Little Redan was most bloody, and the position well defended by the Russians, who here alone defeated five French brigades.

We have on former occasions noticed the absurd system prevalent in the British army, of forming their storming columns so weak that they but count as forlorn hopes

in case they meet with anything like serious resistance. That blunder was conspicuous in Lord Raglan's plan of attack on the 18th of June ; and it seems General Simpson was determined even to outdo his late chief. The salient angle of the Redan had suffered from the English fire, and it was determined to direct the assault against this position as soon as the Malakoff should be fully secured by the French. Accordingly General Simpson had storming parties told off from the second and light divisions, amounting all in all to about 1,800 men—or the half of two brigades ! The other two brigades of these divisions were to act as supports, and the third and fourth divisions were to form the reserves ; and, besides these, the Guards and Highland divisions were on the spot—altogether a force of 25,000 men ; and out of these the actual assault was confided to about 1,800, supported later on by about 2,000 more ! Now, these 1,800 men, unlike the French, who could jump out of their trenches into the Russian ditch, had to perform a journey of 250 yards across open ground, exposed to the flanking fire from the curtains of the Redan. They fell in heaps, but they advanced, passed the ditch by escalade, penetrated into the salient angle, and here they found themselves at once exposed to a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from the coupure and redoubts in the rear of the Redan. The consequence was that they dispersed, seeking shelter behind the traverses, and commenced firing on the Russians exactly as the French did at the Central Bastion. This would not have done any harm, had the support and reserves only advanced and followed up, in close attack, the advantages already gained. But hardly a man came, and those who came, came in dribblets and irregularly. Three times Brigadier Wyndham, who commanded, sent officers to ask for the advance of troops in regular formation, but none were brought. All the three officers were wounded in crossing the plain. At last he went himself, and prevailed upon General Codrington to send another regiment, when all at once the British troops gave way and abandoned the Redan. The Russian

supports had come up and swept the place clean out. Then Father Simpson, who still had 20,000 men intact, resolved to attempt another assault next morning!

This feeble attack of the English on the Redan stamps their Crimean generals with the indelible mark of incapacity. They appear to have an innate tendency to surpass each other in blundering. Balaklava and Inkerman were great feats in that respect; but the 18th of June and the 8th of September outstrip them by far. So carelessly was the assault arranged, that while the English held the salient of the Redan, not even the guns found in it were spiked, and therefore these very guns plied the English on their retreat as lustily with grape and case-shot as they had done during their advance. As to attempts at forcing a proper lodgment, neither Simpson nor the newspaper correspondents mention any such thing. In fact, the first precautions appear to have been neglected.

The attacks on the Redan, Central Bastion and Little Redan were, it is true, mere demonstrations to a certain degree. But the attack on the Redan still had an importance of its own. That was a position by which the conquest of the Malakoff became immediately decisive, because if the Malakoff commands the Redan by its height, the Redan commands the access to the Malakoff, and when once taken, would have taken in flank all Russian columns marching to recapture that hill. The conquest of the Malakoff induced the Russians to quit the whole of the south side; the conquest of the Redan would have obliged them to evacuate at least the Karabelnaya in haste, and before they could organize that well-arranged system of destruction by fire and explosion under shelter of which they made good their retreat. The English, then, have actually failed to do what their allies had a right to expect from them, and on a very important point, too. And not only have the generals failed, but the soldiers, too, were not what they had formerly been. Mostly young lads recently arrived in the Crimea, they were too eager to look out for shelter, and to fire instead of attacking with the

bayonet. They lacked discipline and order; the different regiments got mixed, the officers lost all control, and thus the machine was out of train in a few minutes. Yet it must be acknowledged that, for all that, they held out in the Redan for nearly two hours in dogged, passive resistance while no support was coming up; but then we are not accustomed to see the British infantry sink down to the level of the Russians, and seek their only glory in passive bravery.

The palm of the day belongs to Generals Bosquet and MacMahon. Bosquet commanded the whole of the French assault on the right, and MacMahon had the division which took and held the Malakoff. This was one of those rare days on which the French really outdid the English in the point of bravery. In every other point they had shown their superiority over them long before. Are we, then, to conclude that the English army has degenerated, and that its infantry cannot boast any longer of being, in close order, the first infantry of the world? It would be premature to say so; but certainly, of all men in the world, the British generals in the Crimea are the best fitted to ruin the physical and moral character of the army; and, on the other hand, the raw material for soldiers which has now been for some time introduced into the ranks is far inferior to what it used to be. The British people had better look to this; two defeats in three months form a novel feature in British military history.

Of the Russians we can only say that they fought with their accustomed passive bravery, and in the assault made to retake the Malakoff even displayed great active courage. What their tactical arrangements were, we have no means of judging until their report is published. One thing is certain, namely, that the Malakoff was completely taken by surprise. The garrison were enjoying their dinner, and not any portion of them, except the artillery at the guns, appears to have been under arms and ready to meet an attack.

If we now look at what has been done since the taking

of the south side, we find from Gortschakoff's reports that 20,000 allied troops (of what nation is not said) have gone to Eupatoria, and that at the same time strong reconnoitring parties are pushed against the Russian left in the valley of Baidar, where the Russian advanced troops were compelled to retire towards Urkusta, in the direction of the valley of the Upper Chulin, another tributary to the Chernaya. The corps of 30,000 men, now at Eupatoria, are rather weak, and could not venture any great distance from the place. But others may follow. At all events, field operations have commenced, and another fortnight must decide whether the Russians can hold their ground, or whether they must leave the whole of the Crimea a prey to the Allies.

CVI

Alarums and Excursions

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, November 5, 1855

THE news from the war is abundant. In addition to the report of Gortschakoff, on which we comment elsewhere, we have by the steamer of Saturday the official accounts of the cavalry action at Kurgal, near Eupatoria, before reported; the intelligence of an unsuccessful assault of the Russians on Kars, of the destruction by the Allies of Taman and Phanagoria, and of the landing of a body of allied troops in the peninsula of Kinburn.

The cavalry action near Eupatoria was fought by twelve French squadrons (fourth hussars, sixth and seventh dragoons). According to General d'Allonville's report, which is plain and intelligible, the French and Turks made an extensive reconnoissance toward the interior on three different roads—one to the south and two to the north of Lake Sasik. The two latter columns met at a village called Dolshak, where they discovered the approach of the Russian cavalry. Here the reports begin to disagree. General d'Allonville maintains that eighteen squadrons of Russians—while the French were dismounted, baiting their horses—tried to turn them by the south and cut off their retreat to Eupatoria; that he then ordered his men to mount, fell upon the flank of the Russians, routed and pursued them for two leagues. Gortschakoff says that the Russians were only one regiment (eighteenth lancers) or eight squadrons; that they were surprised by the French after having dis-

mounted in order to unlimber a battery of artillery, and that under these circumstances they had to run for their lives. He makes General Korff responsible for this mistake. Now what business a whole regiment of lancers had to dismount and assist in unlimbering a battery of eight guns, and how it was that the gunners, whose business it was to do this work, were not at hand, we are left to guess for ourselves. The whole report of Gortschakoff is so confused, so unmilitary, so impregnated with the desire to palliate this first cavalry disaster, that it is impossible to treat it as a serious statement of facts. At the same time we see General Korff made responsible for this defeat, as Sylar was made responsible for Silistria, Soimonoff for Inkerman, Read for the Chernaya. Gortschakoff, though defeated in every action, is still invincible. It is not he who is beaten, far from it; it is some unlucky subaltern who upsets the General's wise plans by some clumsy mistake, and who generally gets killed in action in punishment for this crime. In this instance, however, the blunderer is unfortunate enough to preserve his life. Perhaps he may, later on, have something to say to Gortschakoff's despatch. In the meantime he has the satisfaction that his opponent represents him in a far better light than his infallible commander-in-chief does. Since then, the British light cavalry division has been sent to Eupatoria to reinforce the French.

Two other expeditions have been undertaken on the extreme flanks of the Crimean theatre of war. One of these was from Kertch and Yenikale to the opposite side of the straits. The small fortresses of Taman and Phanagoria have been destroyed, about one hundred guns captured, and thus the entrance to the Sea of Azof has been completely secured by the Allies. This operation was merely one of precaution; its immediate results are of no great consequence.

The second expedition is of greater importance. The allied fleets, with about ten thousand troops, first made a demonstration off Odessa, where, however, not a shot was fired, and then sailed to Kinburn. This place is situated

near the extremity of a tongue of land which on the south encloses the estuary of the Dnieper and Bug. At this point, the estuary is about three miles wide; a bar with fifteen feet of water (according to the best charts) closes its entrance. On the north side of this entrance is situated Otchakoff, on the south side, Kinburn. Both these places first came into notoriety during the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1787, when the Bug formed the frontier of the two Empires, and consequently Otchakov belonged to the Turks and Kinburn to the Russians. At that time, Suvaroff commanded the left wing of the Russian army (under Potemkin), and was stationed at Kinburn. The Turks, the masters of the Black Sea, crossed over from Otchakov. They first made a diversion by landing behind the town of Kinburn, to the south-east; but when they saw that Suvaroff was not to be led astray by this false manœuvre, they landed with their main body at the north-western extremity of the spit, exactly opposite Otchakov. Here they entrenched themselves, and attacked the fortress; but Suvaroff sallied forth with a far inferior number of men, engaged them, and with the help of reinforcements coming up, drove them into the sea. Their loss was enormous. Suvaroff himself, however, was wounded during this action, which was followed up in the following year, 1788, by the storming of Otchakov.

This time the Allies landed, not below, but about four miles above the town of Kinburn, so as to intercept its communications by land with Kherson and the interior of Russia. Their gunboats will very likely soon intercept the communications by water also. The spit of Kinburn, for six miles above the town, is extremely narrow, like that of Arabat, and so low and sandy that on digging a few feet below the surface, water is found. Thus, strong fortifications with deep ditches cannot be constructed there in a hurry; and the works thrown up by the Turks in 1787 were either stockades or sand-bag batteries. The fortifications of Kinburn themselves cannot, for the same reason, be very formidable, no good foundation for masonry scarps

being possible, though since that time broad wet ditches have no doubt been constructed. Nevertheless, we think that Kinburn cannot long hold out against the Allies if energetically attacked, and once in their hands, it opens to them a perspective of important operations in the direction of Kherson and Nikolaiev—that is, the direction of the base of operations of the Russian army in the Crimea.' This descent, then, may prove very important if properly followed up. But up to the departure of the steamer no news of anything decisive had arrived, and thus we are led to conclude that this expedition is also to be conducted on the habitual, easy, jog-trot style of the Allies.

The defeat of the Russians before Kars will very probably prove to be the crowning event of the campaign in Armenia. The Turks, badly organized and short of every requisite for war, had played but a poor part in this portion of the seat of war. Unable to hold the field, they confined themselves to the occupation of Kars, Erzerum, and the country immediately under the command of these fortresses. General Williams, who had entered the Turkish service, commanded at Kars, and superintended the construction of proper defensive works. For the greater part of the summer, the whole campaign on either side was confined to skirmishes, forays and foraging expeditions in the hill country, the general and first result of which was that the Russians, gradually gaining ground, succeeded in blockading Kars and even cutting off its communications with Erzerum. Kars is situated in a lateral valley of the Upper Araxes; Erzerum at the sources of the Euphrates; Batum on the mouth of the Choruk, the upper course of which passes near, both to Kars and to Erzerum, so that one of the roads between these two places follows the basin of the Choruk as far as Olti, whence it strikes off across the hills towards Kars. Olti was, therefore, the central point for the Turks, as a road from Batum there joins the one mentioned above, and Batum was the place from which the nearest and strongest reinforcements were to be expected. Had the Russians succeeded in taking Kars, their first step would have been

to establish themselves at Olti, thereby cutting off Erzerum from its nearest and best communication with the Black Sea and Constantinople. The Turks, however, were so dispirited that they retired as far as Erzerum, merely occupying the mountain pass between the Upper Euphrates and the sources of the Araxes, while Olti was all but completely neglected.

At last, when Kars was more closely hemmed in, they attempted to form a convoy of provisions at Olti, and with a strong escort to force an entrance into Kars. Part of the cavalry from Kars having been sent away, as it was useless there, actually fought its way through the Russians as far as Olti, and the convoy started shortly afterward; but this time the Russians were better on the alert—the Turks were completely defeated, and the convoy was captured by the Russians. Kars, in the meantime, began to run short of provisions; Omer Pasha was, indeed, sent to take the command in Asia and to organize at Batum an army fit to act in the field; but this creation of a new army takes a deal of time, and a march direct to the relief of Kars by Olti would not have been the best course he could take, as Kars might any day be compelled to surrender from want of provisions before relief could arrive.

In this difficult position the Turks stood at the end of September; Kars was considered as good as lost, and the Russians were sure, by merely blockading the town, to starve it out. But the Russians themselves appear not to have been willing to wait until the last flour was baked and the last horse cooked in Kars. Whether from the fear of approaching winter, the state of the roads, shortness of provisions, superior orders, or the fear of Omer Pasha's relieving corps, they at once made up their minds to act vigorously. Siege-guns arrived from Alexandropol, a fortress on the frontier but a few leagues from Kars, and after a few days of open trenches and cannonading, Kars was assaulted by the concentrated main body of the Russian army under Muravieff. The combat was desperate, and lasted eight hours. The Bashi-Bazouks and foot irregulars,

who had so often run before the Russians in the field, here fought on more congenial ground. Though the attacking forces must have been from four to six times as numerous as the garrison, yet all attempts to get into the place were in vain. The Turks had here at last recovered their courage and intelligence. Though the Russians, more than once, succeeded in entering the Turkish batteries (very likely lunettes open at the gorge, so as to be commanded by the fire of the second line of defence), they could nowhere establish themselves. Their loss is said to have been immense; four thousand killed are stated to have been buried by the Turks; but before crediting this, we must have more detailed and precise information.

As to Omer Pasha's operations, he had a double choice. Either to march up the Choruk, by Olti, to the relief of Kars, where he would run the risk of arriving too late for this object, while he would have led his army to the Armenian plateau, where the Russians are secure from effective front attack by a strong line of fortresses, and where Omer Pasha could have no opportunity to fall on their flanks; or he would have to march up the Rion to Kutais, and thence across the hills into the valley of the Kur toward Tiflis. There he would meet with no fortified posts of any consequence, and menace at once the centre of Russian power in the South Caucasian country. A more effective means for recalling Muravieff from Armenia could not be found, and our readers may recollect that we have over and over again referred to this line of operations as the only one fit to deal a great blow at the strength of the Russians in Asia. The proper basis of operations for this march would be Redut Kaleh; but as there is no safe harbour, Omer Pasha has chosen Sukum Kaleh, where there is a good harbour and a better road along the coast. Whether the season is not too far advanced for any serious operations there, we shall soon learn.

CVII

The Russians as Fighters

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, November 10, 1855

"OF what use are allies to thee, O Russian? Stride forth, and thine is the whole world!" Times appear to be changed since Derzhavin, the poet laureate of Catherine II., could venture this proud appeal to his people. At that period, indeed, the Russians had made giant strides. The whole of South, or New Russia, from the Don to the Dniester, and the whole of West Russia, from the Dniester to the Niemen, were added to the Empire. Odessa, Kher-son, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, and Sebastopol were founded; and indeed so long as the "great nation" of the East had no more dangerous opponents to fight than Turkish janis-saries and Polish volunteers, every march appeared to imply a conquest, and every declaration of war to be a sure guarantee of a speedy and glorious treaty of peace. It is true the Russian legions, on venturing beyond their favourite and favourable ground, received a terrible lesson at Zorndorf, and were saved from even a severer one at Kunersdorf, by the intervention of the Austrian Laudon only. It is true that in 1798-99 even Suvaroff found his match in Massena, and had to pay dearly for his Italian victories with the defeat of Zürich and the disastrous retreat across the Saint Gothard. But for all that, the time of Catherine and Suvaroff was the great and glorious epoch of the Russian arms, and never since then has a similar splendour surrounded them. At Austerlitz, at Friedland,

the inferiority of the Russian army, as compared with the French, was signally manifested; and if at Eylau they were saved from similar disgrace, it was because Lestocq, with the remnants of the Prussian army, rendered them the same service Laudon had done at Kunersdorf. At Borodino an inferior number of Frenchmen defeated them; and had not Napoleon kept his guards in reserve, the defeat would have been decisive. The battles fought by the Russians during the French retreat from Moscow were far more glorious to the latter than to the former. And in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, it was the Germans who had not only to supply the numerical force, and to bear the brunt of every battle, but to find the generals who could plan them.

Of the campaigns against Napoleon, however, it might be said that there was no disgrace in being beaten by a man who was in himself a host; but when the campaign of 1828-29 against the Turks, and of 1831 against the Poles, showed again what superiority of numbers and what great efforts and waste of time it cost the Russians to overcome opponents far less formidable than Napoleon and his well-seasoned troops, the decline of Russian military glory was evident. It cannot be denied that at the very time when Russian influence in European politics was stronger than ever, the actual feats of the Russian army justified anything but such a political position. And though Russia, in consequence of the events of 1848-50, was actually raised to the position of arbiter and protector of all Europe east of the Rhine, the campaign which seemingly elevated her to such omnipotence, the Hungarian campaign, was positively disgraceful to Russian generalship, and did not add a single laurel leaf to the crown of victory of the "invincible" Russian army.

This "young, powerful, irresistible nation," this "people of the future," as the Russians modestly call themselves, in a military sense at least culminated long ago, and was even declining when the present war began. The Russian army was ranked as a respectable force from the tenacity and

solidity of its infantry, though with many shortcomings which more than made up for these advantages. It appeared imposing by its numbers, professedly ready for war at any moment, and by the implicit obedience which held this vast machine together. But, alas! what has become of this mighty army, this "stern fact" which so frightened Western Europe? Three of its eight corps, on the Danube, were checked by what Turkey could find to oppose to them; and when the Crimean campaign began, division after division, corps after corps, was drawn into the insatiable whirlpool, never to disentangle themselves again. Indeed, the army was drained to its very reserves and *élite* troops. The innate bravery, as well as the innate clumsiness of the Russian soldiers, was aided by the engineering skill of a truly gifted man, Todleben; it was favoured by the sins of omission and commission of the allied generals; it achieved a passive defence, glorious and even unparalleled of its kind, kept up full eleven months; but with all that, there was not a single actual success, not a single victory, and, indeed, invariable and inglorious defeat wherever the Russians attempted to take the initiative, no matter against what sort of enemies.

Except the truly incredible bravery displayed by the French and English soldiers, and in some instances by the Turks also, the whole of this war does not afford to the Allies much matter for bragging; from the Alma to the present day their generalship has been worse than indifferent, and in no single instance have they ever seized time by the forelock. But such days as Inkerman and the Chernaya prove irretrievably the superiority of Western armies over the Russians, while the repelled assaults on Silistria and Kars prove that under certain circumstances even the Turks are more than a match for them. This war has been distinguished by more hand-to-hand encounters than all the wars of Napoleon together. Not an action but the troops have actually closed, even in the open field. Everywhere the bayonet has decided in the last instance. Now the bayonet—*Russki shtyk*—always was the great boast

of the Russians. And precisely with the bayonet have the Russians been beaten in every instance, and by inferior numbers too. *Russki shtyk* belongs to bygone days, and the men who had to shrink back at Silistria and Kars, and even from the small bridge-head of Oltenitza, are no longer the same as those who took Akhaltzikh, Erzerum, and Warsaw, much less the same whom Suvaroff made to storm Ismail and Prague. "Stride forth, O Russian" is bitter irony when applied to the step of the soldiers retiring over the bridge from South to North Sebastopol.

That the position of the Russians in the Crimea is not very enviable is proved by the Emperor Alexander's return to the north without having gone to see the army before the enemy. Had there been any improvement in its position, any possibility of encouraging it by prospects of speedy reinforcements, of increased supplies, and of changes in the fortune of war, surely Alexander would not have lost the opportunity to visit that army which at all events has exhibited more patience and more passive resisting force than any previous army, even in Russia. As he has not done so, there is an increased probability that the rumours are true, according to which the Russians are resolved to retire by small detachments from Simpheropol towards Perekop, leaving a rear-guard only to make a bold front against the enemy as long as may be necessary. There are, indeed, other circumstances tending to confirm these rumours. The fire of the north forts against Sebastopol, though not very effective, is on the increase, as if they intended to expend all their ammunition before leaving. The troops about Inkerman are daily diminishing; and at the same time, as if to make up for this, fresh batteries are daily erected on the north shore. The camp about Mackenzies' even is reported to be peopled by diminished numbers. On the other hand, it is true, stronger columns have appeared on the Upper Belbek as soon as the French showed themselves there, and no progress of any note has been made by the Allies on that side.

It is, however, not to be forgotten that the road through

the steppe from Simpheropol by Perekop to Kherson offers no means of subsistence whatever to a marching army, and very often not even water. Thus small detachments only can pass at a time, as everything for their consumption has to be brought from a distance; consequently the more slowly Gortschakoff effects his retreat, the more regularly supplied will be his columns, and the fewer men will he lose on the long march. On the other hand, the Allied Generals will commit an unpardonable military sin if they allow this gradual retreat of the Russians without even ascertaining, by strong reconnaissances, whether it is actually taking place or not. As far as we can judge, Pelissier is noways satisfied on this point, but it is his own fault exclusively. Should he go on with his offensive movements at the present slow rate, he may have finished his preliminary operations for an attack upon the Russian position by the time the last Russian passes the lines of Perekop. But the "conqueror of Sebastopol" has now a reputation to lose, and this has made him even more cautious than the defeat of the 18th of June did. Napoleon finished his campaign of 1796 in the Maritime Alps in six days and four battles, and that was ground far more difficult than the Crimean chalk hills; but then he was not an understrapper to his own nephew. One attempt has, indeed, been made on the part of the Allies, which displays a little more energy. The corps at Eupatoria, reinforced by General de Failly's French division, consisting of nine battalions and Paget's light dragoon brigade, which counts four regiments, has now extended its feelers as far as half-way to Simpheropol, but very soon retreated again. Gortschakoff, who sends this piece of news, states the strength of the Allies at from thirty thousand to forty thousand men. We shall be nearer the mark if we take the first number. But with thirty thousand men disposable in the field, the Eupatoria corps might attempt far bolder movements, especially as its line of retreat to Eupatoria, either north or south of Lake Sasik, cannot be cut off. Thus, after all, we find the same languor at Eupatoria as on the Chernaya;

and that this languor, instead of being lashed up into action, will rather become more languid, there can be no doubt, if it be certain, as the whole British press asserts, that General Codrington is to succeed old Father Simpson in the command of the British forces. Codrington distinguished himself at the Redan on the 8th of September, where he commanded the assaulting divisions, by his magnificent imperturbability. So imperturbable was he that he could afford to look with the marble placidity of Horace's honest man—*si fractus illabatur orbis*—on the defeat of his vanguard, without so much as even suspecting that it might not be amiss to send the reserves to their support! Codrington, no doubt, is the man for the moment—the great general who has been looked for so long in vain—and if he gets the command the British are safe from defeat, as he never would allow more than his outpost troops to be beaten in a single day.

That the Russians are actually retreating from the Crimea is also indicated by another fact. When Alexander was at Nikolaiev, he inspected the 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, and 36th marine equipages recently arrived from Sebastopol. These marine equipages are battalions of sailors and marines, each of which serves at sea to man a ship-of-the-line, and one or more smaller vessels. That these troops left the Crimea when they could neither be missed nor replaced, if any lengthened resistance was intended, clearly shows what is to be expected. The mission of Generals Benkendorf and Stackelberg to headquarters in the Crimea, in order to inquire into and report on the state of the army there, is also significant; and from what we know of the doings of the allied generals, it may be expected that the Russian retreat, on the whole, will be effected unmolested and without any great loss.

The London *Times*, of course, knows better than this. If Pelissier does not act now, it is merely to induce the Russians to *stop* in the Crimea. If they were to retreat now, while the season is tolerable, what could he do to prevent them? What great injury could he inflict on them? No;

Pelissier's plan is far deeper. Pelissier not only intends to conquer the Crimea, but also to make the Russians perform a counterpart to the French retreat from Moscow. He is waiting for winter to set in, and then he will pounce upon them, expel them from their position, drive them in heedless flight across the frozen steppe, or, as the Russians say of 1812, turn against them "his Excellency General Hunger and his Excellency General Frost," and then have them stopped in their march by flanking corps falling upon them from Eupatoria, from Kertch, from Kinburn, so that what cold and hunger have left will have to surrender at discretion, and not a man escape to tell the tale of the Crimean catastrophe to his countrymen.

Such is the strategy of the London *Times*.

CVIII

The Russian Loan

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, January 4, 1856

THE issue of a new Russian loan affords a practical illustration of the system of loan-mongering in Europe, to which we have heretofore called the attention of our readers.

This loan is brought out under the auspices of the house of Stieglitz at St. Petersburg. Stieglitz is to Alexander what Rothschild is to Francis Joseph, what Fould is to Louis Napoleon. The late Czar Nicholas made Stieglitz a Russian Baron, as the late Kaiser Franz made old Rothschild an Austrian Baron, while Louis Napoleon has made a Cabinet Minister of Fould, with a free ticket to the Tuileries for the females of his family. Thus we find every tyrant backed by a Jew, as is every Pope by a Jesuit. In truth, the cravings of oppressors would be hopeless, and the practicability of war out of the question, if there were not an army of Jesuits to smother thought and a handful of Jews to ransack pockets.

The loan is for fifty millions of roubles, to be issued in five per cent. bonds, with dividends payable at Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg, at the exceedingly moderate price of 86 roubles—that is to say, in consideration of paying 86 roubles, in several instalments, the payer is entitled to five roubles dividend per year, which amounts to nearly six per cent., and to a bond of 100 roubles indorsed by the Russian Government, as security for his capital, which is redeemable at some remote period between this and doomsday. It

is worthy of notice that Russia does not appeal, as Austria has recently done, to the moneyed enthusiasm of her own subjects, stirred up by the stimulus of bayonets and prisons; but this shows only the greater confidence which she has in her credit abroad, and the greater sagacity which she possesses in raising money without embarrassing and therefore without disappointing the people at home. Baron Stieglitz does not propose to retain one single kopeck of the fifty millions for the Greek, Sicilian, American, Polish, Livonian, Tartarian, Siberian, and Crimean sympathisers with Russia, but distributes seventeen millions of the loan to Hope & Co. of Amsterdam, the same share to Mendelssohn & Co. of Berlin, and sixteen millions to Paul Mendelssohn-Bartholdy of Hamburg. And, although British and French houses do not, for obvious reasons, court a direct participation in the loan, we shall presently show that indirectly they contribute largely to furnishing their antagonists with the sinews of war.

With the exception of a small amount of five and six per cent. Russian bonds negotiated at London and Hamburg, and of the last Russian loan which was taken up by the Barings, Stieglitz of St. Petersburg, in conjunction with Hope & Co. of Amsterdam, have been the principal agencies for Russian credit with the capitalists of Western and Central Europe. The four-per-cent. Hope certificates, under the special auspices of Hope, and the four-per-cent. Stieglitz inscriptions, under the special auspices of Stieglitz, are extensively held in Holland, Switzerland, Prussia, and to some extent even in England. The Hopes of Amsterdam, who enjoy great prestige in Europe from their connection with the Dutch Government and their reputation for great integrity and immense wealth, have well deserved of the Czar for the efforts they have made to popularize his bonds in Holland. Stieglitz, who is a German Jew intimately connected with all his co-religionists in the loan-mongering trade, has done the rest. Hope commanding the respect of the most eminent merchants of the age, and Stieglitz being one of the free-masonry of Jews, which has existed in all

ages—these two powers combined to influence at once the highest merchants and the lowest jobbing circles, have been turned by Russia to most profitable account. Owing to these two influences, and to the ignorance which prevails about her interior resources, Russia, of all the European Continental Governments, stands highest in the estimation of 'Change, whatever may be thought of her in other quarters.

But the Hopes lend only the prestige of their name; the real work is done by the Jews, and can only be done by them, as they monopolize the machinery of the loan-mongering mysteries by concentrating their energies upon the barter-trade in securities, and the changing of money and negotiating of bills in a great measure arising therefrom. Take Amsterdam, for instance, a city harbouring many of the worst descendants of the Jews whom Ferdinand and Isabella drove out of Spain, and who, after lingering a while in Portugal, were driven thence also, and eventually found a safe place of retreat in Holland. In Amsterdam alone they number not less than 35,000, many of whom are engaged in this gambling and jobbing of securities. These men have their agents at Rotterdam, the Hague, Leyden, Haarlem, Nymegen, Delft, Groningen, Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels, and various other places in the Netherlands and surrounding German and French territories. Their business is to watch the moneys available for investment and keenly observe where they lie. Here and there and everywhere that a little capital courts investment, there is ever one of these little Jews ready to make a little suggestion or place a little bit of a loan. The smartest highwayman in the Abruzzi is not better posted up about the locale of the hard cash in a traveller's valise or pocket than those Jews about any loose capital in the hands of a trader.

These small Jewish agents draw their supplies from the big Jewish houses, such as that of Hollander and Lehren, Königswarter, Raphael, Stern, Sichel, Bischoffsheim of Amsterdam, Ezekiels of Rotterdam. Hollander and Lehren are

of the Portuguese sect of Jews, and practise a great ostensible devotion to the religion of their race. Lehren, like the great London Jew, Sir Moses Montefiore, has made many sacrifices for those that still linger in Jerusalem. His office, near the Amstel, in Amsterdam, is one of the most picturesque imaginable. Crowds of these Jewish agents assemble there every day, together with numerous Jewish theologians, and around its doors are congregated all sorts and manners of Armenian, Jerusalem, Barbareque, and Polish beggars, in long robes and Oriental turbans. The language spoken smells strongly of Babel, and the perfume which otherwise pervades the place is by no means of a choice kind.

The next Jewish loan-mongering concern is that of Königswarter, who came from a Jewish colony in Furth in Bavaria, opposite Nuremberg, whose 10,000 inhabitants are all Jews with some few Roman Catholic exceptions. The Königswarters have houses at Frankfort, Paris, Vienna and Amsterdam, and all these various establishments will place a certain amount of the loan. Then we have the Raphaels, who also have houses in London and Paris, who belong, like Königswarter, to the lowest class of loan-mongering Jews. The Sterns come from Frankfort, and have houses at Paris, Berlin, London, and Amsterdam. One of the London Sterns, David, was for some time established at Madrid, but so disgusted the chivalrous Spaniards that he was compelled to quit. They have married the daughters of one of the rich London Goldsmids, and do an immense business in stock. The only man of ability in the family is the Paris Stern.

The Bischoffsheims are, next to the Rothschilds and Hopes, the most influential house in Belgium and Holland. The Belgian Bischoffsheim is a man of great accomplishments and one of the most respected bank directors and railway magnates. They came from Mayence, and owing to the genius of this Belgian Bischoffsheim, have attained to their present eminence. They have houses at London, Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels, Antwerp, Frankfort, Cologne,

and Vienna, and have recently sent a clerk or agent to New York. They have intermarried with a Frankfort Jew of the name of Goldschmidt, who, however, is not distinguished either for wealth or genius, although pretending to both. One of these Goldschmidts—and the most insignificant of the firm—presides over the London concern, while one of the Bischoffsheims rules over that of Amsterdam, and the other over those of Brussels and of Paris.

As far as the seventeen million roubles assigned to Holland are concerned, although brought out under the name of Hope, they will at once go into the hands of these Jews, who will, through their various branch houses, find a market abroad, while the small Jew agents and brokers create a demand for them at home. Thus do these loans, which are a curse to the people, a ruin to the holders, and a danger to the Governments, become a blessing to the houses of the children of Judah. This Jew organization of loan-mongers is as dangerous to the people as the aristocratic organization of landowners. It principally sprang up in Europe since Rothschild was made a Baron by Austria, enriched by the money earned by the Hessians in fighting the American Revolution. The fortunes amassed by these loan-mongers are immense, but the wrongs and sufferings thus entailed on the people and the encouragement thus afforded to their oppressors still remain to be told.

We have sufficiently shown how the Amsterdam Jews, through their machinery at home and abroad, will absorb in a very little time the seventeen millions of roubles put at the disposal of Hope. The arrangements attendant on the placing of the amount in Berlin and Hamburg are of a similar nature. The Mendelssohns of Berlin are descended from the good and learned Moses Mendelssohn, and count among the more modern members of the family the distinguished musical composer. In their case, as in that of the Lessings and a few other Frankfort, Berlin, and Hamburg families, owing to some peculiar literary tradition or some peculiar influence of refinement, their houses are far superior in character to those of the general clique of loan-mongers.

Their representative in Hamburg too, Mr. Beschütz, is a man of high character, and there is little doubt that under their auspices the thirty-three millions put by Stieglitz at their disposal will soon be taken. But, as in the case of Hope of Amsterdam, the part taken by the Mendelssohns will only be nominal, and to lend the prestige of their name. Rothschilds' special agent at Berlin, Simon Bleichröder, and their occasional agents, the Veits, will very likely take a portion on speculation, and sell it with a profit to the small Jew fry of Berlin, Hanover, Magdeburg, Brunswick, and Cassel, while the Frankfort Jews will supply the small fry of Darmstadt, Mannheim, Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, Ulm, Augsburg, and Munich. This small fry again distribute the stock among still smaller fry, until eventually some honest farmer of Suabia, some substantial manufacturer of Crefeld, or some dowager Countess of Isenburg has the honour of becoming the permanent creditor of the Czar by locking the stock up as a permanent investment. The Jew jobbers of Breslau, Ratisbon, Cracow, and Posen, the Frankels of Warsaw, Benedick of Stockholm, Hambro of Copenhagen, Magnus of Berlin, with his extensive Polish constituency, Jacobson of the same city, and Ries and Heine of Hamburg, both houses of great influence in Jew financial circles, especially Heine, will each and all disseminate a goodly amount among their multitudinous customers, and bring the stock within the reach of all the northern section of Europe. In this wise any amount, however large, is soon absorbed. It must be borne in mind, that besides the local and provincial speculations, there is the immense stock-jobbing machinery between the various European gathering points of the loan-mongering confederation now all connected by telegraph communication, which, of course, vastly facilitates all such operations. Moreover, almost all the Jew loan-mongers in Europe are connected by family ties. At Cologne, for instance, we find the principal branch house of the Paris Foulds, one of whom married a Miss Oppenheim, whose brothers are the chief railway speculators of

Rhenish Prussia, and, next to Heistedt and Stein, the principal bankers of Cologne. Like the Rothschilds and the Greeks, the loan-mongering Jews derive much of their strength from these family relations, as these, in addition to their lucre affinities, give a compactness and unity to their operations which insure their success.

This Eastern war is destined at all events to throw some light upon this system of loan-mongering as well as other systems. Meantime the Czar will get his fifty millions, and let the English journals say what they please, if he wants five fifties more, the Jews will dig them up. Let us not be thought too severe upon these loan-mongering gentry. The fact that 1855 years ago Christ drove the Jewish money-changers out of the temple, and that the money-changers of our age enlisted on the side of tyranny happen again chiefly to be Jews, is perhaps no more than a historical coincidence. The loan-mongering Jews of Europe do only on a larger and more obnoxious scale what many others do on one smaller and less significant. But it is only because the Jews are so strong that it is timely and expedient to expose and stigmatize their organization.

Traditional English Policy

LEADER, *N. Y. T.*, January 12, 1856

CONCERNING the foreign policy of English Whigs, a most erroneous impression prevails; it is supposed that they have been ever the sworn foes of Russia. History clearly establishes the contrary. In the diary and correspondence of James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury—for several years, under both Whig and Tory administrations, English Minister at the Court of St. Petersburg—and in the *Memoirs and Correspondence of Charles James Fox*, edited by Lord John Russell, we find astounding revelations of Whig policy as inspired and inaugurated by Fox, who is still the political hierophant of the Whigs, being in fact as much revered by them as Mohammed is by the Osmanli. To understand, therefore, how England has been ever subservient to Russia, we will revert for a moment to facts antecedent to the accession of Fox to the Cabinet.

In the diary of the Earl of Malmesbury we perceive the anxious, impatient haste with which England pressed her diplomacy on Russia during the American War of Independence. Her Ambassador was instructed to conclude by any means an alliance, offensive and defensive. The reply of the Czarina in the first instance was evasive: the very word "offensive" was odious to Catherine; and it was necessary first to wait the course of events. Finally the English diplomat discerned that the obstacle was Russia's desire of English support for her Turkish policy; and

Harris advised his Government of the necessity of nourishing the Russian appetite, if her aid against the American Colonies was to be secured.

The following year the proposition of Sir James Harris assumes a milder form ; he does not ask for an alliance. A Russian protest to hold France and Spain in check, if backed by a naval armament, will be acceptable to England. The Empress replies that she can perceive no occasion for such a measure. The Ambassador, with servile flattery, remonstrates that "A Russian Sovereign of the seventeenth century might well have spoken so, but since that epoch Russia has become a leading Power in Europe, and the concerns of Europe are hers also. If Peter the Great could behold the Russian navy allied to that of England, he would confess himself no longer the first of Russian rulers"—and so on in the same strain.

The Empress accepted this flattery, but rejected the Ambassador's proposals. Two months later, November 5, 1779, King George wrote to his "lady sister," the Czarina, an autograph letter in old-fashioned French. He no longer insisted on a formal protest, but would be satisfied with a simple demonstration. "The apparition merely"—such were his royal words—"of a portion of the Imperial fleet will suffice to restore and confirm the peace of Europe, and the League joined against England will at once vanish." Has ever another Power of the first order so abjectly supplicated ?

But all this wheedling on the part of England failed of its object, and in 1780 the armed neutrality was proclaimed. England patiently swallowed the pill. To sweeten the dose her Government had previously proclaimed that the merchant vessels of Russia should not be stopped or hindered by English cruisers. Thus, without compulsion, England at that time surrendered the right of search. Soon afterward the English diplomat assured the Cabinet at St. Petersburg that British vessels of war should not molest the subjects of the Empress in their commercial pursuits ; and in 1781 Sir James Harris claimed as a merit for the

English Board of Admiralty that it overlooked the frequent case of Russian vessels conveying naval stores to the enemies of England, and that wherever such vessels had been by mistake arrested or hindered, liberal indemnity for the detention had been awarded by the Board. Every inducement was employed by the English Cabinet to detach Russia from the neutrality. Thus Lord Stormont writes to the Ambassador at St. Petersburg: "Is there no dear object with which to tempt the ambition of the Empress—no concession advantageous to her navy and her commerce, which may move her to help us against our rebellious colonies?" Harris replies that the cession of Minorca will be such a bait. In 1781 Minorca was proffered to Catherine—but not accepted.

In March, 1782, Fox entered the Cabinet, and immediately the Russian Minister at London was advised that England was ready to treat with Holland, with whom the previous Ministry had declared war on the strength of the Treaty of 1674—wherein it was conceded that free ships made free goods—and would at once conclude an armistice. Harris is instructed by Fox to represent these advances as an evidence of the deference which the King desires to pay to the wishes and opinions of the Empress. But Fox does not stop here. A Cabinet Council advises the King to make known to the Russian Minister residing near his Court, that his Majesty is desirous of sharing the views of the Empress, and of forming the most intimate relations with the Court of St. Petersburg, making the declaration of neutrality the basis of stipulations between the two countries.

Soon after this Fox resigned. His successor, Lord Grantham, certified that the rather favourable disposition of St. Petersburg towards London was the fruit of Fox's policy; and when Fox re-entered the Cabinet, the idea was proclaimed by him that an alliance with the Northern Powers was the policy for an enlightened Englishman, and should continue to be so for ever. In one of his letters to Harris he admonishes him to regard the Court of St. Peters-

burg as the one whose friendship is of the first importance to Great Britain, and avers that the proudest aim of his first brief Administration was to make plain to the Empress how sincerely the English Ministry desired to follow her counsels and win her confidence. The partiality of Fox to a Russian alliance was extreme. He advised the King to write to the Empress and invite her to lend her condescending attention to the affairs of England.

In 1791 Fox, being then in the Opposition, said in Parliament that "it was something new for a British House to hear the growing greatness of Russia presented as matter for anxiety. Twenty years before, England had introduced Russian vessels into the Mediterranean. He (Fox) had advised the King not to impede the annexation of the Crimea to Russia. England had confirmed Russia in her scheme to found her own aggrandizement on the ruin of Turkey. It were madness to betray jealousy of Russia's increased power in the Black Sea." In the course of the same debate, Burke, then a Whig, observed: "It is something new to consider the Turkish Empire as a part of the European equilibrium"; and these views were urged in still stronger language again and again by Burke—who is held by every party in England as the paragon of British statesmen—down to the close of his political life; and they were caught up by the great leader of the Whigs, who succeeded in command of that party.

During Lord Grey's Administration in 1831 and 1832, he took occasion in a discussion on foreign policy to state his conviction that it would be for the advantage of Turkey herself and the happiness of Europe if that Power were merged in the Russian Empire. Was Russia less barbarous then than she is pictured now? Was she less then that hideous despotism which modern Whigs in such terrible colours portray her? And yet not alone was her alliance coveted with fawning servility, but she was encouraged by English Liberal statesmen to that very design for which she is now so vehemently denounced.

The Fall of Kars—I

The People's Paper, April 5, 1856

THE fall of Kars is the turning-point in the history of the sham war against Russia. Without the fall of Kars no Five Points, no Conferences, no Treaty of Paris; in one word, no sham Peace. Then, if we can prove from the Government's own Blue Book—carefully cooked as it is, mutilated by extracts, deformed by omissions, plastered and patched up by falsifications—that Lord Palmerston's Cabinet has planned from the beginning, and systematically carried out to the end, the fall of Kars, the veil is lifted and the drama of the Oriental War with all its startling incidents emerges from the mist diplomatically wrapt around it.

Towards the end of May, 1855, General Williams reports to Lord Clarendon, that "a large force, consisting of 28,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 64 pieces of artillery, was assembled round Gumri (Alexandropol), and that the Mushir had received information of the intention of the enemy to attack Kars. We have in that entrenched camp 13,900 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 1,500 artillerymen, and 42 field pieces." Seven days later, on June 3, Williams informed Clarendon: "I have now four months' provisions in the garrison of Kars, and I trust the central Government and the Allies will soon prove to this remnant of an army that it is not absolutely forgotten by them." This despatch (see Kars papers, No. 231) was received in Downing Street

on June 25. On that day, consequently, the British Government knew that on October 3, Kars must fall if not relieved; and this knowledge became the basis of its operations.

On July 11, Lord Clarendon receives three despatches from General Williams, dated June 15, 17, and 19, stating severally that a skirmish of the advanced posts had taken place; that on the 16th of June a regular attack of the entrenched camp by the Russians had been gallantly repulsed by the Turks; and lastly, that the enemy had made a flank march upon the entrenched camp, and established himself in force (30,000) within an hour's march of the weakest point of the Turkish position. Williams concludes the last of these despatches with the following words: "Unfortunately we have no irregular cavalry. . . . The enemy has already partially interrupted our communications with Erzerum."

When the same news reached Constantinople, Lord Redcliffe was invited to a Conference at the Grand Vizier's house on the Bosphorus. It was proposed by the Turkish Ministers to relieve Kars by an expedition from Redut Kaleh by Kutais into Georgia, the force to consist of—Vivian's Contingent, 20,000; Beatson's, 3,000; Batum Garrison, 12,000; Albanians, 2,000; from Bulgaria, 5,000; Egyptian Regular Cavalry, 800; Tunis Horse, 600. Total, 43,400.

The Porte expressed its readiness to entrust the direction of this expedition to a British commander, and to accept General Vivian in that capacity. This proposition reached Lord Clarendon on July 11. On July 12, Lord Redcliffe further informed him by telegraph that "Preparations for an eventual expedition are in progress. It might save much valuable time if you would inform me at once by telegraph whether Government is prepared to sanction a powerful diversion by Redut Kaleh and Kutais into Georgia."

From June 25 to July 12, the British Government, apprized of the danger of Kars, moved not a finger to come

to the rescue; not once was the telegraph set in motion; from the very day, however, when there is some Turkish plan for the relief of Kars to be thwarted, they suddenly are all activity. On July 13 (see No. 248 of Kars papers) Clarendon addresses a despatch to Redcliffe to this effect:

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the wiser course would be to send reinforcements to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzerum. The distance from Trebizond to Erzerum is less than from Redut Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzerum the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine. If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it should fall back upon Erzerum, and the whole Turkish force should be concentrated there. If the Russians are to be defeated, it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected than by divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive, the further it took place within the Turkish frontier."

On the day following the receipt of Redcliffe's despatch, Clarendon becomes still more liberal, adding Erzerum also to the list of places to be fallen back from.

"Telegraphic.

"The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Foreign Office, July 14, 1856.

"The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars contained in your despatches of 30th June and 1st inst. [should be the 12th inst.] is disapproved. The reasons will be sent by the messenger to-day against employing the Turkish Contingent until it is fit for service. Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzerum cannot hold out at the latter place against the Russians, it might fall back upon Trebizond, where it would easily be reinforced."

If Kars is the key to Erzerum, Erzerum is the key to Constantinople, and the central point of the strategical and commercial lines of Anatolia. Kars and Erzerum, once in the hands of Russia, the British land trade, *via* Trebizond to Persia, is cut off. The British Government, aware of all these circumstances, coolly advises the Porte to surrender the keys of its house in Asia, when scarcely one of

the two was in danger, and invites the besieged army of Kars to come to the reinforcements forbidden to come to the besieged army. "If," says his lordship, "the Russians are to be defeated" (where is the necessity—he seems to ask), he thinks a defeat would be the more decisive and easy the further it took place within the Turkish frontier, *i.e.* the more strong places and territory are surrendered to the Russians, and, in fact, the nearer to Constantinople.

These despatches of Lord Clarendon are worthily backed by the following despatch from my Lord "Take care of Dowb" Panmure, the English Carnot, to Lieutenant-General Vivian:

"Lord Panmure to Lieutenant-General Vivian.

"War Department, July 4, 1856.

"SIR,—

I transmit, herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which the Earl of Clarendon has addressed by the present opportunity to her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, on the subject of the plan proposed by the Porte for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars, and I have to acquaint you that I entirely concur in all that is said in that despatch as to the objectionable character of the plan proposed by the Porte. I place such full reliance on your professional ability, that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and undigested as that contemplated by the Porte. Whilst it is your duty to give every aid in your power, not simply as commanding the Contingent, but as a British officer enjoying the confidence of her Majesty's Government, to our allies, the Turks, it is at the same time necessary that you should be cautious in not risking the honour of the British name and your own reputation, by undertaking military operations for which proper basis has not been laid down, communications opened, supplies arranged, and transportation provided. A *coup de main* by means of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack, an enemy's stronghold is one thing; but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy's country, and on his own territory, to make war upon him, is quite another. In the first case something may be hazarded, but in the other every preparation must precede action. Moreover, from all the information which has reached me, I have every reason to believe the army of Batum to be in a deplorable state. I know the Contingent to be scarcely organized; of the Bulgarian troops you have no knowledge, and I presume that the Beaton Horse are as little reduced to control and discipline as your own troops. In

short, I am assured that it would be madness to attempt to succour Brigadier-General Williams in this way. It is too late to regret the policy which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits; but it would only be opening the way to fresh failures to follow out such schemes as have been proposed for the purpose of relieving him. You must, as I have no doubt you feel, lose no time in getting your force into order for service, which will be sure to await you somewhere, as soon as you are ready for it; but organization is as necessary for an army as endurance and valour, and without the former, the latter qualities are utterly unavailing."

This despatch puts down Lord Palmerston's War Minister a regular clown, useful only for the amusement of his master. To threaten, "or even" to attack, the stronghold of Sebastopol, where Russia had accumulated the defensive labour of twenty years, appears to him a thing very sensible, because it was a heedless *coup de main* on the part of the Allies; but a "deliberate invasion," on the part of the Porte, of an enemy's country with the purpose of beating him—"Dowb" never heard of such a thing. He entirely concurs with Clarendon in the opinion that, to strengthen the rear of one's own army, instead of acting in the rear of the enemy, is the true essence of strategy—a point we may leave him to settle with Napoleon I., Jomini, and all other great strategists. He also concurs with his friend in thinking that, in warfare, an army must never march through hostile, but always through friendly, countries—"with supplies instead of famine"—the true philosophy of the trencher-knife. But through the complacent silliness of the clown we catch a glimpse of the mind that moves him! For, could it be given to poor Dowb to make the discovery that Georgia was a hostile, instead of a friendly country—Georgia, Russia's Poland in the Caucasus.

The Turkish proposal which Dowb styles wild and ill-digested was, in its general conception, bold, correct, we may say the only strategical idea given birth to in the whole war. It reduced itself to taking up an eccentric position with respect to the besieging army, to menace Tiflis, the centre of the Russian power in Asia, and to force

Muravieff to retreat from Kars by the threat of becoming cut off from his basis of operations and line of communications. Such a Mingrelian expedition bade fair, not only to relieve Kars, but to afford the opportunity of advancing offensively on all parts, and thus to gain the greatest point in all warfare, viz., to throw the enemy on the defensive. But the danger being urgent, such a plan, to result in success, required to be pushed on vigorously, with a sufficient force and abundant means of supply and transport. Having in his immediate rear Alexandropol, as his first base of operations, a fortress directly calculated for the defensive against the Turkish territory, Muravieff was enabled to keep his position, till convinced of an advance upon Tiflis really becoming dangerous. To assume that character there was required a descent on the Circassian coast of at least 55,000, the capture of Kutais, and the forcing of the pass of Gumri. Omer Pasha, who, at a later period, undertook the same expedition at the head of 36,000 men, mustered on the Rioni hardly 18,000 to 20,000.

There can exist no doubt that an army of 20,000 men at Erzerum would have been more useful than one of only 40,000 in Mingrelia. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that at the time when the Porte made its proposal, the Russians at Tiflis, according to the Blue Book itself, amounted to only 15,000 men, and Beboutoff, with his reinforcements, had not yet arrived. Besides, the movement of an army sufficiently large for its purposes from Trebizond to Erzerum, and thence to Kars, with supplies, ammunition, and guns, would have cost, on Omer Pasha's assurance, exactly four months. Lastly, if the Porte proposed a right plan, with insufficient means, it was the part of its ally to provide the right means, and not to suggest a false plan. Sixty thousand Turks were at that time pent up in the Crimea in inactivity, and those the only effective troops of Turkey.

"At Batum, Sukum Kaleh, and other neighbouring stations on the coast," writes Lord Redcliffe, under date 28th June, "it would be

extremely difficult to muster more than 11,000 men. . . . The other parts of the Empire (Bulgaria excepted) afford no additional reserves, with the exception of Bosnia, where it is still possible that a few thousand men might be detached; I speak of regulars, Bashi-Bazouks may be procured, but your lordship knows what little dependency is to be placed on such indisciplined hordes. . . . In Bulgaria I question the existence of more than 50,000 men, including garrisons. Austria, it is true, has declared her intention of considering the passage of the Danube by Russia a *casus belli*, and she also stands pledged to the exclusion of that Power from the Danubian Principalities; but the resolution which in such an emergency would enable the Porte to take its line upon those assurances, and to overlook the awkwardness of leaving an important position inadequately defended, is more fit to be admired than likely to be embraced."

What troops, then, remained at the disposal of the Porte, save the Anglo-Turkish Contingent? And this, as results from the despatches of Clarendon and Panmure, was only a contrivance to withhold from the Porte its last available force.

But did the British Government oppose any plan of theirs to the Turkish one? Was it in any way bent on sending the Anglo-Turkish Contingent to Trebizond, and thence to Erzerum or Kars? In his despatch dated July 14, Clarendon declares himself "against employing the Turkish Contingent until it is fit for service." If unfit for service, it was as unfit for the Erzerum expedition as for the Mingrelian one. Clown Panmure, in his despatch of the same day, writes to Vivian, the Commander of the Contingent: "You must lose no time in getting your force into order for service, which will be sure to await you *somewhere*, as soon as you are ready for it"—thus summoning him to be ready, not for an immediate service, not for Erzerum, but *somewhere*—that is, *nowhere*. Still, on September 7 (see No. 302 of Papers), Clarendon considers the Anglo-Turkish Contingent so little organized as to be unfit to encamp in the entrenched lines before Sebastopol. It is thus evident that the British Government brings forth the Erzerum plan, not to execute it, but to thwart the Mingrelian expedition of the Porte. It was not opposed to

a certain plan for the relief of Kars, but to any plan. "It would be madness to attempt to succour the army of Brigadier-General Williams. . . . It is too late to regret the policy (Palmerston's policy) which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits," said Panmure to Vivian. It is too late to do anything but surrender Kars to Russia, and Erzerum into the bargain, says Clarendon to Redcliffe. Not only was this plan settled by the Palmerstonian Government as early as July 13, but it is confessed in the Blue Book, and not a moment shall we see them swerving from it.

From No. 254 to 277 of the Kars Papers every despatch of Redcliffe during June exhibits the Porte busily engaged in the preparations for Vivian's Mingrelian expedition. How came this to pass?

On the 12th July, 1855, as will be remembered, Lord Redcliffe telegraphed to the Earl of Clarendon that the preparations for the Mingrelian expedition under General Vivian were in progress, and to "save much valuable time," he applied for Government instructions to be sent by telegraph. Consequently, by telegraph Clarendon despatches his protest against the Turkish plan; but, although this message bears the inscription of July 14 on its front, it does not reach Constantinople till July 30, when we find Lord Redcliffe writing again to Clarendon:

"The unfavourable judgment passed by her Majesty's Government on the plans which have lately been under discussion, with a view to the relief of the Sultan's army at Kars, has naturally increased the Porte's embarrassment. It was my duty to make it known to the Turkish Ministers, not only as an opinion, but, with respect to General Vivian's Contingent, as a veto. A most serious dilemma is the immediate result. Her Majesty's Government not only withhold the Contingent, but express a decided preference for the alternative of sending reinforcements to Erzerum by way of Trebizond. This opinion is not adopted by the Porte, or indeed by any official or personal authority here. The Seraskier, Omer Pasha, General Guyon, and our own officers agree with the Porte and the French Embassy in preferring a diversion on the side of Redut Kaleh as offering better chances of success, supposing, of course, the necessary means of transport, supply,

and other indispensable wants can be sufficiently provided. . . . Meanwhile, the advices from Kars are not encouraging, and time of precious value is unavoidably wasted in doubt and uncertainty."

The way from Constantinople to London being not a whit longer than the way from London to Constantinople, it is a very curious fact indeed that Redcliffe's telegraphic despatch, leaving Constantinople on July 12, should reach London on the 14th of that month, while Lord Clarendon's despatch, leaving London on July 14, should reach Constantinople only on the 30th, or about that date. Redcliffe, in his despatch of July 19, complains of the silence of the Government, whom he had entreated "to lose no time in making known its pleasure." From a later despatch, dated July 23, we learn that he had received no answer even then. In fact, the receipt of the answer is not acknowledged, as we have said, before the 30th. There can exist, then, no doubt that the London date of the Clarendon despatch is *false*, and that it was not sent until weeks after the date given in the Blue Book. This falsification betrays the aim of the delay. Time of precious value was to be wasted, doubt and uncertainty were to be engendered, and above all, the Porte was to kill the whole of the month of July with preparations for Vivian's expedition, which the British Government was determined should not take place.

The Fall of Kars—II

The People's Paper, April 12, 1856

THE strategical scruples of the British Government not allowing it to settle, during the interval of three months, its views of the great operations to be undertaken by the Porte, nothing would seem more fair and urgent than that it should have sent in the meantime, on its own responsibility, a small detachment *viâ* Erzerum, to re-open the communications between that town and Kars. The Allies were masters of the Black Sea, and the British Government had at its uncontrolled disposition General Beatson's 4,000 Bashi-Bazouks, the only effective corps of Turkish irregular horse. Once landed at Trebizond they might have reached Erzerum in ten days, escorting provisions to Kars, and thus enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance to from four to six weeks, when the severe Armenian winter setting in, all offensive movements on the part of the besiegers would have been stopped. General Beatson wrote to Redcliffe on the 7th July, applying to be sent on active service.

No notice was taken of his memorial. On the 14th of August petitions were presented by the troops themselves, praying that they might not be inactive, but be despatched to Asia. They received no answer whatever. Beatson ventured upon a third remonstrance on September 12. The forbearance of the British Government being now exhausted by the harassing importunities of the indiscreet petitioner, some diplomatic-military intrigues were set on foot, crowned by Beatson's dismissal from the service. As Beatson him-

self was dismissed from the service, so all his communications with the Government are dismissed from the Blue Book.

We have seen how stubbornly the British Government was set on an expedition to Erzerum *via* Trebizond. On the news of the Russians having established themselves on the high road between Erzerum and Kars, and cut off a portion of the provisions collected for the Kars army, some spontaneous efforts at immediate relief were risked from Trebizond, behind the back of the British Embassy. In Redcliffe's despatch, dated July 16, 1855, is enclosed a report from Vice-Consul Stevens, to this effect :

"Trebizond, July 9, 1855.

"MY LORD,—

"I have the honour to report that Hafiz Pasha left for Erzerum yesterday with 300 artillerymen and 20 field-pieces. A large force of irregulars, which may reach the number of 10,000, is now assembling, and will march to-day for the same place.

"(Signed) STEVENS."

Redcliffe, as in duty bound, forthwith asks for explanations on the Seraskier's silence with regard to the collection of 10,000 irregulars at Trebizond, and the advance of Hafiz Pasha for Erzerum. "All that I had heard on the subject from his Excellency," he complains, "is that Toussoum Pasha, was directed to go to Trebizond, and thence perhaps to Sivas, where he would assemble 4,000 irregulars, and proceed with them to the theatre of war." By drawing lines between Trebizond, Sivas and Erzerum, it will be seen that they form an isosceles triangle, the basis of which, *viz.* the line from Trebizond to Erzerum, is about one-third shorter than either of the sides. To send, then, reinforcements direct from Trebizond to Erzerum, instead of sending Toussoum Pasha from Constantinople to Trebizond, from Trebizond, "perhaps," to Sivas, there to waste time in collecting an irregular force, with the view of advancing perhaps upon Erzerum, was too rash a course not to be rebuked by the British Ambassador. Not daring to tell

the Seraskier that the relief of a besieged town depends on a well-calculated dilatoriness, he puts him the question: "May it not be doubtful whether so large a body of Bashi-Bazouks, suddenly and loosely brought together, may be of any use to any party but the enemy?" The Seraskier very properly replying, "that he had insisted on having the necessary funds wherewith to pay them, which was the main instrument of control, and that he had threatened to retire from office if his demand was not complied with," Lord Redcliffe turns at once hard of hearing.

In entering upon the second plan of operations proposed by the Porte and baffled by its Allies, we tread a maze, where all is meander, and no forth-right.

From a despatch of Lieut.-Colonel Simmons', the British Commissioner in Omer Pasha's camp, dated July 15, addressed to Lord Clarendon, and from Omer's memoranda enclosed in it, the following facts may be collected. On June 23, Omer Pasha received a letter from General Williams, stating that the communication with Erzerum was cut off, and requiring in the most pressing terms that reinforcements might be sent to Kars with the least possible delay, or that a powerful diversion might be made on the side of Redut Kaleh. Under date of July 7, Omer Pasha addressed a memorandum to the allied commanders—Simpson and Pelissier—requesting them to assemble a Council of the allied Generals and Admirals commanding-in-chief, in order to come to an immediate resolution. In his memorandum he proposes that "he should throw himself, with the part of his arm which is here (at Balaklava) and at Kertch—25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry from Eupatoria, and a proportional artillery—upon some point of the coast of Circassia, and by menacing from thence the communications of the Russians, oblige them to abandon the siege of Kars." In support of this proposal, Omer argues that the Ottoman army in Asia, to the number of 10,000 men, blockaded in the entrenched camp of Kars by a superior Russian force, is in a position in which it is probable that from want of food it may be obliged to capitulate; that the garrison in Kars

is in fact the Ottoman army in Asia ; that if the garrison of Kars should yield, Erzerum, a town, from its situation, difficult to fortify, will fall into the hands of the enemy, by which means he would become master of the communications with Persia, and of a great part of Asia Minor ; that by accepting his proposal the Allies will make use of the chief advantages which they possess, viz. the facility of sea transport, and of the only Turkish army that is effective and capable of marching, viz. his own. In answer to that memorandum, Marshal Pelissier and General Simpson write that, "in absence of further information, they consider a conference would be premature." Omer Pasha, however, on July 12, addresses them again to inform them that "in the meanwhile he had received from his Government a despatch, according to which the whole of Turkey in Asia, up to the gates of Constantinople itself, is undefended, and entreating him, as every hour is of the greatest value, immediately to find the means, and put in execution the resources, necessary to avert the great danger in which the Government of Turkey, and in consequence the cause of the Allies, are placed." "Under these circumstances," he adds, "since I have in the Crimea 60,000 Turks, of whom the greater part are Asiatics, and whose families and property are exposed to the ravages of the enemy, and since I find that that army is inactive in the Crimea, without prospects of any immediate service that I can discover, I consider it my duty to my sovereign and the common cause to repeat my former proposal." Accordingly he invites them to a conference at the English head-quarters. Simultaneously with this common note to the allied generals he caused Colonel Simmons to address a confidential letter to General Simpson and Admiral Lyons, from which we give the following extract :

"The Porte have proposed to General Vivian to take the Turkish Contingent to Redut Kaleh. . . . Omer Pasha, however, thinks there will be a great risk in sending them there, as the men are not yet acquainted with their officers, the officers do not speak their language, and consequently cannot command them in the field, and

the Contingent, although it might form a garrison, cannot yet be in a condition to march into the interior. The force of the Contingent also is small to make the contemplated operation. Omer Pasha also thinks that possessing, as he does, the confidence of the Turks, and being well known in Asia, where he has had several campaigns, he is more likely to gain the sympathies and assistance of the inhabitants in provisioning and gaining information than strangers who do not know the language or country."

On July 14 the Conference took place, attended by Omer Pasha, Colonel Simmons, Generals Simpson, Pelissier, and Martimprey, and Admirals Lyons, Bruat, and Stewart. Omer Pasha went into a detailed statement of the Russian forces in Asia, and their operations in the vicinity of Kars. He amply developed the arguments above quoted, and forcibly stuck to the opinion that "no time was to be lost in preparing a movement to check the progress of the Russians in Asia." However, as Colonel Simmons reports to Clarendon, "the Generals and Admirals having received no information from their respective Ambassadors at Constantinople, which should lead them to believe that the affairs of Asia were in that precarious state in which Omer Pasha, from the information received from his Government, believed them to be," decided that "in the absence of such information they would give no opinion on the subject." In this instance, then, the allied Generals declined giving any opinion on the subject, because they had received no information from their respective Governments. Afterwards, the allied Governments declined giving their orders because their Generals had not given their opinion. Rather startled at the cool behaviour of the allied commanders, at their curious tactics of making their incredulity in facts a reason for giving no opinion on them, and at the incivility of giving the lie to his Government, the only one immediately interested in the matter, Omer Pasha rose at once, and peremptorily declared that, "under the circumstances, he felt it his duty to proceed to Constantinople for a few days to confer with his Government." Accordingly, two days later, July 16, he proceeded to Constantinople, taking

with him Colonel Simmons, but being accompanied also by one Colonel Sulau, "ostensibly travelling for the purpose of restoring his health" (see enclosure I. in No. 270 of the Kars Papers), but really charged by Pelissier and Simpson with the mission of thwarting Omer Pasha's project. This Sulau, attached to the staff of Simpson, conveyed a letter to Redcliffe from poor General Simpson—the most unlucky warrior ever heard of, as General Evans has it—in which that general tells his ambassador not that he and his colleagues did not believe in Omer Pasha's statements, but that "they entertained the strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea at this moment"—not that they had thought fit to withhold their opinion from Omer Pasha, but that he "earnestly begs his Excellency to use his powerful influence with the Porte to cause their opinion to prevail over that of his Highness," for "great public interests were at stake," and "serious consequences might result from his success." Success indeed! It was Omer Pasha's success that troubled Pelissier's sleep, who, up to that period, had nothing to boast of but the disgraceful battle of the 18th of June. Poor Simpson, the unlucky warrior, naturally obtuse as General Evans affirms his mind to be, was clever enough to catch the uneasiness of his co-commander, and to manage an intrigue in the rear of Omer Pasha, the only manœuvre he can be said to have executed during the whole Crimean campaign.

In a despatch, dated July 19, Redcliffe writes to Clarendon that "the night before last (July 17) he was surprised to hear that Omer Pasha had arrived suddenly from the Crimea, and went straight to the Seraskier." He chuckles at the rumour reported by the Fanariot Pisani, that "the Generalissimo's arrival without the orders of his Government had created some feelings of dissatisfaction," and is under "a strong impression that Omer will best consult the interests of the alliance by returning without unnecessary delay to the command of his forces in the Crimea." Notwithstanding Redcliffe's strong impression, Omer Pasha's stay at Constantinople was prolonged from the 17th of July

to the beginning of September. It will be seen, by-and-by, how this waste of time was occasioned.

On July 23, Redcliffe informs Clarendon that "Omer Pasha had proposed to the Porte to make himself an incursion towards Georgia, starting from Redut Kaleh, and turning Kutais to good account." This idea had been debated the night before (July 22) in a Council at the Grand Vizier's, and the result of the deliberations had been "that the troops to be employed in the above-mentioned manner, under the command of Omer, should be taken from Eupatoria, to the amount of 20,000, and from Bulgaria to the amount of 5,500, and that the Contingent, with its numbers completed, should occupy the vacant space at Eupatoria. By way of alternative, it is proposed, that if the above-mentioned plan be objectionable, it might be so far modified as to take only 10,000 men from the Crimea, and 15,000 from Bulgaria, including those destined to form part of the Contingent."

Now, this despatch, which Clarendon is said to have received on August 1, on the arrival of which he immediately took occasion to address a despatch to Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador at Paris, is evidently and wilfully misconstrued in its main passage; viz., the passage in which the Porte is stated to have proposed the withdrawal from Eupatoria of 20,000 men, to be placed under the command of Omer Pasha, and their replacement at Eupatoria by the Turkish Contingent. It is this very passage to which Clarendon points in his despatch to Lord Cowley, stating "Her Majesty's Government to be favourably disposed to it," and expressing "his hope that the Government of the Emperor will concur in it." In this passage Eupatoria is interpolated for Balaklava. From the despatch of Colonel Simmons, dated 15th July, received by Clarendon on the 30th July, it will have been seen that Omer Pasha, in his memoranda to the allied Generals, and in the war Council, insisted upon taking with him that part of his army which is here (Balaklava), which he had brought from Eupatoria, and which he declared the only one fit for the Asiatic

Campaign. Did Omer Pasha alter his opinion, after arriving at Constantinople? The contrary is shown from a despatch dated August 2, in which Simmons states :

“His Highness Omer Pasha informed me that he should be happy to give over, to complete the Contingent, any of the Turkish troops under his command, except the division which is now at the camp before Sebastopol, which being composed of his best troops, he is naturally desirous to have with him, if he make the proposed movement to Asia.”

Will it be asserted that the Porte, in the Council of the night of July 22, arrived at a resolution contrary to Omer's proposal? In the very despatch of 23rd July in which Redcliffe reports the Porte's resolution, he tells Clarendon that “Omer Pasha has been most graciously received and most generously rewarded by the Sultan,” and adds, “I need not add that he is on excellent terms with his Majesty's Ministers, and particularly with the Seraskier Pasha.” Any discrepancy, therefore, between the Porte and its commander-in-chief is out of the question ; both of them appear equally startled on receiving from London the injunction of placing the troops at Eupatoria under Omer's command, and withdrawing from it the troops at Sebastopol and Kertch. What, then, was the intention of the British Government in forging the above passage? To conceal from the public that while exhibiting themselves as the patrons of Omer's project before the French Government, by a mere shuffling of words they substituted for the Porte's own proposal, one directly hostile to it. Thus a new subject of dispute was provided. Matters were embroiled still further, and the occasion was afforded to waste August and September with orders and counter-orders. The false play of the British Government is apparent even in the arrangement of the Blue Book. To confound the reader, Clarendon's despatch to Cowley figures on page 248, followed up from page 248 to 252 by an extract from Redcliffe's despatch of July 19, Simpson's letter to Redcliffe of July 16, Omer Pasha's letters and memoranda, and only in the last place by Redcliffe's de-

spatch of July 23, of which Clarendon's instruction to Cowley pretends to be the sequel.

We must now stay for a moment in the Foreign Office, Downing Street, there beholding the Earl of Clarendon busily engaged in acting the head clerk of great Palmerston. Two days after the despatch of his message to Cowley on July 16, he is forwarding to Redcliffe another despatch concluding with the following words:

"Her Majesty's Government would still recommend that whatever force is sent for the relief of the army of Kars should proceed to Trebizond. If, indeed, Omer Pasha, who, we understand, is about to proceed to Constantinople, should determine to take any part of his own army, with Tunisians and Albanians, to Redut Kaleh, her Majesty's Government would have nothing to say to that proceeding."

Redcliffe's despatch dated Constantinople, July 23, having reached London on August 1, in exactly nine days, the despatch of Clarendon dated July 16, again wants more than half a month to reach Constantinople. It had not arrived on July 30, when Redcliffe wrote that "her Majesty's Government insisting upon having the reinforcements sent *via* Trebizond placed the Porte in the most serious dilemma." Redcliffe, then, was not in possession of Clarendon's despatch, according to which her Majesty's Government have nothing to say to the Redut Kaleh expedition, if undertaken by Omer Pasha himself. It is a feature peculiar to the chronology of this strange diplomatic-military drama that all despatches sure to create delay arrive with the most admirable speed, while all those pretending to recommend speed arrive with the most inexplicable delay. But there is another point quite as startling in Clarendon's last-quoted despatch. While Lord Redcliffe writes from Constantinople, dated July 19, that he was surprised to learn Omer Pasha's sudden arrival at Constantinople, on the 16th of July, on the very day Omer Pasha left the Crimea, Clarendon informs Redcliffe, from London, that "he understands Omer to be about to proceed to Constantinople." Omer Pasha himself, we know, adopted this resolution only on July 14, after the break-

ing up of the war Council. In the interval from July 14 to 16 no vessel left Sebastopol for Constantinople, so that Omer was obliged to request Admiral Lyons to place at his disposition her Majesty's ship *Valorous*. Are we then to understand that while the despatches the Foreign Office telegraph from London, require seventeen days to arrive at Constantinople, the despatches it receives from the Crimea convey intelligence of events even before they do happen? Not quite so. There was the submarine telegraph from Sebastopol to Varna, and the telegraph from Varna to London; so that Clarendon may have had direct intelligence the very day of the war Council's sitting. But where is this telegraphic despatch dated Sebastopol? Certainly not in the Blue Book. It is simply suppressed. And why? The same electric wire which informed Clarendon of Omer Pasha's intended departure must have informed him of the resistance he met with on the part of Pelissier, that is on the part of the French Government. Thus the question would naturally arise why Clarendon quietly waited from 16th July to the 1st of August to break the matter to the French Government, and to commence negotiations with it on the point on which the whole campaign depended? To prevent this question the telegraphic despatch has disappeared. But having suppressed that despatch from the Crimea, why did he insert his own despatch from London, dated the 16th July? As no trace can be discovered of the latter ever having reached Constantinople, its omission would have caused no palpable blank in the Blue Book. A double-edged end was aimed at. On the one hand, the readiness of the English Government to relieve Kars was to be paraded in contrast to the difficulties raised by Bonaparte, and the whole odium of the delay to be shifted to his shoulders. On the other hand, Clarendon's belief in the spurious despatch of the 23rd July was to be proved by his willingness to leave to Omer Pasha any part of his army, before he was aware of the resolution of the Porte to clog him with the Eupatoria army; having once become aware of this resolution, Clarendon, it is true, did stand

upon it, Omer Pasha's and the Porte's protests notwithstanding. All the proceedings of Clarendon, his encouraging the Porte to occupy July with Vivian's expedition, his deferring the negotiations with Bonaparte to August, his substituting in the despatch to Paris a spurious proposition of the Porte, the very acceptance of which by Bonaparte was sure to become a source of further imbroglio in this comedy of errors—all these proceedings tended to the same end—to kill time.

CXII

The Fall of Kars—III

The People's Paper, April 19, 1856

ON August 2, 1855, Lord Cowley telegraphed from Paris that "Count Walewski foresees objections to the proposal" made by Clarendon in the name of the Porte. Thus the occasion is afforded to the clever Earl of displaying, in a despatch dated August 3, his patriotic zeal, and of pressing on the French Government the enormous consequences likely to arise from Kars and Erzerum falling into the hands of Russia. The following day, August 4, he receives a despatch from Paris to this effect :

"Telegraphic: Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

"Paris, August, 1855.—The French Government will not oppose the projected expedition to Asia Minor under Omer Pasha, provided that the numbers of the Turkish contingent before Sebastopol are not diminished."

Notwithstanding its conditional form, this is the unconditional acceptance of the proposal made by Clarendon on August 1 in the name of the Porte, according to which the troops stationed at Eupatoria were to be given over to Omer Pasha, and General Vivian's Contingent to replace them there. On the same day Clarendon despatched the following to Redcliffe :

"August 4th.—Omer Pasha can go to relieve Kars, provided he does not diminish his Turkish troops before Sebastopol, or disturb the garrison at Yenikale."

The French Government had only protested against the diminution of the Turkish troops before Sebastopol. The English Government add another clog by sequestering the Turkish troops at Yenikale too. On August 8, Clarendon received a letter from General Williams, dated Kars, July 14, stating that General Muravieff had made close reconnaissances on the 11th and 12th July, and that on the 13th "he appeared with his whole army on the southern heights above Kars which form the key of our defences, and by the crowning of which Kars was taken in 1828." The letter concludes with the words, "I have just heard that the Russian General expects reinforcements from Bayazid *viâ* Alexandropol, and those troops recently expelled from the garrisons of the coast of Circassia are also marching into the interior of Georgia, and may take part in the future operations of Asia Minor" (No. 276). Having become aware of the reinforcements of the Russians, the zeal of Clarendon for the diminution of the Turkish forces receives a fresh impulse. He immediately sits down to complete his *index militum prohibitorum*:

"*Telegraphic*: The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Redcliffe.

"Foreign Office, August 9th, 1855.—General Vivian's Contingent to go immediately to Eupatoria. The Turkish troops there, 10,000 or 12,000, to go with Omer Pasha to Redut Kaleh. The Turkish troops at Balaklava and Kertch not to be diminished in number. The Turkish force to go to Redut Kaleh under Omer Pasha to be completed to its proper number by troops from Bulgaria or elsewhere, not from the Crimea."

Here, then, we behold Clarendon again extending the circle of interdiction. Recollecting, from Colonel Simmons' despatch of July 15, that Omer Pasha intended taking with him "the part of his army which is here (Balaklava) and at Kertch—25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry from Eupatoria and artillery," he now forbids the Porte to touch the garrison at Kertch, and extends Bonaparte's objection to the removal of Turkish troops from Sebastopol to the whole Crimea—save Eupatoria; and even the number of troops at the latter place dwindles down to 10,000 or 12,000, instead

of the 20,000 mentioned in his despatch to the French Government, dated August 1. With a sort of clownish humour, he leaves the Porte at liberty to look out for troops "elsewhere." Having filled the bomb at London, he may now quietly await its bursting at Constantinople.

In Clarendon's despatch to Redcliffe of July 16, we were struck by this passage: "If, indeed, Omer Pasha, who, we understand, is about to proceed to Constantinople, should determine to take any part of his own army to Redut Kaleh, her Majesty's Government have nothing to say to that proceeding." Now, from a letter of Fuad Effendi to Redcliffe, dated July 31, from Redcliffe's answer of August 4, and from Redcliffe's letter of August 8 (see No. 282 and enclosures), it results that Clarendon's despatch, dated July 16, had not yet reached Constantinople on August 8. Fuad Pasha states in his letter that what has been begun of the measures (relating to the Mingrelian expedition) had been suspended, in consequence of "the official and categorical answer expected (from London) having not yet been received," and defends the Turkish plan of a Mingrelian expedition against "the substance of the English despatches," according to which "the succour *must* be sent through Erzerum by way of Trebizond." Redcliffe, in his answer, dated August 4, tells us that "when latterly called upon to declare the opinions of his Government, he performed that duty with a painful sense of the embarrassments which surrounded the Porte," increased as they would be by the opinion "he was called upon to declare," and adds: "Though her Majesty's Government have declared their decided preference for a more direct operation by Trebizond and Erzerum, their objections to a diversion on the side of Circassia would in all likelihood be modified if the force employed were of a compact or reliable character." In his despatch to Clarendon, dated August 8, he complains that the Government "still leans with all its weight on Trebizond as the only true chance of relief. . . . The military authorities are decidedly in favour of it (the Mingrelian expedition). . . . Amidst so many motives to

vigorous support of the only practicable scheme of relief, I made no reserve in communicating the adverse opinions of her Majesty's Government to the Porte."

Clarendon's answer to this latter despatch of Redcliffe's (August 20), must be considered from a double point of view—with respect to Redcliffe's assertion that, in his opinion, the English Government had resisted the Mingrelian expedition up to August 8, and with respect to the plan which Clarendon forwarded to Paris on August 1 as the Porte's own plan. As to the first point, Clarendon declares (see No. 203):

"My various messages by telegraph, and my despatch of the 4th inst., which you will have received since the date of your despatch, will have shown you that her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, were willing that Omar Pasha should proceed to Asia to effect a diversion for the relief of Kars, and her Majesty's Government, in that case, no longer insists upon the view they had entertained at first, that the relief should be given by way of Trebizond."

With the exception of the despatch of July 14, in which Clarendon protested against the Mingrelian expedition, and summoned the Turks to fall back from Erzerum and Kars, and his despatch dated August 9, which Redcliffe, of course, could not have received on August 8, Clarendon had, according to the Blue Book, sent no telegraphic despatch at all. It is, therefore, a palpable falsehood when he speaks of his "various messages by telegraph" withdrawing the veto of the British Government against the Mingrelian expedition. Why does he not refer to his despatch dated July 16? Because it figures only in the Blue Book, was written only for the Blue Book, and has never left the Foreign Office at Downing Street. Redcliffe, as if aware of the trap laid for him, writes to Clarendon, dated August 1 (No. 286):

"I have just learnt the contents of your Lordship's telegraphic message dated the 9th inst. The sanction given by her Majesty's Government to the experiment of a diversion on the side of Redut Kaleh will, I doubt not, afford the highest satisfaction as well to the

Turkish Ministry as to Omer Pasha. The disappointment occasioned by the terms of the preceding message, which appeared to favour exclusively an advance upon Kars by Trebizond, was evident."

Redcliffe knows nothing of Clarendon's "various despatches by telegraph." He knows only of the preceding message being "exclusively" in favour of a Trebizond expedition. He means the message of the 13th, backed by the telegraphic message of the 14th of July. He ignores altogether the existence of the message of the 16th of July. We insist upon this point for a simple reason. One glance at the Kars papers will satisfy everybody as to the constant efforts made by the British Government to thwart the projects of the Porte. But the falsifications, forgeries, and lies which we reveal, prove the British Government to have been conscious of foul play, and betray on its part a preconceived plan, which it dares not openly confess.

Let us consider Clarendon's despatch of August 20 from another point of view :

"Omer Pasha," he says, "as commander of the Sultan's troops, will be free to direct his movements in a manner most beneficial to the common cause; and the only limitation placed by the two Governments on his proceedings is the condition that the movement in Asia shall not lead to any diminution of the Turkish force employed before Sebastopol and Yenikale, while the Turkish Contingent, under General Vivian, may be made available for filling up the room of the Turkish troops whom Omer Pasha may take with him from Eupatoria."

According to Clarendon's despatch to Paris, dated August 1, the Porte had proposed to place the Eupatoria troops under Omer Pasha while not meddling with the Turkish army before Sebastopol. How can he call the simple acceptance of the Porte's own proposal "putting a limitation on Omer Pasha's proceedings"? But, on the other hand, could he do otherwise?—since the very despatch of Redcliffe he is answering reminds him that the Pasha reckons on "17,000 men from Balaklava," 3,000 from Kertch, etc. Thus, what figured in his despatch to Paris as the Porte's own proposal,

is now enjoined to the Porte as the advice of its Western allies.

Up to the 13th of August—just a month after Omer Pasha had proposed to the allied Commanders his Mingrelian expedition—the Porte was labouring under the painful conviction that the British Government objected to it, and all its preparations for the relief of Kars were consequently kept in deadly suspense. On the 13th, at last, it is delivered from that nightmare, and has the satisfaction to understand that its Western allies have accepted the resolution it had come to on July 22. It would now, at last, be free to turn its energies against Muravieff, instead of against Clarendon. On the 15th of August, the Ottoman Council was assembled for deliberation as to the most effectual means of succouring Kars. The result of their deliberations is quite as startling as it is unexpected.

“Omer Pasha,” Redcliffe says in his despatch to Clarendon, dated August 16 (No. 294), “objects most positively to the plan transmitted from London by telegraph, of stationing the Contingent at Eupatoria, and he is not prepared to assume the responsibility of commanding the expedition, unless the Turkish troops before Sebastopol be allowed to form part of it.”

Thus we see the Eupatoria plan, pretended to have been sent on the 23rd July to London, is now asserted to have been transmitted on August 9 from London to Constantinople.

On the 16th of August, Colonel Simmons also addressed a despatch to Clarendon (No. 297):

“I have to inform your Lordship that the Seraskier, having received a communication from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the effect that Her Majesty's Government had ordered the Turkish Contingent to Eupatoria, placed the communication into the hands of his Highness Omer Pasha, who, conceiving that this movement would not enable the Porte to provide the necessary force to make any operation in Asia to save the army of Kars, has drawn up a report for the Seraskier. . . . Omer Pasha, while insisting upon taking with him his troops from Sebastopol, will hand over part of them and the Turkish troops at Kertch to the Anglo-Turkish Contingent, such as

are required to complete its full complement. . . . The proposal of the Pasha appears to me the only one which holds out any hope of saving the army of Kars, subject to the condition which his Highness understands has been imposed by the English and French Governments, that there is to be no material reduction of force in the Crimea, and, therefore, that the first proposal made by Omer to the Generals, reported in my despatch of July 15, cannot be put in execution. The Pasha doubts if the expedition will now be in time to save the garrison of Kars, but if not it will, at any rate, prevent the enemy from establishing himself in the government of Erzerum, and there organizing measures for another advance into the interior in the next campaign."

Omer Pasha's memorandum to the Seraskier, alluded to in the above despatch of Colonel Simmons, is enclosed in Redcliffe's letter to Clarendon, dated August 16. We extract from it the following considerations made by Omer Pasha :

"The troops now at Eupatoria are composed of different materials—Tunisians and Egyptians, and are deficient of the means of land transport. . . . They are not capable of taking the field or of manœuvring. . . . If the Egyptians were to go to Asia, as it will be necessary to keep the field during the commencement of the winter, coming as they do from a hot climate, they could not perform the necessary manœuvres, and the army being composed of different materials, there would be but little chance of success. By the execution of this project the unity of the Ottoman as well as of the English army will be destroyed, and it is to be observed that much of the energy, if not the existence, of an army depends upon its unity."

The Pasha observes that every general in warfare ought to consider beforehand the most difficult circumstances in which he may be placed by the events of war, and to provide as far as possible against misfortune. He supposes the case, that the army of Kars is destroyed before his arrival in Asia, and that the Russians had advanced beyond that place, and states that in such a case, being with an army composed of different materials, in which he could not place entire confidence, he would find himself in similar difficulties to those in which the army of Asia is now placed.

Every general to whom an operation is confided ought to consent to the operation, and its mode of execution, in order

that he may be made responsible for its conduct. The Anglo-Turkish Contingent, if supplied with its full complement from the detachment about to be drafted from Bulgaria and from Kertch, will be about equal in numbers to the divisions under his command. As far as the numbers of the allied armies are concerned, there need be no diminution if his views were acceded to. "On the contrary, if the plan sent from London were acted upon, the permanent arrangements made by the Seraskier for the supply of the garrison of Eupatoria would be broken up, unavoidable delay must ensue, absolutely new establishments would have to be organized."

The destruction of the last effective Turkish army, the loss of the unity of the English as well as the Ottoman army, the wilful sacrifice of the Egyptians and Tunisians, the breaking up of the permanent arrangements made for the supply of the Turkish troops at Eupatoria, the creation of unavoidable delay, the ruin of his own military representation, the exposure of the Mingrelian army to the fate of the garrison of Kars—these are, according to Omer Pasha, the natural consequences of the plan sent from London. While communicating to Clarendon this strong protest, Lord Redcliffe evinces not the least suspicion of having himself been the channel through which the Porte is made to have transmitted the identical project to Lord Clarendon.

We have thus new and irrefutable proof that the proposal of the Porte, as figuring in the despatch dated July 23, is a London forgery, and that Clarendon, in submitting it to the acceptance of the French Government in his despatch of August 1, was fully aware of committing an atrocious fraud.

His scheme worked exactly up to his intention. The Porte, at last informed that the British Government consents to the Turkish expedition in general, learns simultaneously that it objects to all the details required for carrying it out. Having been compelled to waste one month with struggling against Clarendon's Erzerum plan, it has now

to waste the still more precious month of August with resisting his Eupatoria scheme.

In a despatch dated August 20, addressed by Redcliffe to Clarendon, he encloses another memorandum of Omer Pasha, similar in substance to the former one, but with the addition (see No. 296):

"Any general undertaking such an operation against all military rules would sacrifice his military reputation, and he would, moreover, imperil the general alliance. I intend doing neither.

"If I were even to accept this service, it would not serve the object in view."

He represents the troops at Eupatoria "as undisciplined, mixed, and inexperienced soldiers."

On August 20 (see No. 298, Simmons to Clarendon) Omer Pasha informs Simmons of the state of things at Kars as reported by an aide-de-camp of the Seraskier, who left Kars on the 5th and arrived at Constantinople on August 19:

"At the time of his departure the stores within the town of Kars did not contain more than sufficient provisions for the garrison for one month or five weeks at the outside, and they were not well provided with ammunition. This, however, does not appear of much consequence, as General Muravieff had proclaimed to his army, which, by the reinforcement it has received, is stated now to number about 50,000 men, to reduce the town of Kars by starvation, and to capture the town without firing a shot. . . . The Russians have caused the inhabitants to remove everything in the shape of provisions throughout a district within a radius of eight hours (28 miles) round Kars as a centre. . . . The forts at Erzerum consist of 6,000 regular troops and 12,000 irregulars; but many of the latter are leaving and dispersing." "From Omer Pasha's conversation," says Simmons, "it is evident that the Porte is deeply impressed with the deplorable state of affairs in Asia, and is almost in despair at the apparent certainty of losing, towards the end of this month or early in September, the garrison of Kars, 16,000 men with nearly 200 pieces of artillery, of which about 70 are field guns. . . . They are very much grieved and disappointed at the time which has been lost—and that the Cabinets of Paris and London, as well as the military authorities in the Crimea, have not considered the subject in that serious aspect in which it presents itself to the Porte, but have

objected to the propositions which have hitherto been made with a view to retrieving their position and their preventing the disaster."

On August 21, at a meeting of the Porte's council (No. 299, Simmons to Clarendon, dated August 23),

"a decision was arrived at to proceed with the utmost vigour and all the means at the disposal of the Porte to carry into execution the plan proposed by Omer Pasha. . . . A note was agreed upon, to be addressed to the Ambassadors of France and England, informing them of the decision of the Porte, and inviting them to obtain the assistance of the fleets of their respective Governments to transport the Ottoman troops, with their artillery, baggage, and means of land-transport to the coast of Asia. . . . Having done all in their power to effect a movement for the relief of the army of Kars, to recover their position in Asia, they (the Porte) considered themselves relieved from the responsibility of any disaster which might happen from the non-execution of any of the plans proposed with that view. The Turkish Government, in order to commence the movement, are now sending their ships to Sizopolis, to begin the embarkation of the troops, etc., but they evidently have entertained some doubt as to taking this decided course, in consequence of the Anglo-Turkish Contingent having received orders to proceed from London to Eupatoria."

Thus the end of August is approaching, the Porte still finds itself clogged in its movements by Clarendon's Eupatoria plan, and its anxiety waxing with the dismal news from Kars, it extorts at last from Redcliffe, who in the meantime had made a trip to Sebastopol, the following telegraphic despatch (No. 290):

"Lord Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.

"Before Sebastopol, August 26.—I request to be informed definitely and immediately here, whether Omer Pasha may take Turkish troops in whole or in part from Balaklava, provided they be replaced by others of the same numerical force, and whether General Vivian's Contingent is in that case at liberty to take position before Sebastopol, instead of going to Eupatoria. Omer Pasha is expected from day to day. He makes his expedition conditional on the power of acting as above. He has stated plausible reasons for this. If transport can be spared by us (the troops) may land, it would seem, at Redut Kaleh, in about a month. The Russians who threatened Erzerum have retired by the road to Kars; the Turkish army there is stated to have nearly six months' provisions early in August."

CXIII

The Fall of Kars—IV

The People's Paper, April 26, 1856

CLARENDON had now succeeded in thwarting, by his Eupatoria plan, all action on the part of the Porte during the whole month of August. Redcliffe's despatch confirmed the statement of General Williams, that "the provisions of Kars will hardly last to the beginning of September." By what extraordinary devotion the Turkish garrison at Kars contrived to prolong its existence beyond the term assigned by Williams will be seen from the following memorandum :—

(Enclosure in No. 315.)

"Kars, September 1, 1855.—The most is made of our provisions; the soldiers are reduced to half allowances of bread and meat or rice-butter. Sometimes 100 drachmas of biscuit instead of bread; nothing besides. No money. Mussulman population, 3,000 rifles, will soon be reduced to starvation. Armenians are ordered to quit the town to-morrow. No barley, scarcely any forage. Cavalry reduced to walking skeletons, and sent out of garrison; artillery horses soon the same. How will the field pieces be moved after that? What is being done for the relief of this army?"

(Signed) WILLIAMS.

Clarendon, having made sure that the provisions of Kars could not last beyond the first days of October, and being on the other hand assured by Redcliffe that even with the succour of the allied transports Omer Pasha's troops would not arrive at Redut Kaleh before the first days of October, thinks it no longer dangerous to press on the French

Government the acceptance of the Turkish plan. He was informed besides that at the very moment he addressed that Government the assault of Sebastopol was imminent, and Pelissier, therefore, had good reasons not to allow any change in the composition of the troops before Sebastopol. To hide this knowledge the despatch of Redcliffe is given in the mutilated shape of an extract. The following is Clarendon's despatch to Lord Cowley :

" Foreign Office, August 28, 1855.—Her Majesty's Government trusts that the Government of the Emperor will agree to the following answer to the despatch from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, dated Balaklava, August 26, in which case your Excellency will send it on immediately from Lord Panmure to General Simpson, who will inform Viscount de Redcliffe, if he is still at Balaklava: ' Omer Pasha is to be at liberty to take such of his own troops as he pleases, from Balaklava to Asia. They must be replaced in equal numbers by General Vivian's Contingent, or by troops from Eupatoria, as the allied Generals may decide; and instructions accordingly must be given in conjunction with the Admirals as to transporting them.' "

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Even in this despatch Clarendon cannot abstain from playing a trick on the Porte. Informed as he was by Omer Pasha's various memoranda that the replacement of his troops before Sebastopol by troops from Eupatoria would go a great length to spoil his whole plan, he proposes to the French Government, quite *en passant*, to replace the troops before Sebastopol by Vivian's Contingent, or by troops from Eupatoria. The answer from Paris was this :

Telegraphic : Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

" Paris, August 29, 1855.—The Emperor has no objection to the removal of the Turkish troops from Balaklava, and to their being replaced by others, provided that the allied Commanders-in-chief have no objection; but he will not take the responsibility upon himself of saying more under these circumstances. I send the telegraphic despatch to General Simpson, inserting, after the word ' Asia,' ' provided that General Pelissier and you have no objection.' "

Lord Clarendon's sincere anxiety to hasten the Mingrelian expedition at this supreme moment shines in overpowering

brightness in his despatch of September 7, sent by ordinary mail to Colonel Simmons, so that it did not arrive till September 23. On September 5 he had received the following despatch from Colonel Simmons (No. 301):

"I have to inform your Lordship that Omer Pasha has stated to me that he will not be able to leave Constantinople for five or six days, as he is occupied in making the necessary arrangements for the expedition to Asia, and his presence here is absolutely required to complete them."

According to the arrangements accepted by the Porte, Omer Pasha

"hoped to land 50,000 men and 3,400 horses in Asia, in two trips of the Turkish fleet alone, the operation occupying from three weeks to one month, or for each voyage from ten days to a fortnight . . . Omer Pasha is most desirous that assistance should be given by the Allies in conveying the troops and their material from before Sebastopol and baggage-horses from Sozopolis, and he considers the most practicable way in which this could be done would be by allowing the English fleet to convey the troops from before Sebastopol to Asia, after having conveyed the Contingent to Balaklava to replace them."

To this despatch Clarendon answers in the following strain:

The Earl of Clarendon to Lieut.-Colonel Simmons.

"Foreign Office, September 7, 1855.—SIR,—The account of the arrangements proposed by Omer Pasha for the relief of the army in Asia, which is contained in your despatch of the 26th ult., is inconsistent with subsequent statements which have reached her Majesty's Government. In your despatch you report that Omer Pasha reckons upon taking a portion of the Turkish troops from before Sebastopol, and replacing them by General Vivian's Contingent. But it appears, by a despatch of a later date from General Simpson, that Omer Pasha has given it as his opinion that General Vivian's Contingent would not be fit to take up a position before Sebastopol until next spring; and, in consequence of that opinion, and by reason of General Simpson's protest against having the Contingent sent to him, which protest was founded upon that opinion, her Majesty's Government have determined that the Contingent shall not go to join the army before Sebastopol."

CLARENDON.

Let it be remarked that the despatch of Simpson, the poor

warrior, is omitted from the Blue Book, that Omer Pasha's "opinion" is a changeling, and that the "later date" when Omer expressed his new opinion contradicting his opinion of the 26th of August, happens to be the beginning of July—as will be seen from the following extract from Colonel Simmons' despatch dated, camp of Kamara, September 23, 1855:

"On this subject I beg to inform your Lordship that this opinion was given by Omer Pasha in a letter to General Simpson early in the month of July . . . and before he was aware of the critical position of the army in Asia. He then stated that he was strongly of opinion that General Simpson could not contemplate making use of the Contingent in the open field (*en rase campagne*) in front of the enemy. . . . Lord Raglan had, on several occasions, asked whether I thought it would be possible to make use of the Contingent to hold the lines of Balaklava, and upon consulting Omer Pasha upon the subject, he told me that he saw no objection to it, if his Lordship considered it absolutely necessary."

In excavating an opinion of Omer Pasha, given before the Mingrelian expedition was mooted, in falsifying that opinion, and in founding upon this falsification a protest, Simpson's "obtuse mind" followed, of course, the secret instructions received from London. Poor Simpson was an invention of Palmerston, one of his golems. Golems, as the German poet Arnim has it, are earth clods, shaped in the human form and infused with a factitious life by the spells of capricious wizards. Supposing Simpson to have written exactly as he is represented to have done in Clarendon's despatch—a point that becomes questionable from the suppression of his despatch in the Blue Book—Clarendon could not be for a moment in doubt either as to the date or as to the substance of Omer Pasha's opinion. As early as July 15, Simmons had informed him that in Omer's opinion "the Contingent, although it might form a garrison, cannot yet be in a condition to march into the interior"; and in a later despatch that "in Balaklava and Kertch the troops of the Contingent will be within fortified lines" and, therefore, not "in the open field."

The history of Omer Pasha's Mingrelian Campaign is not

given in the Blue Book, but enough transpires to denounce the obstacles thrown in its way by the allied Governments even at the too late epoch when they had reluctantly given their consent and captured the south side of Sebastopol.

Simmons writes to Clarendon from the camp at Kamara on September 21, 1855 :

"On the 18th inst. General Pelissier consented to the departure of three battalions of Turkish chasseurs hence for Asia. They will be embarked in a day or two for Batum. Up to the present time General Pelissier has not signified his assent to the departure for Asia of any more of the Ottoman troops now stationed here."

"In answer to my inquiries at the Porte," says Redcliffe on September 26, "I am assured that the passage of troops and the conveyance of provisions are in progress, though slowly, in consequence of the limited command of transport for those purposes. It is impossible not to apprehend that the many changes of plan, the exigencies of our operations at Sebastopol, and heavy demands on the transport-service, concur to diminish the hope of relieving Kars."

Now the many changes of plan were the work of the British Ministry; the exigencies of the operations before Sebastopol a mere pretext, as the Allies, after the capture of the town, confined themselves to guarding its ruins; and lastly, the want of sufficient transport was produced by the orders issued from Downing Street for the useless transmissions of the Contingent from Varna to Yenikale, Kertch, Eupatoria, and back to the Bosphorus.

The gloom of these forebodings was dispelled for a moment by the meteor-like flash of the victory gained by the Turks over the Russian assaulting columns before Kars on September 29. In his despatch of the same date General Williams calls it "a day glorious for the Turkish arms." In his despatch of October 3 (No. 372), he tells Clarendon :

"During the combat, which lasted nearly seven hours, the Turkish infantry, as well as artillery, fought with the most determined courage; and when it is recollected that they had worked on their entrenchments, and guarded them by night, throughout a period extending to nearly four months—when it is borne in mind that they were ill-clothed and received less than half a ration of bread—that

they have remained without pay for twenty-nine months, I think your Lordship will admit that they have proved themselves worthy of the admiration of Europe, and established an undoubted claim to be placed among the most distinguished of its troops."

On the receipt of these glad tidings the Porte issued an address to the defenders of Kars (No. 345), in which the following words occur :

"We were conscious of the zeal and intrepidity which animated your Excellency, and of the infinite mercy of God, and found consolation in this reflection. On the other hand, we worked day and night in devising means to oblige the enemy to raise the siege, and the joyful tidings of this victory have infused new life into us."

And what an exuberance of life will they not infuse into Clarendon's breast! He who worked day and night in devising means to thwart the means devised by the Porte, how will he not, at least professedly, scatter the cheap flowers of his rhetorical sympathy! Nothing of the sort. Rather, disappointed in his calculations he vents his spleen upon the Porte, in the following short and provokingly ironical despatch (No. 346):

". . . The neglected garrison of Kars will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that their sufferings troubled the . . . repose of the Turkish Ministers, who, in default of all ordinary means of relief, never ceased to pray for their safety and success."

Clarendon, formerly the silent friend of Aberdeen, figures here as Palmerston's twanging mouthpiece.

From the repulse of the Russians before Kars on September 29, to the day of its capitulation on November 24, there elapsed again nearly two months. How was this time passed by the British Government? First, in withholding from Omer Pasha the necessary transports. On October 2 Mr. Oliphant, the correspondent of *The Times*, writes from Omer Pasha's camp:

"The Turkish army is gradually assuming a more imposing aspect, and the assent which the allied Generals have at length reluctantly given to the despatch of 10,000 Turks from Balaklava will swell it to about 50,000 strong. The principal delay is caused by the slackness

of our authorities in the Crimea, who do not provide transport for the conveyance of the troops here, nor seem to care in the least whether they ever get here or not. It is certainly unfortunate that the only serious cause of annoyance which Omer Pasha has felt with respect to this expedition is to be attributed to the same source which has already been so fruitful of disaster."

But this was not all. As early as June, Lord Palmerston had stated in the Parliamentary debates on the Turkish loan, that the Porte was lamentably deficient in money, and that all its operations depended upon receiving a supply of it at once. The Parliament having consented to the loan, the British Government advertised it in August, 1855, but from a paper laid before Parliament it appears that of the five millions sterling granted something short of two millions only was paid to the Porte on January 29, 1856, and that even this sum had been sent in dribblets of one hundred thousand pounds. Still, on November 24, 1855, the Porte declares (No. 353, enclosure 4) :

"In conclusion, his Excellency (the Seraskier) turned round to me, and said that I was as well aware as he of the continuous exertion made by him to help the garrison of Kars. That Omer Pasha had been delayed by causes over which he, unfortunately, could not exercise any control. It was an affair of the Alliance. It had all along been understood that such measures as it was in their power to take without the army which had been retained in the Crimea, would not suffice for the object in view. . . . His Excellency then proceeded to tell me with much force that the Turks were absolutely debarred from executing what was necessary for the prosecution of the campaign by the delay in giving them the advantage of the loan. The grain to the amount of one million kilograms bought by them for the service of the army was not forwarded, because they could not pay for it. . . . He had written to the Grand Vizier, that if money was not forthcoming from that source (the loan) in a week from this date, he would resign his office." (Letter of General Mansfield to Lord de Redcliffe.)

It is a rather curious coincidence that on the very day on which Kars surrendered, the Seraskier was forcibly stating to the British Military Commissioner the true reasons of that disaster—the delay of Omer Pasha's expedition by the Allies retaining from the Porte its own troops, and then the stoppage of all operations during October and November

by the British Government retaining from the Porte its own money.

When the capitulation was resolved upon at Kars, on November 24,

"the soldiers were dying by hundreds a day, of famine. They were mere skeletons, and were incapable of fighting or flying. The women brought their children to the General's house for food, and there they left them, and the city was strewed with dead and dying." (No. 366.)

During the whole epoch that Clarendon systematically thwarts the plans of the Porte, paralyses its forces, and retains its own money, we behold him dinning the ears of the manacled man with the counsel to move on vigorously, and abusing him for his slackness. History exhibits, perhaps, no parallel more bitterly ludicrous than that between the British Government making England the laughing-stock of Europe by its adventures in the Crimea, the Baltic, and the Pacific, and the rewards lavished on the tools of its miscarriages—and the same Government upbraiding the Porte in the severest tones of antique Catoism for the blunders of its military officers and administrators. The Government of Sadleirism, morally indignant at pasha-corruption; the patrons of a Codrington and an Elliot insisting on the punishment of a Selim Pasha and a Tahir Pasha; the *improvisatori* of a Simpson sullenly frowning on the promoters of an Omer Pasha; "Take-care-of-Dowb" Panmure doctoring the Seraskier; Downing Street with its Doctors Smiths, its Filders, its Aireys, and its Gordons, during the very sittings of the Sebastopol Committee, censuring a pasha at Trebizond for a load of sponges and rammers not having been packed in bundles and covered with matting—this is the true picture of the Oriental War. And, above all, the brave Clarendon's soul-stirring complaints of the Porte's apathy!—think of an official Thersites taking to task the Danaids for not filling the sieve.

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